Note to the Reader

This guide was produced by USAID’s Office of Military Affairs to facilitate planning and implementation in civilian-military environments. The primary intended audience is USAID officers and partners—i.e., official and unofficial civilians—but military colleagues may find it useful as well.

- The guide is not intended to represent agency policy, except where so noted. The compiler’s goal has been to put useful information in the hands of practitioners to facilitate civilian-military coordination and joint programming.
- It is not feasible at present to describe interagency coordination under all circumstances. In particular, civ-mil coordination during disaster response is best handled by our OFDA colleagues, with whom interested readers are encouraged to correspond. Their Field Operations Guide is particularly helpful for this.
- A number of practical issues of day-to-day implementation are not dealt with here, but are addressed in the Implementation guidelines that accompany the Agency’s Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy. Those guidelines are currently under review and revision.

The guide contains a combination of original and other material drawn from a wide variety of sources, often without attribution. It is the product of countless authors and editors; thanks are due to Tamra Thompson, PACOM’s DMHA, Lynn Sauls, David Bendana, Beth Paige and Tyler Posey for helpful revisions to previous versions.

Please send comments or suggestions for revisions to rbyess@usaid.gov.

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I. General Introduction

The past few years have presented development workers in the field with a daunting set of challenges in carrying out their programs under situations of physical insecurity. Many lives have been lost, particularly those of host country counterparts, members of partner organizations and key host government personnel. USAID and the larger development community have found themselves ill equipped to operate in these new environments, and an urgent need for new tools and techniques has arisen. This situation of development under instability has been described by several new terms to describe it. Humanitarian workers call it stability programming, civilian-military programming, conflict programming, or in some cases, opposed development. Military planners may call it SSTR, Phase 0 or a number of other terms.

As USAID’s Fragile States Strategy\(^1\) makes clear, effectively addressing the complex challenges of fragile states clearly goes far beyond USAID. It will require a coordinated U.S. Government approach, particularly in conflict situations, to ensure that diplomatic, security, and military efforts are mutually reinforcing and that USAID’s assets are integrated with those of the departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and others. The recent creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the Department of State is a strong indicator of the increased understanding of the need for a more coordinated U.S. Government response to post-conflict and stabilization efforts.

For USAID field officers, this situation has led to a rapidly increased need to program and implement activities alongside the military. USAID must develop closer coordination with the military community, to understand how to work alongside them, and to ensure that both civilian and military efforts are aimed at the same set of goals.

A. Purpose

This guide is designed to bring civilian and military units closer to planning and programming together, with the goal of producing better and more effective development results. The purpose of the guide is to help field program officers—particularly those in USAID—enhance understanding of, and cooperation with, military counterparts. The guide lays out how the different parts of the US military plan for operations in the field, discusses different collaboration models, and identifies potential fertile areas of overlap for further exploration and development. Military planners may find the guide useful in understanding how USAID does strategic planning, funding, program implementation, monitoring and evaluation in the field.

A similar guide published by USIP, which may be read in conjunction with the present document, is entitled Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations\(^2\). The USIP document focuses more closely on the NGO-military nexus than does this one, which is aimed at USAID program personnel. It is focused on how to plan activities in the field and how to synchronize planning and implementation between disparate government and nongovernmental agencies, with the focus on USAID-DoD planning.

II. The challenge of civilian-military coordination

Military affairs are increasingly important for program work in the field. This introduces some key concepts and procedures to help you get started with civ-mil programming in AID/Washington and the field.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up, based on analysis</td>
<td>Top-down, based on commander’s intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource constrained</td>
<td>Not resource constrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained engagement</td>
<td>Mission oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented by partners</td>
<td>Implemented by US and allied military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus: in-country</td>
<td>Locus: Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The core policy governing USAID-DoD coordination is the *Agency Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*\(^3\), signed in March 2008. It represents the Agency’s response to the DoD’s Directive 3000.05\(^4\) and the State

\(^{1}\) US Agency for International Development, *Fragile States Strategy*, 2005


Department’s NSPD-44⁵. The annexed implementation guidelines provide further information⁶.

Although the main purpose for closer cooperation with the military is to improve USG effectiveness in the field, there are several opportunities for utilizing DoD funding for USAID programs. Section 1207 funds, which total around $100 million per year, are programmed jointly at post by a State-USAID-DoD Team. The key DoD contact for 1207 funds is the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief based in the Embassy of the USAID mission submitting the application. Proposals may also be submitted via the Embassy's Security Assistance Officer (SAO) or the Defense Attaché (DATT). S/CRS maintains a website with information about the program⁷. The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program⁸ has been successfully used by USAID missions and is a promising source of funding for activities of mutual interest.

Military planning differs strikingly from USAID planning. Military planning is a sophisticated and formalized discipline—with graduate-level institutions for practitioners, and is grounded in a history of preparation for combat⁹. USAID planning begins in the host country, derives from the reality on the ground, and adopts a long-term approach, involving a wide range of partners: An overarching goal of most development planning is the strengthening of host country governmental and civil society capability. This is generally not a consideration in the military realm.

The highest-level document that addresses planning for the military is the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF)¹⁰, which instructs combatant commands to prepare Theater Campaign Plans (TCP)¹¹, the documents that correspond most closely to a regional strategy. There are country-level campaign plans as well, derived from the TCPs. It is challenging for those not conversant with military planning to read and understand them, but your USAID Senior Development Advisor (SDA) or Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) representative may be able to help.

A. Office of Military Affairs

The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) is USAID’s primary point of contact with the Department of Defense. OMA provides the focal point for USAID interaction with US and foreign militaries in formalized relationships through coordinated planning, training, education and exercises. Areas of common interest include humanitarian assistance, the global war on terrorism, strategic communications, conflict prevention and mitigation, counter-insurgency, and post-conflict reconstruction. OMA produces training materials for use in joint training (e.g., conflict assessment frameworks, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) pre-deployment orientation, after-action reports, lessons learned) and coordinates USAID participation in civilian-military exercises.

OMA operations are organized around three focus areas: Interagency Planning and Implementation; Civilian-Military Policy Development; and Training and Education.

OMA performs the following functions:

- Coordinate and monitor USAID participation in military and interagency exercises
- Provide a central coordination point-of-contact for pre- through post-conflict planning and operations between USAID, DoD and the Department of State
- Provide coordination with non-U.S. Military organizations (foreign national, UN, NATO etc.), where appropriate
- Provide pre-deployment training to U.S. Military

⁵ http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html
⁷ http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shor
tcut=49R3
⁸ http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3912/is_200312/ai_n93325
¹⁰ For which no good unclassified guidance is available. Contact OMA if you seek further information.
¹¹ A good introduction is http://mason.gmu.edu/~ssledge/campaignplanningprimer04.pdf
who will operate with USAID in conflict zones, and to USAID personnel to be deployed to insecure environments

- Provide on-going policy dialogue and education and training to the U.S. Military and USAID Bureaus and Missions about the role of USAID in the National Security Strategy
- Facilitate joint DoD-USAID Theater Security Cooperation Planning and Communications generally with the various combatant commands (COCOMs) through an exchange of Liaison Officers (LNOs) and Senior Development Advisors (SDAs)
- Facilitate interagency operations
- Provide USAID planning support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/Planning) on implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05, via participation in DoD conferences and working groups and other means
- Educate civilian and military personnel on the development-defense nexus
- Develop a cadre of USAID leaders able to manage the interface between the two organizations in an emergency environment
- Serve as coordinator and Point-of-Contact (POC) between Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), USAID and the Military at the operational/implementation level
- Liaise with the office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OSD/SO/LIC) and S/CRS on early-warning and “Phase 0” planning efforts
- Work with the Agency’s Knowledge Management Office and Military organizations to maintain “lessons learned” and evaluations from past emergencies, conflicts and transitions
- Serve as the base for USAID personnel trained at the military war colleges
- Support and advise USAID’s Military Policy Board or successor decision-making body

OMA is divided into three divisions in addition to the Front Office:

1. **Planning Division**

OMA’s Planning Division (DCHA/OMA/PD) serves as the overall coordination unit for managing the day-to-day aspects of the USAID-military relationship, and for planning and developing effective operations. This includes developing a joint information network; prioritizing requests for participation in events, exchanges and exercises; and overseeing program planning and development for priority regions and countries. The Division coordinates USAID civilian-military planning and analysis with the Pentagon, S/CRS and other USG departments and agencies. DCHA/OMA/PD manages training programs for selected military and civilian audiences; develops guidance on USAID and NGOs for use in the civilian-military context; and develops and manages staff, budgets, contracts, grants and other mechanisms required to perform Division duties, including program development, planning, training and exercises. Finally, the Division serves as the base for Agency personnel trained in the war colleges or other DoD institutes.

2. **Training Division**

The training division sets the standard and ensures that civilian and military personnel participating in civilian-military operations receive the training they need to operate effectively and deliver the greatest impact. The goal is to give those challenged to operate in unstable environments the tools they need to address the causes of instability and work in cooperation with the military. Currently, OMA training targets the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). However, the goal is to eventually provide training to every country with an interagency mission.
Training is conceptualized in four parts: an evaluation to define the problem; collecting data to identify the cause; analyzing that data to define the objective; and designing a program to meet that objective.

At the core of effectively addressing conflict is defining stabilization. The training division places great emphasis on the first step of the process and challenges trainees to expand and think beyond their own organization in order to further dialogue and understanding in interagency cooperation.

(1) Tactical Conflict Assessment and Programming Framework Training

The training division has designed a tool, the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Programming Framework (TCAPF), to help individuals address the causes of instability. But for TCAPF to be effective, OMA must first train individuals to use this tool within the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The TCAPF provides the US Military with a practical tool for identifying the root causes of conflict in a particular area. It also gives guidance on adjusting programming in order to more effectively address those causes. The TCAPF contains diagnostic questions targeting local populations’ potential incentives for violence. It has detailed directions for military personnel on how to collect answers to these questions, it provides illustrative project examples and information on funding sources for potential follow-on interventions, and it acts as a cultural awareness guide. The TCAPF has been embraced by the military as it can be found in field manuals and detailed information about it will soon be housed on DoD websites. With USAID/Washington’s help, a version has been adapted for use in Afghanistan by the Counterinsurgency Academy in Kabul and is being widely taught to incoming combat troops.

More information about TCAPF is available through OMA.

(1) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Training

USAID works with the US Military, the Department of State, other US government agencies, and representatives from non-governmental organizations to provide training for personnel who will be deployed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating in Afghanistan. These trainings take place at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and at the National Guard’s Camp Atterbury in Muscatatuck, Indiana.

A PRT is an interim civilian-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments following open hostilities. It is intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host government's legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. PRTs were originally established to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment.

PRT training has the following goals:

- Provide key skill sets for success in PRTs (i.e., communication, tactical, teamwork, negotiation, etc.);
- Gain an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military PRT components, NGOs, and international organizations;
- Build interagency PRT camaraderie and teamwork prior to deployment;
- Supply an overview of the country's political, historical, and cultural situation; and
• Share lessons learned from current and previous PRT officers.

The trainings combine a variety of learning methods, including classroom presentations and briefings, round-table discussions with experts from inside and outside the government, coaching and mentoring, and role playing in complex scenarios designed to simulate conditions in-country. Military personnel also provide force protection training for civilians to ensure the security of PRTs and those working directly with PRTs.

USAID involvement in PRTs - both by participating in and supporting PRTs - is critical for ensuring that the military's Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations are planned and carried out in a development-oriented and conflict-sensitive manner.

USAID personnel contribute to PRT trainings by explaining USAID's structure, authority, and relationships with the Department of Defense and the Department of State. USAID personnel also convey the perspective of a development agency regarding stability operations (local capacity building, working with local people), imparting key lessons learned from USAID's growing body of knowledge about the design and implementation of programs in post-conflict areas.

Since the environments in which Afghanistan's PRTs operate change frequently, USAID and other entities responsible for PRT training engage in on-going revisions of PRT training materials to ensure PRTs remain effective.

3. Operations Division

OMA's operations division serves as the lead component to develop operational readiness, leadership, and coordinated response capacity for field operations requiring joint USAID-military action. The division's function includes developing the networks required to develop plans and execute operations with COCOMs. This is accomplished through the placement of representatives in the COCOMs and USAID. The placement of military liaison officers (LNOs) from the Joint Staff and COCOMs and the placement of senior development advisors (SDAs) at the COCOMs and Joint Staff provide a vital link that enables civilian-military cooperation. This exchange extends beyond a simple liaison function to being the actual link between DoD and USAID that fosters active collaboration. They accomplish this mission by knowing the roles and capabilities of each organization and identify opportunities for civilian-military cooperation. This requires that the LNOs maintain situational awareness within the COCOMs and USAID, translate organizational lexicon, and know to whom to talk and how to put the right people together.

The operations division also provides a window into DoD by keeping USAID bureaus informed of pending and ongoing field operations involving the US military and works with NGO and military personnel to strengthen field coordination.
III. Cooperation Cookbook

The eventual goal of civilian-military cooperation is the creation and adoption of a unified framework for planning, implementing and assessing US activities in the field. Although the development, diplomacy and defense functions are all structurally different, they are all necessary components of an effective whole-of-government approach to stability and prosperity.

USAID seeks to work with the DoD and DoS as strategic partners in the design and implementation of field activities. USAID’s intention is to lead the Interagency in developing and actively pursuing implementation of a planning, training and operational framework, linked to budgets, that integrates the soft power activities of Defense and Development at the national, regional, and country level. Some joint programming is already happening.

Civilian-military cooperation, between USAID and various organizations in the field, can generally be described by one of four models:

### Civilian-Military Cooperation Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shorter Term</th>
<th>Longer Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Less permissive</strong></td>
<td><strong>More permissive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Response</strong></td>
<td><strong>Crisis Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Applies to natural and man-made disasters</td>
<td>• As-yet untested model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Handled by OFDA, occasionally with DoD support</td>
<td>• IMS-driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Civilian response coordinated by S/CRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can involve the use of Crisis Response Corps (CRC) personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within USAID, two offices facilitate civilian-military coordination—OMA and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/DCHA/OFDA), both of which are housed in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). Section IV of this document describes each office’s roles and responsibilities in civilian-military coordination and is intended to be an aid for U.S. military personnel working with USAID.

The SDAs serve as advisors to the Commanders and the Secretary of Defense and his staff. In addition, Military Representatives from the geographic COCOMs and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are seconded to USAID Headquarters and provide day-to-day coordination and management.

USAID/OFDA is the lead U.S. Government (USG) office responsible for providing humanitarian assistance in response to international disasters, both natural disasters and complex emergencies. In cooperation with other USG offices and international donors and implementing partners, USAID/OFDA’s humanitarian experts respond to rapid-onset events such as tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and hurricanes; slow-onset emergencies such as prolonged drought leading to food insecurity; and complex conflict situations that result in humanitarian crises and population displacement.

