Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security

The 3D Security Initiative at Eastern Mennonite University led this Roadmap project, cooperating with the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at University of Notre Dame, the Alliance for Peacebuilding, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. The US Institute of Peace, US Army War College, National Defense University, and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan helped to convene these dialogues.

Overview of Civil Society-Military Relations

Military Changes: In response to the challenges and frustrations in Afghanistan and Iraq, top US military and political leaders call for strengthened civilian capacities and more effective civil-military cooperation. US military personnel increasingly conduct humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities under a new Department of Defense Directive[1] that puts stabilization and reconstruction activities on par with war-fighting. Military leaders list "building civil society" and "local ownership" in their strategies and seek NGOs as "implementing partners."

Civil Society Concerns: Many civil society organizations conducting humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding vehemently oppose military involvement in these activities and are withdrawing from all contact with military actors. Civilians do not yet have the capacity to coordinate massive relief efforts and acknowledge there may be a temporary role for the military in extreme cases. Civil society organizations claim military-led development endangers their safety, undermines sustainable development, is not cost-effective, and frequently leads to unintended negative effects counterproductive to human security.[2] In the broader field of peacebuilding, OECD guidelines on security sector reform (SSR) and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration/reconciliation (DDR) call for civilian oversight and participation working with military actors when shared goals exist.[3]

Goal of this Document: This *Roadmap* provides an orientation to the perceptions, tensions, and opportunities between civil society organizations and military actors in conflict-affected regions. It documents a series of frank and thorough dialogues between military and international and local civil society organizations. The *Roadmap* is a work in progress, and looks for U.S. government and military leadership to work with civil society to address the *Roadmap's Agenda*.

How this *Roadmap* is Unique:

- Civilian government, civilian contractors, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the civilian public are very different kinds of "civilians." The intense challenges of coordinating government civilians with military actors and the increasing use of civilian contractors confuses and overshadows the distinct nature of how an independent civil society relates to military forces.
- While a number of civil-military guidelines exist to clarify humanitarian NGO and military interaction, guidance on military involvement in development and peacebuilding is missing. Despite high-level endorsement, there is still minimal wider understanding or monitoring of these existing guidelines. Civil society organizations are reluctant to establish guidelines for military involvement in areas they contest, such as development and peacebuilding. Yet the increasing number of military actors conducting development creates urgency for short-term pragmatic agreements.
- Large international NGOs shaped existing humanitarian NGO-military guidelines. This *Roadmap* focuses particularly on the experiences of hundreds of local peacebuilding NGOs and the US military.
- This *Roadmap* is not a set of guidelines or an advocacy document. It does not aim to achieve agreement. Rather, it takes a conflict resolution approach to reflect the perspectives of all stakeholders; seeing mutual understanding as a first step in addressing the tensions.

[1] See US Department of Defense Directive 3000.07.
[2] "The US Military's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance." Washington DC: InterAction, January 2011.
[3] OECD. Security Sector Reform and Governance, 2005.

Shared Values: People who join the military or civil society organizations share some similar values. They see themselves as making personal sacrifices to serve the public or a larger principle that puts their own self-interest and security at risk when they put themselves on the front lines. Yet neither military services nor civil society organizations receive sufficient training on how to approach and conceive of the other and personal and institutional antagonism is increasing.

Characterizing "Military"

Civil society organizations often lump all armed actors together as "belligerent forces" or may not distinguish between the local national security police and military personnel and international forces. While civil society cites bad experiences with all different kinds of military forces, this lack of distinction is offensive to US military personnel who see important differences.

Military or armed security forces are diverse. Military forces in some countries like the US have codes of conduct related to human rights and civilian protection. Other military services lack discipline or human rights codes. Rogue military actors can be repressive or corrupt. Blurring lines between military and police roles also cause concern.

Military forces conduct a wide variety of activities, from coordinating and delivering humanitarian aid in the midst of natural disasters, to protecting civilians, to waging war.

