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THE US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY PARAMETERS

Contemporary Strategy & Landpower

Mission Command: Strategic Implications

*Anthony C. King
Russell W. Glenn
Thomas-Durell Young*

After 15 Years of Conflict

*Charlotte F. Blatt
Stanley J. Wiechnik
Ellen "Elle" Klein
Douglas A. Sims II and Amy B. Adler*

Modernization among US Partners

*Ian Langford
Rémy Héméz*



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Strategic Landpower Essay Award

The annual Strategic Landpower Essay Award, formerly the Elihu Root Prize, recognizes and rewards authors for the most significant contributions to professional knowledge on the strategic role of landpower in a volume of the *US Army War College Quarterly, Parameters*. The journal's editorial board selects winners based upon the article's analytical depth and rigor. The Strategic Landpower Essay Award is made possible by the generous support of the US Army War College Foundation.

WINNERS FOR VOLUME YEAR 2016

1st Place (\$2,500 Award)

Christopher H. Tuck, "The 'Practice' Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine," *Parameters* 46, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 69–80.

3rd Place (\$1,000 Award)

Ionut C. Popescu, "Levels of Strategic Uncertainty and Planning for the Future(s)," *Parameters* 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016–17): 69–80.

2nd Place (\$1,500 Award)

Ben Nimmo, "Lessons from the Air Campaigns over Libya, Syria, and Yemen," *Parameters* 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 81–95.

From the Editor

Our Spring issue opens with a forum considering the strategic implications of *Mission Command*. Anthony King's article, "Mission Command 2.0: From an Individualist to a Collectivist Model," describes how mission command has evolved to facilitate synchronizing the decisions of key leaders. King uses the leadership models of Generals James Mattis and Stanley McChrystal to illustrate his case. Russell Glenn's contribution, "Mission Command in the Australian Army: A Contrast in Detail," points out the general similarities but subtle differences between the American and Australian models, and what they might mean for cooperation between the two in multinational operations. Thomas-Durell Young's essay, "Legacy Concepts: A Sociology of Command in Central and Eastern Europe," raises important questions regarding the incompatibility of Western notions of mission command with the "legacy concepts" that still dominate the leadership styles of several formerly Communist countries. As NATO develops ways to address Russian adventurism, it would do well to consider the possible effects of asymmetries in the command philosophies of some of its recently added members on its courses of action.

The second forum, *After 15 Years of Conflict*, offers critical insights into the ways the United States has conducted military interventions thus far in the twenty-first century. The first contribution, Charlotte Blatt's "Operational Success, Strategic Failure: Assessing the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge" compares two perspectives on the outcomes of the troop surge and identifies essential strategy decisions that significantly affected the region's stability. Stanley Wiechnik's "Tracking Democratization: Insights for Planners" provides some much needed clarity regarding the issues of state- or nation-building, and what they mean for Western strategists. Ellen Klein's article, "Immunity in Contingency Operations: A Proposal for US Contractors," suggests ways to reduce strategic and operational friction in contemporary military interventions. The US military increasingly relies on contractor support, but several issues stand in the way of making that support seamless and cost-efficient; the United States needs to consider how to protect contractors from the bureaucratic ambiguities of a host-nation's policies over the long term. The final essay, "Enhancing Resilience in an Operational Unit" by Douglas Sims and Amy Adler, discusses measures to increase unit resilience. One of the key characteristics of recent military interventions is they are marathons, not sprints. Are we doing enough to prepare US troops for that reality?

Our third forum, *Modernization among US Partners*, offers a look at how two of America's strategic partners, Australia and France, are moving forward into the twenty-first century. In "Australia's Offset and A2/AD Strategies," Ian Langford discusses the capabilities Australia's political and military leaders chose to pursue as part of their modernization strategies. In "The French Army at a Crossroads," Rémy Hémez describes how the French Army plans to accomplish its dual-missions of expeditionary warfare and homeland security with acceptable risk.

~ AJE

MISSION COMMAND: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Mission Command 2.0: From an Individualist to a Collectivist Model

Anthony C. King

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ABSTRACT: This article specifies the distinctive character of mission command in the twenty-first century by examining the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and James Mattis. These examples contrast the historical attention to immediate tactical tasks with today's application, which involves a deep and enduring interdependence between commanders across echelons so that decisions are closely aligned.

Adopted in the 1980s, mission command is the dominant command philosophy in American and, indeed, Western armed forces. US Army doctrine states “mission command is one of the foundations of unified land operations. This philosophy of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state. Mission command emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment.”¹ By empowering subordinates to take local decisions in line with a superior’s intent, mission command accelerates decision-making while simultaneously maintaining operational unity. It is therefore seen as an optimal solution on a complex, fast-moving battlefield.

Originally developed by German General Helmuth von Moltke the elder based upon German military traditions, mission command reached fruition with Oskar von Hutier’s stormtroop tactics in the First World War and the Wehrmacht’s *Auftragstaktik* in the Second World War.² It is noticeable that studies of the Wehrmacht’s operations, in particular, informed the formal introduction of mission command into Western military doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s.³ While accepting the importance of historical precedents, however, it is also widely recognized that mission command today is not a mere imitation of twentieth-century practices. Operational, organizational, and technological transformations have ensured that—while continuities are certainly observable, especially at the level of principles—the actual practice of mission command is necessarily distinctive today. Mission command has evolved.

Anthony C. King, the chair of War Studies at the University of Warwick, recently authored *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries* (2013 Oxford University Press, 2013) and *Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford University Press, 2015). He is currently writing a book on divisional command which will be published next year.

1 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), *Mission Command*, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1-1.

2 Bruce Gudmundsson, *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–18* (New York: Praeger, 1989); and Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 2005).

3 John T. Nelsen II, “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle,” *Parameters* 17, no. 3 (September 1987).

This article argues the doctrine of mission command in the twentieth century referred to a very limited devolution of authority relating to immediate tactical tasks. By contrast, mission command today does not involve mere local, individual initiative but rather a deep and enduring interdependence between commanders across levels. Decisions are not simply devolved, as they were in the past, but collectively aligned and coordinated across and within echelons to ensure the coherence of the entire network. Mission command in the twenty-first century involves a new level of organizational integration requiring intense, professionalized teamwork between commanders. This article examines the legend and reality of mission command in the twentieth century and tries to demonstrate the distinctiveness of contemporary practices through an examination of the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and James Mattis.

Mission Command in the Twentieth Century

In his work on mission command, Martin van Creveld contrasts the practices of the imperial German army with those of the British Expeditionary Force. He describes the latter as “the most extreme a form as can be found” where “carefully laid plans rigorously and undeviatingly carried out are regarded as the one way to overcome the inevitable confusion of the battlefield.”⁴ The German army, by contrast, developed a highly decentralized system, which “sought to extend the spirit of free cooperation from the highest levels.”⁵ Subordinate commanders were given minimum objectives and then encouraged to improvise. Significantly, van Creveld highlights the individualism at the heart of this system, citing 1906 regulations: “Combat demands thinking, independent leaders and troops, capable of independent action.” Even more tellingly, van Creveld cites a key sentence from the 1908 regulations: “From the youngest soldiers upward, the total independent commitment of all physical and mental forces is to be demanded.”⁶ For van Creveld, German mission command was a decentralized, individualistic system in which, in order to respond to the confusion of battle, subordinate commanders were given freedom to act as they personally saw fit in relation to their immediate circumstances.

This argument has been very influential and, indeed, reproduced almost exactly in the most recent works on mission command from such authors as Eitan Shamir.⁷ He traces the evolution of mission command from the initial approach of Prussian Frederick the Great through the von Hutier “stormtroop” tactics in the First World War. Moreover, his discussion of Helmuth von Moltke the elder is important to understanding traditional concepts of mission command.⁸ Although von Moltke planned campaigns carefully with his general staff, he understood that once in battle, unexpected situations would arise.

Shamir notes “No discussion of Moltke’s style of command would be complete without the extraordinary description of him lying on a sofa

4 Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 166.

5 Ibid., 169.

6 Ibid., 170.

7 Eitan Shamir, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

8 Ibid., 36–41.

calmly reading book while the army mobilized to fight Austria.” Indeed, J. F. C. Fuller claimed that von Moltke “abdicated his command.”⁹ Yet, the scale of operations and the limitations of communications prevented von Moltke from exercising direct command over his forces; *laissez-faire* was required. Consequently, having designed the campaign, von Moltke was forced to give his subordinate army commanders almost total license to operate independently in any crisis; they would be out of communication at decisive moments. Decision-making was not so much aligned as consciously decentralized. Local commanders acted by reference to their intuition in the light of their immediate situation.

Communications had improved enormously by the Second World War, but with mechanization, so had the pace of battle.¹⁰ Consequently, the Wehrmacht adopted a similarly individualist, Moltkean model of mission command where local commanders were empowered to act independently in broad reference to their senior commanders: “It has always been a particular forte of German leadership to grant wide scope to the self-dependence of subordinate commanders. . . . Generally, the German high commanders rarely or never reproached their subordinates unless they made a terrible blunder.”¹¹ Shamir admits that in the course of the Second World War, *Auftragstaktik* (mission-tactics command) suffered a decline. But he explains the German method of mission command was, perhaps, the central factor in Germany’s combat effectiveness in World War II: “Its de-centralised tradition facilitated organized and effective resistance even while the supreme command had all but collapsed.”¹²

Karl-Heinz Frieser’s work on the legend of blitzkrieg supports Shamir’s argument.¹³ While blitzkrieg was invented more or less by accident in 1940, mission command allowed local commanders to act on their initiative in response to their immediate circumstances without consideration or knowledge of the wider situation—for instance, as commander of 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France, Erwin Rommel “explored new paths in the command of a Panzer Division,” which has been taken as the exemplar of mission command.¹⁴ Significantly, at the Meuse, Avesnes, and Arras, he acted all but independently of his corps and army commanders, Generals Hermann Hoth and Hans von Kluge, who often had little idea of his location. Indeed, Shimon Naveh has described Rommel’s method as “sheer opportunism.”¹⁵ In the German army, Rommel was certainly extreme, and other panzer commanders, such as Hermann Balck, were less cavalier in their application of classic mission command involving ad hoc improvisation in a highly decentralized system.

9 Ibid., 41.

10 Ibid., 50.

11 Ibid., 50.

12 Ibid., 52.

13 Karl-Heinz Frieser, *The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

14 Frieser, *Blitzkrieg Legend*; Kenneth Macksey, *Rommel: Battles and Campaigns* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997); Claus Telp, “Rommel and 1940,” in *Rommel Reconsidered*, ed. Ian Beckett (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2014); Desmond Young, *Rommel* (London: Collins, 1950); Ronald Lewin, *Rommel as Military Commander* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2003); and Dennis Showalter, *Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005), 200.

15 Shamir, *Transforming Command*, 51.

Jorg Muth makes a commensurate argument in his recent work on officer education in the American and German armies before the Second World War.¹⁶ He compares West Point unfavorably with equivalent German officer training. Right up to the 1940s, West Point instituted a crude pedagogy in which students learned only boorishness and conformity. Individualism was explicitly extirpated from the officer candidates as the US Army strove to impose discipline and a wooden respect for military hierarchy in its students. By contrast, the German army sought not simply to train its officers but genuinely to educate them. It sought to create knowledgeable and questioning individuals capable of creativity, flexibility, and adaptation. Against the Prussian stereotype, German officer training created thinking soldiers, encouraged to assert themselves and to improvise, not mere automatons. In the work of all these scholars, then, traditional twentieth-century mission command is understood to be an individualistic practice based on independence and intuition.

Mission Command in the 21st Century

Scholars have identified the character of mission command in the twentieth century in detail. They have also recognized a revision of mission command today acknowledged in discussions of the Israel Defense Force and its recent operations. In conventional operations up until 1973, simple devolved mission command worked well for the IDF. Then, an individualistic doctrine proved effective. On the basis of it, the IDF developed a highly pragmatic officer class, oriented to practice and to experience, not to theory.¹⁷ The IDF operated on an ad hoc personal basis. In the twenty-first century in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza, however, this system of mission command has become increasingly inadequate. As war has become more complex and Israel's enemies more sophisticated, "it has now become clear that the practical soldier is no longer enough."¹⁸

In a recent article coauthored with Uzi Ben-Shalom, Shamir draws a divide between classical twentieth-century mission command and contemporary practice. For these authors, contemporary mission command involves more than just Moltkean deregulation: "Mission command require[s] a certain quality of education and a common language."¹⁹ Yet, the Israeli officer corps never developed a genuinely professional ethos. The education of the IDF officer corps has always been markedly inferior especially to their Western peers. Consequently, "the result is something opposed to mission command, since commanders operating in this spirit would act in accordance with their own understanding—not the mission."²⁰ As an individualist practice, the IDF has proved classical twentieth-century mission command is, in fact, increasingly unsuited to the special demands of contemporary

16 Jorg Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II* (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2013).

17 Avi Kober, "What Happened to Israeli Military Thought," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 5 (2011): 708, doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.561109.

18 *Ibid.*, 723.

19 *Ibid.*, 111.

20 Uzi Ben-Shalom and Eitan Shamir, "Mission Command between Theory and Practice: The Case of the IDF," *Defense & Security Analysis* 27, no. 2 (2011): 112, doi:10.1080/14751798.2011.578715.

operations. Indeed, in many cases, the IDF have descended into directive, centralized command of the most extreme type as they lose faith in their own mission command system.

With his discussion of the IDF, Shamir implies the practice of mission command today has evolved considerably. While he is aware of these changes, however, he does not define the term with any precision, especially in relation to Western forces. Indeed, Shamir's monograph mainly focuses on the failure of British and American forces to implement mission command on operations in the last three decades, preferring long established dirigiste systems. Similarly, although Jorg Muth focuses on the prewar period, he adopts a compatible position. He simply assumes the American Army is still committed to a directive command system. Scholars have, therefore, recognized that mission command is in transition, but they do not examine their evidence in sufficient depth to define the scale or the character of the change.

In fact, mission command no longer refers to mere devolution and individual license typical in the twentieth century but to the ever-closer integration and interdependence of commanders. Crucially, mission command today involves increasing interaction and synergy between commanders. For contemporary mission command, education and shared concepts are required so commanders at every level are oriented to the systemic effects of their local decisions. In contrast with the individualistic practice of the last century, mission command today involves collectivism with commanders united around common definitions and a shared consciousness.

Two Case Studies

Although a transformation is clearly recognized, there is a lack of detailed analysis about mission command today. This is somewhat anomalous since, with the long-running campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is extensive evidence on which to draw. In Iraq and Afghanistan, modern mission command was repeatedly demonstrated by a number of commanders. Indeed, the practice is thoroughly ingrained into the US Army and Marine Corps. There is an embarrassment of evidence. This article draws upon some of this material. In an article of this length, however, the empirical analysis must be limited. Consequently, it is impossible to prove a transformation of command definitively. The argument must, perforce, be indicative.

In this situation, rather than provide a generalized and descriptive narrative, two particularly well-documented case studies will illustrate this transformation of command: Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Baghdad (2003–2008), and Major General James Mattis, commander of 1st Marine Division during the invasion of Iraq (2003). McChrystal and Mattis practiced mission command in Iraq, constructing novel systems of command for the challenges of contemporary operations. They commanded very different organizations. The 1st Marine Division conducted conventional maneuver warfare; JSOC, counterterrorism missions. Consequently, identifying a compatible practice of command in both headquarters would seem to be evidentially significant.

Moreover, both generals have another advantage: McChrystal has written extensively about his headquarters while the United States Marine Corps has documented Mattis's command. Consequently, it is possible to develop a sufficiently detailed understanding of their command methods. These cases not only constitute valid evidence of the revision of mission command but also exemplify its precise character. Of course like all samples, McChrystal and Mattis may be outliers, which cannot be refuted here. Since the two studies corroborate each other, however, they suggest the transition might be a much wider phenomenon—mission command has become an increasingly collective practice.

McChrystal's writings describe how, like other organizations, the armed forces have been radically challenged by new global threats. In particular, the hierarchies, developed in the twentieth century for industrial warfare and in which classical mission command emerged, have become increasingly obsolete. Twentieth-century warfare was complicated, involving the coordination of massive forces. This task was administratively demanding—a mistake could be catastrophic—but missions were relatively simple. In contrast, twenty-first century military problems have become heterogeneous and, above all, complex: “the number of *interactions* between components increases dramatically—the interdependencies that allow viruses and bank runs to spread; this is where things quickly become unpredictable.”²¹

In Iraq, McChrystal discovered traditional methods of command were ill-adapted for complex operations and constructed a new network: “We had to unlearn a great deal of what we thought we knew about how war—and the world—worked. We had to tear down familiar organizational structures and rebuild them along completely different lines, swapping our sturdy architecture for organic fluidity, because it was the only way to confront a rising tide of complex threats.”²²

The most important element in this network was McChrystal's command team itself. Here, traditional models of leadership had become obsolete and obstructive: “The heroic ‘hands-on’ leader whose personal competence and force of will dominated battlefields and boardrooms for generations had been overwhelmed by accelerating speed, swelling complexity, and interdependence.”²³ Yet, the mission command McChrystal introduced was also quite novel. In order to realize this intent, McChrystal did not merely devolve decision-making authority to subordinates who acted on their own initiative. He had to create a “shared consciousness” which “helped us understand and react to the interdependence of the battlefield.”²⁴

One of the central means by which McChrystal created shared consciousness was the daily Operations and Intelligence Brief, at which representatives from every involved agency would share their assessment of the campaign. This brief was “a relatively small video teleconference between our rear headquarters at Fort Bragg, a few DC officers and our biggest bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Quickly, though, that audience

21 Stanley A. McChrystal with Tatum Collins, David Silverman and Chris Fussell, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement* (New York: Portfolio / Penguin, 2015), 57.

22 *Ibid.*, 20.

23 *Ibid.*, 231.

24 *Ibid.*, 202.

grew”; “In time, people came to appreciate the value of systemic understanding. O&I attendance grew as the quality of information and interaction grew. Eventually we had seven thousand people attending almost daily for two hours.”²⁵

McChrystal saw the briefing as the principal means of generating shared consciousness and therefore exercising a new form of mission command. Indeed, he actively adopted certain practices to encourage this sense of collective participation and shared cognition: “I adopted a practice I called ‘thinking aloud’ in which I would summarize what I’d heard.” “Thinking out loud can be a frightening prospect for a senior leader” as it risks exposing ignorance and uncertainty. Yet, in the context of JSOC, it had a salutary command effect: “The overall message reinforced by the O&I was that we have a problem that only we can understand and solve.”²⁶

McChrystal recognized that even as a commander, he could not know everything:

“Being woken to make life-or-death decisions confirmed my role as a leader, and made me feel important and needed—something most managers yearn for. But it was not long before I began to question my value to the process. Unless I had been tracking the target the previous night, I would usually know only what the officers told me that morning. . . . My inclusion was a rubber stamp that slowed the process, and sometimes caused us to miss fleeting opportunities.”²⁷

Accordingly, McChrystal implemented a heightened form of mission command in JSOC, empowering commanders at the local level to prosecute missions—but always in line with the collective consciousness of the organization. McChrystal specifically drew on the example of British Naval Commander Horatio Nelson who

“had told his commanders ‘No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy,’ but that broad authority could have gone terribly wrong if he had not spent decades cultivating their individual qualities as decision makers, and if they had lacked an overall understanding of the force and the battle as a whole. This was Nelson’s equivalent of shared consciousness, and it was only because of that his captains could thrive as empowered agents in a chaotic mêlée.”²⁸

Although McChrystal mentions the “individual qualities of decision-makers,” it is important to note that he does not use Nelson as an exemplar of *laissez-faire* mission command. On the contrary, in Iraq, McChrystal created a federation of commanders, linked together in a closely integrated network, able to cue actions reflecting the collective goals. His subordinates exercised their individual qualities as decision-makers precisely insofar as they were already members of an integrated team: “The term ‘empowerment’ gets thrown around a great deal in the management world, but the truth is simply taking off constraints is a dangerous move. It should be done only if the recipients of newfound authority have the necessary sense of perspective to act on it wisely.”

25 Ibid., 164, 168.

26 Ibid., 229.

27 Ibid., 202.

28 Ibid., 215.

To distribute command authority accordingly but to retain simultaneously unity of command, McChrystal developed a policy of “Eyes On, Hands Off.” He monitored his subordinates, confirming they were acting in line with his intent without seeking to manage them. McChrystal both liberated his subordinates and drew them into an ever closer relationship with him and their colleagues. In this way, decision-making at every level was closely synchronized. Using a new lexicon of terms like “shared consciousness” and “empowerment,” McChrystal adapted and advanced existing concepts of mission command. In place of individual license, he created a professional team whose members were mutually oriented to collective intentionality.

It might be argued McChrystal was only able to adopt this distinctively collective system of command because of technological imperatives. He enjoyed the most advanced communications and information system of any US commander in history. In fact, while digital communications and surveillance were certainly not irrelevant to McChrystal, his command method cannot be reduced to mere technology. On the contrary, digital technology potentially allowed McChrystal to operate a highly centralized, directive system precisely because real-time, high-fidelity video feeds were available to him. By contrast, he actively constructed a confederated system. He employed technology not to oversee his subordinates but to unite their activities and to coordinate their decision-making, forming a tightly articulated but flexible network. The technology was not employed to eliminate individualism—as it could have been—but rather to develop an integrated command community.