In addition, USAID/OFDA has its own mechanisms for coordination with the DoD on matters within its purview. Within USAID/OFDA, the Military Liaison Unit (MLU) provides a focal point for engaging with the military at the tactical and operational level for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The MLU maintains staff in Washington, D.C., as well as Humanitarian Assistance Advisors/ Military (HAA/M) at AFRICOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM. In addition, Washington-based MLU staff regularly visit and engage with the various COCOMs where USAID/OFDA does not have a continuous presence. During large-scale disasters when USAID/OFDA has requested U.S. military support, the MLU deploys multiple Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) to advise U.S.
military leadership at all levels—field, COCOM, and Pentagon—and make recommendations for the appropriate use of DOD assets for disaster response.

In addition to the MLU, USAID/OFDA regional teams in Washington, D.C., and in the field regularly communicate and coordinate with DOD on disaster response and mitigation issues. USAID/OFDA regional advisors are based in regional offices in Costa Rica, Hungary, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand. USAID/OFDA also has field-based staff in countries where humanitarian needs require regular, vigilant monitoring, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Pakistan, and Sudan.

Both USAID/OMA and USAID/OFDA conduct civilian-military training. A core purpose of USAID/OMA is to ensure that civilian and military personnel participating in civilian-military operations receive the training needed to effectively accomplish their missions as described in the Department of the Army Stability Operations Field Manual (FM 3.07). In addition to training USAID staff to operate in unstable environments, USAID/OMA trains military personnel in identifying and managing conflict, programming in conflict areas, working effectively with USAID personnel and other civilian partners, and using military assets to support stabilization operations. USAID/OMA has developed a pre-deployment training for personnel from USAID and the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and State assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. USAID/OMA also collaborates in an interagency initiative to train personnel deploying to Iraq.

Since 2004, USAID/OFDA has conducted Joint Humanitarian Operations Courses (JHOCs) for select U.S. military leaders and planners. The JHOC prepares participants to work collaboratively during humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations by facilitating discussion on the relationship between USAID, its implementing partners, and the U.S. Military. USAID/OFDA’s MLU conducts nearly 50 JHOCs worldwide each year, including at the COCOMs and home bases of various units frequently involved in international disaster response operations.

The remainder of this chapter deals with the joint (steady-state) programming model.
Ten Ways to Advance Civ-Mil Cooperation in Your Mission

Once you have made the decision to pursue closer cooperation with the military, the following are ways to bring this about:

1) **Establish a civilian-military coordination unit.** Most missions have established a point of contact or working group. This may include the program officer, MD or Deputy Director as appropriate and BS-76 personnel, particularly those with prior military coordination experience.

2) At the end of program review and/or portfolio reviews, **invite military counterparts to participate** in discussions and lessons learned sessions. Use this as an opportunity to identify opportunities for joint programs in the future.

3) **Seek to attend TSCP meetings.** Theater Security Cooperation Meetings (including Theater, Region & Country Plans) occur periodically in the combatant command. Contact your SDA to find out when the next one is scheduled for your region and

4) **Exercises and Experiments.** Each year the DoD conducts a large number of these. A working group managed by S/CRS (the CMART) selects a limited number of exercises each year for civilian focus. USAID program personnel should work with SDAs to identify exercises in which mission personnel can participate.

5) **Seek funding.** 1207 (see below) and OHDACA (see below) are two sources of funds that can be used to fund or supplement USAID activities.

6) **Undertake a joint conflict assessment.**

7) Visit/get to know/work with the SDA and MilReps from your corresponding region

8) **Civil Affairs visits.** Find out if a Civil Affairs team is coming to your country. Meet with them and, if appropriate, conduct joint field visits.

9) Prepare documentation on the mission programs, particularly showing where USAID activities can be indicated on a map.

10) Talk to your regional disaster specialist about joint disaster preparedness activities. The DoD has extensive capability in this area.

Invite military to participate in program development. The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the Mission Strategy Plan (MSP), etc. are excellent opportunities for joint program

**A. How to begin**

Upon deciding to pursue enhanced cooperation, you have many courses of action available. Key to cooperation is identification of the counterpart with whom to coordinate. Consultation can occur at many levels.

1. **Whom do I talk to?**

One challenge USAID program personnel face in the field is that there is generally no peer at the Combatant Command level with whom to have an effective dialogue. Nor is there a universal rule for where to begin. Command structures vary widely, from those in Afghanistan and Iraq to those in conventional USAID countries. Every Combatant Command is organized differently as well. Understanding the organization and roles of those with whom you are working is key to effective collaboration. If there is no COCOM representative in country, the J-5 (plans) country desk officer in the COCOM is a good place to start. Your Senior Development Advisor at the Combatant Command can help with this. Furthermore, the DoD complex has different planning protocols for different services—the Army and Marines, for example, have very different approaches to mission analysis, and despite significant effort, the interagency effort led by S/CRS has not yet produced a convincing framework to tie all civilian and military planning together.

In late 2007, former Deputy Secretary of Defense England signed a directive creating the position of Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché. This position, SDO/DATT, was designed to serve as Department of Defense’s principal military representative to the Embassy Country Team and the Partner Nation, thus consolidating management oversight of the SCO and the Defense Attaché Office. In some countries, the current DATT will assume the SDO/DATT title, while in other countries the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) Chief will assume the SDO/DATT title.

**B. USAID Civilian-Military Policy**

USAID’s Policy on Civilian-Military Cooperation, launched in July, 2008, provides a foundation for enhanced cooperation between USAID and the U.S. military community. This new policy establishes the foundation for USAID-DoD cooperation in planning and

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12 http://armyrotc.msu.edu/resources/FM5-0ArmyPlanningOrdersProd.pdf
implementation. Specifically, it states that USAID and DoD will cooperate in joint planning at every level where both organizations are working in the same country and where civilian-military cooperation will advance U.S. foreign policy. Over time, the policy will change the way USAID does its business—both regional bureaus and missions are encouraged to reach out to DoD counterparts to compare strategic goals and seek ways to cooperate, including through joint programming.

1. Background of the Policy

In his 2008 State of the Union speech, President Bush affirmed the need for a “whole-of-government” approach to support U.S. national security objectives. An integrated approach that includes the military, development assistance and diplomacy is required to support stabilization, basic needs, reconstruction and governance and development in unstable countries and regional environments. The point is not to divert USAID from its core sustainable development mission. Rather, the idea is for USAID to perceive DoD as a strategic partner in achieving its development goals and to reevaluate mission portfolios through a lens of national security. The policy also authorizes USAID to pursue the organizational and training changes required to support this Civilian-Military cooperation.

The Implementation Guidelines Annex which accompanies the Policy lists the functional areas in which USAID and military cooperate, and details the responsibilities of the USAID organizational units charged with implementing the policy. The Guidelines address legal issues and instruct USAID operating units in when and how to consult with appropriate General Counsel contacts. They also provide examples of successful civilian-military coordination in planning and implementation.

With the issuance of the new policy, USAID has the opportunity to support DoD and DOS by developing the operational capacity to more fully and effectively engage with the U.S. military in direct support of national security objectives in selected countries.

A key feature of OMA’s staffing is the exchange of senior military and development personnel. Under memoranda of understanding with six Combatant Commands—Special Operations (SOCOM), Southern (SOUTHCOM), Europe (EUCOM), Central (CENTCOM), Pacific (PACOM), and US Africa Command (AFRICOM)—senior USAID Development Advisors serve as advisors to the Commanders, and the DoD has provided corresponding Military Representatives to USAID to provide day-to-day coordination and management. Arrangements are currently under way to create Deputy Advisors at some of these commands, and AFRICOM has established other positions to address coordination in program management and disaster response. Additionally, USAID has placed an advisor in the J-5 Directorate in the Pentagon.

One of the recurring frustrations on the part of USAID officers is that many key USAID offices have no equivalent in the DoD universe. There is no DoD program office, no monitoring and evaluation office (although there is a center for lessons learned). There is no DoD-USAID cooperation policy, in part because USAID is viewed as one of many civilian entities with which the Defense Department cooperates. There are several offices that deal with health and medical issues, both in the DoD proper and in the services. This disparity has been highlighted since the issuance of DoD 3000.05\(^4\), NSPD-44\(^15\) and the USAID civilian-military policy, which mandate interagency cooperation to a degree never before seen.

C. Examples of civilian-military cooperation in selected USAID countries

The examples provided below are not meant to be prescriptive, but rather illustrative of the range of USAID-DoD involvement at the time the policy was prepared. For further details on the programs described, you are encouraged to contact your regional bureau or mission, or the Office of Military Affairs.

1. Philippines

The long-standing conflict in Mindanao has roots in the historical poverty and discrimination experienced by Muslims in Mindanao and the nearby Sulu Archipelago. These conditions have contributed to feelings of

\(^4\) http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html
resentment and fueled an insurgency that jeopardizes the country's economic and social development and represents an important threat to regional security. The US has been heavily involved in resolving both the development and security challenges of this conflict, and USAID’s relationship with the military has a long and productive history. USAID, present in Mindanao for many years, currently carries out development programs in infrastructure, economic growth, education, health, environment and energy, and established a relationship in 2002 with the arriving Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Over time, USAID and JSOTF developed a productive working relationship in promoting peace in Mindanao. For example, by coordinating Civil Affairs projects with longer term USAID programs. USAID has unparalleled access to CJOTF assistance in Mindanao, which has been critical for implementation and monitoring. Close coordination of scheduled civilian and military activities increases the effectiveness of the overall US effort and reduces the risk of associational concerns for development partners.

2. **Afghanistan**

USAID programs are designed to support US foreign policy, with military stabilization programs informed by USAID technical expertise. Funding is provided by USAID/Kabul for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) activities in the field as well as national-level programs. It would be physically impossible for USAID to operate independently in Afghanistan without close military support. USAID field program officers serve alongside military counterparts in forward operating bases and PRTs, where they undertake jointly planned civil affairs and quick-impact development programs.

3. **Iraq**

USAID works with US and multinational units to help cities recover from the effects of battle and to gain a sense of balance after the insurgency has departed. Projects are aimed at a series of small, rapid programs that are followed by more complex projects that return public services to operation, promote representative local government, and reactivate the economy. The Community Stabilization Program (CSP) works to achieve economic and social stability in Iraqi communities. The program works directly with community groups, local government officials, and PRTs in the development and implementation of activities that foster more productive and peaceful communities. CSP offers activities that focus on training and employment and a micro-grant component to help Iraqis start or expand small businesses.

4. **Yemen**

In Yemen there is a strategic convergence between conventional USAID concerns about human development indicators and security concerns, as the poorest areas of the country pose the biggest security threats. USAID shares operational space with the US military, and the USAID program is driven by security and conflict concerns. The Country team ensures that USAID planning is undertaken in conjunction with USAID/Yemen activities, which are designed and implemented alongside those of Joint-Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). On the military side, the programs are integrated with the military’s theater security cooperation planning.

5. **Northern Uganda**

Uganda is one of the few missions where USAID has established a sub-regional presence (in Gulu, in the North). USAID field officers are able to coordinate closely there with the civil affairs team leaders from CJTF-HOA. This level of proximity at the tactical level enables USAID to engage on relatively small activities—for example, schools, road rehabilitation, water projects. And these activities are integrated into USAID’s yearly operational plans.

6. **Colombia**

USAID/Colombia’s Alternative Development (AD) Program supports the Government of Colombia (GOC) efforts to strengthen the licit economy through productive projects, enterprise development, natural resource protection, institutional strengthening, and promoting access to markets. At the local level, the goal is to improve effectiveness of municipal governments, expand access to markets, and promote growth in targeted regions. To date, USAID AD activities have supported the cultivation of over 158,000 hectares (390,382 acres) of licit crops. In addition, USAID works with the GOC to facilitate the creation and effective implementation of modern laws and policies to promote trade and strengthen economic competitiveness. In addition, a program funded by the Department of Defense (Section 1207) and
implemented by USAID delivers small, discrete community based grants that will be utilized for capacity building, community organization and mobilization. It will also support strategic communications and public information/outreach by the Government of Colombia.

7. Kosovo

USAID/Kosovo cooperates with the 38 nations supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Kosovo Force or KFOR, helping to increase KFOR’s visibility in order to assure all Kosovars that security is in place. Several Mission programs directly support KFOR, helping to increase KFOR’s visibility, particularly in minority communities which feel most at risk. Quick-impact small infrastructure projects identified jointly by KFOR and USAID, and implemented by local construction companies, such as footbridges or road repairs, help keep channels of communications between KFOR and communities open. A small community self-help grant program allows KFOR soldiers to submit requests for simple inputs, such as cement or lumber, from community organizations to construct their own projects, often with additional labor provided by KFOR soldiers.

Other coordinated efforts include projects where USAID’s assistance complements American military humanitarian assistance projects, such as providing computers and internet connectivity to a cultural center built with Department of Defense (DoD) funds. The Mission’s projects are particularly coordinated with the American forces (primarily National Guard) heading up the multi-national task force serving the seven southeastern municipalities of Kosovo, and USAID project engineers support the American soldiers in planning and designing projects which may either be funded by USAID or DoD.

But not all coordination is infrastructure-centered—it often involves engaging American soldiers and commanders with USAID projects. The Mission’s local governance initiative work with municipal officials mirrors interests of American KFOR, and joint meetings with mayors and other government officials are often held, with USAID’s mission director and American KFOR’s commanding general presiding. USAID’s small-medium enterprise development project coordinates with KFOR, and has made use of the soldiers’ civilian expertise (such as veterinary medicine) in enterprise training programs, and supports cooperation such as the military’s delivery of used plastics to a project-supported recycling business. Such cooperation has been ongoing since KFOR came to Kosovo following the end of the 1999 conflict.

8. TSCTP

USAID participation in the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has been characterized by close coordination with DoD. Multiple joint assessments in Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria and Mali in 2005 through 2007 have resulted in several actions to improve linkages and collaboration between programs implemented by DoD and USAID. These include geographic targeting in Niger, Mali, Nigeria, and soon in Mauritania as well as early involvement by DoD in the development and submission of the proposal for funding through Defense Authorization Act Section 1207 authorities. The Section 1207-funded activities include specific targets for jointly-executed community projects by DoD and USAID. TSCTP is also characterized by designated Points of Contact (POCs) in each country or agency to facilitate coordination. There are also several forums for interagency coordination in the field and at headquarters, including monthly Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC), annual interagency conferences, and the recent piloting of a newly developed DoD country plan that is presented to individual country teams in an interagency process.