Civil-military relations differ according to the local context. In many countries, civilian governments control the military. In others, there is no democracy and the military controls the government. Context, history, and each specific mission shape civil society-military relations.

Military Challenges: U.S. military forces and support for local security forces have contributed to human rights violations in places like Colombia, Indonesia and Iraq. These incidents shape the perception and relationship of civil society to all security forces. U.S. military personnel may consider human rights scrutiny offensive but CSOs put respect for rights as mission critical.

US military services follow civilian orders. US military personnel are not always in agreement with US policy makers but are forbidden from speaking about these differences publicly. Military personnel find it frustrating when CSOs blame military actors for a mission they did not choose. CSOs applaud military personnel who follow their conscience even at the cost of their careers, such as those who opposed the war in Iraq. CSOs are actively supporting the increasing number of military personnel with PTSD resulting from carrying out orders that may go against their sense of morality.

Congress delegates the US military budget. Even though many military personnel would like to see more funds going to civilian agencies to do development and diplomacy, the influence of the military-industrial complex on the US political process leads Congress to overfund the military while leaving civilian government agencies underfunded. The State Department, USAID, and other US government civilian agencies that work in development and peacebuilding do not have the same number of constituent supporters urging Congress to fund them. The defense industry lobby significantly shapes military spending. Even military leaders point out that this dynamic is sometimes contrary to US security interests.

Military personnel contribute to a comprehensive approach to human security when they are sensitive to inter-group dynamics, use conflict management skills with local populations, provide logistical support to reconciliation efforts such as transporting tribal elders to a dialogue, and when the military responds directly to stop mass atrocity.

Characterizing "Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)"

Historically, military strategists advised on how to "pacify" civil society. Today, building civil society is a key element in reconstruction and stabilization strategies. But the concept of "civil society" is still somewhat confused and not widely known. Military actors often lump all CSOs together or misunderstand the concept of civil society. Some military actors perceive civil society organizations as naïve, lacking patriotism, illegitimate or corrupt. CSOs do not want military representatives to call them "force multipliers" noting this makes them soft targets for armed groups.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are groups of citizens not in government that organize themselves on behalf of some public interest. CSOs include religious, educational, media, community-based organizations (CBOs), business and trade associations, traditional and indigenous structures, sports associations, musicians, artists and more. There is no single representation for civil society's vast diversity. CSOs represent a wide variety of views, and do not agree on all issues.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are a type of CSO. There are several types of NGOs: humanitarian, development, human rights, research, environmental and peacebuilding. There are both local NGOs (LNGOs) and international NGOs (INGOs). Many NGOs hold several mandates. NGOs must meet specific legal requirements for organizational oversight and accountability.

An active local civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state. Civil society both works in partnership with the state to complement and supplement its capacity and to hold the state to account for its responsibilities and transparent governance. "The legitimacy of civil society organizations derives from what they do and not from whom they represent…"[4]

CSOs conduct a wide variety of activities including economic development, health, agriculture, human rights, conflict resolution, participatory governance, security sector reform, as well as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and fostering moderation and coexistence.

CSO challenges include dealing with incapable and corrupt CSOs operating in the midst of legitimate CSOs, maintaining consistent funding despite donors' shifting priorities, evaluating their work, and dealing with growing government repression of civil society restricting CSO activities. Local populations trust some CSOs and distrust others. Some CSOs also exacerbate conflict and violence. Vetting systems can distinguish legitimate from illegitimate CSOs.

Internal CSO tensions: Local and international NGOs often differ in their analysis and long-term commitment to the local context. For-profit entities and nonprofit NGOs also conflict over the missions and motivation guiding their work. Local CSO's strengths lie in their cultural, linguistic, and socio-political knowledge of and long-term commitment to the local context. International CSO's strengths lie in their technical knowledge, capacity building, broader resources, comparative experience across contexts, and access to advocate to international policy makers. INGOs often hire the country's best and brightest at salaries higher than local government or CSOs can afford, and create parallel government structures that can undermine local capacity.