Although the operational conditions in which Mattis was working were quite different, he did something very similar with the 1st Marine Division. Instructively, while McChrystal’s command system exploited the most advanced digital technology available to US forces, Mattis’s division notably lacked information technology. It was eventually supplied with Blue Force Tracker equipment, but the division constructed its own ad hoc communications system before the operation with procured commercial videophones, video teleconference suites, and Iridium phones.²⁹ The relative paucity of the 1st Marine Division’s information and communication technology suggests that while digital communications have certainly assisted the revision of mission command, it cannot be reduced to them. Contemporary mission command represents a transformation in professional expertise and practice, not merely available technology.

Like McChrystal, Mattis consciously implemented the doctrine of mission command, laid out in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, *Warfighting*.³⁰ “His style of command is a function of the mission concept from army and marine maneuver warfare laid out in *Warfighting*. He follows those tenets ‘to a T.’ It is all about intent and guidance. Everything that can possibly be done by direct communications with commanders should be done that way—through his intent and guidance. Opportunities are fleeting and you have to make sure that commanders are in a position not to have to second guess their decisions (i.e. to require

29 Michael S. Groen, *With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy* (Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), 83–86.

30 Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), *Warfighting*, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997), 50.

direction from above).³¹ Indeed, Mattis consciously understood himself to be implementing the precepts of mission command: “Commander’s intent is straight out of Marine Corps doctrine, as written by Al Gray, 10 years ago. It demands a higher level of discipline.”³²

The commander’s intent was central to Mattis’s method of command.³³ Crucially, Mattis established speed as the center of gravity for the 1st Marine Division in his intent and impressed its importance upon all his subordinates; indeed, one of his regimental team commanders was removed precisely because he failed to implement this principle. Unless the division could quickly react in Baghdad and depose Saddam Hussein, the operation would deplete its supplies and potentially generate regional and international political opposition.

Moreover, the commander’s intent was only as effective as Mattis’s subordinates understood, accepted, and implemented it. Following the precepts of *Warfighting*, it was here that Mattis demonstrated his greatest skill.³⁴ Mattis invested great effort in creating a command fraternity able to enact his intent. Before deploying to Iraq, Mattis issued his “Commanding General’s Staff Guidance” to his regimental and battalion commanders, his division principals, and special staff. The guidance was also communicated orally in a series of visits to his units; indeed, the guidance constituted his notes for his briefing. It is a deeply interesting document which provides a privileged insight into the way he built a command team in the 1st Marine Division.

One of the most important principles was the equality of all commanders in the division. Radically, Mattis stressed: “All of us are [Marine Air Ground Task Force] MAGTF leaders.” Unusually, Mattis believed all commanders, at whatever level, were distinctive. They constituted a special status group within the division, unified by their decision-making responsibilities. He worked hard to create a special relationship with each of his subordinate commanders down to battalion and even company level. Later in the guidance, he elaborated upon the point: “Accused of making subordinate commanders my equal—that is good—I stand guilty. I don’t need to call the plays so long as the plays will gain my endstate/intent. I don’t want subordinates on a string like puppets, but I expect them to energetically carry out my intent.”³⁵

An officer who was a battalion commander with the 1st Marine Division in Iraq and subsequently worked on Mattis’s staff noted the difference: “With the relationship commander to commander, you have responsibility. You are placed there for the commander. He gives you his will, personality, force—and trust. That was not his relationship with his staff. It is much more demanding to work for him as staff. It was a privilege to be both. But he had a different relationship with his staff.”³⁶

31 Colonel Clarke Lethin, (assistant chief of staff, G-3, 1st Marine Division), interview with author, July 19, 2016.

32 General James Mattis, interview, January 23, 2004.

33 Michael L. Valenti, *The Mattis Way of War: An Examination of Operational Art in Task Force 58 and 1st Marine Division* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2014), 48.

34 HQMC, *Warfighting*, 51.

35 James Mattis, “Commanding General’s Staff Guidance,” 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, August 14, 2002, 4.

36 Interview with a marine, March 15, 2016.

Specifically, Mattis sought to replace a traditional military hierarchy with a unified team. Indeed, Mattis employed sporting metaphors to communicate unity. Rather than directing operations from above, he saw himself as a coach or perhaps a quarterback calling plays from within the action, a first among equals rather than a superior. Naturally, commanders in this team were not equal; however, mission command was anything but a license for subordinates to do as they pleased: “Don’t screw with higher commander’s intent, missions, tasks.”³⁷

In order to generate a common consciousness among his commanders, Mattis exploited standard planning methods such as the drill Rehearsal of Concept (ROC). Of course, Mattis was in no way unique in using sandtables, tactical models, or Rehearsal of Concept drills to prepare his troops for battle. Models of this type had been used at the division and corps level since the First World War and their use at higher levels can be traced back to the late-eighteenth century. But Mattis dramatically intensified their significance, consciously seeking to draw his commanders together as a decision-making community.

Before the operation began in Iraq, the 1st Marine Division conducted a series of Rehearsal of Concept drills.³⁸ In August 2002, when the division was first warned they were possibly deploying to Iraq, Mattis decided to conduct a rehearsal maneuver on a scale model of Iraq constructed in front of the “White House,” the division’s headquarters building, with over 6,000 Lego blocks representing every vehicle in the division. After arriving in Kuwait, the marines completed two additional drills in the desert on February 7 and 27, 2002, using two large Olympic swimming pool sized model sandpits made with bulldozers.³⁹ Commanders wore distinctively colored football jerseys with the unit’s call sign to distinguish the units from each other.

On the basis of these drills, Mattis and his staff were able to draw definite deductions about plausible and impractical schemes of maneuver—for instance, after formulating the invasion plan the division learned Task Force Tarawa would be assigned to their area of operations with a mission of securing its lines of communication around Nasiriyah. Mattis opposed the order on the basis of the Lego drill:

“Adding Tarawa, which was crossing in front of the divisional line of march and stopping in the middle of it; it was going to conflict with [Regimental Combat Team One] RCT-1. It was going to create friction. We knew that was going to occur but we didn’t know how much. We had covered that one though. When we saw Task Force Tarawa briefing their move to the [Marine Expeditionary Force] MEF, I said: ‘You won’t be able to do that. We are on the main effort and you are now on the same road at the same time.’”⁴⁰

This was an important episode: it showed the drills also allowed leaders in the division to anticipate and practice decision-making. By anticipating alternative scenarios, the two jersey drills allowed the 1st Marine Division to predict when a decision might have to be taken and, therefore, accelerating or even eliminating decision-making

37 Ibid., 4.

38 Groen, *With the 1st Marine Division*, 109–12, 126–8.

39 Lethin interview.

40 General James Mattis (commanding general, 1st Marine Division), interview with author, June 4, 2016.

during the actual operation. The identification of decision points was indispensable to the application of mission command because the points effectively presented subordinate commanders with anticipated decisions. Subordinate commanders were already cued to the kinds of situations they would face, the sorts of decisions which they might have to make, and the way that General Mattis and the division wanted the decisions to be made. The “commanders knew the second and third order effects of their possible decisions, based on the commander’s intent and guidance.”⁴¹

The ROC drills impressed Mattis’s intent upon commanders collectively orienting them to a coherent pattern of action even when they were not copresent. In order to facilitate accurate and coherent decision-making in line with the commander’s intent, the 1st Marine Division also deployed nominated staff officers to those decision points in Iraq: “We gamed out where the friction points were likely to be. Myself and Colonel Kennedy performed that function of the division. We would be at the friction point, for instance, when the Division was splitting on its line of march. I was free to roam to a friction point when they needed someone there to assist.”⁴²

Mattis’s method of command was by no means original. Indeed, Mattis himself has denied he was doing anything novel at all. Most of the techniques he employed like his intent, building a command team, and using models were all well-established practices; however, Mattis intensified these methods to such a degree that the mission command he exercised in Iraq was of a different order to the ad hoc decentralization typical of the twentieth century. His subordinates did not act on their individual initiative or instinct. Their decision-making was facilitated insofar as they were all bound together in a highly developed team with a shared understanding of the operation. In many cases, the decisions subordinates “made” were in fact already anticipated and collectively agreed upon in the course of the ROC drills. As Mattis emphasized, this system of mission command demanded far more discipline and professionalism; it no longer involved mere individual freedom and independence. It stood in direct contrast to the Moltkean tradition.

In Iraq, McChrystal and Mattis explored new frontiers of command under different operational conditions. Although they based their methods of command on existing doctrine, they were, in fact, developing novel practices of command. Specifically, both sought to create a dense federation of commanders who shared a common understanding and were closely united around the commander’s intent. Decision-making was, therefore, collectively preconceived, aligned, and coordinated.

The McChrystal and Mattis methods of command were significant developments of traditional Western concepts of mission command. Although the principle of decentralized decision-making and improvisation remained important, the practices involved articulating different command levels and required a high level of professionalism—commanders at each level were committed to a common understanding of the operation. Consequently, McChrystal and Mattis did not enact mission command by reference to their own immediate situation but

41 Ibid.

42 Lethin interview.

rather by reference to the shared intentions of the wider force reinforced by careful collective preparation, anticipation, and imaging reinforced by constant interaction, communication, and feedback. Ironically, mission command today requires intensifying the professional bonds between commanders at each level so they are acutely attuned to each other; it requires an accentuated shared consciousness. In this way, apparently instinctive individual decisions are actually increasingly informed by the collective, systemic expectations.

Although among the most gifted commanders of their generation, McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual in implementing this intensified system of mission command. Many other commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan engaged in similar practices—for instance, Mattis's superior Lieutenant General David Mckiernan, the Combined Forces Land Component commander, implemented a very similar system. As he prepared his forces for the invasion of Iraq, Mckiernan was careful to anticipate decisions through the use of ROC drills and other techniques. He was diligent in communicating his intent to his subordinate corps and division commanders, including Mattis, to ensure unified and coherent decision-making at every level. In particular, Mckiernan was careful to engage in a series of face-to-face meetings with Lieutenant General James T. Conway, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps, to rehearse their passage of lines and to anticipate when a command intervention might and might not be necessary.⁴³ McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual.

Moreover, recent developments have only accentuated the methods McChrystal and Mattis pursued. The US Army is currently implementing a division-level system of mission command whereby a networked main division headquarters remains in the continental United States, while tactical command posts deploy. Mission command has many advantages, reducing the vulnerability and logistical footprint of the division's headquarters; however, a dispersed command system of this type requires higher levels of discipline, professionalism, and teamwork from commanders and staff. Precisely because it is now radically distributed, local decision-making cannot be autonomous. Rather, local commanders must continually align their decision-making with the rest of the force to ensure coherence across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Mission Command 2.0 does not involve merely decentralizing vertical hierarchy, but in fact, integrating a complex and heterogeneous network.

Conclusion

Mission command is indisputably a central precept in Western military doctrine today; it is the professed method of command. It is also true that when Western forces institutionalized mission command into doctrine, they drew heavily on historical examples, especially from the Wehrmacht in World War II. While recognizing continuity, this article argues the changing character of operations and the expansion of the span of control facilitated by new technologies deepens and intensifies mission command into a highly distinctive phenomenon.

⁴³ I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers who served on Mckiernan's staff for this example.

In particular, while traditional mission command might be characterized as an individualistic system, giving local commanders temporary independence to make immediate tactical decisions, Mission Command 2.0 relies on a dense federation of commanders. It is highly collective. It aligns and coordinates decisions across command echelons. It unites commanders into dense, professional communities, whose members are intimately and constantly attuned to each other's intentions and situations. Ironically, to increase the tempo and accuracy of decision-making, Mission Command 2.0 involves not the increased independence of subordinate commanders but radical interdependence.

MISSION COMMAND:
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Mission Command in the Australian Army: A Contrast in Detail

Russell W. Glenn

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ABSTRACT: This article explains the importance of mission command to joint operational effectiveness through the experiences of the Australian and American armies. Guidance is also given regarding the caveats of subordinate competencies and experiences, which affect the appropriate application of the leadership practice.

Military operations—whether combat, peacekeeping, or humanitarian, whether single-country or multinational—are complex and unpredictable. Intelligence, understanding one’s own capabilities and limitations, and carefully crafted command guidance at best lend limited insight into how to confront what lies ahead. Adversaries seek to deceive and surprise. Environmental conditions change. Leaders’ understanding of circumstances at the sharp end increasingly dims the further up the chain of command one goes, even in an era of communications capabilities undreamed of a generation ago. The sergeant leading his squad sees what his platoon leader cannot. Those at battalion, brigade, and higher know little of what confronts their trusts below. The wise military leader recognizes unforeseeable events always lie ahead. Those commanders, therefore, require subordinates be ready to adapt to the unexpected.

Mission command—the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved—provides a means of addressing this challenge.¹ The United States is not the only country committed to practicing mission command. Armies in Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom have adopted the familiar approach. Centuries old in concept and decades aged in military doctrines, effective implementation has nonetheless proven elusive.

The following paragraphs focus on the Australian approach to mission command. Australia and the United States have a long historical partnership. The two countries’ soldiers served side by side in East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; on World War II battlefields; and elsewhere. There is great value in learning from such allies and colleagues akin to but different from ourselves.

This article presents mission command practices during recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, major predecessor conflicts from World War I on, and in today’s Australian Army brigade. The events

Dr. Russell W. Glenn, director of plans and policy for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command G2, recently served on the faculty of the Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. His most recent book, *Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict*, was published in April 2015.

¹ Australian Army, *The Fundamentals of Land Power*, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 (Canberra, ACT: Australian Army, 2014), 45.

include both confrontations with armed foes distant from Australian shores and disasters on the island continent itself.

US and Australian Perspectives

American and Australian views on mission command are similar both in concept and in terms of the two countries' expectations regarding what the philosophy requires of senior and subordinate leaders. Seniors must cultivate "implicit trust between and across all elements of the land force" in such a way that subordinates develop situational awareness that prepares them to exercise sound judgment in support of the commander's intent.² In this manner, US Army General Ulysses S. Grant conveyed he would not dictate a plan to Major General William T. Sherman in 1864, but admonished him to "execute [work] in your own way."³ This exchange makes it clear the mission command concept has long been with America's army even though the term was not introduced in the doctrine until 2003.⁴

America's joint and army definitions of mission command are common in spirit but different in detail. Mission command in joint doctrine is "the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders, [which direct] a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished."⁵ The US Army defines the approach as

the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. . . . [It] emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution.⁶

This disciplined initiative is "action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise."⁷ More verbose than the joint guidance, there is little difference between the two definitions. The Army guidance correctly observes that mission command is not the responsibility of the senior alone. Subordinate leaders in staff and command positions support their seniors by showing initiative and otherwise acting within the dictates of higher echelon intent.

Consistent employment of mission command continues to prove elusive in both the US and Australian armed forces. Clear communication of a commander's intent is fundamental to subordinate understanding of what underlies an assigned mission. Intent—"a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state helps subordinate and supporting commanders to act . . . even

2 Ibid.

3 Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant* (New York: Cosimo, 2007), 278.

4 John Case, "The Exigency for Mission Command: A Comparison of World War II Command Cultures," *Small Wars Journal*, November 4, 2014.

5 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), 158.

6 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), *Mission Command*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1-1. "Mission orders" are defined as "directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them" (Ibid., Glossary-3).

7 Ibid., 2-4.

when the operation does not unfold as planned”—allows junior leaders to make appropriate decisions when confronted by the unforeseen.⁸

An omniscient commander could provide precise instructions and the resources necessary for accomplishing every assigned task. No such commander has yet graced history; thus, leaders need to provide subordinates with an intent to guide judgment when conditions vary from those envisioned. Simply stated, an effective intent conveys what the commander wants his leaders and staff to remember when they face the unanticipated.⁹

Clarity of orders and intent, decentralized decision-making, and trust are the underpinnings that bring about unity of effort through the exercise of mission command in Australia's ground force as in the US Army.¹⁰ Exercising mission command while avoiding unnecessary risk receives explicit notice in Australian joint doctrine just as in the American, the objective being flexibility and adaptability to respond more effectively to the unexpected.¹¹

Where US and Australian approaches diverge is in the amount of doctrinal guidance provided. Australian doctrine tends to appreciate mission command's inherent simplicity of character better without ignoring the difficulty of its proselytization. The desired end is no different; the underlying wisdom is the same. But the Australian Army seems satisfied with avoiding verbiage that obscures rather than illuminates the philosophy. Offered in the spirit of multinational cooperation (and simplicity), we will use its definition from here on:

Mission command is the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved.¹²

We will see, however, that these few words demand much from senior and subordinate alike.

Influences on Application

After the Roman commander Vespasian became the fourth emperor during 69 AD, he chose his son Titus to complete the empire's suppression of a first century uprising in Galilee, Samaria, and Judea. Vespasian's choice was founded on more than nepotism. Titus had demonstrated his expertise as a commander and experience relevant to the tasks while campaigning alongside Vespasian in the preceding years and while commanding away from his father's direct oversight. These and other factors caused Vespasian to trust Titus. Such trust must obviously underlie decentralization. Commanders must trust subordinates' judgment and, in turn, subordinates must trust their commander will back their decisions when their judgments have been made in faith with seniors' intentions.

8 Ibid, 2-3.

9 Russell W. Glenn, "The Commander's Intent: Keep It Short," *Military Review* 67, no. 8 (August 1987): 51.

10 Australian Department of Defence (ADoD), *Campaigns and Operations*, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0 (Canberra, ACT: ADoD, July 12, 2012), 2-3.

11 ADoD, *Command and Control*, ADDP 00.1 (Canberra, ACT: ADoD, 2009), 2-11.

12 Australian Army, LWD 1, 45

Familiarity, which was obvious in the father-son relationship of Vespasian and Titus, will also play a significant role in determining the extent of operational freedom. That scope will differ from individual to individual. The well-known junior commander with demonstrated ability to function without close supervision merits less oversight than one less familiar or proven; close supervision, less freedom of action, and more specific guidance will be given to unproven leaders. A commander accounts for his own ignorance by exercising greater control: the less familiar he is with subordinates' capabilities, the greater the need for him to ensure his guidance is clear and followed. Time together before pending operations and nature of the mission will influence the scope of leeway bestowed—time as it may reassure the commander of new subordinates' abilities, mission because the most brilliant leader might require increased supervision when pursuing objectives with which he or she has less experience.

Greater familiarity and trust combined with a high level of subordinate expertise would tend to result in less risk of decentralization. Granting the same responsibility to a less proven or well-known individual would qualify as imprudence. During World War II, German General Friedrich-Wilhelm von Mellenthin drew on his considerable experience when similarly noting “commanders and subordinates start to understand each other during war. The better they know each other, the shorter and less detailed the orders can be.”¹³

Subordinates' experience and expertise, their demonstrated ability to exercise good judgment under relevant operational conditions, a commander's familiarity with those individuals, the extent of trust that senior leader imbues given these and other considerations are all factors influencing the nature of guidance given to and freedom of action bestowed upon each subordinate. There must be understanding of why one individual receives more detailed guidance and closer supervision than another. Trust will play a part, but trust has many components. Lesser trust by no means need imply a senior questions the judgment or reliability of a junior, but rather that those qualities are yet unmeasured. Trust—from above to below and vice versa—comes only with demonstrated performance, validation, and the passage of time. Even the most dependable subordinate will find the diligent commander occasionally ensuring his or her actions fall within bounds of the senior's intent. Subordinates have a responsibility to operate within those bounds, to educate senior commanders when their unit is less familiar to those above them in the chain of command, and to understand that good commander's check on performance.

Mission command in which both seniors and subordinates understand their responsibilities is cultivated via training, including instruction in military schoolhouses where junior noncommissioned and commissioned officers learn their trade, where midgrade leaders acquire staff and command tradecraft, and where seniors prepare for the pinnacles of responsibility. Training incorporates instruction during exercises that force decision-makers to deal with the unexpected and that allow senior commanders to demonstrate well-intentioned even if less-than-perfect

13 As quoted in Eitan Shamir, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 106.

judgments are not only allowable but demanded. Training encompasses self-education guided by mentors and ensures subordinates read Grant, British Field Marshal William Slim, and others whose command styles demonstrate mission command at its best. And there is training through one-on-one evaluations when the overly conservative and risk-averse leader is told that his or hers is not an acceptable form of leadership. Trust, familiarity, and expertise gained in training provide cornerstones for applying mission command during operations whether the force hails from the northern or southern hemisphere.