9. Mercy Ship Visits, Medical Civil Assistance Program (MEDCAPS), VETCAPs

Since its origins in 1963 in the Vietnam War, the Medical Civil Assistance program (MEDCAP) has brought together US military medical personnel for short-term medical missions, generally for the provision of primary care. MEDCAPs were originally designed as an adjunct to a USAID-implemented sectoral program in Vietnam known as the Provincial Health Assistance Program. After the war ended, MEDCAPS and VETCAPs (their veterinary equivalent), have continued to the present as a program of the civil affairs community. Because they are short-term in nature the connection between these missions and the larger public health engagement in a given country may not be obvious. MEDCAPs continue to operate in the absence of an overarching public
health framework, which can be frustrating for USAID health officers at post. Navy ships including the Kearsarge, Comfort, and Mercy make annual circuits to the ports of countries where USAID missions are located. The port visit decisions are generally not made primarily with regard to development objectives, so what the Navy personnel who arrange them are seeking is assistance in locating host country medical or health personnel and NGOs with whom they can work. Since the creation of OMA, USAID has been making progress in guiding the selection of sites and improving coordination with the medical mission personnel. Guidance on how to arrange these visits is available from the regional bureau technical office or GH.

10. Civilian-Military Programming in Djibouti

In Djibouti, in order to ensure effective and coordinated civilian-military programming the US Embassy and USAID have taken the lead and restructured the design and approval process for civil affairs (CA) activities based on the following principles: strategic programming, sustainable development, host country ownership, and managing for results. Originally, CJTF/HOA identified CA activities and then hoped that the Country Team would approve them. More often than not, these nominations did not address foreign policy or host country priorities leaving the Country Team with no option but to reject the nominations and leaving CJTF/HOA frustrated and unsure of how to move forward. In order to correct this situation, USAID, in conjunction with the Embassy, reversed the process so that USAID would identify the priority development sectors (to ensure that they corresponded to USAID’s development strategy) and then the government ministries in those sectors would recommend activities for consideration (to ensure host country ownership). After activities were proposed, CJTF/HOA would assess them against their own criteria and submit nominations to the Country Team for approval -- resulting in a 100% approval rate.

This strategy paid dividends in one very important way - it enabled the USG to continue to meet the pressing health needs in the country and fill an important gap in USAID programming. This was critical because Djibouti has some of the lowest health indicators in the world including the third highest TB prevalence rate worldwide, one of the highest maternal mortality rates, and staggering acute malnutrition rates, especially for children.

As background, USAID’s four year $12 million Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Program had been instrumental in addressing maternal and child health issues by assisting the Ministry of Health to expand essential health services to rural areas. By constructing or rehabilitating 23 of the 25 rural health clinics in the country, providing training, and creating capacity at the local level, childhood immunization rates tripled the under-five mortality rate was reduced by 27%, and 90% of the country had access to health care. In four short years (2004-2008), the lives of mothers and children in rural areas were saved or improved due to increased access to health care.

Despite these impressive results, future funding for the MCH program was not available and USAID’s health program shifted to a focus on TB, polio and HIV/AIDS. It was therefore essential to find other means to assist the Government of Djibouti to continue to meet the urgent MCH needs in the country. In order to accomplish this, USAID worked with the CJTF/HOA to re-align their civil affairs program to focus on construction of the remaining clinics or provide rehabilitation to the current ones. USAID facilitated linkages between CJTF/HOA and the Ministry of Health which helped to ensure that CJTF/HOA’s rehabilitation efforts contributed to and built upon larger USG and Government of Djibouti priorities -- multiplying the impact of their assistance. The President of the Country has expressed gratitude to CJTF/HOA for assisting the Government in meeting its target of providing access to health care to 100% of the country.

Specific factors that have made this whole-of-government approach possible in Djibouti:

- **Location**: Since CJTF/HOA is based in Djibouti, the close proximity of the Embassy, USAID and the base facilitates easy communication and reduces some of the inevitable misunderstanding that comes from bridging different priorities, budgets, timelines and cultures. USAID chairs weekly implementing partner meetings, of which CJTF/HOA is a member, to ensure coordination with USAID implementers. These weekly sessions also serve as orientation and
teaching sessions and assist CJTF/HOA personnel in better understanding the complexities of development assistance and the needed adjustments in the way they plan, assess and implement their programs. Size of Program: The balance between the USAID program and CA activities in Djibouti is more aligned than it is in other countries in their area of operation (AOR). USAID/Djibouti’s budget is small compared to other USAID missions in the AOR while CJTF/HOA’s civil affairs budget for Djibouti is large compared to their budgets in other countries. It therefore pays for USAID to invest the time and energy it takes to align activities. As an example, most of the USAID missions in the AOR have budgets in the half a billion to $1 billion range while CJTF/HOA’s CA activities can be as small as $150,000 in some countries. In these circumstances, USAID Mission’s do not have the same incentive to spend the immense amount of time and energy that it takes to align activities. For many of these countries, the impetus to get involved then becomes one of ensuring that men and women in uniform carrying out civilian affairs activities are doing no harm.

- Emphasis on Large vs. Small CA Activities: Although the Country Team agreed to approve a limited number of nominations from the CA team for small scale activities of less than $10,000 that weren’t directly related to USG priorities but that could help to advance the credibility of the CA team at the local level, the clear emphasis was placed on large projects (up to $500,000) in priority sectors. There were proponents on both sides of the ‘focus and concentrate’ vs. ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’ approaches, but in the end, most have now seen the value of focusing and concentrating resources for a larger impact. This approach has helped Djibouti avoid the problems highlighted in the "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya" study, namely that "small-scale and scattered projects did little to win hearts and minds or change perceptions of the US in the communities where they projects were implemented."

- Overall Goal: The stated goals of CJTF/HOA’s CA activities range from countering violent extremism, improving security, fostering stability, and forging relationships. When CJTF/HOA does their assessment of the projects that are submitted by the Government of Djibouti (through USAID), they look at how they will help to achieve these goals, but the links are very tenuous.

D. Funding

Although promoting civilian-military cooperation is desirable in itself, it may also result in access to additional funding beyond that authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and appropriated by the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriation Act. This section discusses several of the DoD-managed and interagency funds which may be of interest to USAID missions.

1. Section 1207

Section 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act states that the Secretary of Defense may provide services to, and transfer defense articles and funds to, the Secretary of State for the purposes of facilitating the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country. The aggregate value of all services, defense articles, and funds provided or transferred to the Secretary of State under this section in any fiscal year may not exceed $100m. For FY 08, the Defense Authorization Act changed the subsection number from 1207 to 1210. However, for the sake of clarity, funds are to be referred to as 1207 as outlined in the original authorization. Operations and maintenance funds from the three military services and from the defense-wide account have been tapped for this purpose, although the legislation does not specify a funding source.  

16 For FY 2010, Section 1207 funds are limited to $25 million. Section 1207 may be phasing out to be replaced by the $50 million complex Crises fund created in the FY 2010 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Public Law 111-117. Whether Section 1207 continues or not, the principles acquired during the first few years of this facility’s implementation should be equally applicable to the new fund.
In short, NDAA section 1207 provides funds designed to be transferred to civilian agencies, to further the following purposes:

- To address unanticipated needs for reconstruction, stabilization and security
- Promote interagency cooperation and a whole-of-government (WoG) approach to Stability Security Transition Reconstruction (SSTR) issues.
- Stimulate civilian participation in War on Terror
- Ideally, complement to 1206 (train and equip) funding

The criteria include the following.

- Proposals should assist our foreign partners to address conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism.
- Programs should focus on security, stabilization, or reconstruction objectives in regions and countries where a failure to act could lead to the deployment of U.S. forces.
- Programs should be distinct from other U.S. government foreign assistance activities and address urgent or emergent threats or opportunities that conventional foreign assistance activities cannot address in the required timeframe.
- Programs should seek to achieve short term security, stabilization or reconstruction objectives that are coordinated with longer-term development efforts and that are expected to be sustained by the host government, international organizations, or other forms of U.S. foreign assistance.
- Programs should address stability, security and development goals from a holistic perspective, integrating initiatives across multiple sectors.
- While proposals may originate at Embassies, State regional bureaus, USAID, or Combatant Commands, all proposals must be closely coordinated with the affected Embassy and submitted by the Ambassador. All proposals must be cleared with the relevant Combatant Command. Those submitting proposals should consult broadly and draw in other U.S. Government components that have relevant expertise.
- Programs should be coordinated with any U.S. security capacity building programs.

Section 1207 does the following:

- Give DoD the authority to transfer up to $100M (per year) to the State Department for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance – primarily to put civilian professionals alongside warfighters in stability operations.
- Require coordination with State.

Section 1207 does not:

- Allow DoD to transfer funds/resources to USG agencies and departments other than State.
- Provide resources for Iraq and Afghanistan, for which Congress has appropriated separate monies.
-Void existing restrictions under Appropriations Acts, the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act prohibitions.

2. OHDACA

The Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Program was established in 1986 to assure friendly nations and allies of our support and provide basic humanitarian aid and services to populations in need. The Department and Combatant Commanders seek to help avert political and humanitarian crises, promote democratic development and regional stability, and enable countries to begin to recover from conflicts.

DoD’s 2009 Guidance for the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Program specifies that:

OHDACA-funded humanitarian assistance programs must not duplicate or replace the work of other USG agencies that provide foreign assistance;

Projects must be consistent with, and complementary to, each Mission Strategic Plan and USG Foreign Assistance Plan as established by USAID and State Department;

DoD will seek concurrence on OHDACA-funded humanitarian assistance programs from the USAID Mission Director.

(See DOD POLICY GUIDANCE FOR DOD OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (HAP))

HA projects and activities accomplish these objectives in several ways. They support (1) donation of excess non-lethal DoD property and (2) the provision of on-the-ground activities carried out by U.S. military personnel.
aimed at assuring friendly nations of our support by improving U.S. military presence in countries. Such activities include assessment of needs, rudimentary construction of clinics, schools, and roads, as well as medical, technical and logistical assistance. In non-crisis peacetime settings, DoD humanitarian assistance programs support the Combatant Commanders by providing access to and fostering goodwill for the U.S. military in selected countries.

DoD, in coordination with the Department of State (DoS), transports non-lethal excess defense property in support of US national security and foreign policy objectives. Funding also provides for distribution of relief supplies, acquisition and shipment of transportation assets to assist in distribution; purchase and provision of relief supplies; refurbishment and restoration of excess DoD non-lethal equipment; storage of excess property; and inspection, packaging and intermediary warehouse storage until excess material is delivered. The costs of DoD assistance include other smaller scale activities conducted by U.S. forces targeted at relieving suffering and promoting U.S. military presence in countries. These activities include training, rudimentary construction, and medical, technical, engineering and logistical assistance. Among the functions of such activities are surveys and assessments to ensure the DoD excess property is appropriately used for the intended purpose and that local personnel are trained in its operation and maintenance.

Humanitarian Assistance activities of the Combatant Commanders reflect the priorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They also include support programs that ensure proper administration of humanitarian activities and allow the DoD to anticipate future requirements and understand key issues related to program execution. Activities include technical and administrative assistance and studies, including initiatives to support actions to improve civilian-military collaboration and coordination of humanitarian assistance and operations with NGO and international organizations. These activities provide for timely response to emerging priorities defined by USG principals as important to the bilateral military relations of the United States, to include requests from other agencies that further national security and foreign policy objectives.

Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response (FDR/ER): This activity enables the Combatant Commanders to respond timely and effectively to crises in their areas of responsibility. FDR/ER enables the Commanders to assist countries by improving local crisis response capacity and training in disaster planning and preparedness. This minimizes the potential for crises to develop or expand – promoting regional stability and reducing a requirement for large-scale deployment of US military forces at a later date. These disaster preparedness efforts increase host nation’s capability to respond to natural or manmade disasters, reducing the likelihood that future disasters will require a significant USG/DoD response.

In times of severe natural disasters, the U.S. military has been and will continue to be, called upon to provide aid and assistance. The Commanders have unique assets and capabilities to respond to major disasters. OHDACA funding allows the Commanders to provide immediate life-saving assistance to countries in their region. These funds have helped the Defense Components and the Commanders reduce their costs of operations as well as transportation costs for logistical support. OHDACA funding is available to support the DoD response to small-scale contingencies, and to provide seed money aimed at leveraging larger assistance packages from national and international donors responding to complex emergencies.

DoD also plays a key role in humanitarian crises by providing effective response when asked by the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. The U.S. military offers exceptional operational reach and can be immediately deployed as a stopgap measure to limit the extent of emergencies. DoD’s ability to respond rapidly assists in the containment of crises and limit threats to regional stability by donating and/or transporting relief aid within hours or a few days of a disaster. The DoD is unmatched in regard to command and control, logistics, transportation, and communications, and in the amount of cargo able to be transported by available air or sealift. These capabilities would be extremely expensive to develop and maintain in any other government agency.

Emergency response encompasses transportation, logistical support, provisions of Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) (to maintain the health of moderately
malnourished recipients until conventional relief programs or targeted feeding can be resumed), search and rescue, medical evacuation, and assistance to internally displace persons and refugees, in the form of both supplies and services. Projects also include those that help build recipient country and non-governmental organizations’ emergency response capability to reduce the potential need for U.S. military involvement in future crises response.

The Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program is a major component of DoD’s security cooperation strategy. Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), which include landmines, unexploded ordnance, and small arms ammunitions, are the residues of civil wars and internal conflicts on virtually every continent. Increasingly in these conflicts, these ERW deny civilian populations their livelihoods, uproot them from their lands, and promote political instability. Today, explosive remnants of war kill or maim at least 1,000 people every month—most of them innocent civilians.

The HMA Program, executed by the Combatant Commanders, provides significant training and readiness-enhancing benefits to U.S. forces while contributing to alleviating a highly visible, worldwide problem. The program aids in the development of leadership and organizational skills for host country personnel to sustain their mine action programs after U.S. military trainers have redeployed. The DoD program provides access to geographical areas otherwise not easily available to U.S forces and contributes to unit and individual readiness by providing unique in-country training opportunities that cannot be duplicated in the United States. U.S. military personnel do NOT enter active minefields or remove emplaced landmines. Our military forces hone critical wartime, civil-military, language, cultural, and foreign internal defense skills. Additionally, DoD health services professionals are included in training missions, which increase their knowledge and ability to deal with blast/trauma wounds, while providing advice and assistance to host nations on immediate and short-term victims assistance issues. These victim assistance activities include epidemiological studies of injuries caused by ERW, first responder training, educational material development, surgical care and training, and enhancement of consultative services using telemedicine technology. Projects provide direct humanitarian assistance while benefiting DoD by providing excellent training opportunities for our soldiers and by expanding U.S. military medical contacts with foreign medical providers.

Summary of the Sri Lanka Experience

The following is information and summary of how PACOM/Sri Lanka funds were transferred.