"Humanitarian space," as defined by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), refers to the ability to pursue humanitarian missions in a context with other armed actors without fear of attack and while maintaining independence, impartiality, and freedom of movement. The term does not refer to physical space but the clarity of roles between civilian and military actors.

CSO humanitarian principles help ensure CSO access to and security with local populations who view them as humanitarians, not military agents. Not all CSOs follow these principles. Some CSOs want complete neutrality and others will collaborate with military when shared goals exist.

CSO Code of Conduct

Humanitarian Imperative: to save lives, alleviate suffering, and uphold dignity.

Independence: to make decisions, program plans, and strategies free from political goals.

Impartiality: to provide resources regardless of the identity of those suffering.

Partial to Human Rights: to work in support of the human rights of all people.

Neutrality: to not take sides in armed struggles.

Do no harm: to avoid harming others intentionally or unintentionally.

Accountability: to consult and be accountable to local people and long-term sustainability.

Respect for rights: to ensure that local populations are able to exercise their human rights.

[4] High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society, Civil Society and Global Governance, Contextual Paper prepared by the Panel's Chairman Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 2004.

Civil Society & the Comprehensive Approach

A comprehensive approach, according to US military stability operations doctrine,[5] integrates cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities such as CSOs to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. **A whole of society approach** recognizes the key roles civil society plays in building security from the ground up.

Governments and military forces look for cooperation with CSOs. The NATO CIMIC policy states "The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organizations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations in order to allow him to fulfill his mission."[6]

CSOs contribute to a comprehensive approach to countering extremism and terrorism by conducting conflict assessments, providing aid, development, and de-radicalization to vulnerable groups, helping reconcile divided groups, and fostering participatory governance and security sector reform. A comprehensive approach that **respects the independent roles of civil society** is most likely to enable their contributions to stability and security.

Any "comprehensive approach" or "unity of effort" requires unity of understanding and unity of mission. Local CSOs often complain that international actors do not take the time to consult with local civil society to discuss local social, political and economic factors. They balk at military "human terrain teams" and complain that the "we know best" attitude ignores democratic principles and the will and capacity of local CSOs to provide cultural advice. Military actors on the other hand, may wish to consult CSOs, but have no way of identifying whom they should consult. Underfunded and understaffed USAID offices are also often not aware of local NGO capacity. The comprehensive approach cannot have a unity of effort including CSOs until there is a shared understanding of the causes driving conflict and violence and a shared mission that includes broader human security.

CSOs see communication, not integration, as necessary for a comprehensive approach. Many CSOs resist terms that name them as "force multipliers" or requests for them to "coordinate" with or "implement" a mission and strategy perceived as different from their own. However many CSOs do recognize the benefits of policy dialogue and "communication" with government and military actors. Yet few consultation structures exist to engage with those CSOs willing to provide policy advice, share conflict assessments, or to discuss overlapping human security goals.



[5] See *Stability Operations US Army Field Manual 3-07*. October 2008.

[6] *Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Mission (UN-CIMIC).* United Nations Office of Military Affairs, Policy and Doctrine Team. October 2010.

Human Security and National Security

In conflict-affected regions, key tensions and differences between CSOs and US military and government center on how they define and pursue security. All actors see the need for stability and security. But when asked "stability for whom and for what purpose?" their perceptions diverge.

Human Security Defined: Human security emphasizes the safety of individuals and communities around the world. Human security includes civilian protection, fostering stable, citizen-oriented legitimate governments with participatory democracy, human rights, human development and peacebuilding. It requires a locally led, bottom-up approach including civil society and local government that works, when necessary, with civilian-led, legitimate, multilateral actors.[7]

National Security Defined: National security traditionally prioritizes political and economic interests of the state deemed central to the nation's survival or way of life. While the National Security Strategy also names key US values in freedom, human rights and democracy, it is not clear which takes precedence in situations like the people's movement for democracy in Egypt or Nigeria with US backed repressive regimes. What happens when US values conflict with US economic and geopolitical interests?