This discussion clearly establishes the application of mission command should be conditional rather than absolute. One size does not fit all. We have noted even familiar, completely trusted, and very experienced subordinates require more command guidance under some circumstances. Resource availability further influences the extent of decentralization. Freedom of action when employing one's own forces will logically be greater than that involving allocation of low-density assets on which multiple commands rely.¹⁴

A military's culture also influences the nature of mission command. The US resurrection of the practice during the last decade of the Cold War was partially due to perceptions that fighting a larger Warsaw Pact foe on Western Europe's compartmented terrain meant leaders would be unable to personally direct all their command elements. The agility inherent in mission command practice was seen as an advantage over those opponents, adversaries for whom extensive variation from plans was antithetical.¹⁵ The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were similarly thought to favor highly decentralized tactical operations. Yet IDF leaders proved uncomfortable with their military's presumed extent of decentralization. Those leaders instead opted for "selective control" in which those exercising higher-echelon oversight provided mission-type orders and expected initiative even as they tracked operations in detail, remaining ever prepared to intervene should a situation appear to be beyond a subordinate's capabilities or should an opportunity arise that otherwise might be lost.¹⁶

Israeli control has apparently become even further centralized in succeeding years. While ground force units were assigned increased numbers of air support liaison personnel during Operation Protective Edge (2014) in Gaza, those at the sharp end had to request clearance for danger close strikes from a centralized authority remote from the battlefield.¹⁷ Some contrast British command approaches (and presumably those of the Australian and other militaries with similar cultural and historical ties) with those of America; the former rely on assigned objectives communicated in quite general terms while US leaders provide more detailed guidance in their orders. This greater

14 Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, *Command and Control*, Joint Doctrine Publication 5 (The Hague: Doctrine Branch, Netherlands Defence Staff, 2012), 59.

15 Douglas A. Pryer, "Growing Leaders Who Practice Mission Command and Win the Peace," *Military Review* 93, no. 6 (November-December 2013): 32.

16 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, "Command Arrangements for Peace Operations" (Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program, 1995), 69. Alberts and Hayes' work is summarized in Keith G. Stewart, "Mission Command: Problem Bounding or Problem Solving?" *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 4 (2009).

17 Russell W. Glenn, *Short War in a Perpetual Conflict: Implications of Israel's 2014 Operation Protective Edge for the Australian Army*, Army Research Paper 9 (Canberra, ACT: Australian Army, 2016), 93.

specificity is thought to dictate more regarding how objectives are to be accomplished, resulting in less freedom of action by commanders on the receiving end.¹⁸

Variations in application are not limited to those between national militaries. Other-than-armed forces organizations have in recent years recognized value in adopting a mission command-type philosophy. The Australian Fire and Emergency Services Council finds the approach beneficial during its geographically-dispersed operations. Similar to military conceptions of mission command, the council's leaders communicate a commander's intent and ensure subordinates receive the resources necessary to achieve both mission-specified ends and those implied by the intent.¹⁹

The Australian Army's Path

The moniker "mission command" originated nearly one hundred years after the Australian Army first applied the practice on battlefields dispersed across the globe. While soldiers fought at Gallipoli, Europe's Western Front, Palestine, and the Pacific Islands north of Australia, the country's leaders came to realize success required trust, decentralized decision-making, guidance tailored to a man's capabilities, and checking to ensure subordinates acted within the constraints of that guidance. Australia's most senior commanders first fought as subordinates to the British during the First World War and later to Americans during the Second. That role did not preclude their adoption of what would later become the core content of mission command.

Writing on World War I, Peter Pedersen observed that by 1918 Australian "divisional commanders were now proven . . . that allowed higher commanders to apply a light touch to the tiller."²⁰ At times Australia's senior alliance partners in these conflicts must have provided insights on command worthy of emulation. Unfortunately, they most assuredly supplied negative examples. American General Douglas MacArthur and his staff made little attempt to decentralize decision-making in his Southwest Pacific Area, an approach that while contrary to British Field Service Regulations referenced by the Australian Army at the time, was in keeping with the 1939 edition of US Army Field Service Regulations stipulating "so long as a commander can exercise effective control he does not decentralize."²¹ Such tension would characterize Australian-US Army relations for the duration of fighting in the Southwest Pacific as MacArthur and his staff believed the failure of Australian Army commanders to provide detailed guidance to subordinates demonstrated faulty planning while the Australians were irritated consequently by the demonstrable lack of trust.

18 Alberts and Hayes, "Command Arrangements," 70.

19 Euan Ferguson, "Mission Command for Fire and Emergency Managers: A Discussion Paper," Australian Fire and Emergency Services Council (AFAC), May 2014, http://www.cfabellarine.com/uploads/1/3/0/0/13001256/mission_command_discussion_paper_may_2014.pdf.

20 Peter Pedersen, "Mission command and the Australian Imperial Force," in *Trust and Leadership: The Australian Army Approach to Mission Command* (working title), ed. Russell W. Glenn (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming).

21 US War Department, *Operations*, Tentative Field Service Regulations FM 100-5 (Washington, DC: War Department, 1939), 34, as quoted in Peter Dean, "Mission Command in World War II: Australia, MacArthur's General HQ and the Southwest Pacific Area," in *Trust and Leadership*.

The passage of time did not heal all wounds. Antipathies would arise anew when Australian soldiers served under American commanders in Vietnam. The friction between Australian and US commanders tended to occur at upper echelons. Australian doctrine emphasized population security based on earlier counterinsurgency operations in Malaya and North Borneo. Initial tensions arose due to General William Westmoreland's given priority, the destruction of the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong enemies. Though that emphasis underwent a degree of modification with the promotion of Creighton W. Abrams upon Westmoreland's departure, Australia's senior in-country leaders found themselves caught between what they thought was Abrams' move away from a priority of force-on-force operations and the dictates of the II Field Force Vietnam Commanding General Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell (April 1969–April 1970).

Australian Major General Robert Hay, commander, Australian Force Vietnam, found Ewell's guidance not only contradictory to both Australia's preferred approach and Abrams' intent but also unnecessarily detailed. Historian Bob Hall noted,

“Ewell's directives show[ed] a commander intent on directing his subordinates in detail, instructing them to increase enemy casualties via more ‘company days in the field’ with ‘30 to 40% of company effort’ on night offensive operations and ambushes. Directives further dictated policies regarding zeroing of rifles, marksmanship training, ambush techniques and patrolling, and how best to integrate new reinforcements. A later memorandum urged subordinate commanders not to employ their troops on population security tasks ‘unless it's quite clear that the hamlet will be lost unless we step in.’”²²

The result presented a dichotomy for Australian forces. While reliance on often highly dispersed small unit tactics meant mission command-type approaches were characteristic of battalion and below operations, the country's military leaders serving above that echelon frequently found themselves working around the dictates of US commanders to shield subordinates from what they thought were inappropriate and overly detailed orders.

Subsequent Australian contingencies provided repeated opportunities for refining command approaches suitable to leaders operating distant from their senior commanders, not infrequently in environments lacking reliable communications. Australian soldiers found themselves in Somalia, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and with the arrival of the new millennium, Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenges associated with successfully practicing mission command during these more recent contingencies were less multinational in nature than internal. Such was particularly the case with subordinate interpretations of the meaning of mission command. Senior and subordinate alike understood the need for decentralized decision-making within the constraints of a mission and commander's intent. Some senior commanders were surprised by subordinates' perspectives on those seniors' visits to check that performance reflected higher-level guidance.

22 Headquarters, Australian Forces Vietnam, “Memorandum to HQ II Field Force Vietnam,” April 16, 1969, AWM98, R569-1-196, Operations-General-II Field Force Vietnam Operational Directives, Australian War Memorial. Quoted in Bob Hall, “A Long Bridge in Time: The 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam via Malaya and Borneo,” in *Trust and Leadership*.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Smith was among those taken aback during his battle group (battalion task force-equivalent) command tour in Afghanistan. Investigating a report of a negligent discharge, Smith determined that a round from an unauthorized AK-47 had nearly struck an Australian soldier. The weapon had been stored behind the driver's seat of a vehicle for a period of weeks if not months. When Smith questioned the responsible section commander (equivalent to a US Army squad leader) regarding whether he inspected his drivers' vehicles, the junior leader stated he did not, believing it to be a breach of the trust between himself and his subordinates. The section commander also made it clear that he considered Smith's checks a breach of trust. Further discussion failed to convince the section commander of his responsibility to ensure both his and his seniors' guidance was followed; rather than a breach of trust, not checking was a failure of leadership that reflected a deeply flawed understanding of the responsibilities inherent in mission command. Recalling the incident, Smith observed such practices led to "shoddy practices and casual attitudes."²³

Understanding what mission command requires from senior and subordinate alike continues to challenge Australia's professional army no less than America's primary ground force. The definitions might seem clear. Yet too many leaders find the courage to exercise the full spectrum of mission command responsibilities overly daunting. Too many subordinates also cease listening upon hearing mission command encourages decentralization of decision-making; they choose to ignore the responsibility to check that decisions and behaviors are in keeping with the commander's guidance. Rooted in distant history, its value already repeatedly proven in twenty-first century operations, full understanding and effective practice of mission command remain elusive.

Concluding Observations

Australia's and America's armies face similar challenges in employing mission command. While many leaders have the courage to trust and decentralize, too many remain committed to hypercontrol, the antithesis of effective application. Of notable significance given Australian commanders' experiences and American commanders' comments, subordinates recognize the two-way nature of mission command: it is not "fire and forget." Rather, senior commanders have the responsibility to confirm those more junior understand and operate within the constraints of higher-echelon intent and mission. These are not the only similarities between the two professional armies, however. Americans and Australians operating together find more in common than otherwise. Historians, politicians, and soldiers tend to emphasize the differences and resulting frictions that arise during coalition operations. Mission command instead offers a common foundation on which to build multinational cooperation.

The paragraphs above establish a conditional nature of mission command is needed to adapt guidance and supervision in light of subordinates' abilities. What should be unconditional, however, is the approach's application throughout an army. Fear of a subordinate

23 Chris Smith, "Mission Command and the 2RAR Battle Group in Afghanistan: A Case Study in the Relationship between Mission Command and Responsibility," in *Trust and Leadership*.

making a mistake that might threaten a senior leader's career tightens centralization.²⁴ Enhanced communications technologies become implements of intrusion on junior leaders' decision-making. Those in helicopters overhead during operations in Vietnam at least realized that jungle foliage or elephant grass blocked much of their vision. There are no such obvious filters when looking at a computer screen's false clarity. "Train to trust" and "train to take appropriate risk" must be building blocks for propagating mission command. The commander who tolerates otherwise is an obstacle to that nurturing.

Operations in the opening years of the twenty-first century increasingly demand a comprehensive approach involving all services, multiple nations with several government agencies from each, and capabilities only other-than-government organizations such as nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental associations, and commercial enterprises can bring to the table. Decentralization is a given; such operations will never see unity of command. Unity of effort is perhaps an achievable goal with various organizations' efforts orchestrated via a commonly agreed upon general intent. Mission command's cornerstones—clear intent, trust, initiative, understanding of context and objectives sought, familiarity with subordinates, decentralization, and the courage to accept risk—are attainable regardless of background. Leaders, military and civilian alike, recognize the need to employ comprehensive approaches better. Mission command offers a means of achieving the orchestration essential to success whichever nation or organization is in charge.

Common understanding of the approach similarly offers opportunities to share concerns and insights in its application. Increasingly sophisticated communications technologies, for example, should reinforce calls for better inculcation of mission command throughout a military. Subordinates will have to turn to the commander's intent when communications fail due to either enemy antipathy or nature's hand. Organizations unable to practice effective mission command will find themselves at a disadvantage when facing commanders who "receive general operating guidelines but have significant autonomy to run their own operations" as do those in the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.²⁵

What does this mean for the American commander fortunate enough to have an Australian unit under command?²⁶ That those partners would be no less professional than their own soldiers is a given as is the reality that doctrinal, leadership, and other differences will merit recognition and respect by all parties involved. There will almost certainly be constraints under which the commanders of Australian units operate differently than those imposed by America's political or higher-echelon military leaders. Mission command in a multinational environment may be better practiced in an inquisitive rather than directive mode. Clear statement of the higher echelon's mission and

24 Gary Luck, *Mission Command and Cross-Domain Synergy*, Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper (Suffolk, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Deployable Training Division, 2013), 4.

25 Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, "ISIS Leader Takes Steps to Ensure Group's Survival," *New York Times*, July 20, 2015.

26 The Australian Army currently has three maneuver brigades, which are the largest units an American commander might find in partnership. Battle groups or regiments (respectively equivalent to US battalion task forces or battalions) are the more likely. Australia deployed battle groups to Iraq and Afghanistan during the first decade of this century.

intent will be no less crucial. Savvy commanders have realized, however, that determining how a multinational partner will support said mission and intent may require an approach significantly different than one with US subordinates.

Directing specific actions to be taken by partners can cross “no go” lines established by their seniors, leaving them no other option than refusing to comply. No less than adapting the extent of guidance given to a subordinate depending on the individual’s capabilities, a senior commander must mold his mission command approach to multinational conditions. Stating the higher echelon mission and intent, then asking how a multinational partner might best support establishes a basis for successful coalition operations and avoids straying into red card territory.

Consideration of the Australian Army’s approach to mission command provides an opportunity to draw on the experiences of an able ally. Australian leaders’ experiences reveal challenges inherent in mission command span national boundaries. They include not only the necessity of understanding and adhering to the concept’s tenets but also the ever-present challenge of persuading over-controlling leaders to adapt their ways. So too, experiences in both countries bring to the forefront the less recognized requirement to convince leaders and subordinates alike that, properly applied, mission command reinforces rather than replaces the age-old dictum that soldiers do well what leaders check.

Legacy Concepts: A Sociology of Command in Central and Eastern Europe

Thomas-Durell Young

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ABSTRACT: Elements of the Communist concept of command continue to ramify throughout Central and Eastern European armed forces. They inhibit the orderly delegation of command, the consistent creation of defense capabilities, and the professional development of commanders and managers; they also impede these armed services from adopting the concepts of authority, accountability, and responsibility—concepts taken for granted in Western defense institutions.

An optimistic view of military leadership in the defense institutions of Central and Eastern European post-Communist countries prevails among Western officials and influences many of their decisions to support new allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since most of these European countries have deployed forces in combat and peace-support operations with NATO after the Cold War, and many have received positive reviews, these assumptions are understandable.¹ Many Western leaders also presume commanders of post-Communist nations who have been exposed to Western philosophies of command during combined operations and the introduction of modern Western combat platforms and systems will naturally adopt similar practices of accountability and responsibility in their own organizations. This article examines the contrast of such contemporary expectations in the context of a trinity of Communist legacy command concepts: collective decision-making to avoid personal responsibility; conflating leadership, command, and management; and hypercentralized decision-making.²

Leaders in Central and Eastern Europe have yet to appreciate the effects of this trinity on the adoption of delegated decision-making on the development of a merit-based officer and noncommissioned officer corps and on the sustenance of Central and Eastern European military capabilities when they assess the viability of their armed forces under the shadow of Russia's new adventurism. Interest also piques when discerning the challenges that have occurred during recent modernization

Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, the program manager Europe at the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Civil-Military Relations, has written a number of monographs and articles for professional and academic journals as well as *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity* published by Bloomsbury Academic (New York, 2017).

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1 James S. Corum, *Development of the Baltic Armed Forces in Light of Multinational Deployments* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 34–38.

2 See Thomas-Durell Young, *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Thomas-Durell Young, "The Challenge of Reforming European Communist Legacy 'Logistics,'" *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 29, no. 3 (2016): 352–70, doi:10.1080/13518046.2016.1200376; and Thomas-Durell Young, "Impediments to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: Addressing the Conceptual Divide," *Problems of Post-Communism* (2016): 1–14, doi:10.1080/10758216.2016.1220256.

efforts. With some exceptions such as Yugoslavia's republic-based territorial defense forces, post-Communist defense organizations come from a conceptual legacy whereby all decision-making was highly centralized and quite different from Western mission command philosophies.³ Thus, integrating Western weapons systems and platforms, designed to require critical thinking and decentralized operation, is formidable. The Polish Air Force provides an apt example: they acquired F-16s in 2006, declared them operational in 2012, deployed them on operations for the first time during the summer of 2016, and scheduled their first Baltic Air Policing mission for May 2017.⁴

The omission of similar Central and Eastern European defense institutions' preparedness to absorb more Western equipment, training, and exercises, let alone effectively use such resources, is not fully appreciated by Western leaders. In March 2016, for instance, US Air Force General Philip M. Breedlove, who was then commander of the US European Command, presented a comprehensive review of the state of security and defense in Europe to the US Senate Armed Services Committee.⁵ Yet, his testimony in no way suggested a need to address the conceptual and philosophical foundations of these defense institutions. Thus, one can only conclude US planning and managing of military and defense advice and assistance to these critical allies is premised on the unchallenged, and indeed dubious, assumption that these organizations hold Western philosophies of command and governance.

The anatomy of post-Communist defense institutions in the context of organizational sociology, however, reveals strong political, institutional, cultural, and indeed, sociological influences that inhibit the adoption of basic Western concepts of defense governance. These legacy practices produce organizational pathologies which prevent delegating command authority in a planned and predictable fashion, producing defense capabilities, and developing commanders and managers at all levels. Although, these challenges cannot be solved using Western technical and educational programs alone, ignoring these command pathologies perpetuates Central and Eastern European military weaknesses and makes them vulnerable to opportunistic Russian mischief.

3 For more on mission command, see Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2015).

4 Lukáš Dyčka and Miroslav Mareš, "The Development and Future of Fighter Planes Acquisitions in Countries of the Visegrad Group," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 25, no. 4 (2012): 544–46, 555, doi:10.1080/13518046.2012.730370; Remigiusz Wilk, "Polish F-16s Deploy for First-Ever Combat Operation," IHS Jane's 360, July 7, 2016, <http://www.janes.com/article/62046/polish-f-16s-deploy-for-first-ever-combat-operation>; and Jacek Siminski, "Polish F-16s Prepare To Take Part in NATO Baltic Air Patrol Mission for the Very First Time," *Aviationist*, February 23, 2017, <https://theaviationist.com/2017/02/23/polish-f-16s-prepare-to-take-part-in-nato-baltic-air-patrol-mission-for-the-very-first-time/>.

5 *Hearing to Receive Testimony on Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Assistance Programs and Authorities, Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats*, 114th Congress (March 9, 2016) (statement of General Philip M. Breedlove, commander US Forces Europe); and *Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When It Works and When It Doesn't Before the US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services*, 114th Congress (October 21, 2015).

Table 1. Understanding Western and Communist Legacy Command Concepts⁶

| Mission Command | Versus | Detailed Command |
|--|-----------------------------|---|
| Unpredictable | Assumes war is | Predictable |
| Disorder/Uncertainty | Accepts | Order/Certainty |
| Decentralization Informality Loose rein on subordinates Self-discipline Initiative Cooperation Ability at all echelons Higher tempo | Tends to lead to | Centralization Formality Tight rein on subordinates Imposed discipline Obedience Compliance Ability only at the top Stasis |
| Implicit Vertical/Horizontal Interactive and Networked | Types of communications | Explicit Vertical Reactive and Linear |
| Organic Ad hoc | Organization types fostered | Hierarchic Bureaucratic |
| Delegate | Leadership styles | Disempower and Direct |
| Art of war | Appropriate to | Science of war |

Collective Decision-Making

Communist governance separated decision-making from accountability via collectivization. Various ministries actualized this managerial practice by forming collegia. These groups were perfect ideological expressions of collectivization as they removed an individual from any responsibility for the collegium's decisions. In addition to removing the principle of individual accountability from governance and management, these bodies facilitated anonymous, arbitrary meddling at the expert level. In contrast, Western organizations encourage staffs to consult, coordinate, and recommend, while only senior officials, or commanders, make decisions.

Despite their dubious political provenance, collegia such as Ukraine's military collegium and Moldova's military council persist throughout former Soviet republics.⁷ Rarer in former Warsaw Pact defense institutions, such governing organizations existed until recently in Slovakia and Hungary, and arguably still exist in Bulgaria.⁸ These bodies still

⁶ I am indebted to Major General Walter Holmes, Canadian Army (Ret), for permission to use the chart he developed, which also appears in Young, "Impediments to Reform."

⁷ Ben Lombardi, "Ukrainian Armed Forces: Defence Expenditure and Military Reform," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 14, no. 3 (2001): 32, doi:10.1080/13518040108430487.

⁸ A Slovakian think tank advocated for regular consultations between the president and the chief of defense, as well as the minister of defense's collegium to enable more informed decision-making. See Jaroslav Nad', Marian Majer and Milan Šuplata, *75 Solutions for Slovakia's Defence* (Bratislava: Central European Policy Institute, 2015), 2; and Réka Szemerényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk*, Adelphi Paper 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press / International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 13, 15. The Collegium of the Minister began during the Communist period. As the membership of that body and the current defense council remain essentially the same, arguably, its purpose to depersonalize decision-making and escape from responsibility has not changed.

function extensively, sometimes under disguise or mutation as in the former Yugoslav Republics.⁹

In Serbia, for instance, matériel requirement proposals are reviewed by the minister of defense's collegium. In the case of Macedonia, its collegium comprises the chief of the general staff, his deputy, the director of the staff, and the heads of staff directorates and can include representatives from units and, at one point, even the resident NATO training team. Moreover, many of these countries practice joint meetings of the collegia of the ministry of defense and general staff or, alternately, the chief of defense or chief of the general staff attends the minister of defense's collegium either regularly or by invitation.