In the case of Sri Lanka, the request for HCA funds was submitted by the ODC Chief to PACOM’s J4. In other combatant commands, applications may be submitted via the Security Assistance Officer (SAO) or the Defense Attaché (DATT) based in the Embassy of the country submitting the application. It is important to ensure that the application is brought to the attention of the geographic combatant command as early as possible.

Good communications between USAID (in this case, specifically Asia and Middle East Bureaus) and J4 (and the ODC heads that report to the J4) were established. This was key in providing programs suggestions where PACOM’s funding could complement, fill gaps and not duplicate USAID program activities already underway. Regardless, programs need to benefit both USAID and PACOM (or the relevant COMCOM). Once program activities are agreed upon by PACOM and USAID, an Inter-agency agreement was written (using the Economy Act authorities) with the assistance of the PACOM, the Mission, the New Delhi regional office of acquisition and Assistance (OAA) contracting officer and RLA to transfer funds from PACOM to USAID in the amount $2.66 million. Funds were transferred out of PACOM and were received by USAID in about two weeks’ time from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). They were then allowed to the Mission last week. The money can be whatever flavor the Mission wants. It is determined with the Financial Management staff in USAID.
3. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

CERP is an important and growing source of funding available to the US military. The Program appropriates funds for commanders of operational units in Iraq and Afghanistan to meet the emergency humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the local population. CERP activities have included water distribution projects, sanitation services, electricity projects, health care programs, education programs, rule of law initiatives, and civic cleanups. CERP has been continuously authorized since November 2003. For a complete list of CERP laws see http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/08-006.pdf, pg 16.

The following information is extracted from the Commander’s CERP Handbook:

The Department of State (DOS) has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the U.S. government (USG). The legal authority for the DOS security assistance and development assistance missions is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §2151.1 An exception to this authority occurs when Congress enacts a Department of Defense (DOD) appropriation and/or authorization to conduct foreign assistance. The CERP, as currently funded, falls within this exception for Humanitarian Assistance Authorizations and Appropriations. The CERP is resourced with federally appropriated funds of the USG. These funds are provided to military commanders to meet the urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements of the Iraqi and Afghan civilian population. The U.S. Army Budget Office provides CERP funds to the U.S Central Command Combined Forces Land Component Commander who, in turn, distributes these funds to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Combined Joint Task Force-82/76 (CJTF-82/76). The Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and CJTF-82/76 C7 (Engineer) and C8 (Comptroller) staffs develop recommended CERP distribution plans for each of their respective Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) in their respective theaters based upon desired effects, operational priorities, and the MSC’s ability to execute the funding plan. All CERP distribution plans are approved by the MNC-I and CJTF-82/76 commanders. The commanders for MNC-I and CJTF-82/76 provide guidance, establish priorities, and identify focus areas for the use of CERP among subordinate headquarters in support of theater-specific strategic objectives and desired effects. These objectives may vary over time. Examples of theater-level objectives for the CERP include the following:

- Ensuring urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements are met for the indigenous population
- Improving local governance capacity by partnering with provincial government agencies in identifying, prioritizing, selecting, and developing projects
- Ensuring the larger, strategic projects and services are connected to the end user in local communities
- Creating momentum and conditions for economic recovery and development

MSCs and tactical commanders, in coordination with local officials and other USG agencies, develop and approve CERP projects consistent with theater-specific guidance, their respective funding approval authority, and budget availability.

1. Authorized Uses of CERP

Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR) DOD 7000.14-R, Volume, Chapter 27, and DOD policy outlined in the Tina W. Jonas, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Memorandum, Subject: Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) Guidance, 9 May 2007, provides commanders with specific authorizations and restrictions on the use of their CERP funds. The Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) guidance states CERP funds may be used to assist the Iraqi and Afghan people in the following 19 representative areas:

- Water and sanitation projects that repair or develop water and sewer-related infrastructure (wells, filtration and distribution systems, storage tanks, pumping stations, treatment plants).
- Food production and distribution projects that increase food production or food distribution processes (food storage centers/warehouses, food distribution facilities).
- Agriculture projects that increase agricultural production or provide for cooperative agricultural programs (irrigation systems, pipelines, pump units,
irrigation canals).

- Electricity projects that repair or develop electrical power or distribution infrastructure (generators, distribution lines, substations, towers, residential/commercial connections).

- Healthcare projects that repair or develop healthcare facilities and services (hospitals, clinics, urgent healthcare services, immunizations, medicine, medical supplies, or equipment).

- Education projects that repair or develop education facilities (schools, universities, education supplies, furniture, and equipment).

- Telecommunications projects that repair or develop telecommunications systems or infrastructure (cell phone towers, switch networks, hubs, telephone lines).

- Economic, financial, and management improvement projects that improve economic or financial security (banks, banking systems, facility security)

- Transportation projects that repair or develop transportation systems (roads, bridges, culverts, public transportation stations and facilities).

- Rule of law and governance projects that repair or develop government buildings and legal facilities (administration offices, courthouses, and prisons).

- Irrigation projects that repair or develop irrigation systems (canals, pump stations)

- Civic cleanup projects that remove trash and clean up communities (trash collection and disposal programs, landfills, waste incinerators).

- Civic support projects that purchase or lease vehicles to support civic and community activities.

- Civic and cultural facilities projects that repair or restore civic or cultural buildings and facilities (museums, historic and cultural sites).

- Repair of damage that results from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations and is not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. Condolence payments may include payments made to the surviving spouse or next of kin of defense or police personnel who are killed because of U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations (sometimes referred to as “martyr” payments).

- Payments to individuals upon release from detention.

- Protective measures projects to enhance the durability and survivability of critical infrastructure sites (fencing, lighting, barrier materials, berming, and guard towers).

- Other urgent humanitarian relief or reconstruction requirements not covered in 1-18 above but equally critical to local humanitarian and reconstruction needs and deemed necessary by local commanders (examples may include facilities related to firefighting, rescue services, removal of hazardous materials).

(2) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Waiver

Of additional importance to the commander using CERP funds is the “waiver authority” granted the Secretary of Defense in Section 1202, Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 208-287). The language in the Authorization Act states that, “[f]or purposes of the exercise of the authority provided by this section or any other provision of law making funding available for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program…the Secretary may waive any provision of law not contained in this section that would (but for the waiver) prohibit, restrict, limit, or otherwise constrain the exercise of that authority.” To streamline CERP expenditures, the Secretary of Defense waived provisions of the FAR and other federal contracting and procurement rules that might otherwise prohibit CERP implementation. Specifically, commanders can give preference to Iraqi and Afghan contractors and are not required to undertake the traditional “bid process” to identify the lowest cost to the government. This waiver is balanced by general fiscal prudence and local guidance that states commanders will not deliberately overpay for projects and will pay reasonable prices for supplies and services that yield a modest functional standard. Again, the intent of the CERP is to shape the
battlefield by funding projects that provide immediate, tangible, relief to the indigenous populations, as well as inject money into the local economies by providing jobs to the unemployed.

3) CERP Restrictions

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) guidance outlines that the CERP may not be used for any project, program, or service that provides:

- Direct or indirect benefit to U.S., coalition, or other supporting military personnel.
- Goods, services, and funds to national armies, national guard forces,
- Border security forces, civil defense forces, infrastructure protection forces, highway patrol units, police, special police, intelligence, or other security forces. (Other funds, such as the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund provide other avenues of financing for such projects)
- Weapons buy-back programs or other purchases of firearms or ammunition, except as authorized by law and separate implementing guidance. (10 U.S.C. §127b allows the military to pay monetary rewards to people for providing USG personnel with information or nonlethal assistance that is beneficial to an operation or activity of the armed forces conducted outside the U.S. against international terrorism or for force protection of the armed forces. This reward program is not a weapons buy-back program; however, the USG will pay rewards for information leading to the recovery of enemy weapons).8
- Entertainment.
- Reward programs. (However, many reward programs are authorized under 10 USC Section 127b and implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan through major command orders.)
- Removal of unexploded ordnance.
- Services available through municipal governments.
- Salaries, bonuses, or pensions of Afghan or Iraqi military or civilian government personnel.
- Training, equipping, or operating costs of Afghan or Iraqi security forces.
- For conducting psychological operations, information operations, or other U.S., coalition, or Iraqi/Afghanistan Security Force operations.
- Support to individuals or private businesses, with the exception of condolence payments, battle damage payments, and micro-grants.

Example: A brigade commander has been given approval authority from his division commander for CERP projects less than $200,000 in value. However, the brigade has a water treatment facility in its area of responsibility that is critical to the local population and requires rapid repair work estimated to be approximately $250,000. To expedite the repair of the facility, the commander cannot divide the required work on the water treatment plant into two $125,000 projects (or any other combination). He and the staff must combine all estimates of work necessary to make the plant complete and usable to the community and submit a project request to the division commander or next higher command echelon. Commanders may not commingle CERP appropriated funds with non-appropriated funds, and CERP funds will be separately executed, managed, recorded, and reported.

Commanders may not circumvent established monetary limits and approval requirements for their echelon of command by “splitting” a single project into multiple, smaller-scale projects. The commander should apply the “complete and usable” concept to determine if a project is in potential violation of splitting. Specifically, this means any given project cannot be dependent upon the completion of another project to be “complete and usable” to the end user.

If in doubt on any potential use or restriction of CERP funds, commanders should get a ruling from unit legal, finance, and/or contracting officers.

4) Micro-Grants

Micro-grants represent a modification to earlier CERP policy that prohibited direct payment to assist private businesses. The micro-grant program expands the flexibility of CERP and authorizes commanders to provide cash, equipment, tools, or other material support to small businesses that lack available credit or
financial resources. Micro-grants are not a “free money” program. Micro-grants must be used with strict disciplinary measures in place to ensure the economic development objectives of the command are being advanced. The intent of the program is to increase economic activity, particularly in areas where small businesses have suffered because of insurgent or sectarian violence. The business activity must support coalition reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations and meet specific criteria established by theater-specific policy. Commanders should consider two points when implementing micro-grant programs within their areas of responsibility. First, they should require the enterprise to submit a proposal for the loan that outlines the enterprise’s spending plan. This proposal confirms the business leader’s legitimate intent for the coalition CERP funds. Additionally, commanders should require the business owner to accomplish the first elements of the business plan using his internal financial or material assets. This procedure confirms the owner’s dedication to his stated plan and minimizes the potential unauthorized use of coalition funds.

(5) General Funding Approval Authorities

The approval authorities outlined below reflect the implementing guidance from the USD(C), as well as current theater specific standing operating procedures (SOPs). These authorities may vary by theater and command.

As the Executive Agent for CERP, the U.S. Army is required to notify the USD(C) separately for each project in excess of $500,000. As such, the approval authority for projects in excess of $500,000 in Iraq is the Commander, MNC-I. In Afghanistan, the approval authority for projects in excess of $500,000 is the Commander, CFTF-76/82. These projects also require a contract by a warranted contract officer. These commanders have delegation authority for projects below the $500,000 threshold. As a general rule, in each theater, battalion and provincial reconstruction team commanders have approval authority for CERP projects up to $25,000. Brigade combat team/brigade commanders generally have retained approval authority for CERP projects up to $200,000. Division commanders have generally held approval authority for CERP projects up to $500,000. However, each of these thresholds may be adjusted over time by theater-specific policies and/or command SOPs.

Brigade-level commanders are generally the approval authority for micro-grants valued at or below $2,500. The approval authority for micro-grants in excess of $2,500 is retained at the general officer level.

4. How funding works in PRTs

(1) Afghanistan

Provincial Reconstruction Teams were established in Afghanistan at the end of 2002. PRTs are integrated civilian military organizations that are designed to improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces. In keeping with the overall policy environment at the time, the central focus was on maintaining a light international security “footprint” and on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to address instability in remote, ungoverned regions of the country.

At present, twenty-two PRTs are operating in Afghanistan. Thirteen are managed by the U.S. led Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan and the remaining nine are under the auspices of the International Security Assistance Force.

Initial guidance on the structure and functions of US-led PRTs was agreed to by senior civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the Deputies Committee in June 2003. The guidance envisioned that civilian representatives and military officers in the PRT would work as a team to assess the environment and develop strategies to achieve their three primary objectives.

The military has responsibility for improving security in their area of operation and providing force protection for all PRT members, including civilians. USAID has the lead on reconstruction and the Department of State is in charge of political oversight, coordination, and reporting. All members of the PRT leadership structure—military and civilian—are required to approve reconstruction projects and to coordinate with local government offices and national ministries. The concept anticipated that as PRTs matured and conditions changed, additional capacity would be available through reach back to military and civilian assets.
The Local Government Development Project (LGDP) provides the civilian funding for PRT activities. The activity is currently undergoing a redesign and will launch its next phase in mid-2009.

(2) Iraq

Unlike in Afghanistan, CERP funds in Iraq (also termed Development funds for Iraq, or DFI) originated as a stabilizing tool that commanders could use to benefit the Iraqi people. Initial resources came from millions of dollars of Ba’athist Party cash discovered by U.S. forces. These funds, along with the other regime assets, funded a variety of emergency projects. CPA guidance directed that the funds be used by commanders “to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq.” The program was intended to include interventions in water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, healthcare, education, telecommunications, projects in furtherance of economic, financial, management improvements, transportation, and initiatives which further restore the rule of law and effective governance, irrigation systems installation or restoration, day laborers to perform civic cleaning, purchase or repair of civic support vehicles, and repairs to civic or cultural facilities.

(3) CJTF-HOA

The combined Joint Task force- Horn of Africa is a military task force located on the African continent, with which many USAID and NGO staff have had the opportunity to coordinate. The Task force has been operating since May 13, 2003, when the mission transitioned ashore to Camp Lemonier in Djibouti City, Djibouti. Since then, CJTF-HOA personnel have used Military-to-Military mentorship as the cornerstone to building partner country security capacity. CJTF-HOA has supported development by building numerous schools, clinics and hospitals and conducted dozens of Medical Civil Action and Veterinary Civil Action projects.

E. How to MIPR

Cooperation between USAID and the Department of Defense has resulted in a significant number of funds transfers between DoD and USAID, pursuant to interagency agreements as governed by USAID’s Automated Directives System, specifically ADS 306. These transfers require a rather burdensome set of steps, many of which were designed to ensure that congressional intent with regard to the end use of funds is respected. Caution must be taken in pursuing such transfers. When it is appropriate to do so, the procedure, known as Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request, or MIPR, requires the steps shown at right.

The MIPR form looks like this:

OMA has much more information on this process and will be pleased to share examples of memoranda and checklists with other interested offices.
III. Organization of the Military

A. Civilian control and the Services

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, was enacted primarily to improve the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct joint (interservice) and combined (interallied) operations in the field, and secondarily to improve the DoD budget process. The act contained three major changes: it greatly strengthened the influence and staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, compared to those of the service chiefs and military departments; it increased the authority and influence of the unified combatant commands that control U.S. forces in the United States and around the world; and it created a “joint officer specialization” within each service to improve the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff.