Merging Threats: Transnational threats from natural disasters, diseases, and trafficking of humans, weapons, extremist groups, and drugs challenge both "national security" and "human security." Some CSOs want military services to focus on population-centric security and argue that national security and human security need not contradict. With wider consultation, the two approaches could better complement each other.

Key Tensions:

Legitimacy and Consent: Both local and international CSOs question the legitimacy of security missions, national or international, when military forces act without the consent of local populations, and when no legally enforceable mechanism exists to hold forces accountable to legitimate local political decision-making bodies. CSOs cite a long legacy of military forces acting against the interest of local citizens to achieve access to resources or geo-political gains. Greater consultation with CSOs before and during military interventions could help achieve greater legitimacy, consent and collaboration on human security goals.

Enemy Centric vs. Population Centric "Do No Harm:" The US government gives military services the authority to use both kinetic (violent) and non-kinetic (nonviolent) measures to detect, deter and destroy an enemy. US military actions are subject to international laws such as the Geneva Convention that include provisions to do the least amount of harm and reduce civilian casualties. Counterinsurgency emphasizes population-centric security, focusing on the safety of local citizens. Many CSOs focus exclusively on human security and make explicit commitments to 'do no harm'. Civilian casualties and human rights violations increase CSO-military tensions.

Control vs. Empowerment: Current US counterinsurgency guidance identifies empowering local populations to interact effectively with their own government as key.[8] Residual military references to more widespread "population control and pacification" as well as the metaphor of "human terrain" raise suspicions, misunderstandings or confusion of military objectives. While CSOs and military articulate the goal of "local ownership," both struggle to operationalize it.

Short-term vs. Long-term Time Horizon: US policies direct military actors to focus on short-term, quick-impact relief and development efforts to reduce immediate national security threats. CSOs generally take a long-term, relationship-based approach. CSOs claim that these different time horizons more often undermine rather than complement each other.

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[7] Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor. *The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace*. New York: Public Affairs, 2010.

[8] *U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide*. January 2009.

Types of and Mechanisms for Civil Society-Military Relations

A spectrum of civil-military relationships, defined by UN OCHA, exists at the operational level. The type of CSO-military relationship depends on whether missions align or there is sufficient humanitarian space for CSOs to maintain their principles.[9] The first category, "curtail presence" refers to situations such as the height of the Iraq war when civil society-military relations disappear when it becomes impossible for CSOs to operate in the same space as armed actors because of a lack of security and humanitarian space. The second category represents the situation in Afghanistan today, where there is minimal contact or communication between representative CSOs and military actors.

Curtail Presence	Where it becomes impossible for CSOs to operate safely, international CSOs may pull out and local CSOs may go into hiding.
Co-existence/ Communication	Where CSOs, government and military operate in the same space but their missions do not align, only basic communication on logistical details takes place.
Coordination	Where CSOs, government and military missions partially align, there may be some basic coordination to promote CSO core values in human security.
Cooperation	Where CSOs, government and military missions partially or fully align, there may be collaboration on joint projects, particularly in disaster relief or DDR.

CSO-military communication happens informally and formally. Where there is no coordinating body, groups coordinate informally when working in the same area, or groups coordinate via "Heineken diplomacy" as individual people build relationships in informal settings. **Coordination by command** refers to some type of government Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) or international coordinating agency (UN OCHA) that has legitimacy through formal authority, through the rewards for being coordinated (e.g. funding) or the punishments for not following commands (e.g. denial of access to certain areas or refugee camps). Given CSO humanitarian principles of independence, coordination by command has not worked in places like Afghanistan, Haiti or Rwanda. More often, there is minimal **coordination by consensus** when a recognized coordination body builds consensus among diverse actors to work in ways that complement rather than conflict.