Although not secretive, these bodies obscure senior-level decision-making and thereby violate basic Western governance concepts such as the alignment of authority with accountability. Despite their prevalence, printed details regarding the constitution of these bodies is difficult to find, which could explain why some collegia, such as Montenegro's do not formally exist by law. Yet, one can gain an appreciation of the scope of these bodies' responsibilities in the case of the General Staff collegium of the *Vojska Srbije i Crne Gore* (Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro), circa 2002, which were based on the practice of the Yugoslav People's Army:

- Analyze the outcome of the general staff's monthly work plan.
- Analyze combat readiness and determine causation of shortcomings.
- Assess the regional intelligence and security situation and determine implications for the country.
- Assess the regional security situation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and analyze its possible implications for the combat readiness of the armed forces and the defense of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- Analyze the financial situation in the armed forces.
- Determine whether there is a need for organizational changes within the armed forces.
- Manage personnel issues:
 - Regulate the condition in the service, promotions, termination of service, and retention in the service for professional soldiers of the general's rank.
 - Review and approve the colonel's promotion list.
 - Select candidates for professional military education courses.
 - Assign postings of officers completing professional military education.
 - Assign postings of colonels and lieutenant colonels.
 - Manage regular promotion in the rank of colonel and all extraordinary promotions for all professional soldiers.

⁹ While the title collegium is eschewed, Slovenia continues using boards or committees, some of which are related to the collegia functions in all but name.

- Oversee the condition of the service for colonels who are assigned to mobilization units.
 - Determine who should be retained in service as distinguished experts who meet the requirements for retirement.
 - Approve release from service.
 - Analyze the personnel management of the armed forces.
- Propose other issues for the attention of the chief of the general staff at his request.¹⁰

Based upon interviews with officials from numerous defense institutions throughout the region, these terms of reference clearly represent the responsibilities of their own collegium, or defense councils. When examining the strengths and weaknesses of these bodies, an inevitable explanation for their continued utilization is that they provide useful coordination in the absence of the chief of staff concept yet to be fully embraced throughout the region. Another argument is the group's ability to obviate subjectivity, which is important to decision-making such as assignments and promotions.

What should surprise and disturb Western observers is the power *collegia* continue to hold over essentially all aspects of planning and managing Central and Eastern European armed forces. Notably, decision-making is limited to colonels and general officers; the views of others, no matter how well-informed, are not considered. Also vexing is the continued domination of these ranks in human resource management decisions, which violates Western defense governance principles. Coming from a tradition of conscription and an oversized officer corps based on mobilization, those transitioning and newly formed defense institutions lack centralized or integrated human resource structures. Except for the Yugoslav People's Army, these services also lack noncommissioned officers with leadership responsibilities.¹¹ Unsurprisingly, these factors contribute to the legacy practice of using *collegia* for personnel decision-making that extends from individual units up to the general staffs and the ministries of defense.

Fundamentally, this form of collective decision-making undermines commanders' authority to provide professional advice on individuals' performance and prospects for growth and promotion—inherent responsibilities of commanders in Western armed forces. In the West, commanders' recommendations weigh heavily in independent selection board processes to mitigate against favoritism, let alone nepotism. Moreover, as Central and Eastern European defense institutions continue to struggle to adopt Western concepts of defense governance, *collegia* have not been identified for elimination. By continuing the practice of collective decision-making, they release senior officials from accountability and responsibility for their decisions.

One should never underestimate the strength of bureaucratic inertia, and clearly *collegia* are unlikely to be retired without considerable

10 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, *Order on Authorities of the Organizational Units of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Sector for Manning, Mobilization and Systems Issues, March 20, 2002), section IV (nota bene, translated text).

11 Robert Niebuhr, "Death of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Wars of Succession," *Polemos* 7, no. 13/14 (January 2004): 93.

political pressure. Perhaps a first step would be to assess the function of, and justification for, collegia—for example, Macedonia adopted the chief of staff principle, which should enable objective evaluation of the effectiveness of the director of staff function thereby removing a justification for the continued use of its collegia.

A final concern with collegium is most Western officials and analysts are unaware of their existence, which leads to misunderstandings of the decision-making process, particularly regarding key human resource management functions. As the underlying organization's sociology of decision-making remains misunderstood, Western officials have misdiagnosed the human resource management challenges faced by these organizations. By superficially defining weak personnel structures and processes as the challenges, Western officials and analysts have missed the key organizational sociology cause. The reason human resource management directorates appear to be underperforming by Western expectations is due to these relatively new bureaucratic bodies existing in a parallel bureaucratic universe where power continues to be exercised by collegia.

Accordingly, human resource management directorates concern themselves with administration and the exercise of negative control with hardly any consistent, constructive influence on personnel decisions. Thus, when reforming this key aspect of management, officials need to identify collegia as a reality that can only be addressed within the political context of democratic defense governance. In other words, a bottom-up, technical approach without strong, supportive messaging from national leaders will always be stillborn. Within the legacy of detailed command structures, a directive approach is likely to be much more effective than using Western national models and modeling delegation.

Even more pressing, Western and allied officials must acknowledge the deleterious effect collegia have on developing commanders. The importance of basing performance assessments on the objective assessments by field commanders should be incorporated in efforts to develop leadership, command, management, and decision-making capabilities of partner nations. These efforts should encourage serving in units as a necessary step toward overcoming the current professional strategy of seeking permanent postings on staffs, where decisions are made and power over personnel management decisions is highly concentrated. These current incentives are so misaligned that in some countries, such as Hungary, officers serving on the general staff are better paid than those commanding units.¹² This perverse incentive discourages officers from serving in units, ensuring an institutional disconnect among the general staff, units, and commanders.

Conflating Command and Management

Defense institutions which continue the legacy practice of collective decision-making suffer from another institutional lacuna within the context of the Western concept of defense governance. Whereas all of the Baltic States' divided leadership and command from management—the ministries of defense adopted posts for permanent under-secretaries

12 Act CCV of 2012 on the Status of Military Personnel, Hungarian Civil Code, 5th Appendix, http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1200205.TV (accessed October 27, 2016).

and the armed forces have directors of staff—this practice is rare, even in Western-leaning Georgia.¹³

By conflating leadership and command with management, it is essentially impossible for a policy framework that drives defense institutions to develop. Rather, power is concentrated in a small body of officials, thereby precluding critical thinking, effective coordination, and consensus-building. Due to centralized decision-making without a designated official whose sole function is to optimize daily functioning of civilian or military organizations, these organizations are also all but incapable of performing effective staff work when judged by Western standards. As James Sherr of Chatham House so presciently observes:

As in other post-communist states, few and far between are those who ask themselves how policies, programmes and directives should be implemented. The vastly safer and almost universal practice is to await orders about how orders should be implemented. If directives are not to become conversation pieces, their authors must walk them through the system themselves. Not surprisingly, the result is a system overmanned, overworked and largely inert.¹⁴

As a result, there is no consistent management to ensure staff coordination, press decision-making downwards, and allow only the most critical policy issues to be addressed at the minister or the chief of defense level. By allowing, and indeed encouraging, all decision-making to remain with the minister, the chief of defense, and within their collegia, no decision is too minor to be raised to them and modern command and management concepts cannot take hold.

Even the widespread practice of designating deputy ministers and deputy chiefs of defense to run the organization still breaks this principle. These individuals cannot be honest brokers in the staffing process while being members of the leadership team. On the military side of the equation, even the seemingly advanced and reformed Polish defense institution has yet to embrace this concept: two deputies support the Polish chief of defense, but there is no chief of staff. This inability to divide command from management in Poland is remarkable considering it was a key reform principle identified as early as 1992.¹⁵ Confusing hybrid models, such as the Czech armed forces who have both a first deputy chief of defense as well as a deputy chief of defense and chief of staff, also exist.

Conflating these two responsibilities produces yet another practice whereby commanders and staff officers are not allowed to develop properly. While the concentration of power may suggest an illusion of control, in reality, the system incentivizes officers to become micromanagers. Officers are taught by examples of senior officers to focus inward

13 Regarding the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense see, Vaidotas Urbelis and Tomas Urbanas, “The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Case of Lithuania,” in *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards*, eds. Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster (London: Palgrave, 2002), 117–18. For more on Georgia’s structure of the ministry of defence and joint staff, see Ministry of Defence of Georgia, *Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 2013–2016* (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 22, 23.

14 James Sherr, “Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine’s Armed Forces: To What End? By What Means?,” in *Army and State in Postcommunist Europe*, eds. David Betz and John Löwenhardt (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 74.

15 Andrew A. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 50–53.

on the organization as opposed to looking outward and thinking critically and creatively.¹⁶ These expectations cripple strategic-level thinking, thereby inhibiting thoughts of creating a future for the organization and dooming the armed services to live always in the past.¹⁷

Centralizing Financial Decision-Making

When the Cold War ended, every former post-Communist country found itself in a state of economic crisis. Strong pressure to decrease defense spending was accompanied by an outbreak of conflicts in Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Bessarabia, which further stressed defense budgets. None of these defense institutions, with the exception of the Yugoslav Territorial Defense Force, found themselves with a heritage of a modern defense planning nor a financial management system that would enable them to conduct even the most rudimentary defense planning.¹⁸

With a universal focus on effecting civilian control and shrinking bloated Communist-era defense budgets, the fastest way to seize civilian control of the armed forces was by removing budget responsibilities from general staffs. Newly elected political leaders and civilian defense officials centralized all financial decision-making within ministries of defense. In the case of the Yugoslav armed forces, whose commanders possessed their own budgets and spending authorities, the subsequent centralization of finances constituted a major step backwards. Conversely, the Czech defense budget circa 1993 was almost incomprehensible to civilian government officials who were challenged to ascertain actual spending. In 1996, then-Czech Minister of Defense Vilem Holan launched a major reform that included the introduction of the “revolutionary” concept of double-entry bookkeeping management.¹⁹

Thus, the immediate task confronting early democratic reformers was to find effective financial management methods to stop defense institutions from spending public funds needed elsewhere. What began in the early years of democracy to make defense “fit” its budget has become an all but impossible task. Notwithstanding reductions in force structure and personnel, retaining needless infrastructure continues to waste money. To appreciate the enormity of this task, upon independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2006, Montenegro took possession of 12,000 tons of munitions and 242 pieces of real estate and 1,450 buildings it still owned in 2013.²⁰

Established with Western technical assistance, planning, programming, and budgeting system directorates placed unrelenting pressure on centralizing financial decision-making that has only increased following

16 Agnieszka Gogolewska, “Problems Confronting Civilian Democratic Control in Poland,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change*, eds. Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner, and Jürgen Kuhlmann (New York: Routledge, 2006), 101.

17 The author is indebted to retired Colonel Vladimir Milenski, Bulgarian Army, for suggesting this most insightful observation.

18 See Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *Yugoslavia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 252; and Milojica Pantelic, “The System and Organization of National Defense,” *Yugoslav Survey* 10, no. 2 (1969): 6.

19 Jeffrey Simon, *NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 35.

20 Montenegro Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review 2013* (Podgorica: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 19.

the 2008 crisis—for example, Slovenia’s defense budget was savaged by a 34.6 percent reduction from 2007 to 2015.²¹ Historically, these directorates have effectively maintained their own bureaucratic autonomy, though they have been particularly ineffective at translating any existing defense policy priorities and plans into measurable defense outcomes.²² This hypercentralized financial decision-making has produced practices in which the general staffs of such nations as Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Serbia conduct force planning absent financial inputs.

It is not surprising that few of these defense institutions have been capable of producing or executing viable defense plans. Thus, a unique managerial pathology has emerged throughout the region: ministries of defense not only manage all aspects of finances but also do so without considering whether outcomes are achievable. Instead, salaries, pensions, military hospitals, and social welfare benefits—such as spas and even a ski resort in Bulgaria—have become default priorities that have produced under-staffed units, limited flying hours, and reduced ship days at sea.

Undermining Commanders

The confluence of the Communist trinity of legacy concepts inhibits armed forces from developing leaders and fostering an environment for encouraging well-rounded, professional commanders to emerge. Even in reformed defense institutions, such as in Slovenia, the chief of defense controls no more than five percent of the force’s budget and the midterm defense program restricts battalion commanders’ abilities to manage finances to meet assigned missions and tasks.²³ Thus, junior leaders are not expected nor groomed to understand the relationship between fiscal management and force outcomes necessary for mid- and senior-grade postings.

Ministries of defense even determine personnel numbers and present them to chiefs of services as de facto decisions as well as regularly prohibit these senior leaders from moving money from one category to another to produce outcomes. Even worse, commanders who should have the best appreciation of which leaders have both performed well in stressful command postings and have the potential for succeeding in more challenging command environments are not permitted to influence personnel management decisions comparable to Western practices.

Such decision-making, again, is highly centralized in general staffs and ministries of defense. Arguably, the authority of the chief of defense in Slovenia is diluted since his list of officer promotion recommendations is first vetted by the Intelligence and Security Service before being forwarded to the human resource management directorate, a practice one Slovenian general associates with control mechanisms and an ignorance of military advice. Legislation even enables untrained and

21 Slovenia Ministry of Defense, *NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2015/16*, ANNEX 1. AC/281-WP(2016)0024 (R), (Ljubljana: Ministry of Defense, n.d.), 1–4. For more on US assistance programs in the area, see US Department of Defense, *FY 2010 Annual Report on Cost Assessment Activities* (Washington, DC: DoD, 2011), 20, appendix 2.

22 Thomas-Durell Young, “Is the US’s PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist Defense Institutions?” *RUSI Journal* 161, no. 5 (October–November 2016): 68–77, doi:10.1080/03071847.2016.1253382.

23 Branimir Furlan, “Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: Slovenian Case,” *Armed Forces and Society* 39, no. 3 (2012): 442, doi:10.1177/0095327X12459167.

unqualified individuals to become commanders or take staff postings thereby undermining the basic concept of military professionalism.²⁴

This pervasive practice of negative civilian control undermines the professional growth of the officer corps by denying demanding command and staff postings. Equally, these practices preclude officers from acquiring a full appreciation of all aspects of the operation of the armed forces, particularly their financial implications and realities. In short, *management* of the armed forces is really a misnomer while *administrating* is clearly observable in the absence of experienced, professional military advice. The persistence of the Communist trinity of legacy concepts is nothing short of scandalous.

Despite the claim that such legacy practices constitute “national business” exempt from allied discussions, these practices produce senior leaders who have not been exposed to the same professionally challenging assignments as their Western counterparts: this fact ultimately creates problems in allied commands and multinational forces. Succinctly, the alliance should be interested in developing senior commanders who are capable of controlling the financial and human resources necessary for combined operations.

To be sure, there are always exceptions to the rule, but one cannot ignore the possibility that limiting these officers from the same professional challenges enjoyed by their Western counterparts produces an officer corps with stunted professionalism. Equally, in lieu of healthy civil-military relations, one finds an unbalanced relationship substituting uninformed and risk-adverse administration for military professionalism.

Implications and Solutions

Arguably, Western and legacy command concepts are antithetical; however, the Communist trinity of legacy concepts—collective decision-making; conflating leadership, command, and management; and hypercentralized decision-making—undermines the very basis of the Western definition of command. Absent a change in alliance policy and the selection of allied commanders, only time will tell how the stark conceptual rift between Western and residual legacy practices will affect the ability of commanders from these armed forces to operate within the alliance’s integrated military command structure. How have 25 years of cooperation with NATO and its nations’ armed forces missed addressing this important challenge? Answers to this question are more easily found in both Western and Eastern *policy* failures.

The Western approach of providing assistance to new partners and allies has stressed technical solutions, often using Western models that have failed to address the two antithetical concepts of command. Moreover, Western nations’ training and professional military educational courses, which expose students to modern warfare, leadership, and management approaches, have only been partially successful. Appreciation (and one wonders, recognition) that this knowledge is highly contextualized and cannot easily be exported to different national and organizational environments has been lacking. As David Ralston

²⁴ Ibid., 441–42.

writes in the context of exporting European army models in the nineteenth century, “The reformers were to learn, often to their dismay, that the introduction of European forms and methods into their military establishments would sooner or later oblige their societies to undergo internal adjustments which were by no means trivial.”²⁵

Simply put, the conceptual difference between Western and Eastern defense and military concepts are so antithetical the adoption of the former is all but impossible without retiring the entire conceptual basis of legacy defense institutions. Even when legacy armed forces adopt some key Western-influenced reforms, junior and noncommissioned officers voice complaints that NATO procedures are faithfully followed during operations but legacy concepts prevail at home. Many young officers and NCOs, including many with operations experience, chafe at this reality.

The existence of this major differentiation in the concept of command clearly needs wider understanding and attention by all NATO nations. The traditional solution of “reform” needs to be rethought. Like it or not, past assistance policies and programs have neither identified this conceptual command divide nor produced any effective methods to address it. This challenge to the Western alliance simply cannot be addressed at the technical level alone. To be sure, Western training and professional military education courses have their place. What needs to be acknowledged by senior officials in both Western and Eastern capitals is the conceptual divide in command, as well as other areas, is due to subtle factors that can only be addressed with a deep understanding of organizational sociological, conceptual, and political characteristics.

To be blunt, only Eastern allies at the level of presidents and prime ministers—officials who need to accept the urgency of effecting changes in how commanders are groomed, are selected for stressful and growing assignments, and are expected to command—can successfully address the contrast. After all, in any military organization, command is the “coin of the realm” and changing its basic characteristic will strike at the very institutional soul and enabling culture of an armed force. Such an initiative will not be easily accepted, particularly in the more profound legacy-leaning defense institutions where Western and legacy concepts of professionalism are antithetical and therefore incapable of coexisting (see table 2).²⁶ Thus, senior Western political and military officials need to be prepared to exert sharp and consistent political pressure on their counterparts for the comprehensive exculpation of legacy concepts and assumptions as well as their replacement with modern Western concepts. Assuredly, these will be politically painful, fundamental changes.

25 David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1900), 173.

26 Michael H. Clemmesen, “Integration of New Alliance Members: The Intellectual-Cultural Dimension,” *Defense Analysis* 15, no. 3 (December 1999): 261–72, doi:10.1080/713604685; and Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 108–53.

Table 2. The Professional Conceptual Divide²⁷

| Western concepts | Eastern concepts |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Practical | Theoretical |
| Critical thinking is required | Iron discipline rules |
| Decentralized execution | Centralized execution |
| Commanders are empowered | Commanders only execute |
| Results oriented | Process oriented |
| Future oriented | Past obsessed |
| Low social context | High social context |
| Serve the troops | Mistreat soldiers (Dedovshchina) |
| Low power distance | High power distance |
| Low uncertainty avoidance | High uncertainty avoidance |
| Lying is unacceptable | Lying is not a sin |
| Failure is part of learning | Failure is never an option, but a shame and disgrace |

Conclusion

In summary, command as defined and practiced in many Central and Eastern European defense institutions, and expressed as a Communist trinity of legacy concepts, could not be more foreign and antithetical to Western approaches. This premise should come as no surprise since communism's absolute centralization of power never entrusted lower officials with decision-making authority. Bereft of responsibility and accountability, the legacy definition of command constitutes absolute power over individuals, which likely explains why most newly independent republics systematically compromise commanders' abilities to command. Largely absent in the region is a timely evolution of laws, policies, incentives, and control mechanisms that ensure the responsible exercise of command.

Yet, these concepts and practices are too limited by the continued practices of collective decision-making; conflating leadership, command, and management; and hypercentralized decision-making to be effectively adopted, particularly regarding financial authorities and human resource management. Overcoming these legacy concepts and comprehensively replacing them with their Western counterparts presents no small challenge. An encouraging first step would be NATO nations' universal and honest acknowledgement of the challenge and their commitment to addressing these atavistic legacies with deliberate and systematic new methods to effect change.

The only way to undertake this challenge is to place the solution where it belongs, at the highest political level. Thus, the default of long-standing policies and programs that address defense reform as a military problem addressed via technical assistance programs alone needs to be fundamentally reviewed to develop new approaches based on a deep understanding of individual cultures and organizational sociologies. The solution to reforming legacy command concepts will be found in growing and empowering commanders.

²⁷ Adapted from Young, "Impediments to Reform."

Operational Success, Strategic Failure: Assessing the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge

Charlotte F. Blatt

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ABSTRACT: This article outlines the contemporary history of sectarian conflict in Iraq and identifies the consequences of the US surge strategy in perpetuating the region's violence and strengthening the Islamic State.