The act's supporters felt that U.S. military operations since World War II had suffered from conflict and inadequate coordination among the services. They believed that individual service programs and priorities, rather than the needs of actual joint military operations—the ultimate purpose for which the armed forces were maintained—dominated DoD. Enough retired senior officers, former civilian DoD officials, and private analysts and commentators, as well as members of Congress, agreed with these views to make it possible for the act to be enacted over the objections of the uniformed military leadership.

The intensity of objection was much greater in the Navy and Marine Corps, as had been the case for all disagreements about service unification since the end of World War II. In general, those who objected to the act felt that DoD operational and budgetary problems in the post–World War II era resulted from lack of political will, inadequate defense budgets, excessive civilian “micromanagement” of military operations and defense budgets, and the inevitable chaos and friction attendant on war or the operations of any large organization. They were also skeptical of “jointness,” believing that service-unique assets and views needed to be nurtured, not submerged; and that increased requirements for joint and central organizations created unnecessary bureaucracy, subsuming service assets and doctrine into less than optimal joint doctrines or systems.

The act has been accepted by most officers and civilian analysts, but certain issues remain. For USAID, the effect of this is that agreements made with one part of DoD may not be widely understood by other parts—the Army, Navy and Marines continue to have separate command structures that may interfere with each other, and efforts may be duplicated among the services.

1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities. OSD includes the immediate offices of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries of Defense, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Assistants to the Secretary of Defense, Director of Administration and Management, and such other staff offices as the Secretary establishes to assist...
in carrying out assigned responsibilities.

2. **Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the head, or chief of staff, of each military service and an additional high-ranking officer from one of the services who serves as chair, function as the virtual high command of the U.S. armed forces, the key planning organization for and coordinating link between the services, and the foremost military advisers to the president, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and Congress. The organization was established informally during World War II and institutionalized by an act of Congress in 1947. It has been altered on numerous occasions since then, with the emergence of a powerful chairman and joint staff the most notable change.

**B. Ranks**

Officer ranks in the United States military consist of commissioned officers and warrant officers. The commissioned ranks are the highest in the military. These officers hold presidential commissions and are confirmed at their ranks by the Senate. Army, Air Force and Marine Corps officers are called company grade officers in the pay grades of O-1 to O-3, field grade officers in pay grades O-4 to O-6 and general officers in pay grades O-7, which is at present the highest rank. The equivalent officer groupings in the Navy are called junior grade, mid-grade and flag.

Warrant officers hold warrants from their service secretary and are specialists and experts in certain military technologies or capabilities. The lowest ranking warrant officers serve under a warrant, but they receive commissions from the president upon promotion to chief warrant officer 2. These commissioned warrant officers are direct representatives of the President of the United States. They derive their authority from the same source as commissioned officers but remain specialists, in contrast to commissioned officers, who are generalists. There are no warrant officers in the Air Force.
The non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps (which in the USA, includes Navy and Coast Guard petty officers PO)), is often referred to as "the backbone" of the armed services. NCOs are the primary and most visible leaders for the bulk of Service personnel – the enlisted corps. Additionally, NCOs are the primary military leaders responsible for executing the military organization's mission and for training military personnel so they are prepared to execute their missions. NCO training and education typically includes leadership and management as well as Service specific and combat training. Another critical role NCOs play is providing advice and guidance to the officer corps. This role is particularly important for junior officers, who begin their careers in a position of authority but lack practical experience, including commanders at all levels and flag officers (generals and admirals). Senior NCOs and Chief Petty Officers, with their wealth of leadership and mission training and experience are the primary link between the bulk of the enlisted personnel and the officers in any military organization in the United States Army, United States Air Force and United States Marine Corps, all ranks of Sergeant are termed NCOs, as are Corporals in the Army and Marine Corps. The rank of Corporal (E-4) in the Army and Marine Corps is a junior NCO, and is to be shown the same respect as any other NCO. In the United States Navy and United States Coast Guard, all ranks of Petty Officer are so designated. Junior NCOs (E-4's through E-6 grade), or simply "NCO's" (E-4 and E-5 only) in USMC usage, function as first tier supervisors and technical leaders. NCOs serving in the top three enlisted grades (E-7, E-8, and E-9) are termed senior noncommissioned officers (Chief Petty Officers in the Navy and Coast Guard). Senior NCOs are expected to exercise leadership at a more general level. They lead larger groups of service members, mentor junior officers, and advise senior officers on matters pertaining to their areas of responsibility. Within the Marine Corps, senior NCOs
are referred to as Staff NCOs and also include the rank of Staff Sergeant (E-6). A select few senior NCOs in paygrade E-9 serve as Senior Enlisted Advisors to senior commanders in each Service (e.g., major command, fleet, force, etc.) and in DoD (unified commands, e.g., STRATCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, etc.), and DoD agencies, e.g., DISA, DIA and NSA. One senior E-9, selected by the Service Chief of Staff, is the ranking NCO/PO in that Service, holds the highest enlisted rank for that Service, and is responsible for advising their service Secretary and Chief of Staff. One E-9 holds a similar position as the SEA to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senior Enlisted Advisors, Service Enlisted Advisors and the SEA to the Chairman advise senior officer and civilian leaders on all issues affecting operational missions and the readiness, utilization, morale, technical and professional development, and quality of life of the enlisted force.

Unlike Warrant Officers in other militaries, Warrant Officers in the United States Armed Forces are considered specialty officers and fall in between non-commissioned and commissioned officers. Warrant officers also have their own rank tier and paygrade. However, when Warrant Officers achieve the rank of Chief Warrant Officer, CWO2 or higher, they are commissioned and are considered as commissioned officers just like any other commissioned officer but are still held in a different paygrade tier. They are entitled to salutes from their juniors, an officer's sword and uniform, but for much of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) are considered on par with NCOs.

### D. Combatant commands

A Unified Combatant Command (UCC) is a United States joint military command composed of forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is organized either on a geographical basis (known as "Area Of Responsibility", AOR) or on a functional basis. All UCCs are commanded by either a four star general or admiral and are considered "joint" commands with specific badges denoting their affiliation. UCCs (formerly known as "COCOMs", a term now reserved exclusively for the authority they hold, which is also called "combatant command") are led by Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), formerly known as a regional "Commander-in-Chief" (CINC; pronounced "Sink").

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is updated annually in conjunction with the DoD Fiscal Year and can modify areas of responsibility or combatant command alignments or assignments. As of January 2008, there were ten Unified Combatant Commands as specified in Title 10 and the latest annual UCP. Six have regional responsibilities, and four have functional responsibilities. President Truman approved the first Unified Command Plan on 14 December 1946.

There are six geographic combatant commands, whose headquarters are shown below.

- **US Africa Command** (Kelley Barracks; Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany). [USAFRICOM](https://www.usafic.com)
- **US Central Command** (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida). [USCENTCOM](https://www.uscentcom.mil)
- **US European Command** (Patch Barracks; Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany). [USEUCOM](https://www.useucom.mil)
- **US Joint Forces Command** (Norfolk, Va.). [USJFCOM](https://www.usjfcicom.mil)
- **US Pacific Command** (Honolulu, Hawaii). [USPACOM](https://www.uspacom.mil)
- **US Southern Command** (Miami, Florida). [USSOUTHCOM](https://www.ussouthcom.mil)
- **US Strategic Command** (Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska). [USSTRATCOM](https://www.stratcom.mil)
- **US Transportation Command** (Scott Air Force Base, Illinois). [USTRANSCOM](https://www.ustranscom.mil)
The map below shows the area covered by the geographic combatant commands. It can be seen that the geographic areas do not correspond exactly with those of regional bureaus at AID or State which, upon occasion, can cause difficulty.

**E. Civil Affairs**

Although USAID may be called upon to work closely with a variety of military units and functions, many of the counterparts with whom you are likely to deal belong to the area the Army calls Civil Affairs. The CA unit’s principal purpose is to act as a liaison between the civilian inhabitants of a war zone or disaster area and the military presence, informing the local commander of the status of the civilian populace and either coordinating military operations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and IGO’s or directly distributing aid and supplies. The Civil Affairs function in the Army is housed in Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Their presence in humanitarian operations is a recurring source of friction with NGO humanitarian actors, but determining the appropriate roles for civilians and military in combat and highly insecure environments is far from obvious, especially in areas where NGOs are not present. Note that CA activities may be designed as much to serve a public relations purpose as a developmental one.

DoD humanitarian assistance activities were first authorized by Congress in 1986, essentially to transport DoD excess non-lethal property and privately donated humanitarian assistance and relief material to countries in need. In FY 1996, DoD was permitted to fund a wider variety of HA activities, including using contracts and

\[17 \text{ http://www.socom.mil} \]

\[18 \text{ http://www.usip.org/pubs/guidelines.html} \]
deployment of U.S. military personnel to conduct specific humanitarian projects. The program is authorized by 10 U.S.C. section 2561 and its projects are funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Appropriation, managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Projects include the refurbishment of medical facilities, construction of school buildings, digging of wells, improvement of sanitary facilities, and training of host country personnel in internally displaced persons/refugee repatriation operations and in disaster relief and emergency response planning. The involvement of the military geographical commanders has been key to the design and execution of the projects and the success of the program.

Civil affairs units support military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations during peace, contingency operations and war. Used during both conventional and special operations, civil affairs forces have a vital role and are capable of assisting and supporting the civil administration during operations.

Civil affairs specialists identify critical requirements needed by local citizens in war or disaster situations. They also locate civilian resources to support military operations, help minimize civilian interference with operations, support national assistance activities, plan and execute noncombatant evacuation, support counterdrug operations and establish and maintain liaison with civilian aid agencies and other nongovernmental organizations.

In support of special operations, these culturally-oriented, linguistically-capable Soldiers may also be tasked to provide functional expertise for foreign internal defense operations, unconventional warfare operations and direct action missions. The functional structure of civil affairs forces and their expertise, training, and orientation provide a capability for emergency coordination and administration where political-economic structures have been incapacitated.

Tactical civil affairs was provided to military commanders during Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm in Southwest Asia, support to the restoration of the Panamanian government infrastructure during Operation Promote Liberty, management of Haitian refugee camps at Guantanamo Bay and stateside natural disaster assistance in the aftermath of hurricanes Andrew and Iniki. Civil affairs experts were also called on to help rebuild the Haitian civilian infrastructure during Operation Uphold Democracy. They also participated in NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

More recently, Civil Affairs units have deployed with ground combat units in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom to assist the Afghan and Iraqi people in rehabilitating their societies after the Global War on Terrorism brought an end to decades of war and oppression in those countries. Civil Affairs Soldiers continue to play critical roles in the global peace and stabilization and reconstruction of both countries and they continue to provide support for ongoing missions in countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia and Yemen.

F. Military Exercises

Exercises are typically training events or simulations of wartime operations and may include multinational, nongovernmental, joint or single-service participants. Rather than focusing solely on the Department of Defense’s various military missions, recent exercises may include emphasis on counterterrorism, homeland defense and security, major and limited combat operations, domestic and foreign consequence management, stability operations, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

G. Organizational culture of each service

Civilians working with the armed forces often enter with the impression that the chain of command means that all members of the armed forces are united in purpose. Although they have been united in purpose and structure since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the services differ in their uniforms, capabilities, culture and operating principles. The distinctions between the services are extensive and too complicated to discuss here. The reader is referred to guides like “A Civilian’s Guide to the US Military” (Barbara Schading, 2007). It is available in the USAID library.
H. Planning and budget cycles

The DoD planning, budgeting and procurement systems are extremely complex and not easily aligned with corresponding USAID systems.

1. **GEF**

The Guidance for the Employment of the Force is the Pentagon’s most strategic guidance document, first issued in 2008 and updated every two years. The document is being updated/reviewed this year and USAID has actively participated in this process. Participation in this process affords the Agency the ability to shape and leverage DoD activities in support of USAID objectives. The GEF guides the production of each of the combatant command theater campaign plans, which should be consistent with USAID’s regional strategies, where they exist.

2. **TSCP and country plans**

Following the publication of the 1995 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the Office of the Secretary of Defense regional commanders and the Joint Staff developed a formal peacetime engagement planning process. Through the process each Geographic Combatant Commander developed a regional strategic plan now referred to as the Theater Security Cooperation Plan that described the security environment, identified engagement objectives and listed associated activities that supported those objectives. A criticism of engagement planning was that the plan was developed and executed with scarce resources and little chance to influence the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) for support.

3. **The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process**

The DoD’s budget cycle is known as the PPBE, or Program Planning for Budget Execution. The programming phase begins with the development of a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) by each DoD component. This development seeks to construct a balanced set of programs that respond to the guidance and priorities of the Joint Programming Guidance within fiscal constraints. When completed, the POM provides a detailed and comprehensive six-year projection of the proposed programs, including a time-phased allocation of resources (forces, funding, and manpower) by program. In addition, the DoD component may describe important programs with no or partial funding in the POM, and assess the risks associated with the shortfalls.

Once the Service Departments complete their POM development, the senior leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff review each POM to help integrate the DoD Component POMs into an overall coherent defense program. In addition, members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff can raise issues with selected portions of any POM, or any funding shortfalls in the POM, and propose alternatives with marginal adjustments to resources. Issues not resolved at lower-levels are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for decision, and the resulting decisions are documented in the Program Decision Memorandum.

4. **The Quadrennial Defense Review**

Planning is the first step in the DoD resource allocation process and is accomplished by almost parallel actions by the civilian side of OSD (USD Policy) and the military side (led by Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] with participation of the Services and Combatant Commanders [COCOMs]). Although USD (Policy) is the official lead for the Planning Phase of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) plays a significant role in the process. This phase begins with issuance of the national defense policy by the President’s National Security Council, in the form of the National Security Strategy (NSS), which includes input from multiple federal level agencies. The NSS defines specific national-level strategic outcomes that must be achieved.

The Planning Phase ends with the issuance of the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), which is prepared by the OSD Director, PA&E and released by the SECDEF. The JPG sets specific fiscal controls and directs explicit program actions for each Military Department and Defense Agency. The JPG is normally issued only in the on-years of the PPBE process. In general, the Planning Phase identifies the capabilities required to deter and defeat threats and defines for the upcoming Programming Phase national defense policies, objectives, strategy, and guidance for resources and force requirements to meet the capabilities and objectives. The Planning Phase begins about three years in advance of the first fiscal year for which budget
authority will be requested in the President’s Budget; for example, the planning to support the FY10 budget request began in the early part of calendar year 2007.