Examples of Coordination and Cooperation Models

In Rwanda, the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO*)* successfully led this type of coordination by consensus. Co-leaders from UN and NGO backgrounds were able to facilitate participatory style of meetings in a neutral location separate from UN military offices.

In Ghana, CSOs, government, and security forces coordinate rapid response to potential violence via a "National Architecture for Peace." During the 2008 elections civil society leaders mediated between political candidates to deescalate impending election-related violence.

In the Philippines, Filipino military leaders attended training at a civil society-led peacebuilding institute on negotiation, mediation and peace processes. Military leaders then asked for a peacebuilding training program for thousands of military personnel.

In Thailand, civil society worked with the military to write the national security policy for the southern border provinces from 1999 to 2003. The process of developing this strategy together changed how top military leaders saw their role in supporting a human security agenda.

In Afghanistan, the US State Department and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan have a staff person with the title "NGO Liaison." The ISAF NGO Liaison helped build momentum around a successful CSO pilot police program to improve SSR and police-community relations.

In the US, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties consults with a group of approximately 20 Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, and Somali community leaders. DHS draws on this group for crisis rapid response phone consultations, broader community consultations to identify concerns and brainstorm solutions, and to develop DHS cultural competency.

[9] Edwina Thompson. "Principled Pragmatism: NGO Engagement with Armed Actors." Monrovia, California: World Vision International. 2008.

An Agenda for Civil Society-Military Dialogue on Human Security

This *Roadmap* project seeks high-level leadership from the US military, State Department, USAID, Administration, and Congress to create and participate in problem-solving forums, identify needed research, address dilemmas and tensions, and create interest-based solutions on these 11 issues.

RESEARCH

1. **The Relationship between "Security" and "Development:"** A wide array of research demonstrates an association between low levels of development and the likelihood of violent conflict. Yet the underlying assumption that development contributes to security is not yet proven. CSO efforts in war zones over many decades have often had little impact on conflict dynamics. Research suggests that harnessing development programs for counterinsurgency goals is often counterproductive, endangering and undermining long-term development and peacebuilding, wasting development funds, and inadvertently fueling both corruption and insurgency.[10]Local CSOs ask: "Do they think we're stupid?" suggesting that local people tend to see through simplistic hearts and minds programs.[11] Military personnel, on the other hand, cite specific positive outcomes from their development and peacebuilding activities, such as gaining access to communities or facilitating reconciliation between tribes. *What shared research could illuminate further the complex relationship between development and security and if and how development contributes to either short term stabilization or longer term human security?*

2. **Integration vs. Humanitarian Space:** The comprehensive approach assumes development must be integrated with security efforts. Is this assumption based on research? Can development better contribute to both national and human security goals when it is free from short-term political and security imperatives as CSOs suggest? Is it possible to design effective short-term development programming that contributes toward long-term goals? *What are the real benefits of the integration model to security, the costs of this model to humanitarian space, and the alternatives to the existing civil military "integration" model?*

3. **The Relationship between Military Development Efforts and NGO Insecurity:** The number of NGO personnel targeted and killed each year is increasing. Many assume shrinking humanitarian space and blurred lines between integrated military and civilian actors are making NGOs the "soft targets" or front lines of the military forces. Military personnel question this assumption, pointing to the increased attacks by insurgents against all kinds of civilians. Military actors ask: *Where is the research documenting the relationship between military development and NGO security?*

OPERATIONAL MECHANISMS

4. **Mechanisms for Multi-stakeholder Consultations:** CSOs, civilian government, and military personnel do not have adequate forums for information exchange, monitoring of civil-military guidelines or general discussion of issues related to conflict assessment, planning, and implementation. This *Roadmap* detailed a range of civil society-military structures. *Which mechanisms could provide a space for CSOs to share conflict assessments, advise on policy options, or address field-level issues with the US government and military?*