By 2006, security had declined dramatically in Iraq. The February bombing of the al-Askari mosque, a major Shia holy site, sparked a rapid increase in sectarian conflict. Violence in Baghdad increased 43 percent over the summer; by October, civilian deaths had risen to more than three thousand per month.¹ Thus, in January 2007 the United States radically shifted the course of the Iraq War by executing Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, commonly known as “the surge.” Under General David Petraeus, the surge attempted to reverse the course of the war and stabilize Iraq using counterinsurgency tactics, which included 30,000 additional soldiers “[living] with the people’ in order to secure them.”² Operationally, the effort appeared to have been a success. By January 2009, casualties declined from 2,693 to 372 civilians and from 101 to 14 US troops; violent incidents declined from 908 to 195.³ In recent years, however, increasing sectarian conflict is again jeopardizing Iraq’s stability.⁴

At this point it seems the surge has failed to achieve the strategic objectives—“daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will . . . make progress”—stated by President George W. Bush in January 2007.⁵ Why? Most scholarship on this issue falls into two camps. The first group claims the operation would have succeeded if President Barack Obama had kept US forces in Iraq past 2011. The second camp argues the mission could not have succeeded because it failed to address the underlying sectarian conflict and the political instability fueling civil war. Due to the complexity of the issue, determining the correct cause with complete certainty is challenging. The debate centers around such evidence as the contemporary history of sectarian conflict in Iraq, sectarian tension and institutional mismanagement during the surge, immediate consequences of the surge, and implications of the strategy. After carefully accounting for such

1 Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 31–32.

2 David Petraeus, foreword to *Surge*, by Mansoor, x.

3 David Kilcullen, *Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 45.

4 “Iraq Profile-Overview,” BBC News, December 24 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14544541>.

5 “Transcript of President Bush’s Address to Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq,” *New York Times*, January 11, 2007.

Charlotte F. Blatt is a fellow in the War and Peace Studies Program at Dartmouth College’s John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding.

evidence, this article not only posits the military solution to the political and sectarian problems was misguided but also illustrates lessons from this operation for use in future conflicts.

The Debate

The optimists in the surge efficacy debate argue Iraq's increasing instability is due to troop withdrawal under the Obama administration. This view claims reduced violence and improved relations with local communities were squandered in the absence of US troops enforcing the rule of law.⁶ David Kilcullen, Petraeus' senior counterinsurgency adviser, notes "in a conflict like Iraq, if violence drops when you apply counterinsurgency techniques, then returns when you stop . . . it suggests [the tactics] do work . . . and you shouldn't have stopped before figuring out a way to maintain the progress." Kilcullen also criticizes Obama's desire to end the war rather than to fight for a status of forces agreement (SOFA) to extend troops in Iraq past 2011.⁷ Similarly, Peter Mansoor, Petraeus's executive US Army officer, argues the surge was a successful strategy shift: "Al-Qaeda in Iraq was allowed off the ropes . . . due to our inability to remain sufficiently engaged in Iraq . . . not to the failure of the surge as a strategic concept."⁸

According to the optimists, two assumptions explain Iraq's security decline. First, reduced violence during 2007 and 2008 increased Iraq's stability and positioned the government to manage sectarian tension successfully. For example, former Sunni insurgents, known as the "Sons of Iraq" (SOI), willingly began working with coalition forces and Shia police. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr also stood down the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Shia militia.⁹ Second, by the end of 2011, trend lines indicated efforts to stabilize Iraq were on target; therefore, the 20,000 troops recommended by General Lloyd J. Austin III, commander of US Forces in Iraq, would have likely maintained the trend and mitigated the rise of the Islamic State (IS).¹⁰

The second camp argues the surge failed to transform operational success into strategic success because it did not address the fundamental problems driving conflict in Iraq: sectarian tension and weak

6 See, for example, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, "The Anti-Surge: How Obama Snatched Defeat from the Jaws of Victory in Iraq," *Foreign Policy*, October 30, 2013; Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, "The Collapsing Obama Doctrine," *Wall Street Journal*, June 17, 2014; Rick Brennan, "Withdrawal Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2014; Sergei Boek *Combining Exit with Strategy: Transitioning from Short-Term Military Interventions to a Long-Term Counter-Terrorism Policy* (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 2014); and John McCain, "McCain: Fire Obama National Security Team," interview on Morning Joe, MSNBC, June 13, 2014.

7 Kilcullen, *Blood Year*, 47–48.

8 Mansoor, *Surge*, 270.

9 *Ibid.*, 264–65

10 Liz Sly, "U.S. Commander, Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, Predicts Turbulence Ahead in Iraq," *Washington Post*, November 21, 2011; and Cheney and Cheney, "Collapsing Obama Doctrine."

governmental institutions.¹¹ Ali Khedery, the longest continuously serving US official in Iraq, argues US intervention ultimately failed due to “empower[ing] a new set of elites who drew their legitimacy almost purely from divisive ethno-sectarian agendas rather than from visions of truth, reconciliation, the rule of law, and national unity,” ultimately fueling nationwide sectarian strife.¹² Emma Sky, political adviser to General Ray T. Odierno, observed positive changes in Iraq immediately after the surge, and found American-backing of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the 2010 national election reflected “supporting the status quo rather than reform,” which would have been necessary for long-term political stability.¹³

With this view, trends in Iraqi stability were not sufficiently positive by the end of 2011 to render the surge a success.¹⁴ American troop behavior did not reduce sectarian conflict. And, American officials supported ineffective and unsustainable institutions during and after the surge. Since Iraq’s security and stability began declining before troops had left, this camp could not give credence to the optimists’ argument that Obama’s failure to extend the SOFA caused Iraq’s destabilization. Some members of this camp do consider, however, America’s inadequate understanding of Iraqi society as a reason Iraq could not be fully stabilized.¹⁵

Contemporary Sectarian History and the Surge (2007–2008)

The history of sectarian conflict in Iraq is complex. The Shia and Sunni sects of Islam have lived peacefully together, worshiping the same god despite different religious ideologies for over a thousand years.¹⁶ Although occasional conflicts over power, resources, and status have occurred during the last 100 years, recent Western intervention contributed to a resurgence of violent sectarian conflict in Iraq before 2007.¹⁷

The Sunni minority has consistently enjoyed political control of Iraq since the time of the Ottoman Empire, consolidating power with the 1958 overthrow of the British-installed monarchy and effectively maintaining power during the 1963 Baath Party coup.¹⁸ Politicization of sectarian conflict increased sharply after the Iranian Revolution of

11 See, for example, Steven Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008; David Hastings Dunn and Andrew Futter, “Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq,” *Defence Studies* 10, nos. 1–2 (Spring 2010), doi:10.1080/14702430903377977; Bernard Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2010); T. David Mason, “Ending the War in Iraq: The Third Option,” *Civil Wars* 14, no. 2 (June 2012), doi:10.1080/13698249.2012.679504; Ivo H. Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge,” Brookings Institution, December 8, 2007; Alex Kingsbury, “Why the 2007 Surge in Iraq Actually Failed,” *Boston Globe*, November 17, 2014; and Peter Beinart, “The Surge Fallacy,” *Atlantic*, September 2015.

12 Ali Khedery, “Iraq in Pieces: Breaking Up to Stay Together,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2015.

13 Emma Sky, *The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq* (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2015), 338.

14 Ali Khedery, “Why We Stuck with Maliki—and Lost Iraq,” *Washington Post*, July 3, 2014.

15 Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics.”

16 Geneive Abdo et al., “The Sunni-Shia Divide,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 9, 2017.

17 Harith Hasan al-Qarawee, “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis: Legacy of Exclusion,” Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2014.

18 David Gritten, “Long Path to Iraq’s Sectarian Split,” BBC News, February 25, 2006.

1978–79 that established a Shia theocracy focused on inspiring similar movements in neighboring nations. Saudi Arabia countered Iran’s ambitions, promoting the Sunni vision of Islam in the region and supporting Iraq during the long and brutal Iran-Iraq War (1980–88).¹⁹

Though notable, the destabilizing effects of Iraq’s dependence on oil for state revenue and inability to manage and divide the resource between groups is beyond the scope of this article.

Further disrupting sectarian relations, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, pursued a largely secular governance strategy.²⁰ Despite reports of equally applied force, much of Saddam’s brutality targeted Shias and Kurds. During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, thousands of Shias were not only prohibited from freely practicing their religion but were also expelled from the country, imprisoned, tortured, or killed. In 2006, Saddam was tried on a charge of “genocide for attempting to annihilate the Kurdish race” during the Anfal military campaign (1988) that killed at least 50,000 civilians and destroyed thousands of villages.²¹ Thus, Saddam’s practices reinforced the historically Sunni Arab-dominant society and marginalized Shias and Kurds.²²

Arriving in 2003, the United States further divided the population by forcing each Iraqi to list his or her sect on any state issued document. This identity was used for the country’s new political structure, pitting sectarian groups against each other for government positions and authoritative roles. While this structure placed power in the hands of the Shia majority, who had long been disenfranchised, the rapid and aggressive de-Baathification policy disproportionately impacted Sunnis: they were removed from positions in the military and government and had few avenues of recourse.²³ As the war escalated, tensions worsened, and violence increased throughout Iraq.²⁴ Though there were certainly many other divisive factors in Iraqi society, sectarian lines were well-pronounced before the surge.

During the Surge

While “all quantitative measures . . . indicated the tentative success of the surge” due to the counterinsurgency strategy reducing violence, and the Sunni community increasingly working with US forces, these changes did not substantively address underlying sectarian tension.²⁵

19 Ian Black, “Iran and Iraq Remember War that Cost More than a Million Lives,” *Guardian* (Manchester), September 23, 2010; Mike Gallagher, “The ‘Beauty’ and the Horror of the Iran-Iraq War,” BBC News, September 26, 2015; and Abdo et al., “Sunni-Shia Divide.”

20 Musa al-Gharbi, “The Myth and Reality of Sectarianism in Iraq,” *Al Jazeera America*, August 18, 2014.

21 Edward Wong, “Saddam Charged with Genocide of Kurds,” *New York Times*, April 5, 2006.

22 Gawdat Bahgat “Saddam Hussein’s Legacy: A Preliminary Assessment and Future Implications,” *S AIS Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2005), doi:10.1353/sais.2005.0027; and Gritten, “Long Path.”

23 Daniel Byman “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or a Bridge Too Far?,” *Security Studies* 17, no. 4 (October-December 2008); and al-Gharbi, “Myth and Reality.”

24 Mansoor, “A War Almost Lost,” in *Surge*, 31–43.

25 David H. Ucko, *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 125–26.

Sectarian Tension

The surge did not sustain reduced violence for several reasons, which undermines the optimists' claim the operation set Iraq toward long-term stability. Cooperation between Sunnis, Shias, and coalition forces was a marriage of convenience rather than intentional reconciliation. Sunnis who had previously cooperated with al-Qaeda began to work with coalition troops as members of the Sons of Iraq due to al-Qaeda's control of resources as well as a series of killings of important Sunnis. The deaths led one Sunni leader to explain "resistance groups [were left] with two options: either to fight al Qaeda and negotiate with the Americans or fight the Americans and join the Islamic State of Iraq. . . . Both options are bitter."²⁶ Furthermore, Sunni cooperation with the United States happened to increase as they were simultaneously losing a civil war with the Shias. Thus, Sunnis did not form the SOI to cooperate with the United States because of genuine support for their goals, rather they were motivated by a desire to reverse their marginalization and to better position themselves against al-Qaeda and Shias, a risk factor for future conflict.²⁷ Similarly, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia, consented to a US assault on Shia militias because he saw cooperation with America as his best hope for survival.²⁸ And, the US military worked with SOI out of necessity, unable to take counterinsurgency action without the help of local allies.²⁹ Thus, cooperation during the surge was unrepresentative of underlying trends in sectarian behavior.

Also undermining long-term stability, coalition forces used payments to motivate the Sons of Iraq. Sunni sheikhs took as much as 20 percent of US payments to SOI groups, which was often worth over \$100,000. This practice caused concerns that chiefs would not agree to integrate SOI forces into Iraqi state security services. Most SOI militia members were already well armed, but some individuals and their sheikhs were given US weapons.³⁰ Fears that allied militia members would return to insurgency when the money stopped flowing came to fruition; violence eventually returned.³¹

The divergent goals of each sectarian group fueled the violence and reduced the operation's state-building capacity because negotiation and resolution never occurred. Sunnis frequently believed reconciliation between Iraq's sectarian groups would mean their restoration to power. Shias wanted justice for previous regimes' subjugation indicative of early elements of Maliki's regime.³² Kurds viewed reconciliation as respecting their autonomy.³³ When Sunnis realized their cooperation with coalition troops would not equate to help challenging the Shias, the work with US forces decreased and some returned to al-Qaeda.³⁴

26 Simon, "Price of the Surge."

27 Fred M. Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 267–68; and Stancati, "Tribal Dynamics."

28 Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 267–68.

29 Jon Lee Anderson, "Inside the Surge: The American Military Finds New Allies, But at What Cost?" *New Yorker*, November 19, 2007.

30 Simon, "Price of the Surge."

31 Kingsbury, "2007 Surge in Iraq."

32 Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 284.

33 Simon, "Price of the Surge."

34 Ibid.

Not only did these factors further divide sectarian groups, but US troop missteps combined with a weak sectarian government also set Iraq down a path of instability. American presence in Iraqi communities helped gather better intelligence; however, the lack of understanding of local culture and language led to the mistaken arrests of thousands. Prisons became centers of radicalization described as “jihadi universities,” contributing to later conflict.³⁵ Furthermore, Iraqis were angered by decisions to wall off Baghdad neighborhoods and hire and arm SOI groups without community input. Locals worried the United States was just arming new militias and further undermining the unstable state government. The population disapproved of constant raids that reinforced the idea of the United States as a coercive power, a catalyst leading some Iraqis to become insurgents.³⁶

The lack of a strong national government throughout the surge meant Iraq did not develop its own viable and independent national army or police force. Existing societal divisions materialized within Iraq’s armed forces, laying the foundation for further sectarian strife after US troops left.³⁷ Moreover, the Shia government arrested hundreds of Sunnis who were cooperating with US forces, which was indicative of the conflicting goals of US and Iraqi leadership and foreshadowed later sectarian conflict driven by the Maliki regime.³⁸ Indeed, during the surge, Shia militias dominated Iraqi government security forces, while Maliki resisted any threat to his authority. Moreover, groups like the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia purportedly accepted Iran’s support, increasing Iranian power in Iraq.³⁹

In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group, a congressionally formed bipartisan research organization, concluded, “Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.”⁴⁰ Because the surge did not sufficiently manage the combination of issues illustrated above, trends in Iraqi security and stability were bound to be negative after the surge, regardless of the short-term benefits.

Institution-Building

When Sky left Iraq in 2008, she and Odierno understood “the surge had not eliminated the root causes of conflict in Iraq . . . the Iraqis must still develop the necessary institutions to manage competition for power and resources peacefully.”⁴¹ Troops had not laid the foundation for the civil institutions vital to the surge’s overall success. Even during the surge, then-Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta, recognized the mistake of assuming other elements of Iraqi reconciliation like institution-building would “fall into place” if surge troops reduced

35 Kingsbury, “2007 Surge in Iraq.”

36 Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”

37 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge.”

38 Richard A. Opiel Jr., “Iraq Takes Aim at U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups’ Leaders,” *New York Times*, August 21, 2008.

39 Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 210; and Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”

40 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), xiii.

41 Emma Sky, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty: Winding Down the War in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2011.

violence.⁴² One scholar elaborates: “Only when Iraq’s Sunni and Shia Arabs and its Kurds all felt represented by the government would the country be safe from civil war.”⁴³

The problems with institution-building during the surge largely fell into three categories: institutional discrimination, leadership failures, and service delivery challenges. Iraqi institutions, largely unchecked by US forces, perpetuated discriminatory sectarian policies during the surge. These policies led to sectarian influence over the leadership and the staff of government ministries and hindered efforts to build a professional civil service.⁴⁴ Important ministries remained under sectarian militia control, “creating an environment of danger and intimidation both for Iraqi civil servants and their coalition advisors.”⁴⁵ The population also experienced government-perpetuated discrimination. One Sunni neighborhood, for example, received half as much electricity per day as a nearby Shia community.⁴⁶

American civil servants spent almost no time mentoring their Iraqi counterparts due to security concerns about leaving the Green Zone. Furthermore, action taken by American forces to reform the government’s sectarian tendencies was described as “fragmented and incoherent.”⁴⁷ Thus, the United States did not sufficiently manage the creation of secular institutions during the surge, allowing destabilizing sectarian discrimination to continue within the Iraqi government.

The Bush administration attempted to mentor senior Iraqi ministers even though the advice and council US officials provided was insufficient to guard Iraqi institutions against future turmoil. Both Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker met frequently, sometimes even simultaneously, with Maliki, mentoring him about proper governance; Bush regularly video conferenced with Maliki, seeing himself as a mentor to the prime minister.⁴⁸ Former National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley elaborates Bush decided, “I’ve got to be his best friend. I’ve got to be his counselor . . . Because if he doesn’t succeed, U.S. policy isn’t going to succeed.”⁴⁹ Despite these efforts, Maliki did not heed the counsel he received during the surge and led Iraq back toward unstable institutions.

By May 2007, there were only 150 members of provincial reconstruction teams assisting with service provision in Iraq. This “woefully inadequate” number was not shocking as few State Department (or even Agriculture Department) personnel know how to maintain local irrigation systems or electrical grids. Because the United States did not have enough skilled personnel on the ground, American civil and

42 Leon E. Panetta, “Surge Not Working as Hoped,” *Monterey (CA) Herald*, September 9, 2007, reproduced by Panetta Institute.

43 Beinart, “Surge Fallacy.”

44 Colonel Guy T. Cosentino, “The United States Government Interagency Process and the Failure of Institution Building in Iraq” (Senior Service College Fellowship Project, US Army War College, 2008), Defense Technical Information Center.

45 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama* (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), 512.

46 Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”

47 Gordon and Trainor, *Endgame*, 511–12.

48 Conrad C. Crane, *Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 143–44.

49 Jason M. Breslow and Evan Wexler, “Who is Nouri al-Maliki,” *Frontline*, July 29, 2014.

military personnel did not sufficiently support the Iraqi government's delivery of vital services during the surge, which established a long-term trend of ineffective institutions.⁵⁰

By late 2007, most Iraqis still lacked electricity, trash collection, potable water, healthcare, and telephone services.⁵¹ Pervasive corruption exacerbated this problem.⁵² Even if the United States had increased the size of the provincial reconstruction teams, inefficiencies would have likely persisted due to cultural clashes between American civilian and military bureaus. Thus, the US failure to assist the Iraqi government in providing services for its people during the surge caused most Iraqis to view sectarian militias, rather than the state government, as the provider of security and services.⁵³

Many argue that by mid-2008 the surge was successful and that the gains would have been maintained with extended US troop presence.⁵⁴ Stephen Biddle testified to Congress that “the violence reduction was more than just a temporary lull. It reflected a systematic shift in the underlying strategic landscape of Iraq, and could offer the basis for sustainable stability if we respond appropriately.”⁵⁵ By the end of 2008, Biddle's view seemed justified. Violence had declined so substantially that Iraq's future seemed bright, the SOI program appeared successful, and Iraqi institutions seemed relatively stable; however, significant arguments stand in contrast to the surge optimist viewpoint. Evidence suggests that at the end of 2008 Iraq was not trending toward long-term sectarian conflict resolution even though violence had declined.

Consequences of the Surge

Despite the compelling argument for the surge's success, Iraq may not have been as stable as believed. By 2010, challenges leading up to and surrounding the national election illustrated the surge had not achieved “sustainable stability” and “Washington had reneged on the promises it had made to Iraqis to protect the political process and it had betrayed the very principles the US military believed it was fighting to uphold.”⁵⁶ Violence had returned to pre-surge levels in 2012.⁵⁷ Iraq was not trending toward long-term sectarian conflict resolution.

Immediate Instability

Some attribute the increased instability to Maliki, who had been the US choice for prime minister in 2005 due to his low profile, leadership

50 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Civil Defense: The Surge That Would Really Save Iraq,” Brookings Institution, May 21, 2007.

51 Panetta, “Surge Not Working.”

52 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge.”

53 Pollack, “Civil Defense.”

54 See McCain and Graham, “The Anti-Surge”; Cheney and Cheney, “Collapsing Obama Doctrine”; Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms”; Boek, *Combining Exit with Strategy*; and McCain, “McCain.”

55 *Stabilizing Iraq from the Ground Up, Hearing on Iraq after the Surge: Political Prospects, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, 110th Cong., (April 2, 2008) (statement of Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations).

56 Sky, *Unraveling*, 338.

57 Michael E. O'Hanlon and Ian Livingston, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Iraq* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013).

skills, and acceptability to Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds.⁵⁸ Indeed, in March 2008 Maliki supported a successful charge against the Jaysh al-Mahdi in Basra, earning him praise as a secular and patriotic nationalist.⁵⁹ After the surge, however, the prime minister began treating former Sons of Iraq and secular governmental institutions differently.

Broken pre-surge promises to reintegrate former members of the SOI into post-surge national security forces indicated a continuation of Iraq's sectarian struggle. After much resistance, the Maliki regime agreed to accept 20 percent of the former militia members into regular state security forces and to employ the remainder in nonsecurity government jobs.⁶⁰ But, the government quickly failed to pay salaries to former SOI members or to complete the integration. Sunni leaders were also arrested and protests were repressed, which led to additional Sunni disenfranchisement and future radicalization.⁶¹

In 2008, polls indicated public satisfaction with government services was exceptionally low.⁶² Some Sunnis compared the Maliki regime to a Shia mosque due to unequal distribution of government services.⁶³ Khedery stated, "The insatiable lust for power and money evidenced by virtually every national leader I met . . . still leaves me dazed." Corruption was rampant among leaders from all sects; leaders supported by Americans engaged in more corrupt behavior than those under Saddam Hussein.⁶⁴ Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the surge, Iraq was not trending toward stability: its leaders exacerbated sectarian tension while America backed an ineffective regime.