The first activity in the Planning Phase is a review of previous guidance. This review examines the evolution in required capabilities and changes in military strategy and policy as documented in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) issued by the SECDEF (first issued in 2005 and re-issued in June 2008). The NDS provides strategic guidance on the priority of defense missions and associated strategic goals. The review also includes the National Military Strategy (NMS) issued by the CJCS. The NMS provides strategic direction on how the Joint Force should align the military ends, ways, means, and risks consistent with the goals established in the NDS. The Planning Phase also includes the OSD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (which was last completed in 2006 and is required to be completed again and submitted to the Congress in 2010). The QDR provides the results of a comprehensive examination of potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, modernization programs, infrastructure, and information operations and intelligence. The FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) amended the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) to recognize the Department’s QDR Report as the Department’s strategic plan. All of these documents provide strategy-based planning and broad programming advice for preparation of what was previously published as the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG); however, in 2008 the SPG was replaced by a new document. The Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) considers a long-term view of the security environment and helps shape the investment blueprint for the six POM years. Issued for the first time by SECDEF in May 2008, it establishes priorities within and across Joint Capability Areas managed by Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs). In a forthcoming Department of Defense Directive (DoDD), the CPMs are to be charged with developing capability portfolio planning guidance and programming, budgeting, and acquisition advice. The overall role of the CPMs will be to manage assigned portfolios by integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing programs to optimize capability within time and budget constraints. A related document, but not included in the PPBE process, is the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), which sets forth operational priorities from the present time through the next two years (budget years). The GEF was issued by SECDEF for the first time in May 2008. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which is developed concurrently with the GEF and issued by the CJCS, tasks the COCOMs with developing plans consistent with the GEF.

The JCS-level Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), along with the Joint Staff, assists the CICS in identifying and assessing the priority of joint requirements, studying alternatives, and ensuring priorities conform to and reflect resource levels projected by the SECDEF. Within the Planning Phase, the JROC provides suggested issues and recommendations for the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), which is intended to influence the JPG. The CPR provides the CJCS’s program recommendations that are intended to enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and satisfy warfighting requirements. Overall JCS participation in the planning phase is governed by the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), CJCS Instruction (3100.01), and CICSI 8501.01A, which addresses participation by the CJCS, the COCOMs, and the Joint Staff in the DoD PPBE process.

The Planning Phase concludes with the SECDEF’s issuance of the JPG, which is the link between the Planning and Programming Phases. In recent PPBE cycles, to include the 2010-2015 POM, the JPG has been initially issued, revised, and reissued as the Planning phase evolves.

5. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)

The UJTL is a comprehensive list of possible military tasks at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The UJTL is meant to be a tool in operational planning and similar forms of military planning. It gives a menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that a joint force commander may select to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission essential task list, or METL.

I. Examples of DOD Civ-Mil structures
1. **The civilian-military operations center (CMOC)**

The CMOC is a mechanism for the coordination of civilian-military operations that can serve as the primary coordination interface and provide operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. In reality, the CMOC may be physical or virtual and conducted collaboratively through online networks. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task organized based on the mission.

A CMOC is formed to:

- Carry out guidance and JFC decisions regarding CMO;
- Exchange Information. Sharing information is a key function of the CMOC, but military staff must be careful to avoid the impression that stakeholder organizations are being used for intelligence gathering.
- Perform liaison and coordination between military...
capabilities and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

- Provide a forum for military and other participating organizations. It is important to remember that these organizations may decide to attend CMOC meetings but may choose not to consider themselves members of the CMOC to better maintain their impartiality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for informal stakeholder discussions but not as a stakeholder coordination forum.

- Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, indigenous population and institutions (IPI), the private sector, and regional organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.

The recent DOD funding that Sri Lanka has received are Humanitarian and Civil Assistance (HCA) funds. Submissions for these funds are done on an annual basis and are put into the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS). In the case of Sri Lanka, the funds came through DoD via the Pacific Combatant Command (PACOM), but funding for the Central Asian Republics would come through CENTCOM.

2. Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are special interagency teams that provide security and facilitate stability and development programming. They exist in two countries at present and may assume a variety of forms. PRTs first began in Afghanistan in late 2001 or early 2002 followed by Iraq in 2003. Each PRT consists of a small operating base from which a group of sixty to more than one thousand civilians and military specialists work to deliver aid and perform reconstruction projects as well as provide security for others who are involved in aid and reconstruction activities.

There are approximately 26 PRTs in Afghanistan and an unknown number in Iraq. Within these PRTs there are typically 3-5 civilians and the remainder is made up of military forces. PRTs are backed by local and international security forces. PRTs were originally built and operated by US forces as means of facilitating reconstruction efforts in provinces outside the capital, Kabul. Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
IV. For a Military Audience

The following brief introduction to USAID is designed to help the military officer assigned to work with USAID staff at headquarters or in the field. An on-line introduction to USAID, and to the Department of State, is available at www.jko.mil. Further specific information is available at www.usaid.gov and from USAID’s Office of Military Affairs at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/.

A. Brief history of USAID

On September 4, 1961, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which reorganized the U.S. foreign assistance programs including separating military and non-military aid. The Act mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic assistance programs, and on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID became the first U.S. foreign assistance organization whose primary emphasis was on long-range economic and social development assistance efforts. Freed from political and military functions that plagued its predecessor organizations, USAID was able to offer direct support to the developing nations of the world.

The agency unified already existing U.S. aid efforts, combining the economic and technical assistance operations of the International Cooperation Agency, the loan activities of the Development Loan Fund, the local currency functions of the Export-Import Bank, and the agricultural surplus distribution activities of the Food for Peace program of the Department of Agriculture.

While some could argue that the creation of USAID simply represented a bureaucratic reshuffling; but the agency, and the legislation creating it, represented a recommitment to the very purposes of overseas development. USAID was established to unify assistance efforts, to provide a new focus on the needs of a changing world, and to assist other countries in maintaining their independence and become self-supporting.

1. Historical Perspective

The 1961 reorganization of America’s foreign aid programs resulted from an increasing dissatisfaction with the foreign assistance structures that had evolved from the days of the Marshall Plan, to which USAID and U.S. foreign assistance policy traces its roots.

By the end of World War II, Europe had suffered substantial loses, physically and economically. Responding to Europe’s calls for help, the international community established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) on December 27, 1945. On April 2, 1948, through the enactment of the Economic Cooperation Act, the United States responded by creating the Marshall Plan. While the IMF and the World Bank were created as permanent institutions, the goal of the Marshall Plan was specific: To stabilize Europe, not as a permanent program for European recovery but as an emergency tool of assistance.

When the Marshall Plan ended on June 30, 1951, Congress was in the process of piecing together a new foreign aid proposal designed to unite military and economic programs with technical assistance. On October 31, 1951, this plan became a reality when Congress passed the first Mutual Security Act and created the Mutual Security Agency.

In 1953, the Foreign Operations Administration was established as an independent government agency outside the Department of State, to consolidate economic and technical assistance on a world-wide basis. Its responsibilities were merged into the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) one year later.

The ICA administered aid for economic, political and social development purposes. Although the ICA’s functions were vast and far reaching, unlike USAID, ICA had many limitations placed upon it. As a part of the Department of State, ICA did not have the level of autonomy that USAID currently maintains. At the time, multilateral donors (such as those affiliated with the United Nations and the Organization of American States) were playing a greater role in foreign assistance.

The Mutual Security Act of 1954 introduced the concepts of development assistance, security assistance, a discretionary contingency fund, and guarantees for private investments. The Food for Peace program was implemented that year, introducing food aid.
Congressional approval of a revised Mutual Security Act in 1957 lead to the creation of the Development Loan Fund (DLF), which acted as the ICA’s lending arm. The DLF’s primary function was to extend loans of a kind that the Export-Import Bank and other donors were not interested in or prepared to underwrite - those repayable in local currencies. The DLF financed everything other than technical assistance but was most noteworthy for financing capital projects.

Neither the ICA nor the DLF addressed the need for a long-range foreign development program. That led to the creation of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

2. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act

By 1960, the support from the American public and Congress for the existing foreign assistance programs had dwindled. The growing dissatisfaction with foreign assistance, highlighted by the book The Ugly American, prompted Congress and the Eisenhower Administration to focus U.S. aid to developing nations, which became an issue during the 1960 U.S. presidential campaign.

The new Kennedy Administration made reorganization of and recommitment to foreign assistance a top priority. It was thought that to renew support for foreign assistance at existing or higher levels, to address the widely-known shortcomings of the previous assistance structure, and to achieve a new mandate for assistance to developing countries, the entire program had to be "new."

In proposing a new United States foreign assistance program in 1961, President Kennedy provided a justification based on three premises: (1) then current foreign aid programs, "America’s unprecedented response to world challenges", were largely unsatisfactory and ill suited for the needs of the United States and developing countries, (2) the economic collapse of developing countries "would be disastrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity, and offensive to our conscience", and (3) the 1960s presented an historic opportunity for industrialized nations to move less-developed nations into self-sustained economic growth.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that was enacted as a result of the legislative process begun by President Kennedy was a relatively concise document that recognized the economic and political principles expressed in the President's transmittal message. Development assistance consisted primarily of two programs: (1) a Development Loan Fund whose primary purpose was to foster plans and programs to "develop economic resources and increase productive capacities" (i.e., a significant amount of capital infrastructure), and (2) a Development Grant Fund, to focus on "assisting the development of human resources through such means as programs of technical cooperation and development" in less developed countries.

The new directions most emphatically stressed were a dedication to development as a long-term effort requiring country-by-country planning and a commitment of resources on a multi-year, programmed basis. The new focus of development was to achieve economic growth and democratic, political stability in the developing world to combat both the perceived spread of ideological threats such as communism and the threat of instability arising from poverty. The economic development theory of W.W. Rostow, which posited "stages of economic development," most notably a "takeoff into growth" stage, provided the premise for much of the development planning in the newly-formed U.S. Agency for International Development.

In the final analysis, the greatest achievement of USAID and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was that they addressed the goals of setting up country-by-country planning and long-term development planning mechanisms through solving the organizational problems in the then-existing foreign assistance programs.

One of the first programs undertaken by the fledgling USAID was the Alliance for Progress. Conceptually set-up in the fall of 1960 by the Act of Bogota and confirmed by the Charter of Punta del Este (Uruguay) in early 1961, the Alliance was a hemisphere-wide commitment of funds and effort to develop the nations of the Americas. The Alliance became the basis for USAID's programs in Latin America throughout the 1960s. President Kennedy promoted the Alliance in trips to Colombia and Venezuela in 1961.

In Asia, USAID's first emphases were on countering the spread of communism, particularly the influence of the People's Republic of China. This quickly ballooned into a
large program of assistance based on counter-insurgency and democratic and economic development in Vietnam, which lasted until the withdrawal of American troops in 1975. In Africa, USAID focused on such initiatives as the education of the leadership of the newly-independent countries and meeting other economic and social imperatives.

B. USAID Organization

The U.S. Agency for International Development is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has field offices in many of the countries where we have programs. For a graphical representation of this structure, please see the USAID Organization Chart.

1. Leadership

USAID is headed by an Administrator and Deputy Administrator, both appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Administrator is Dr Rajiv Shah.

2. Bureaus

In Washington, USAID’s major organization units are called bureaus. Each bureau houses the staffs responsible for major subdivisions of the agency's activities.

USAID has both geographic bureaus (which are responsible for the overall activities in the countries where there are programs) and functional bureaus (that conduct agency programs that are world-wide in nature or that cross geographic boundaries.) The agency's geographic bureaus -- and the Assistant Administrators
In addition, certain major headquarters functions are also assigned to bureaus. Headquarters bureaus include Management (M); Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA).
Each bureau is headed by an Assistant Administrator, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

### 3. Independent Offices

In addition to these bureaus, USAID has several independent offices that carry out discrete functions for the agency. These offices are headed by directors who are appointed by the USAID Administrator. USAID’s Independent offices are the Office of the Executive Secretariat (ES); Office of Equal Opportunity Programs (EOP); Office of the General Counsel (GC); Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU); Office of Security (SEC); and Inspector General (IG).

The Office of the Inspector General reviews the integrity of Agency operations through audits, appraisals, investigations and inspections. A more complete description of these organizational units, authorities and responsibilities is available in Chapter 101 of the agency’s Automated Directives System (ADS) (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/).
C. How USAID budgets

The foreign assistance budget cycle has an enormous number of stakeholders in Congress, the State Department and the White House. This chart shows the formal steps in the process.

**Key to Map (main focus on Foreign Assistance)**

A. RM/SPP develops MSP guidance for Foreign Operations and Foreign Assistance (FA) out-year requests with input from the Secretary, F, and Bureaus.
B. Operating Unit (OU) develops its MSP with its out-year FA budget request in response to budget scenarios in the MSP guidance.
C. F, Agency Management, and Bureaus review country submissions for foreign policy priorities and adjustments to be made.
D. With input from the Secretary, F, and Bureaus, RM/SPP develops BSP guidance for Foreign Operations and Foreign Assistance out-year requests.
E. Bureaus develop BSPs with the out-year Foreign Assistance budget request for the resources they manage.
F. F reviews assistance priorities and compares to assistance requests to arrive at out-year allocation of funds.
G. Bureaus influence country allocation process.
H. Senior reviews lead to development of Annual Budget Submission (ABS) that is submitted to OMB.
I. OMB reviews ABS and makes adjustment. These are sent back in the Passback.
J. F/R&A considers the Passback with State and USAID management and sends a reclama to OMB.
K. OMB sends final Passback to State and USAID.
L. F, Operating Units, Bureaus, H, and LPA begin working with OMB to prepare and submit the President’s budget and CBJ respectively (i.e., so that requested funding is consistent in both documents).
M. President’s Budget and CBJ submitted. Conf Rep: Conference Report with House and Senate Appropriations Bills. This is what is ultimately passed as a Conference Bill. In many cases, there is a Continuing Resolution that extends this process into OYB new fiscal year.
N. F uses the Conference Report to come up with initial budget allocations based on various directives and earmarks that are informed to them by H and LPA.
O. Operating Units use the initial allocations to complete the Budget Distribution (Phase 1b of the Operational Plan).
P. After the appropriation is signed, F/R&A and OMB negotiate any final control levels.
Q. Afterwards, the Agency must send the 653a Report and the Congressional Notification to the Hill to inform Congress of this whole process and of the intent to obligate funds. The Budget Distributions are used to inform this process.
R. Operating Units inform the bureaus how to obligate the funds, i.e., bilateral vs. Washington-based field support (Phase 2 of the Operational Plan).
S. OMB releases funds to State and USAID (apportionment).
T. F allots the funds
U. Bureaus allow the funds.
V. Operating Units sub-allow the funds to activities.
W. Operating Units provide performance information related to the completed fiscal year (Phase 1a of the Operational Plan, aka the Performance Report).
Although the steps may vary from year to year, the outline of the process remains fairly constant. Still, the great number of steps and stakeholders means that a given year’s allocation process may not be completed until the final days of the fiscal year. This makes the obligation and multiyear programming system critically important for development programs which would otherwise be prey to shifting policy winds from year to year.