5. **Mechanisms for Funding CSOs** The Department of Defense administrates up to 25% of US development assistance. The US Commanders Emergency Response Fund and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams ask CSOs to implement development programs with military funding. This places some CSOs in a dilemma of balancing their need for resources with humanitarian principles, which they perceive as essential to their security and access to local populations. Many CSOs will only accept funds from civilian donor agencies that allow CSOs to independently

[10] See, for example, Fishtein, P. "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Balkh Province." Medford, MA, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. November 2010. See also Wilder, A. "Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan" in *Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the Grip of Conflict*. Middle East Institute. December 2009.

[11] See, for example, Bradbury, M. "Do the think we're stupid? Local perceptions of 'hearts and minds' activities in Kenya." Humanitarian Practice Network, July 2010.

identify program plans through impartial needs assessments. *What alternative funding mechanisms - such as channeling development dollars through Embassy development offices, national governments, or international donor pools - could best address this dilemma?*

6. **Development of Shared Standards:** CSOs, governments, and military actors doing development all share similar challenges of fostering local ownership, accountability, and monitoring what is working and what is not. While CSOs oppose military-led development, they do argue that they should at the very minimum be transparent. Development programs can foster corruption and unintentionally legitimate unpopular local leaders and armed groups. Could *shared standards help to build civil-military transparency on program effectiveness, cost, and sustainability?*

TRAINING

7. **"Do No Harm" Training for Military:** Despite decades of development expertise, even many CSO development projects still fail to address causes of poverty and do more to fuel local conflict than mitigate it. Development and peacebuilding CSOs have undergone extensive training in a "Do No Harm" methodology to avoid negative impacts of their work.[12]CSOs resist military-led development efforts. The Austrailian military and AUSAID co-train so that all actors understand the potential for harm in the development process. *Given broad concerns on military-led development, could the US military include a "Do No Harm" training for the US military?*

8. **Training on CSO-Military Relations:** Both CSOs and military suffer from a lack of training and capacity for managing their interactions. Knowledge of existing humanitarian NGO guidelines and International Humanitarian Law is lacking. *What curricula and training opportunities could assist CSOs and military to advance their understanding of the issues outlined in this Roadmap?*

LEGISLATION AND BUDGET

9. **Legalizing CSO Peacebuilding:** Current War on Terror legislation makes it impossible for many CSOs to play positive roles in countering extremism, fostering democracy and civilian oversight of SSR and DDR. CSO contact with groups on terror lists is illegal, even when that work aims to end violence via negotiation training. *What could military and CSOs do to help educate Congress about the roles of civil society in countering extremism and the need for more precise legislation that would permit the work of legitimate peacebuilding CSOs with groups on terror lists?*

10. **Budgeting for Comparative Advantage:** The 2010 UN CIMIC Policy calls for military actors to support the creation of "an enabling environment ... maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area." CSOs want military actors to focus on population-centric security, not development. CSOs and military actors generally agree that civilian agencies do not yet have the capacity to address all the development and peacebuilding needs in complex conflict settings. CSOs believe there is no quick military fix to this problem, as development assistance is not an "add-on" skill, but requires extensive expertise to be effective and to avoid negative impacts. *What can CSOs and military officials do together with Congress to create an institutional plan and funding mechanisms to address the lack of civilian capacity?*

HUMAN SECURITY COMMISSION

11. **Broader Research and Dialogue on Human Security:** Defense Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen both call for "demilitarizing US foreign policy." Addressing the tensions between CSOs and military actors in the US requires a dialogue including Congress, the Administration and civilian agencies, the international community, as well as the many for-profit contractors who also work on security and development. How does the US balance its own national interests when they conflict with broader global human security and without the distracting influence of those motivated by profit or power? *Could a Human Security Commission, Congressional hearings, or whole of society dialogue process examine national security and global human security?*

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12 Mary Anderson. "*Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace – or War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, February 1999.