The 2010 Iraqi Election

The Iraqiya coalition—a nonsectarian group headed by Iyad Allawi, a secular Shia, and leaders of the Sunni community—edged out Maliki's State of Law coalition by 2 seats (91 to 89) in the 2010 election. Since Iraqiya did not win by an outright majority, Allawi should have had the first chance to form a ruling government coalition; however, Maliki refused to accept the loss, claiming rampant fraud.⁶⁵ Though there was no evidence to support this claim, Maliki pushed Iraq's high court to allow him to form a government, preventing Allawi from doing so.⁶⁶ The United States and Iran also committed to supporting Maliki even though Iraqiya had won the popular vote.

Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Iraq, opposed the US decision: "We . . . bandwagoned . . . rather than pushing back and saying the [Iraqi] Constitution had to be followed."⁶⁷ Indeed, Maliki got his way;

58 Sarah Childress, "Zalmay Khalilzad: Maliki and the 'Unmaking of Iraq,'" *Frontline*, July 29, 2014.

59 Ali Khedery, "Why We Stuck."

60 Stancati, "Tribal Dynamics."

61 David Romano, "Iraq's Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation," *Middle East Journal* 68, no. 4 (Autumn 2014), doi:10.3751/68.4.13; and Mason, "Ending the War."

62 Sky, "Iraq."

63 Sky, *Unraveling*, 253.

64 Khedery, "Iraq in Pieces."

65 Sarah Childress, "Zalmay Khalilzad: Maliki and the 'Unmaking of Iraq,'" *Frontline*, July 29, 2014; and Emma Sky, "How Obama Abandoned Democracy in Iraq," *Politico*, April 7, 2015.

66 Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Fall and Rise and Fall of Iraq," Brookings Institution, July 30, 2013.

67 Childress, "Zalmay Khalilzad."

a parliamentary coalition formed, reinstated Maliki as prime minister, and relegated Allawi to be the leader of a strategic council that never materialized.⁶⁸ A security dilemma consequently developed from Maliki's likely fear of instability among opposing sectarian groups and interest in protecting his authority in contrast to other sects' growing alienation from and escalating anger with the election outcome.⁶⁹ Iran's active role of payment and persuasion—including the head of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continuously summoning Iraqis to Iran—during the Iraqi election shifted additional power to a pan-Shia coalition backing Maliki.⁷⁰ Moreover, Obama's promise to end Bush's "dumb war" and the global economic downturn decreased US interest in the region. Thus, Iran's influence over Iraqi elections increased, contributing to Maliki's reversion to sectarian practices.⁷¹

Rafi al-Issawi, then-deputy prime minister of Iraq commented, "If the [United States] acknowledged that Iraqiya won the elections . . . the others would not have challenged it."⁷² Instead, US mismanagement negatively impacted Iraqi institutions and pushed the nation toward instability. Maliki began to influence independent governmental institutions, including the judiciary, government oversight bureaus, and the election committee.⁷³ Iraq's national security forces became almost entirely Shia, another sign of Sunni disenfranchisement.⁷⁴ Paralyzed by sectarian disagreement, the government still struggled to provide basic services equitably. Furthermore, Maliki ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, illustrating secular tension at the highest levels of Iraqi government.⁷⁵

A combination of the faulty foundations laid during the surge, the problems leading up to and surrounding the 2010 national election, and US apathy toward continued stability contributed to the violence rising to new highs.⁷⁶ Sunnis were detained without trial and pushed outside of political processes; peaceful protests against discrimination faced violent retaliation.⁷⁷ Indeed, even during the 2010 political crisis, Khedery returned to Iraq and expressed he "was shocked that much of the surge's success had been squandered by Maliki and other Iraqi leaders."⁷⁸ Khedery later noted the Islamic State grew from the defeat of democratic principles during the 2010 election and the resultant Sunni radicalization.⁷⁹ Iraqis did not simply fail to manage their own government: America failed to reduce sectarian tension during the surge and to protect democratic principles.

68 Mason, "Ending the War."

69 Pollack, "Fall and Rise"; and James F. Jeffrey, "How Maliki Broke Iraq," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 13, 2014.

70 Sky, *Unraveling*, 329; and Sky, "How Obama."

71 Khedery, "Why We Stuck."

72 Sky, *Unraveling*, 330.

73 Pollack, "Fall and Rise."

74 Ali Khedery, "Iraq's Last Chance," *New York Times*, August 17, 2014.

75 Mason, "Ending the War."

76 Khedery, "Iraq in Pieces."

77 Sky, "How Obama."

78 Khedery, "Why We Stuck."

79 Khedery, "Iraq's Last Chance"; Fanar Haddad "Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 7, 2016; Pollack, "Fall and Rise"; and Colin H. Kahl, "No, Obama Didn't Lose Iraq," *Politico*, June 15, 2014.

The Status of Forces Agreement, Troop Withdrawal, and the Rise of IS

The SOFA signed in 2008 established the legal presence of US troops in Iraq through December 31, 2011.⁸⁰ Military leaders argued Obama should negotiate for the presence of 20,000 US troops in Iraq past 2011; however, the proposed presence dwindled to 8,000 troops; then 5,000—a size Obama believed would be sufficient to continue intelligence collection, counterterrorism, training missions, and checkpoint management.⁸¹ There was a caveat: the SOFA granting troops in Iraq immunity from local prosecution must be renewed. Maliki would have to sign an executive memorandum of understanding endorsing immunity, but it had to be approved by parliament. Since US presence was wildly unpopular among Iraqis, and parliamentarians were influenced by then-Iran-backed Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, the SOFA extension was impossible.⁸² Thus, Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq at the end of 2011.

Many politicians, military personnel, and journalists argue a residual troop force in Iraq beyond 2011 would have given the surge more time to work and subsequently prevented, or at least substantially mitigated, the rise of the Islamic State.⁸³ The accompanying reduction of US embassy staff and infrequent communication with the Iraqi government compounded the destabilizing factors increasing sectarian violence.⁸⁴ John McCain reiterated this stance in 2014, “General Petraeus had the conflict won thanks to the surge and if we had left the residual force behind . . . we would not be facing the crisis we are today . . . we are paying a very heavy price.” McCain and others point to nations in which the United States left troops behind for extended amounts of time, such as South Korea and Germany, as evidence that Iraq would be a far more stable country today if we had acted similarly.⁸⁵

While compelling, this logic does not account for the trend of sectarian conflict leading up to troop withdrawal. As the Maliki regime oppressed Sunnis, former US tribal allies began to view “the Islamic State as the lesser of two evils when compared with Maliki.”⁸⁶ Indeed, sectarian conflict reemerged while US troops were present, suggesting that extending US presence would not have substantially impacted the rise of the Islamic State. Moreover, successful postconflict American presence has historically focused on improving an existing state rather than laying foundations for a new one. Thus, comparisons between Iraq and nations with established governments, such as Germany, are poor.⁸⁷

The counterfactual scenario of Iraq with US troop presence past 2011 casts additional doubt upon the optimists’ hypothesis. While it is probable extending the presence of US counterterrorism advisers and

80 Tony Karon, “Iraq’s Government, Not Obama, Called Time on the U.S. Troop Presence,” *Time*, October 21, 2011.

81 Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms.”

82 Kahl, “Obama Didn’t Lose”; and Karon, “Iraq’s Government.”

83 See, for example: Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad”; and Mary Habeck et al., “A Global Strategy for Combating al Qaeda and the Islamic State,” American Enterprise Institute, December 7, 2015.

84 Crane, *Cassandra in Oz*, 214.

85 McCain, “McCain.”

86 Sky, *Unraveling*, 360.

87 Jason Brownlee, “Was Obama Wrong to Withdraw Troops from Iraq?,” *Monkey Cage*, *Washington Post*, June 26, 2014.

military trainers could have increased pressure on Iraqi terror networks, “the idea that such a force would have completely stopped the jihadists is a fantasy.”⁸⁸ If 175,000 troops in Iraq during the surge could not ameliorate the sectarian tension propelling the Islamic State into power, a lesser or noncombat force could not sufficiently reconcile sectarian and political tension to prevent IS success.⁸⁹

Although Iraq was not sufficiently stable by 2011 to validate the claim that the surge was not given enough time to work, troop withdrawal could plausibly be a major source of Iraq’s return to instability.⁹⁰ Strong or conclusive evidence linking troop presence and stability in Iraq from the end of the surge to troop withdrawal or proof of the effectiveness of a residual force was not encountered. Such information would be a compelling reason to consider the surge optimist perspective.

Lessons for Future Conflicts

By recognizing practices that amplified sectarian tension during the surge, military and government leaders can more effectively manage future conflicts. Paying tribes to fight alongside coalition forces yielded short-term benefits that caused long-term problems. When the surge—and the cash payments—stopped, dissension reemerged.⁹¹ Ignorance of local culture as well as insufficient consultation and ineffective communication with the populace prevented authentic coalitions from forming.⁹² Inattention to the incompatible goals of various ethnosectarian populations perpetuated conflict.⁹³ Tolerating a national government that perpetuates societal divisions and sectarian discrimination prevents the long-term reconciliation necessary for a stable state.⁹⁴

The following strategies conversely reduce sectarian tension. Military intervention must be coupled with efforts to increase official oversight, agency funding, and interagency communication.⁹⁵ Collaboration between US personnel and the nascent state’s leaders must lead to strong governmental institutions that adequately reconcile sectarian divides.⁹⁶ Host country personnel interactions with civilian and military trainers must occur across all levels of government to ensure adequate representation of the country’s citizens, including in its

88 Kahl, “Obama Didn’t Lose.”

89 James Franklin Jeffrey, “Behind the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 2, 2014; Abby Phillip, “Obama Keeps Iraq Promise—Will Anyone Notice?,” *Politico*, August 30, 2010; Brian Montopoli, “Obama Announces End of Iraq War, Troops to Return Home by Year End,” CBS News, October 21, 2011; and Doug Mataconis, “Panetta: At Least Some Non-Combat Troops Will Remain in Iraq After 2011,” *Outside the Beltway*, August 20, 2011.

90 See, for example, McCain and Graham, “The Anti-Surge”; Cheney and Cheney, “Collapsing Obama Doctrine”; Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms”; Boockvar, *Combining Exit with Strategy*; and McCain, “McCain.”

91 Kingsbury, “2007 Surge in Iraq.”

92 *Ibid.*; and Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”

93 Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 284; and Simon, “The Price of the Surge.”

94 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge”; Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 210.

95 Virginia Byers, “Sharing the Load: Evaluating Two Civilian and Military Interagency Missions,” *Small Wars Journal*, January 28, 2014; Richard Byers, “Civilian-Military Cooperation: What’s Next?,” in *Frontiers in Development* (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 2012); and R. Jeffrey Smith, “The Failed Reconstruction of Iraq,” *Atlantic*, March 15, 2013.

96 Cosentino, “Interagency Process”; and Gordon and Trainor, *Endgame*, 511–12.

military forces.⁹⁷ Cultural competency training for US troops must be completed prior to their participation in interventions.⁹⁸ These changes will position American leaders to generate more positive outcomes in future interventions.

To be clear, this article does not challenge the idea that counterinsurgency requires substantial manpower, nor does it assert the absence of positive lessons from the surge. To the contrary, the surge's influx of troops living among the people to provide security demonstrated remarkable operational success.⁹⁹ But, the operational success could not be translated into strategic success because corresponding intergroup reconciliation and institution-building did not occur.

Future efforts should focus on aligning military interventions with intergroup reconciliation efforts. Research should explore how US personnel can effectively facilitate intergroup negotiations and productive dialogue in host countries. Divergent expectations for post-surge interactions should be addressed to bolster intersectorian efforts to sustain security.¹⁰⁰ Finally, strategies to encourage local participation in military interventions that do not rely on cash payments should be developed and assessed to prevent similar destabilization.¹⁰¹ The lessons from the surge provide a powerful starting point for understanding military, government, and sectarian interactions.

97 Pollack, "Civil Defense"; al-Qarawee, "Iraq's Sectarian Crisis"; and Kenneth Pollack, *A Switch In Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq*, Analysis Paper 7 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), 43.

98 Allison Abbe and Stanley M. Halpin, "The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education and Leader Development," *Parameters* 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10); and Paula Caligiuri et al., *Training, Developing, and Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence in Military Personnel*, Technical Report 1284 (Arlington, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2011), 53–55.

99 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?," *International Security* 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012), doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00087.

100 Oppel, "Iraq Takes Aim."

101 Simon, "Price of the Surge."

Tracking Democratization: Insights for Planners

Stanley J. Wiechnik

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ABSTRACT: Drawing from previous debates on the topic of state- and nation-building in this journal, this article offers a baseline understanding of the theories of democratization. It then provides a convenient visualization of the political transition from an autocratic or failed state to democracy. This visualization should be useful to practitioners and policymakers engaged in strategically expanding democracy.

The officially stated goal in Iraq was, and the ultimate political objective of many recent US ground military operations has been, promoting democracy.¹ In two recent *Parameters* articles on nation-building, it became clear that a general disagreement exists over whether postconflict rebuilding can realistically entail creating a “successful democracy.”² Obviously, understanding what it takes to promote democracy “can precondition the Army’s ability not only to fight effectively but also to secure the political objectives of war.”³ If the ultimate end state includes the successful transition from military authority to democratic civilian authority, then it is incumbent upon military commanders to set conditions for the success of the nascent democracy. To do this, commanders and planners need a basic understanding of democratization even though guidance for military leaders on how to promote democracy is lacking.

Broadly speaking, there are two methods to promote democracy.⁴ The political approach concentrates on building institutions that support democracy by transition from autocracy to democracy. Alternatively, the developmental approach concentrates on setting conditions for a stable democracy to develop over time. Success requires both. Even though applying only the political approach leaves out key social aspects of democratization, most doctrinal literature concentrates on the political approach and neglects the developmental approach, making the task look far easier than it really is.

This article explores what the developmental approach can provide strategists and planners and offers a rudimentary, but quantifiable,

1 Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, *Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?*, Report RL34296 (Washington, DC: US Congressional Research Service, 2007); and Thomas Carothers, *Democracy Promotion under Obama: Finding a Way Forward*, Policy Brief 77 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).

2 M. Chris Mason, “Nation-Building is an Oxymoron,” *Parameters* 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 68. See also Charles J. Sullivan, “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge,” *Parameters* 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016).

3 Joseph Roger Clark, “To Win Wars, Correct the Army’s Political Blind Spot,” *Parameters* 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015–16): 37.

4 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?,” *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 1 (2009): 5–19.

Lieutenant Colonel Stanley J. Wiechnik, JD, serves in the Office of the Chief Army Reserve and writes on political legitimacy and democratization. He enlisted in the US Army in 1982 and was commissioned in 1993.

understanding of the efforts necessary to transition and consolidate from an unstable state to a viable democracy. This discourse does not explore the academic nature of democracy but distills an extremely complex sociopolitical event down to its essence—the fewest possible variables that still yield a demonstrable relationship—to provide a simple way to conceptualize and visualize the transition to democracy. While discussing other metrics, this analysis focuses on theories of democratization, the process of democratization, a functional definition of democracy, and the most salient democratization data points. An introduction on using key metrics to estimate timelines relevant to defense policy is also provided. The article concludes with some thoughts on factors to consider when discussing democratization with civilian leaders and policymakers.

Theories of Democratic Transitions

The causes of a society's transition from an autocratic to democratic government are not fully understood. Over the years, researchers have proposed multiple theories that are generally placed into one of four categories: social structural evolution, where both the elite and the general populations simply witness the inevitable transformation of civilization; top down, driven by the elites; bottom up, forced by the general populace; or a hybrid combination of the three.

The structural approach, commonly referred to as modernization theory, recognizes a societal correlation between democracy and certain structural factors that usually include average income, average education, availability of media sources, and levels of industrialization and urbanization.⁵ Namely, increases in income, education, and urbanization associated with industrialization create conditions favorable for democracy. With these changes, the population adopts “equalitarian” value systems. Because “groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primary values,” as a society's values shift, so does its political system.⁶

Top-down approaches that apply strategic bargaining theories of democratization deal primarily with the period of transition from autocracy to democracy. Elites drive the process, forcing democracy upon the general population, which has no influence on events. The approach gives no consideration as to why, but only how, democratization occurs. The theory concentrates on the political elites and breaks down the transition into phases. During the preparatory phase, a new elite is born out of the leaderless masses. In the decision phase, the new political and economic elites challenge the existing power structure.

Eventually, the current autocrat and the new challengers strike a deal to allow elections. Autocrats only take this distasteful option when they see they have little choice. Rather than totally lose power, they engage in a power-sharing arrangement. In the habituation phase, elements of democracy become more ingrained into society's structures; democracy

5 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (March 1959): 69–105, doi:10.2307/1951731.

6 *Ibid.*, 105, 86–87.

triumphs.⁷ This theory treats democracy as “a matter primarily of procedure rather than of substance.”⁸

The idea that social forces from within a society drive democratic transitions contrasts with the elites-only approach. In this bottom-up notion, economic progress acting over an extended period creates a diverse social structure where the autocrats and their vassals become dependent upon the middle class for everything from specialized goods to economic support. Eventually, the middle class demands more of the privileges once restricted to the ruling elites, including influence in political decision-making.⁹ Commonly associated with this approach to democratization is the idea that the existence of democracy depends on an economic middle class.¹⁰

Today, almost no theory is purely structural, elite driven, or population driven, which leads to the hybrid approach. Most of these methods consider how structural factors affect populations to cause change; for example, some hybrid theories examine the political economy to understand how short-term economic conditions change the bargaining powers of various political actors.¹¹ Others explore how economic security causes a society to change its value structure from one less supportive of democratic systems to one that supports prodemocratic change.¹²

Process of Democratic Transition

While theories on why countries transition from autocracy to democracy are still widely debated, most experts recognize the process of democratization includes the three phases of liberalization, transition, and consolidation. Liberalization is “the process of making effective certain rights that protect both the individual and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties.”¹³ Liberalization is easy to overlook because it often occurs as part of a slow, indistinct process of social change.¹⁴ While some theories fail to separate transition from the liberalization phase, other models recognize the process of legally formalizing the rights demanded during the liberalization phase as a central component of democratization.

The second phase, transition, occurs as political leaders write constitutions and create the political instruments necessary to run a democracy. Even though many people consider this portion complete

7 Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 337–63, doi:10.2307/421307.

8 *Ibid.*, 345.

9 Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

10 *Ibid.*, 418.

11 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

12 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

13 Carston Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization,” in *Twenty Years of Studying Democratization*, vol. 1 of *Democratic Transitions and Consolidations*, ed. Aurel Croissant and Jeffrey Haynes (London: Routledge, 2014), 45.

14 See Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation,” 64–65 for examples of lengthy liberalization such as Poland, which began in the 1980s and completed in 1998, as well as many North African countries, which have yet to complete liberalization even though it began much earlier.

after the first free and fair election, it may take several years to replace all the autocratic organs of government with democratic ones. The final phase, consolidation, starts at the end of the transition phase and continues until the country's fall back into autocracy appears unlikely. Successful consolidation can take decades. Most stabilization operations occur during transition and consolidation phases.

Definition of Democracy

Before moving to specific metrics, we must define democracy. Many doctrinal guides already provide lines of effort associated with stabilizing a host nation's government; however, neither Joint Publication 3-07 nor Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-07 defines democracy.¹⁵ For such a definition to be useful, it should be in terms of the host nation government and nested into the concept of legitimacy as "a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legal or moral rightness of a set of actions, and the propriety as well as authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them" already used in the doctrine.¹⁶ This definition derives from Max Weber's basic concept of legitimacy as the "right to rule."¹⁷ The perception of the right to rule is founded in the population's belief that the government has the legal and moral authority, the legitimacy, to govern. But, what about the legitimacy of the method or type of government?

A difference that may be best distinguished by how people refer to the government, democracy is a type of governmental system and not a specific government. Governments, for example, include the "Bashar al-Assad regime" or "Bush administration" while phrases such as "Syria is a monarchy" or "the United States is a democracy" reflect governmental systems. The legitimacy of a specific government, however, is tied to the rulers: how did the authorities gain their positions and do they rule in accordance with the values of the society? If the ultimate power of the government is God or holy scriptures, the government is a theocracy. If authority is tied to an ethnic group or ethnic identity, the system is an ethnocracy, many of which are monarchies.

The legitimacy of a democracy is based on the idea that each citizen has rights equal to other citizens regardless of social position, race, tribal or ethnic affiliation, or religious beliefs. Therefore, a practical definition of democracy is "a type of government whose source of legitimacy is a grant of authority given to the government by the individual citizens acting as individuals."