For the program officer in the field, the budget cycle is laid out as shown on the next page.

D. How USAID Does Planning

USAID Planning is described in detail in ADS 201: [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/201.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/201.pdf). The key feature is the results framework, around which a given result is resourced and evaluated:

A brief overview of the process is given in the following slide.

One example of a planning format for an individual activity is given below. This worksheet is appropriate for use when funds are available and have already been obligated in a strategic objective agreement. Planning and preparation of the worksheet can begin before obligation, however.
# Activity Planning Worksheet

**Program Area:**
**Element(s):**
**Activity title:**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- **Background Information:**
- **Potential opportunities:**
- **Potential constraints:**

## ACTIVITY DETAILS

**Describe the activity or activities:**
**Planned inputs and outputs:**

## PRE-OBLIGATION REQUIREMENTS

1. Will the activity (or activities) directly support achievement of an approved result?
2. Is there an illustrative budget for the activity providing a reasonably firm estimate of the cost to the U.S. Government?
3. Is there a plan for monitoring performance of the activity?
4. Have analyses necessary for adequate planning been completed?
5. Have steps been taken to minimize the use of new obligating instruments? Has consideration been exercised to use existing instruments?
6. Additional Planning Considerations:
   a. Was this activity selected from among alternative approaches?
   b. Are findings from the gender analysis adequately reflected in the activity design? Has the gender statement or rationale been included?
   c. Are appropriate obligating and subobligating instruments planned?
   d. Are appropriate partner organizations (or types of organizations) identified?
   e. Are acquisition and assistance (A&A) plans clear and any waiver requirements documented?
   f. Do proposed implementing entities have the requisite financial and other management capacities?
   g. Are any counterpart contribution requirements identified (or waived, if waiver is necessary and authorized)?
   h. Are identified signatories authorized to sign and bind their respective principals?
   i. Are implementation time frames clear, including completion dates?
7. Have Agency Environmental Review Procedures been followed for this activity or activities?
8. If the activity involves assistance to a country, has the annual country statutory checklist been completed?
   If yes, when was it completed?
9. Has an assistance statutory checklist been completed covering this activity or activities?
10. Has an authorized official approved the activity?
11. Has Congress been properly notified and is there no outstanding objection?
12. Are funds available?

## ILLUSTRATIVE INTERVENTIONS

**Describe proposed interventions (Type and mechanisms):**

## IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT

**Describe the overall implementation strategy:**
**Identify management of activity (internally and externally):**
**Describe proposed obligating instruments:**
**Identify the institutions and/or organizations involved:**

## WAIVERS

**Describe any waivers of policy or regulations:**

**Other Notes:**
USAID planning has three elements:

- **Strategic planning:** Under the direction of the Director of Foreign Assistance, USAID collaborates with State/F to formulate a coordinated USG foreign assistance strategy. At the field level, USAID Missions—an integral part of the USG Operating Unit led by the U.S. Ambassador—participate in preparing joint country assistance strategies, where those are required. Alternatively, USAID Missions may prepare their own USAID country strategic plans.

- **Assistance Objective (AO) planning:** Assistance Objective (AO) planning: USAID uses bilateral AOs to provide comprehensive long-term support to achieve clearly defined foreign assistance results. AO’s are done for USAID programs covered by joint country assistance strategies as well as programs covered by USAID Strategic Plans. USAID applies its development knowledge and expertise in analyzing host-country issues and in identifying appropriate tactics to implement jointly defined strategic priorities, which may often have cross-cutting dimensions. USAID collaborates with other USG agencies in preparing the Mission Strategic Plan and the Operational Plan, which request program funding and describe the tactics proposed to achieve Foreign Assistance results and report on progress in achieving objectives. To demonstrate its effective use of USG resources, USAID also plans how it will monitor, evaluate, and report on the programs it implements in annual Performance Plans and Performance Reports.

- **Project planning:** USAID’s well-established systems for collaborative project and activity design — including feasibility, financial planning, and procurement considerations — ensure attention to technical issues and USG statutory requirements.

The Agency mission, vision, and core values provide a framework that guides planning. This framework is shaped by learning from past experience (both from USAID and other entities’ experiences) and is described in the mandatory reference, **Agency Strategic Plan**. This plan also sets out an overall vision of what USAID want to accomplish through a statement of overarching Agency goals, and represents a broad consensus on a framework for action that directly affects planning efforts.

Linking the planning, assessing and learning functions are performance measures. USAID needs to know whether it is succeeding, and it does this by establishing performance measures and performance targets before achievement takes place. These measures are used to assess progress and outcomes. When necessary, USAID works to develop better performance measures as programs are implemented. These measures help USAID stay focused on results throughout the three phases of our work.

Assessing and learning is not the end of the process. It includes making decisions that lead to management initiatives that in turn put us back into planning. New planning could range from developing a new activity, to refining Strategic Objectives (SOs) or Intermediate Results (IRs), to rethinking our tactics in an entire goal area of the Agency Strategic Plan. The latter could affect many subsequent objectives in different countries or Washington programs.

Values are deeply held beliefs that guide action in a wide range of circumstances. The USAID core values are an explicit statement of those values that USAID, as an Agency, seek to promote actively in order to improve our overall performance. Core values represent ideals we strive for, as opposed to a state that we have already achieved. In USAID, we specifically seek to promote five interrelated core values:

- Managing for results
- Customer focus
- Teamwork and participation
- Empowerment and accountability
- Valuing diversity

These core values help us focus on the things that matter: working with others; encouraging staff to take initiative and assume risks; embracing cultural, social, and gender differences; and achieving development results. These values are reflected in how the agency organizes its work and processes, delegates authority, engages partners and customers, judge the value of its efforts, and apply the regulations expected to follow.
Core values alone are not sufficient for success in a large government organization. Similarly, simply following the regulations in ADS chapters is not sufficient either. Applying the core values while implementing rules, regulations, and procedures leads us to achieve the most meaningful results rather than merely implement activities or administer resources.
### 1. Planning glossary

Here are some common terms used by project and program designers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Specific value or values that can serve as a basis for control or subsequent comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to an intervention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Impact     | 1. A result or effect that is caused by or attributable to a project or program. Impact is often used to refer to higher-level effects of a program that occur in the medium or long term, and can be intended or unintended and positive or negative. (Source USAID-State)  
2. The overall effect of accomplishing specific results. In some situations it comprises changes, whether planned or unplanned, positive or negative, direct or indirect, primary and secondary that a program or project helped to bring about. In others, it could also connote the maintenance of a current condition, assuming that that condition is favorable. Impact is the longer-term or ultimate effect attributable to a program or project, in contrast with an expected accomplishment and output, which are shorter-term. |
| Indicator  | 1. A quantitative or qualitative variable that provides reliable means to measure a particular phenomenon or attribute.  
2. Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable basis for assessing achievement, change or performance. A unit of information measured over time that can help show changes in a specific condition. A given goal or objective can have multiple indicators. |
| Outcome    | 1. A result or effect caused by or attributable to a project, program or policy. Outcome is often used to refer to more immediate and intended effects.  
2. The intended or achieved short and medium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs, usually requiring the collective effort of partners. Outcomes represent changes in development conditions which occur between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact. |
| Result     | The output, outcome or impact intended (or unintended).  
2. The measurable output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive or negative) of a development intervention. |

### 2. Achieving


In distinction from the military implementation model, most of USAID’s activities are implemented through partners—host country institutions, NGOs, contractors and others. This indirect approach to implementation permeates the USAID business model, ensuring that all parties to the activity understand the goals and objectives and have a stake in the outcome.

### 3. Learning

E. The Focus Country effort

In October 2008, the Administrator approved designation of five focus countries, one per geographic bureau, for more robust articulation of the civilian-military planning concept and implementation of the civilian-military policy. OMA is tasked with coordinating efforts among the regional bureaus, the Combatant Commands, and USAID missions to carry this out. Regional bureaus each nominated one country where USAID and DOD share strategic interests, and gained GCC concurrence and buy-in from DOS, OSD, and the Joint Staff.

Under this initiative, Country Teams host 1-2 working group meetings with the Senior Defense Official/Security Cooperation Organization, the GCC, and USAID to identify sectors where DOD and USAID objectives overlap; identify activities that the Mission and DOD can undertake jointly in shared space; establish regular consultations between DOD and US Missions within respective program cycles; and develop best practices for coordination in other Missions. Ultimately the Focus Country Initiative seeks to institutionalize the link between the DOD GEF and DOS and USAID Strategic Planning; institutionalize USAID participation in GCC Theater Campaign Plans; and operationalize whole of government planning and execution. The desired outcome is more efficient use of USG resources to meet foreign policy goals; an intermediate result is to move closer to the point at which USAID and DoD regard one another as strategic partners in achieving their goals.

Since that time, a number of countries have sought to do achieve the same goals in other ways. The following checklist may be of use to missions seeking to set up such an event:
### Timeline and Checklist for Focus Country Visit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Who</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Establish contact and set expectations with Mission, ODC, State regional bureau, COCOM, OSD/Joint Staff</td>
<td>OMA, USAID Regional bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USAID Mission, ODC, and COCOM exchange strategic planning documents, analyze them for mutual objectives</td>
<td>USAID Mission, ODC, COCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Washington working group convenes to discuss Focus Country effort and support Mission/ODC</td>
<td>USAID/W, OSD, Joint Staff, State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Teleconference with all participants to confirm progress, determine participants and logistical details, set workshop dates (if not already establish)</td>
<td>All concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>USAID Mission, ODC, and COCOM begin developing Workshop agenda, drafting MOU for joint USAID-DoD activities, setting up workshop logistics</td>
<td>USAID Mission, ODC, COCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>COCOM planners and HCA staff visit Focus Country to assess proposed joint project sites (optional)</td>
<td>COCOM Planners and HCA staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Second Washington working group meeting to discuss Focus Country effort and support to Mission/ODC (optional)</td>
<td>USAID/W, OSD, Joint Staff, State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Teleconference with all participants to confirm progress, finalize logistical</td>
<td>All concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Send country clearance request</td>
<td>Out-of-country participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Final teleconference to confirm preparations</td>
<td>All concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Focus Country Workshop</td>
<td>All participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Survey of Workshop Participants</td>
<td>All concerned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Points of contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>USAID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>The Office of Military Affairs in DCHA has resident military representatives from each combatant command and the US Army Corps of Engineers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For matters relating to disaster assistance and emergency response, contact the Military Liaison Unit of OFDA. In the field, contact the Mission Disaster officer or the Regional Disaster Management officer in the regional office (ask at the USAID mission where this is located). For crisis response, SSTR and Phase 0 operations, contact the office of Military Affairs (DCHA/OMA) in Washington.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The place to start is the Joint Interagency Coordination Team, or JIAC, or its equivalent. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM are organized differently.

Field

This varies widely. Where there is a Combatant Command representative in the embassy, he or she will be known as the ODC or MilRep or SDO. The Defense Attache is generally not the right person to talk to unless there is no other representative. The Marine Security Guard is charged only with Embassy security and is not an appropriate point of contact.

For matters related to general development programming, begin with the program officer or Deputy Director. For disaster response, ask for the disaster response officer. For NGO coordination matters, the Humanitarian or FFP officer may be helpful.

1. **The Senior Development Advisors**

The Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) are senior Foreign Service positions, and many of the new SDA officers have experience implementing development and stabilization programming in collaboration with DoD and DoS in GWOT countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan. SDAs provide advice and counsel to Combatant Commanders regarding development, relief, reconstruction and stabilization issues in the AOR. SDAs will provide critical linkages for COMOs with USAID headquarters and with bilateral USAID missions in a role analogous to that of the POLAD for the Department.

The goal of creating these new positions in 2007 was to seek ways to implement development activities in a manner that complements DoD strategic and operational plans as reflected in Theater Campaign Plans and as part of Theater Security Cooperation Plans. The SDA is charged with the following:

- Lead USAID’s evaluation, review and development input for Theater Security Cooperation Plans, linking USAID’s regional bureau headquarters and field missions with the host Combatant Command.

- Lead or facilitate evaluation, development and execution programs related to Stability Operations, including activity reviews and program development; work on joint budget initiatives wherever appropriate; and ensure program integration on both sides of the relationship.

- Develop a network of working relationships between USAID and the US military, with a focus on USAID field missions, key USAID contractors and grantees working in the AOR, other key donors and partners working in the region, US and overseas training, pre-deployment and support units in the military, key policy and support groups and leaders in the Pentagon, and other lead military groups working in the region, such as NATO and other country services.
• Work with USAID’s Office of Military Affairs and DOD to develop training, exercises and joint activities that strengthen USAID-military cooperation; and

• Serve as USAID’s Point of Contact on interactions between USAID and the Combatant Command including duty as the initial Point of Contact on any emergency or crisis response action until such time as additional personnel may be assigned.

2. SDA MOA

Regardless of the quality of the relationship between USAID and the military authority at post, it is necessary to develop an MOA to govern joint activities. This is especially true where there will be an assignment or detail of personnel. The following page from an MOA with CJTF/HOA it provided to show what the MOA looks like, but does not contain detail about personnel or reimbursement. This format is by no means mandatory but may be helpful to posts seeking to identify formal coordination structures. For MOU examples pertaining to a given combatant command or region, contact OMA and the General Counsel.
3. **Models of cooperation**

USAID’s engagement with the Department of Defense is principally dictated by whether the engagement is of short duration or longer duration, and whether the environment is permissive or non-permissive. As a general rule, the role of USAID in these cases is to promote development, stability or disaster response; each of these roles requires a different mix of USAID authorities and tools. The following matrix can be helpful in determining the composition of programs and their application.

### Examples of program modes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Threat</th>
<th>High Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Country</td>
<td>Stability Programming Infrastructure Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster, Humanitarian CA coordination, MEDRETE</td>
<td>PRT, FATA Q1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Country examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Threat</th>
<th>High Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines, Colombia</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunami, Hurricane Mitch, Georgia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Strategic approach:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Threat</th>
<th>High Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Planning</td>
<td>Stability Ops Hold-Build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief CA Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEXES

### A. Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity Cycle (OTI)</strong></td>
<td>Loosely outlined by five stages – Idea, Pending, Cleared, Completed, and Closed – the Activity Cycle aims to focus people on the intentionality of implementation and evaluating its impact. Throughout the Activity Cycle, lessons learned must be documented and then subsequently used in creating follow-on activities. Similarly, new ideas may stem from one activity that lead to other ideas in an effort to maximize the positive impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automated Directives System (ADS)</strong></td>
<td>A continually updated reference consolidating all federal statutes and regulations relevant to USAID’s work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **After-Action Review (AAR)** | 1. A process that provides commanders with direct feedback regarding the accomplishment of selected joint mission-essential tasks, conditions, and standards, stated in terms of training objectives, for the evaluation of training proficiency.  
2. An analytical assessment of training events that enables the training audience, through a facilitated professional discussion, to examine actions and results during a training event. (CJCSI 3500.01 B) |
<p>| <strong>AO</strong> | Area of Operation |
| <strong>AOR</strong> | Area of Responsibility |
| <strong>Backstop</strong> | The skill category of a particular position in USAID (e.g., country director, contracts officer); also, the numeric code used to identify a skill category |
| <strong>Bilateral grant agreement or bilateral grant</strong> | A grant by USAID to a foreign government or a subdivision thereof, e.g. Ministry of Health, or a local or state government or agency, to finance activities in furtherance of a assistance objective or for other purposes. Bilateral grants range from grants financing specific objectives and limited scope grant agreements to SOAGs, commodity import program grants and cash transfer grants. |
| <strong>Building Partnership Capacity</strong> | Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners, including other U.S. government departments and agencies; state and local governments; allies, coalition members and other nations; multinational organizations; and nongovernmental organizations at home and abroad. |
| <strong>Calendar of Critical Events</strong> | A calendar formed as part of the Rolling Assessment and daily analysis process that projects, forecasts and identifies critical events that we can knowingly predict, assign to a date or time period, and critical events that do not yet have a date/time but which present opportunities once scheduled. |
| <strong>Capacity building</strong> | A process whereby people, organizations, and society as a whole are enabled to strengthen, create, improve, adapt, or maintain their abilities to manage their affairs, through training, mentoring, networking, and improvements in equipment, infrastructure, programs, and organizational structure. |
| <strong>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joint Training Master Plan (JTMP)</strong> | A directive developed and updated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that provides planning guidance and commended training issues. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Training Master Schedule (JTMS).</strong></th>
<th>A calendar of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise program events that integrates the joint training schedules of the combatant commands, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Joint Staff-sponsored exercises; includes exercise summaries for the program year and proposed summaries for the following five years.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change Agents</strong></td>
<td>See Target Actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CMOC</strong></td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COCOM, Combatant Command</strong></td>
<td>Military organization at the Operational level that covers an assigned geographic area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collection Management Plan.</strong></td>
<td>A detailed effort to ensure that all exercise joint mission-essential tasks, training objectives, and specified training audience processes are analyzed and reported; describes who, what, when, where, how, and how much data to collect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combatant Command Joint Training Plan</strong></td>
<td>A strategy that is developed and updated annually by each combatant commander for training assigned forces in joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures that are used to accomplish the mission during the selected training period; identifies the training audience, objectives, events, and required resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combatant Command Joint Training Schedule</strong></td>
<td>A resource-constrained program that is developed and updated annually by the combatant command staff and that integrates the command’s joint training plans with the schedule of the combatant commander-sponsored exercises; includes exercise summaries for the program year and proposed summaries for the following five years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command Post Exercise (CPX)</strong></td>
<td>An event that involves simulated forces, plus the commander, the staff, and communications within and among headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commander's Summary Report (CSR)</strong></td>
<td>A written record of the significant strengths and weaknesses of a commander's staff's performance relative to the selected joint mission-essential tasks and training objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complex emergency</strong></td>
<td>A disaster, usually long-term, combining political, military, and humanitarian problems in a way that hinders relief efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CORDS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Event</strong></td>
<td>An event or development that we can knowingly predict OR that emerges unexpectedly that is of political, social/cultural significance. It often presents a “window of opportunity” – a strategic opening in a political transition. It can make or break the momentum or direction of the political transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CTO</strong></td>
<td>The USAID official responsible for administering a contract and seeing that the contractor’s performance meets the contract’s technical requirements and quality standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emerging Issues</strong></td>
<td>An issue or topic of growing importance or concern within a region, country or community that has the potential to impact or affect the momentum or direction of the political transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EPRT</strong></td>
<td>Embedded Provincial reconstruction team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Exercise** | A multinational, joint, or single-service military maneuver or simulated wartime operation that is conducted for training and evaluation purposes and that involves planning,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Exercise Incident</strong></th>
<th>An occurrence that directing staffs inject into an exercise, that affects the participating forces or their facilities, and that requires action by the appropriate commander and/or staff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exercise Specifications</strong></td>
<td>The fundamental requirements for an exercise, providing in advance an outline of the concept, form, scope, setting, aim, objectives, force requirements, political implications, analysis arrangements, and costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exercise Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>The commander who conceives a particular exercise and orders that it be planned and executed either by the commander’s staff or by a subordinate headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exercise-Directing Staff</strong></td>
<td>A group of experienced, qualified, and knowledgeable officers who direct or control an exercise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F</strong></td>
<td>Bureau for Foreign Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Command-and-Control System (GCCS)</strong></td>
<td>Highly mobile, deployable command-and-control system that supports forces for joint and multinational operations throughout the range of military operations, any time and anywhere in the world, with compatible, interoperable, and integrated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interagency</strong></td>
<td>United States government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intergovernmental Organization (IGO)</strong></td>
<td>A group created by a formal agreement, such as a treaty, between two or more governments and established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes; formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 3-08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Interoperability.** | 1. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and to accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to enable the services to operate effectively together.  
2. As applied to the Department of Defense only, the condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. |
| **Joint [Personnel] Reception Center (JRC, JPRC).** | The facility established in an operational area that receives, accounts for, trains, and processes arriving and departing military and civilian individual augmentees. |
| **Joint After-Action Report (JAAR).** | A written account of significant joint and universal lessons learned that provides the official description of an operational training event. |
| **Joint Doctrine.** | Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more military departments, in coordinated action and toward a common objective. This authoritative joint doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise .. It will be promulgated by or for the |
| **Joint Event Life Cycle (JELC).** | The design, planning, preparation, execution, analysis, evaluation, and reporting stages of joint training. (CJCSI 3500.03A) |
| **Joint Exercise** | A joint military maneuver, simulated wartime operation, or other event designated by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by a combatant commander, that involves planning, preparation, execution, and evaluation. The forces of two or more military departments interact with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, as well as with joint forces and/or staffs. The exercise is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. |
| **Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG).** | A collection of exercise participants whom the combatant command staff assigns to plan, direct, and control joint exercises. The group includes five subgroups: observer/trainer; controller; modeling and simulations; role players; and the opposition force. Its organization and responsibilities may vary with the combatant command. |
| **Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).** | A committee of staff members that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of U.S. government civilian and military experts, the group is accredited to the combatant commander and is tailored to meet his requirements, including the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other U.S. government civilian agencies and departments. |
| **Joint Mission-Essential Task (JMET)** | An assignment from a joint force commander that is deemed vital to mission accomplishment and that is defined with the conditions and standards language of the universal joint task list. |
| **Joint Mission-Essential Task List (JMETL).** | A written record of commander-selected work objectives that are deemed critical to mission accomplishment. It includes associated tasks, conditions, standards, as well as command-linked and supporting tasks. |
| **Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR).** | A document that provides the Department of Defense leadership with a current, macro-level assessment of military readiness as defined by the national military strategy that emanates from the combatant commands, the services, and defense combat support agencies. |
| **Joint Task Force (JTF)** | A group of joint warfighters that is designated by the secretary of defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. |
| **Joint Training** | Military instruction that is based on joint doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures, and that prepares joint forces and/or staffs to respond to the strategic and operational mission requirements of combatant commanders. The forces of two or more military departments interact with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, as well as with joint forces and/or staffs. The exercise is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. |
| **MAARD** | M Acquisition and Assistance |
| **Master Training Guide** | A collection of tasks and associated conditions and standards of a specific joint organization. Tasks are derived from joint doctrine and are grouped by mission and/or |

February 8, 2010

[CIVIL-MILITARY PROGRAM OPERATIONS GUIDE]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MilRep</td>
<td>Military Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Training Assessment (MTA)</td>
<td>A commander's subjective critique of the command's training proficiency with respect to assigned missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Exercise</td>
<td>A military event that contains one or more non-U.S. participating forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Force (MNF)</td>
<td>A group of warfighters composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Exercise Program (NEP)</td>
<td>Creates a framework to reinforce the importance of timely integrated planning, decision making, strategic coordination and operational awareness for both domestic and international crises. Coordinates the exercise requirements of HSPD-8 and multiple other Presidential Directives and strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level Exercise (NLE)</td>
<td>&quot;National-level Exercise&quot; is the term for the annual operations-based exercise, either a Functional Exercise (FE) or a Full-Scale Exercise (FSE), for which participation by heads of departments and agencies is required under the NEP. NLEs address USG strategic- and policy-level objectives and challenge the national response system. An NLE will involve all levels of Federal, State, and local authorities, and critical private sector entities. The NLE may involve international partners, as appropriate. The NEP will integrate department and agency exercise planning activities into NLEs that support specified national priorities and objectives, as contained in Presidential directives. While Principle Level Exercises (PLEs) may be used to advance the development of policy and plans, NLEs test the implementation of existing policies and plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMP</td>
<td>Performance Monitoring Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Response</td>
<td>Reacting to current events that effect the political transition in a timely manner to widen the window of opportunity, keep that window from closing, open a new window, or some combination of the three. Since timing is critical, the response should happen in as little as days if possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Components (Re)</td>
<td>Emergency supplemental forces that consist of the Army and Air National Guards and the Army, Naval, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Reserves. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario Mapping</td>
<td>A structured strategic thinking process in which emerging issues and critical events are projected to occur over the next 3 to 6 months; each scenario presents a different projection/forecast. The process facilitates shorter-term strategic thinking-planning around the emerging issues and critical events pertinent to political transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Senior development Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situational Forces</td>
<td>Groups of police, relief workers, host-government or paramilitary personnel, or potential terrorist cells that are present within an operational area and that contribute to the uncertainty of conditions within the environment of military operations other than war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strategic Objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations</strong></td>
<td>A core U.S. military mission that includes activities across the peace-war spectrum that are conducted to establish or maintain order in states or regions in order to achieve sustainable peace, while advancing U.S. interests. (DODD 3000.05 Military Support for SSTR Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stabilization</strong></td>
<td>Pertains to promoting activities that ready a situation or prepare the ground for a longer-term agenda. Lays the tracks, prevents backsliding or eruption to greater conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategically Opportunistic</strong></td>
<td>Using OTI’s limited financial resources to fund activities that will provide the greatest amount of impact. Much of this involves deliberate timing, choosing the appropriate actors, and working in the correct geographical regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Actors</strong></td>
<td>Individuals, groups of individuals or specific populations that are integral to the political transition; they offer real, potential or perceived influence, leadership in the transition; they do or potentially can impact the transition; generate or sustain momentum; they have defined or evolving interests in the transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Areas</strong></td>
<td>Communities, locations, places venues that are integral to political transition; they represent a nexus of emerging issues, critical events, target actors; often possess symbolic significance in the transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Performance Observations</strong></td>
<td>A list of joint training audience members, objectives, observer reports, and an executive summary for the commander's review and evaluation. (CJCSM 3500.03A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRADOC</strong></td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Audience</strong></td>
<td>A staff element, command, or other unit that performs a particular joint mission-essential task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Objective</strong></td>
<td>A description of the training audience, the desired outcome of a training activity, and the measures used to evaluate the learning outcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Proficiency Assessment (TPA)</strong></td>
<td>An appraisal derived from the primary trainer’s subjective assessment of an organization by comparing collective evaluations of training competence over time and against joint mission-essential tasks, conditions, and standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Proficiency Evaluation (TPE)</strong></td>
<td>An objective assessment of an organization’s achievement of training objectives, conducted during the execution phase of the joint training system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition</strong></td>
<td>A shift in the political situation at a critical juncture in a nation’s history. Three kinds of transition situations (these are basic conceptual frameworks for defining transitions – to show basic differences in the environments in which we might work) that OTI works in: Transition to Democracy; Post-Conflict Transition; Transitional Political Crisis (potential backsliding countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Forces</strong></td>
<td>All armed U.S. troops, including those of the Coast Guard, as individuals and as a group, and all equipment that belongs to the U.S. or that is being used, escorted, or conveyed by U.S. military personnel, including Type I and II Military Sealift Command vessels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)** | A menu of mission-derived assignments, including associated conditions and standards, from which a joint force commander may select. These mission-essential tasks are
reflected within the command joint mission essential task list.

| Window of Opportunity | A situation whereby either success or failure is possible, but where an opening exists to shift the situation in favor of success. Political, social, or economic circumstances could likely eliminate this opportunity in a short period of time. The windows can be fleeting, but offer an opportunity to create a perception of forward momentum that is critical to shoring up public opinion and political progress. |
B. Suggested Reading List

1. USAID

1- USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It, 2006
   http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/PDACG100.pdf
3- USAID’s Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy Implementation Guidelines (Internal USAID Document)
4- USAID Fragile States Strategy, 2005.
6- USAID-State Strategic Plan 2007-2012
7- U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century
8- Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity, 2002
9- USAID White Paper, January 2004

2. DOD

1- DOD 101
   DOD 101-Interagency.doc
   http://www.dsca.osd.mil/samm/

3. **State**


   http://www.usgcoin.org/library/USGDocuments/PlanningForRSTriggers-20070816.pdf

3. S/CRS Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization  

4. **Interagency**


4. Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and NGHOs in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments (USIP/InterAction/DoD):  
   http://www.usip.org/resources/guidelines-relations-between-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-hostile-or-potentially-hostile-envi


6. Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, rev. 1.1, November 2007 (“Oslo Guidelines”), IASC/UN OCHA:  

5. **Other**


   http://www.pnsr.org/data/images/pnsr%20preliminary%20findings%20july%202008.pdf


C. List of DOD Doctrine/Publications/Handbooks

1. DoDD 3000.07 - Irregular Warfare
2. DoDD 5100.46 - Foreign Disaster Relief
3. DoDI 3000.05 - Stability Operations
4. FM 3-05.40 - Civil Affairs Operations
5. FM 3-05.401 - Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
6. FM 3-07 - Stability Operations
7. FM 3-07.31 - Peace Operations Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations (w/Change 1)
8. FM 3-24 - Counterinsurgency
9 FM 3-24.2 - Tactics in Counterinsurgency
10. JP 3-07 - Stability Operations
11. JP 3-07.6 - Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
12. JP 3-08 - Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations
13. JP 3-24 - Counterinsurgency Operations
14. JP 3-57 - Civil Military Operations