As the population begins to recognize individual rights during liberalization, democracy takes firmer root. For it to survive, a population that is at least partially liberalized must be willing to embrace individual human rights and liberties over traditional parochial values that favor in-group members in political and economic matters. Recognizing individual citizens as having equal political rights is essential to creating the conditions for a stable democratic state.

15 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Stability*, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016); and Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), *Stability*, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012).

16 JCS, JP 3-07, I-15.

17 Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischhoff et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

Identity and Factionalism

This definition of democracy does not imply one must give up one's identity as a Scotsman or a Catholic to be part of a democracy but implicitly recognizes that all people have multiple identities within society. These include personal identities, or the person's individual self-concept; role identity, or the identity tied to a social position; and social identity, or the identity that ties them to various social groups.¹⁸ A person's role identity as a citizen is key to the idea of a political system's legitimacy. When the social identity of ethnic or religious group members dictates their actions as citizens, then democracy becomes difficult if not impossible. In cases where social identity dictates personal and role identity behaviors, factionalism can result.

Factionalism occurs when ethnic or other parochial groups, which regularly compete for political influence, promote agendas that favor their group members over common, secular, or crosscutting agendas thereby dominating economic and political competition.¹⁹ Many scholars recognize this "winner-take-all approach to politics is often accompanied by confrontational mass mobilization, as occurred in Venezuela in the early 2000s and Thailand prior to the 2006 military coup, and by the intimidation or manipulation of electoral competition."²⁰ In an unconsolidated democracy, factionalism increases the odds of instability and failure. In regions like Africa, with strong tribal identities and colonial boundaries drawn without consideration for historical tribal territories, factionalism is particularly problematic. In fact, a recent study on forecasting political instability found that "*every African country that mixed partial democracy with factionalism suffered instability*" [italics in the original].²¹

Metrics of Democratic Transition

Metrics commonly used when discussing democratization measure either the potential for democratization or the indicators of successful democratization.

Potential for Democratization

At the national level, policymakers suggest many factors are critical to democratic transitions; however, the positive factors of economics, education, and cultural values, as well as the negative factor of fractionalization continue to top the list. Perhaps the most consistent factor in democratic liberalization has been the economic condition of the population. Identified early on by the gross domestic product or gross national income per capita, economic conditions have been frequently connected with the transition to democracy. But, economic conditions alone, while necessary, are not a sufficient condition to initiate a transition to democracy in the population. Many countries, including Saudi

18 Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

19 Jack A. Goldstone et al., "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 190–208, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x.

20 Ibid., 196.

21 Jack Goldstone et al., "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability," Fund for Fallen Allies, <http://fundforfallenallies.org/sites/fundforfallenallies.org/files/library/A%20Global%20Forecasting%20Model%20for%20Political%20Instability.pdf> (accessed April 22, 2016). In an earlier version of the paper, Africa was looked at separately.

Arabia, have a high gross domestic product per capita yet have not even begun the transition to democracy.

A strong correlation between the transition to democracy and the level of education also exists. Early studies on education centered only on literacy, but recently researchers began measuring average adult education levels as well as the potential for children's education. In addition to formal education, the number and availability of various sources of information also matter. If the information we receive only validates our belief in the superiority of an ethnic or religious group, then our perceptions of that group's superiority are unlikely to change. Conversely, receiving information from multiple sources offering conflicting points of view requires us to reconsider our restricted view of reality.

Theoretically, changes in these two factors can result in favorable changes to the values that support democracy, commonly called "democratic values." Based on the definition of democracy used in this article, the key value is individuality—the belief that each human is an individual, autonomous of the group, with equal rights and obligations. Shifting perceptions of this value in a population positively affects liberalization, which is the first step in a natural democratic transition.²²

In contrast to these positive factors, measures of fractionalization do not indicate the potential for a successful democratic transition but rather the potential for failure. Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, known as ELF, calculates the probability that two randomly chosen people in a given country would be from different ethnic groups and is available for 129 countries.²³ Other social and political sciences measure factionalism in the context of ethnic groups becoming politically active in a divisive manner or Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups, known as PREG. Although this measure is a better metric for indicating threats to democratic potential, and it identifies situations in which fractionalization becomes politically divisive, the data are only available for a limited number of countries.²⁴ Fractionalization not only creates an "us versus them" mentality that runs counter to democratic values but has also been shown to slow economic growth critical to effective democratic consolidation.²⁵

Indicators of Successful Democratization

The indicators of successful democratization generally identify government and social institution outcomes paralleling the phases of democratic transition—liberalization, transition, and consolidation. Leaders can determine the status of liberalization by asking several questions about the current regime or the one immediately preceding the military intervention:

22 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

23 William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no. 4 (1997): 1203–50, doi:10.1162/003355300555466; and Daniel N. Posner, "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (October 2004): 849–63.

24 Posner, "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization."

25 Easterly and Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy"; and Joseph Wright, "Political Competition and Democratic Stability in New Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (April 2008): 221–45, doi:10.1017/S0007123408000124.

1. Has the regime made political concessions in regards to human rights issues?
2. Does the regime have no, or almost no, political prisoners?
3. Does the regime tolerate political or social opposition groups?
4. Does more than one legally recognized political party exist?
5. Do any members of the opposing political party hold seats in the parliament or legislature?
6. Are there trade unions or professional organizations not controlled by state apparatuses?
7. Is there an independent press and access to nongovernmental news sources?²⁶

This list of questions is not exhaustive, and we should not settle for simple yes or no answers as the answer in many cases is likely to be “no.” An amount of gradation is preferable to give a more nuanced view; the more positive the answer, the closer the country is to progressing through liberalization. A hasty measure of liberalization is the Freedom House ratings of countries as Free (liberalization complete), Partially Free (liberalization in progress), or Not Free (liberalization not started).²⁷

Measures of Transition

The US military invests considerable time and effort into measuring transition, and we have a vast list of metrics frequently applied. Various Department of Defense and Department of State entities worked together to create the Measuring Progress in a Conflict Environments framework that covers all phases of the conflict environment from imposing stability through self-sustaining peace. Included in this system are metrics for the three drivers of conflict and the seven indicators of institutional performance.²⁸

Measures of Success in Consolidating Democracy

Most of the metrics that measure successful democratic consolidation examine the nature of the government. The Polity IV dataset, for example, uses six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition to examine a governing authority.²⁹ The most consistent single factor in ensuring successful democratic consolidation, however, is not one of governmental efficiency. It is a metric associated with the potential for democratic transition: the gross domestic product per capita. While theorists still disagree on the minimum economic requirements for successful transitions to democracy, even the most ardent critic agrees that states are unlikely to fall back into autocracy once the

26 Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation.”

27 “Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.Wli8k6q7pzM> (accessed January 24, 2017).

28 John Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, and Barbara Sotirin, eds., *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010).

29 Polity IV, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012,” <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (accessed March 20, 2013).

country's gross domestic product per capita reaches about \$12,800 in 2016 dollars.³⁰

System for Gauging Effort

Where the mission includes promoting democracy on any level, the ability to estimate the amount of time required to complete that political task is helpful. Looking only at the political approach, the task appears relatively simple—create a constitution, hold an election, and behold the democracy. This approach suggests success can be accomplished in 3 to 5 years; however, this focus omits the other phases of democratization. Without liberalization, the population will not likely accept the new democracy as legitimate. Without consolidation, failure remains a risk.

US strategic planners need the capability to estimate the total time required for democratization, not just the time required for the political-institutional approach. To that end, a simple, yet demonstrably viable, method to estimate the effort toward democratization graphs a country's data from two readily available open-source metrics, the Human Development Index and the World Values Survey, that correlate with the status of consolidation. The Human Development Index moves away from simple economic factors like gross domestic product and centers instead on measuring improvements in human well-being—long life by life expectancy at birth, education level by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age, and economic security by gross national income per capita.³¹

The World Values Survey asks a series of questions about every 5 years to determine values most important to the societies of over 80 countries, which can be used to produce an estimate of societal values such as communal or individualistic.³² Historically, communal values have not supported democratic legitimacy and individualistic values have; therefore, determinations can be made regarding the prevalence of ethnic divisions associated with fractionalization and factionalism.³³ More specifically, Switzerland, a country with French, German, and Italian ethnolinguistic groups, displays almost no factionalism in large part because of the society's high level of individualistic values. Available for more countries than the Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups metric, communal values measures can estimate the potential for destructive factionalism.

Measurement of Democratic Attributes

Data about a nation's government in terms of attributes associated with democratic and autocratic regimes from the Polity IV Project can

30 Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

31 "Human Development Index," United Nations Development Program (UNDP), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (accessed March 20, 2012).

32 "Data & Documentation," World Values Survey, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp> (accessed February 27, 2012); and Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

33 Questions link directly to whether ethnic or religious diversity is economically or politically divisive—for example, a person's willingness to work with, or live next to, members of another ethnic group.

demonstrate a country's propensity toward democracy.³⁴ The project examines governing authorities using six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. The results combine into a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) correlating to the Human Development Index. Only three categories—consolidated or full democracies (+10), more democratic than autocratic leanings (+1 through +9), and more autocratic than democratic leanings (0 through -10)—are needed to distinguish nondemocratic regimes from partially democratic regimes and from completely consolidated democracies.

Dimensions

When graphing country data from the Human Development Index (y-axis) and societal values from the World Values Survey (x-axis), an obvious arc develops from widely scattered points in the lower left quadrant, representing countries with communal societies and low citizen well-being, to a narrow band of points in the upper right quadrant, depicting highly individualistic societies with high citizen well-being. As the majority of consolidated democracies appear in the upper right quadrant and there are no poor, uneducated democracies or autocracies with individualistic values in the lower right quadrant, leaders can use the graph to assess countries' democratic attributes.

Although the previously mentioned graph would demonstrate the relationship between a nation's development and societal values, it would not help determine the time and effort required to make changes that promote democracy. Moreover, plotting 12 countries over 15 years in the liberalization-transition period or in consolidation, illustrates democratization can take many years of effort, assuming a country achieves gross domestic product per capita and education levels.³⁵ In such a graph, the progress of countries such as Mexico and India trends up and generally to the right, even though the consolidation is not completed yet. Brazil and Sweden steadily trend toward higher Human Development Index and World Values Survey figures while the democratic attributes of some countries such as the United Kingdom and Finland fluctuate along both the Human Development Index and World Values Survey axis. Japan's development vacillates even though its values trend upwards.

Guidelines

Democratization can be visualized as the process of a polity going through liberalization that sets the condition for transition. Following transition, consolidation occurs as the population adopts the democratic values of individualism.³⁶ If there has been a period of liberalization, the timeline depends on the country reaching the levels of economic

34 "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012," Polity IV, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (accessed March 20, 2013).

35 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Timothy J. Power, "The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World," *Comparative Political Studies* 31, no. 6 (December 1998): 740, doi:10.1177/0010414098031006003.

36 This is not the only model. Others have argued that liberalization is not necessary prior to the transition to democracy. See Christopher Hobson, "Liberal Democracy and Beyond: Extending the Sequencing Debate," *International Political Science Review* 33, no. 4 (March 2012): 441–54, doi:10.1177/0192512111432563.

prosperity and of education needed to sustain a democracy. Specifically, democratization requires a gross domestic product per capita of \$5,000 and a literacy rate of 40 percent—a little less than half of consolidation requirements. Though arbitrary, these numbers provide a goal for successful liberalization and transition as well as a benchmark for calculating the additional 5 to 10 years to complete transition and to begin consolidation. For successful liberalization, the gross domestic product per capita and literacy rate should nearly double. The economic and educational aspects of democratization are normally beyond the control of the military, so other entities should be intimately involved in the operation.

Generally, a country that has already begun the process of liberalization, has an educated citizenry, and has the potential for a robust, distributed economy can consolidate into a self-sustaining democracy in roughly 15 years. Post-World War II (WW II) Germany with its history of a republican government and educated population, would be such a case. Germany's experience with the Weimar Republic (1919–33) was generally positive, and the republic might have succeeded had the 1929 Great Depression not occurred. Still, the experience with democracy and its failings set the stage for West Germany's postwar democratization.³⁷

In contrast, many of the postcolonial countries that transitioned to democracy after WW II returned to autocracy within 20 years.³⁸ These countries were generally poor, uneducated, and had no prior experience with democracy. In the middle of these two extremes are countries like Iraq, which have a relatively educated population and potentially favorable economic conditions but have not begun liberalization and have no experience with democratic governments or democratic ideals. Democratization in Iraq could easily take decades to complete, and factionalism will have to be addressed to complete a successful consolidation.³⁹

A general review of democratization efforts provides some general guidelines to estimate the required length of involvement. Assuming regime collapse, 2 years of military governance followed by 3 years of transition to civil authority and rebuilding the basic civil infrastructure is safe to assume. If all of the conditions are favorable, a democratic transition could be conducted and be safely on its way to consolidation in an additional 5 to 10 years. If liberalization has not started but the country has prior experience with democracy or competitive government, then 10 years can be added to the transition period. If liberalization has not started and the country has no experience with democracy or competitive political systems, then 20 years of effort must be added to the task.⁴⁰ If the country has the potential for factionalism, then transition toward democracy probably cannot proceed until leaders address the underlying problems. These are, of course, very rough estimates and every country is unique. Further, if there is little hope of reaching the necessary economic and educational levels, other options should be considered.

37 Michael Bernard, "Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal," *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 4 (July 2001).

38 Duncan Fraser, "Long Waves in Economics—Waves of Democracy," *Democratization* 8, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 41–64, doi:10.1080/714000228.

39 Bruce E. Moon, "Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq," *International Security* 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 115–48.

40 Schneider and Schmitter, "Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation."

Implications for Defense Policy

From the onset of planning, strategists must consider the political end state. Before the first shots are fired, consideration must already have been given to setting the conditions for the postconflict environment, which requires assessing the target country's preconflict sociopolitical status. A society that previously existed under the thumb of a dictator is not likely able to administer a protodemocratic government on its own; therefore, leaders should establish control in areas behind the division rear and remain in charge of the entire territory upon achieving military victory.

Furthermore, the occupying force must identify and co-opt spoilers to the democratic process as well as identify potential partners in democratization. Having a military government not only allows those things to happen but also ensures that whatever infrastructure survives the battle remains intact and impedes humanitarian crisis. The last manual published by the US Army dealing with a full-scale military government was printed in 1947; still, the security and stability provided by such an involvement will be indispensable in setting the conditions for the later transition.⁴¹

The breadth and depth of the commitment must also be considered and weighed against other looming threats. The recently published *Priorities for 21st Century Defense* states that the US Army will no longer be sized to conduct prolonged stability operations.⁴² Unfortunately, to have any hope of a successful consolidation, democratization can require decades of military security assistance after the transitional authority takes command from a military government. Further, real democratization requires a significant security presence—at a minimum three soldiers for every 1,000 residents are required for initial security duties.⁴³

Until the country's police and military forces can ensure security, outside help will be required. For those units assigned this mission, there will be no returning to forward operating bases at nightfall; properly trained troops must be out, in force, with the people. This kind of effort will certainly strain the capabilities of a downsized military and limit our ability to respond to multiple threats.

Policymakers must consider whether democratization is realistically achievable or if factionalism should be addressed first. Will the nation's natural environment limit the country's ability to reach the requisite economic levels required to both create a middle class and pay for the mass education required to complete democratic consolidation? What options are available to achieve the minimum economic and educational requirements?

Partial democracies tend to be the most volatile form of government, and poor multiethnic tribal countries tend not to blossom into

41 US Departments of the Army and Navy, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs Military Government* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947).

42 US Department of Defense (DoD), *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012).

43 Steven M. Goode, "A Historical Basis for Force Requirement in Counterinsurgency," *Parameters* 39, no. 1 (Winter 2009–10): 45–57.

democracies on their own.⁴⁴ Leaving the job half done may create greater problems in the future. When present, factionalism may require more creative options such as closely controlled partitioning, a lesson learned from efforts in the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁵

To see this approach in practice, a quick analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq will serve as a simplified and limited example. Beginning with the baseline human developmental index, which includes economic and educational data, the examination will then determine liberalization, and end by assessing other factors.

In 2015, Afghanistan had a human development index of 0.465 with a gross national income per capita of \$1,885.30.⁴⁶ If placed on the x-axis of the previously mentioned graph, Afghanistan would be graphed to the left of the Human Development Index benchmark of 0.700 that represents the value in which liberalization becomes possible. As to be expected, Freedom House rates Afghanistan as Not Free, indicating that liberalization has not begun.⁴⁷ Based on this cursory review, the primary focus in Afghanistan should be on economic growth. Planners can also see that several decades could easily be required to build the economic infrastructure before political liberties and individual civil rights will likely become a priority to the general population.

Better than Afghanistan in some ways and worse in others, Iraq has a 0.654 human development index, which would be graphed closer to the 0.700 baseline, and a gross national income per capita of \$14,003.20, which is a much better economic condition.⁴⁸ Liberalization, however, has not started in earnest. Freedom House also rates Iraq as Not Free.⁴⁹

While both Afghanistan and Iraq are fractionalized, Iraq has one additional problem: its ethnic and religious factions are well developed and have been vying for political power for years. This infighting will likely produce internal instability that will keep liberalization from taking root. Iraq may not be able to make further progress until a solution to the fractionalization is found.

Based on this extremely cursory analysis and a population of 33.4 million people, Afghanistan would require an initial total commitment of approximately 100,000 security personnel for a period ranging between 25 and 40 years. This estimate assumes inclusive economic institutions could create a fivefold increase in the average Afghan's income within the first 15 years of the effort.⁵⁰ With a population of 37.6 million in Iraq and a better economic situation, that nation's timeframe would be

44 David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (July 2006): 551–69, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00201.x.

45 For a discussion on partitioning, see Carter Johnson, "Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): doi:10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.140; and Jaroslav Tir, "Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 5 (2005): doi:10.1177/0022343305056228.

46 "Afghanistan: Human Development Indicators," UNDP, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG> (accessed January 24, 2017).

47 "Freedom in the World 2015: Afghanistan," Freedom House.

48 "Iraq: Human Development Indicators," UNDP, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRQ> (accessed January 24, 2017).

49 "Freedom in the World 2015: Iraq," Freedom House.

50 For an explanation of inclusive economic institutions, see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Publishing, 2012).

reduced, but still, require a security force of 112,000 personnel for 20 years until liberalization could take hold and democratic institutions become self-sustaining. In both cases, the security force size would need to be adjusted up or down as conditions on the ground dictate.⁵¹

This overview of the developmental aspects of promoting democracy and stability provides planners with a quantifiable frame of reference to help them set the conditions for political victory when the victory includes democratization. The information presented here can be used to help explain to commanders and civilian leadership why democratization can take so long as well as what aspects of development might be most important, helping bridge the gap between military and political victory.

Armed with this understanding of democratization, military leaders can provide better advice to the civilian administration as to what is achievable—creating a stable democracy—as well as requirements of time, troops, and treasure commitments. As one commentator put it, “success in Germany and Japan, moreover, was achieved by policies that focused on sweeping economic, political, and educational reforms that affected the entire population for several decades.”⁵² The information presented here will help planners and commanders understand why such reforms are necessary and appreciate the level of time and effort involved in creating a self-sustaining democracy. Thus, commanders and planners can set conditions for political victory lest military victories become hollow ones.

51 See Goode, “Force Requirement in Counterinsurgency.”

52 Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,” *Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2000): 95, doi:10.1162/016366000560764.

Immunity in Contingency Operations: A Proposal for US Contractors

Ellen “Elle” Klein

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ABSTRACT: This article introduces the nuances of bilateral security agreements and status of force agreements in Afghanistan. Many contain legal restrictions that complicate the ability of Long War contractors to provide advice and security during international missions.

Department of Defense (DoD) contract employees have become a vital part of the force. Soon after Overseas Contingency Operations began in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report observed “limits on the number of military personnel allowed in an area, called ‘force caps,’ led DoD to use contractors to provide support to its deployed forces.”¹ Many of these contractors play a “critical role in supporting US troops.”² Most third-country and even US contract employees are generally systems contractors who provide basic life and information technology support; however, many US contractors provide direct and indirect command support such as advising and security.³

According to the Congressional Research Service, 28,189 of 45,592 Defense Department contractors working for US Central Command in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016 were in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴ Few know more than 3,000 contractors were killed and another 1,000 were wounded in these countries’ wars; American contractors account for approximately 32 percent of these casualties.⁵ There were even periods during these long wars in which more US contractors than US military personnel were killed. In 2014, for example, “private contractors accounted for 64 percent of all U.S. deaths in Afghanistan (56 service members and 101 contractors died).”⁶ Given that contract personnel represent approximately 72 percent, nearly two-thirds, of the DoD

1 US General Accounting Office (GAO), *Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003), 8.

2 Heidi M. Peters, Moshe Schwartz, and Lawrence Kapp, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007–2017* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 1.

3 Gordon L. Campbell, “Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend upon Them” (conference paper, Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics 2000, Springfield, VA, January 27–28, 2000).

4 Peters, Schwartz, and Kapp, *Contractor and Troop Levels*, 2.

5 “Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs: Defense Base Act Case Summary by Employer,” US Department of Labor, March 31, 2017, <https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallemmployer.htm>; “Contractor Casualty Statistics,” Feral Jundi, February 9, 2017, <http://feraljundi.com/contractor-casualty-statistics/>; and Micah Zenko, “The New Unknown Soldiers of Afghanistan and Iraq,” *Foreign Policy*, May 29, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/29/the-new-unknown-soldiers-of-afghanistan-and-iraq/>.

6 Zenko, “New Unknown Soldiers.”

Dr. Ellen “Elle” Klein has served as the US representative to the Secretariat of the Bilateral Security Agreement and Senior Command Adviser in Afghanistan from 2015–16. She also served as the special assistant to the Rule of Law field force commander in Afghanistan and as Rule of Law coordinator to the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team.

manpower in Afghanistan, clear legal protections for these Americans while in theater would seem only reasonable.⁷

Under the US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) signed in 2014, US contactors working in Afghanistan became subject to Afghan law. Since the agreement was fully implemented in January 2016, companies and individual workers must navigate complex and onerous procedures that are often arbitrarily interpreted and inconsistently enforced. This quandary often leaves many American contract personnel in untenable situations in which they may be subjected to fines, deportation, or even arrest by Afghan authorities. Contractors frequently face the dilemma of illicitly bribing Afghan officials or going without documents required by the BSA and Afghan law. To compound these problems, US government officials often view contractors with suspicion and even contempt, and are reticent to defend the contractors' cause with the Afghan government. These obstacles degrade the contractors' ability to support the mission for which they were hired fully and efficiently.

Therefore, the American position regarding its contractors in Afghanistan needs to be reevaluated. Specifically, the United States should consider renegotiating the current BSA with Afghanistan and any forthcoming status of forces agreements (SOFAs) for ongoing operations to ensure legal protections for this group of Americans.

Despite the dangers and sacrifices, contractor employees often feel marginalized and undervalued by both military and civilian government personnel, who may think of them as greedy, corrupt, and operating outside the law.⁸ This negative perception is not imaginary. Despite the prevalence of contractors with previous military service, professional competition between the military and the contractor communities is fierce.⁹ Scholars claim to be alarmed by the level of integration of contractors into military activities, and the bulk of the literature begins by assuming contractor motives are less than noble.

The pejoratively titled *Patriots for Profit*, by Naval Post Graduate School scholar Thomas C. Bruneau, for example, broadly challenges stereotypes regarding civilian-military relations; nonetheless, he identifies dependence on contractors as a strategic weakness.¹⁰ Another scholar holds private contractor firms operate opaquely, carrying “the stench of corruption” and eroding “trust in the motives behind [their] efforts.”¹¹ And some legal experts are even ready to cede US sovereignty

7 For more on the ratio of 28,626 contractors to 9,800 military personnel, see Micah Zenko, “Mercenaries Are the Silent Majority of Obama’s Military” *Foreign Policy*, May 18, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/18/private-contractors-are-the-silent-majority-mercenaries-iraq-afghanistan/>. For more on the estimated 750,000 private-sector contractors providing services to the Defense Department, see Robert F. Hale, *Business Reform in the Department of Defense: An Agenda for the Next Administration* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2016), note 18.

8 For more on the common misuse of “mercenaries,” the similarities between them and private military contractors, and the legal perspective, see J. Ryan Cutchin, *Privately Contracted Military Firms in the Twenty-First Century: Reclassifying, Redefining, and Reforming the Way We Fight* (thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, June 2012), 75–76. For more perspective on contractors’ sense of being marginalized, see Zenko, “New Unknown Soldiers.”

9 Scott L. Efflandt, “Military Professionalism & Private Military Contractors,” *Parameters* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 53.

10 Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

11 Cutchin, *Privately Contracted*, 3.

over American contractors as they look to international law for ways to “mitigate concerns,” “control private military actors,” and “encourage their compliance to [international] public norms.”¹²

While there may be empirical evidence that some contractors may not be motivated to serve solely out of a sense of patriotic duty, these American citizens nonetheless deserve legal protections and considerations afforded to other US civilians similarly serving overseas.¹³ Although contractors, specifically those performing security duties, may have had too much latitude during the height of combat operations and expeditionary capacity building in Iraq and Afghanistan (circa 2002–08), the opposite is true today.

The Need for Status of Forces Agreements

On September 30, 2014, in one of his first official acts as the newly inaugurated president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani agreed to the BSA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement.¹⁴ These types of agreements are standard treaty-like mechanisms that establish the rights and privileges of US personnel present in a sovereign nation to support larger security arrangements.¹⁵ According to an International Security Advisory Board report, the United States has similar agreements with more than 100 nations.¹⁶

Among other things, SOFAs set the conditions for protecting US interests to ensure taxpayer dollars are properly managed and US personnel are not subjected to foreign taxes, customs fees, and other administrative liabilities in the course of carrying out the security arrangement. According to DoD Directive 5525.1, *Status of Forces Policy and Information*, the main goal of any SOFA is “to protect, to the maximum extent possible, the rights of United States personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons.”¹⁷ In general, SOFAs are negotiated with host nations to allow the presence of US military forces and to ensure Defense Department personnel—military members, government civilians, and sometimes contractors—are given limited legal protections from host nation laws

12 Ibid., 89; and Laura A. Dickinson, “Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law,” *William & Mary Law Review* 47, no. 1 (2005): 135–237.

13 In addition to anecdotal evidence that most US contractors have previously served in the US military, 61.5 percent of respondents in a study on military versus corporate culture were former military. For more on this finding and the trend to outsource positions such as “security guards, operational planners, and participants in raids by special operation forces . . . endanger[ing] the basic tenets of the military profession itself,” see Gary Schaub Jr. and Volker Franke, “Contractors as Military Professionals?,” *Parameters* 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009–10): 93, 94, 100–101.

14 On behalf of President Ghani, Afghan National Security Advisor Mohammed Haneef Atmar cosigned the BSA with US Ambassador James B. Cunningham and the NATO SOFA with NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems.

15 For more on the distinctions between various international agreements, which are led by the Department of State, see Barry E. Carter et al., *International Law* (New York: Aspen Publishing, 2003), 203; and Frederic L. Kirgis, “International Agreements and U.S. Law,” *ASIL Insights* 2, no. 5. Notably, “the NATO SOFA is the only SOFA that was concluded as part of a treaty.” R. Chuck Mason, *Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 2.

16 International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), *Report on Status of Forces Agreements* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2015), 1.

17 US DoD, *Status of Forces Policy and Information*, Directive (DoDD) 5525.1 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2003); emphasis added.

and international tribunals. In other words, the SOFA establishes how jurisdiction over US personnel is exercised in the host nation.¹⁸

Under US law, the Department of State is the lead agency for all international agreements, even when an agreement, such as the BSA, is focused on Department of Defense activities.¹⁹ These agreements, when executed by the United States, usually contain a clause that each party has an inherent right to self-defense, which allows either party to cancel the agreement at any time. After September 11, 2001, the United States encountered new and complex expeditionary and civil-society development missions imbued with varying United Nations Security Council authority, which created a new era of SOFA-craft, requiring experts focused on writing and negotiating such agreements.²⁰

The Afghanistan Agreements

After the initial NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the Military Technical Agreement of January 2002 (MTA) was established under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001). The agreement covered all forces under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, including support personnel working with the interim Afghan administration.²¹ The agreement did not, however, apply to the non-NATO US forces covered under the commonly referenced Diplomatic Note No. 202.²² While the MTA specifically reserved jurisdiction for support personnel under the NATO mission to an individual's home country, the note covered support personnel operating exclusively under the US mission, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (2001–14). Although the note did mention support personnel, it left the level of protection for contractors and their employees open to interpretation.

After 13 years, the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan formally ended. On January 1, 2015, coalition and US forces simultaneously began a new phase of involvement in Afghanistan: the NATO-led mission, Resolute Support, to train, advise, and assist and the US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) mission; Operation Freedom's Sentinel, to contribute to the Resolute Support mission; and to US counterterrorism missions. The new missions required new agreements, thus the NATO SOFA and US-Afghanistan BSA were drafted and signed. Formal implementation of these agreements, however, was not scheduled until the following year, giving contractors until January 2016 to prepare for compliance.

18 Mason, *Status of Forces Agreement*, 3.

19 See Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1972) issued pursuant thereto by the Department of State and codified at 22 C.F.R. 181 (2010) reflecting *Department of State Circular 175* (1955), as amended, codified at Volume 11, Chapter 700 of the *Foreign Affairs Manual* (Circular 175).

20 ISAB, *Status of Forces Agreements*, 15.

21 See ISAF Commander-Afghan Transitional Authority, Military Technical Agreement of January 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf> (accessed February 25, 2017); and Jeremy Greenstock to President of the United Nations Security Council, S/2002/117, January 25, 2002, which references UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001), which reaffirms UNSCR 1378 (2001) and UNSCR 1383 (2001).

22 Karen DeYoung, "Only a Two-Page 'Note' Governs U.S. Military in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, August 28, 2008; and Diplomatic Note No. 202, *Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Military Training and Exercises, and Other Activities*, State Department Number 03-67, 2003 WL 21754316 (Treaty), May 28, 2003.

The development of specific implementation criteria is standard for such agreements; for example, the 1966 agreement with South Korea, amended in 2001, established a joint committee for consultation, and the 2002 Japan-United States Status of Forces Command Order established a joint committee for “any matter regarding [the SOFA’s] implementation.” Likewise, an essential component of both the BSA and the SOFA for Afghanistan was the requirement for implementation bodies to resolve “any divergence in views or dispute regarding the interpretation or application.” The BSA Joint Commission and the Afghanistan-NATO Implementation Commission were established “to oversee implementation” of the agreements and the auxiliary groups, which held their first combined meeting on February 4, 2016.²³ No further guidance was provided; therefore, an additional document was required to lay out the procedures for convening and conducting the business of the commissions as well as establishing an Executive Steering Committee, working groups, and a secretariat for each.

To date, the missions in Afghanistan have two separate agreements and two distinct implementation bodies with identical leadership and nearly identical members. The US contingent is, in fact, dual-hatted. As the US member of the secretariat for the BSA, the author participated in Joint Commission meetings at the same time and in the same room as the NATO commission meetings; people addressed the same agenda items and issues as members of both groups. The similarities and concurrent meetings resulted in nearly identical minutes reflecting only minor changes to indicate the two different bodies.

Melding these two implementation commissions may have been expedient, but the arrangement inhibits addressing important issues affecting only US contractors. The NATO SOFA focuses on nonkinetic train, advise, and assist activities. The BSA is between the United States and Afghanistan only and includes the counterterrorism mission which may include more kinetic activities “when the U.S. deems it necessary.”²⁴ This fundamental difference in mission alone warrants separation as the more kinetic training usually requires contractors to be armed. Moreover, issues regarding the proper and legal use of deadly force by contract employees authorized to carry weapons while assisting US military forces in dangerous missions will not be of interest to our NATO partners.

The Immunity Question

A primary objective of the US and NATO missions is to assist the Afghan government in becoming administratively functional and able to properly exercise the powers of a sovereign nation, which includes consular and immigration functions, taxing, business licenses, and

23 The similar bodies comply with Article 25 of the BSA and Article 23 of the “Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO Personnel Conducting Mutually Agreed NATO-Led Activities in Afghanistan” (NATO SOFA) signed by the RS Commander and the Afghan Minister of Defense on November 6, 2015.

24 Note that BSA articles 4, 5, and 6 refer to an earlier agreement, The Strategic Partnership Agreement, which went into effect on July 4, 2012, and defers concerns regarding security and defense to the Defense and Security Cooperation Working Group, which did not meet for the first time until April 2016, leaving the BSA for more mundane, operational issues, such as contractor compliance.

determining who is permitted to carry firearms. Therefore, as the new Afghan government began to gain more autonomy, it seemed natural for the United States and NATO to shift jurisdiction over contractors to the Afghan government. This decision, however, exposed contract employees, many of whom are US citizens, to a system rife with corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude coupled with limited avenues for redress.²⁵

The US policy identifies techniques for crafting agreements to ensure the maximum protection for all US citizens. Some SOFAs include language that, according to the International Security Advisory Board report, “will most always include special agreements and arrangements for both civilian DoD employees and contractors” within the scope of their official duty.²⁶ The SOFAs for Japan and Korea, for instance, cover US citizens who are contractor personnel,” especially when they “qualify as technical experts” and are involved in assistance of “key activities” that are “closely linked to a military mission.”²⁷ Despite these examples and the Defense Department’s stated policy of extending protections to all US personnel, “less than 10 percent of SOFAs directly address government contractors.”²⁸ Unfortunately, the US-Afghanistan BSA falls within the 90 percent that does not offer such protections in a country of continued armed conflict. The BSA specifically states: “Afghanistan maintains the right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees.”²⁹ Such an arrangement may be feasible in nations and regions which have a culture of rule of law and transparency, but the reality in Afghanistan demands revisiting this provision of the BSA.

While most contractors and contract employees finish tours of duty without incident, many personnel find BSA compliance difficult and understand the inherently dangerous consequences established therein—for example, the BSA allows military personnel and Defense Department civilians to enter and exit without passports, but contractors are required to obtain passports and visas.³⁰ Although most contractors purchase multiple entry visas, the Afghan government insists contractors also acquire an entry or exit stamp every time they enter or leave Afghanistan.

Stamping is a traditional practice at most borders. But, the Afghan government did not have the capacity to provide such services on a regular basis from 2015 to 2016. This deficiency affected contractors who had been permitted in the country previously with no stamp in their passport; they now had no way to exit Afghanistan. While they waited for the Afghan government to obtain the capability to stamp visas,

25 For the US government’s most recent assessment on the issues of ministerial capacity building and endemic governmental corruption see, Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, *Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Report to the United States Congress*, October 1, 2016–December 31, 2016 (Washington, DC: US Office of the Inspector General, 2017), 4–5, 39–41, 48, 64–67.

26 ISAB, *Report on Status of Forces Agreements*, 20.

27 Donald P. Oulton and Alan F. Lehman, “Deployment of U.S. Military, Civilian and Contractor Personnel to Potentially War Hazardous Areas from a Legal Perspective,” *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 23, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 15–21, 16; and ISAB, *Report on Status of Forces Agreements*, 52.

28 G. Christine Ballard and Wray E. Bradley, “Beyond Tax Treaties: Status of Forces and USAID Agreements,” *Journal of International Taxation* 17, no. 4 (April 2006).

29 BSA, art. 13, para. 6.

30 BSA, art. 15, paras. 1, 2.

contractors had to choose between traveling back to the United States or mailing their passports for processing. Moreover, if an Afghan official found a contractor's passport had no stamp in it when the contractor attempted to leave the country, there would be dire consequences—unless the official was paid to ignore the lack of a stamp.³¹

In one incident, contractors spent months diligently pursuing entry stamps in order to comply with the Afghan law, only to be told that the stamps were not readily available. Without a separate US-focused implementation committee, there was nowhere to voice concerns formally or to seek official assistance. When the Afghan Border Police finally did start stamping visas, some contractors traveled days to and from the designated ports of entry within Afghanistan to join others who were literally lining up for the only opportunity to get their passports stamped. There was little official information to enable efficient compliance. In fact, despite the willingness of the US contractors to comply, at least one group was issued a blunt statement through official US channels: report for a stamp within 48 hours or face arrest, fines, or deportation.

As the January 1, 2016, deadline for contractor compliance with the BSA approached, a significant number of contract employees were unable to attain the required paperwork and permits, including those for weapons, which put their safety at risk. In some cases, individual employees had no one to blame but their own lack of urgency. But, many cases of noncompliance were caused by external forces, including political and legal pressures such as the well-documented bribery and corruption endemic in Afghanistan.³² When contractors sought redress with US officials, there was little institutional support for them due to the lack of protections in the BSA.

Full Immunity Option

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces during war or contingency operations.³³ Today, American contractors in Afghanistan are subject to US federal and military jurisdiction as well as Afghan law. While the International Security Advisory Board report recommends protections for contractors be written into agreements on a case-by-case basis, it acknowledges there “will be instances where the United States has a strong interest in protection for contractors.”³⁴ Specifically, the report mentions missions with “large scale deployments that entail a very substantial and continuing U.S. presence,” environments where “contractors are deeply integrated into core military operations and mission tasks,” and tasks in which contractor involvement has a high

31 A number of contractors in Afghanistan expressed they had no choice but to pay Afghan officials who demanded bribes even though the practice violated Afghan and US law, specifically the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.

32 For more on Afghanistan's ranking of 166 out of 168 countries ranked for corruption, see Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/country#AFG> Afghanistan.

33 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552; and Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802, para. a(10). See US Secretary of Defense, “UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving With or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations” (memorandum, March 10, 2008).

34 ISAB, *Report on Status of Forces Agreements*, 51–52.

“risk of incidents.”³⁵ When negotiating such agreements, the report suggests “contractor protection is worth insisting on.”³⁶

One solution to the dilemma with contractors is renegotiating the BSA to include full immunity for contractors supporting US military and diplomatic missions. American and Afghan officials have reasons to avoid this option, not the least of which is that it amounts to an admission of the Afghan government’s failure to oversee contractors competently. Nonetheless, the short-term pain of the United States reasserting full jurisdiction over contractors may pay dividends in the long-run for both countries, as the mission would be better equipped to train, advise, and assist the Afghan government even with reductions in military and diplomatic personnel.

Some skeptics claim immunity for contractors and their employees will never again be politically viable as the result of Blackwater contractors’ actions at Nisour Square in Baghdad (2007). The shootings left 17 Iraqi civilians dead and 20 others injured.³⁷ While the Coalition Provisional Authority established immunity for all coalition personnel, including contractors, the American government chose to prosecute several members of Blackwater through the US court system.³⁸ After this incident, the United States felt compelled to reconsider the large aperture of legal and political protection created for contract employees. In 2008, the US government agreed to lift immunity for contractors in Iraq.³⁹

Others argue the contractors’ case in Afghanistan not only suffers from the bitter legacy of the Blackwater contractor’s actions but also from President Hamid Karzai’s residual distrust from America’s first attempt at an agreement.⁴⁰ This personal animosity combined with the shifting US policy against contractor immunity shaped the current BSA so that it lacks much needed administrative and legal protections for contract companies and employees. These insufficient protections affect contractors’ daily lives, especially those who are required to carry weapons in order to do their jobs. Such contractors must apply for an endorsement from US Forces-Afghanistan to be armed and must acquire weapons permits issued by the Afghan government.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 The question of the legitimacy of the actions of the Blackwater employees, despite the eventual sentencing of several members of the security team, remains a subject for debate.

38 Coalition Provisional Authority, *Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liason Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors*, Order Number 17, June 26, 2003. The UN Security Council-recognized legal receivership was in authoritative control of Iraq at the time of the Nisour Square incident. Some pundits called for the US government to waive the immunity clause granted in Order No. 17 and allow the contractors who committed serious crimes to be prosecuted in Iraqi courts. See Scott Horton, “Getting Closer to the Truth about the Blackwater Incident,” *Bronzings* (blog), *Harpers*, November 14, 2007.

39 During negotiations for the 2008–11 SOFA, some Iraqi politicians also wanted to remove immunity for US service personnel, which the military opposed.

40 For more on the background and history of presidential directives from the Karzai administration concerning private security companies, see Moshe Schwartz, *The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2009); Renata Giannini and Rens de Graaff, “The Private Security Companies (PSCs) Dilemma in Afghanistan,” *Afghanistan Security* 4, no. 10 (December 20, 2010); and Presidential Directive (PD) 62, which mandated that all private security companies be disbanded by December 2014 and directed the development of a committee to facilitate the actions necessary to “scrap” all such contractors. Under President Ashraf Ghani, Presidential Directive 66 rescinded some of the prohibitions of PD 62 to relieve some of the pressures on security contractors, but the new status of contractors is still under debate.

Moreover, while the BSA states members of the military and US civilians can wear uniforms, bear arms without acquiring Afghan weapons permits, and have unlimited entry and exit rights without requiring visas, US contract employees cannot. Under Afghan jurisdiction, if contractors do not have a valid visa, they can be detained or deported; if they do not have proper weapons permits, they can be arrested.⁴¹ These obstacles create moral and legal dilemmas for a number of contractors and their employees. Some contractors can obtain relief through administrative exceptions, but many cannot.

An additional concern for contractors involves accusations of owing taxes to the Afghan government, which can create an administrative logjam.⁴² For example, when a contracting company is on the Afghan blacklist for failing to pay taxes—rightly or wrongly—their employees can incur great personal risk. Without the proper tax documents, American corporate contractors cannot acquire or renew their licenses to operate their businesses in Afghanistan. Without those licenses, their employees cannot obtain other documents needed to carry weapons legally for self-protection.

Although most contractors worked in Afghanistan without the need to carry a weapon, those who had weapons were left in precarious positions.⁴³ Either they could not participate in missions because they would have left the secure military bases while carrying their weapons illegally—without the proper Afghan permit—or worse, they would go on missions with no weapon at all. This left US citizens who were performing critical services for the military without proper force protection in what was often a very dangerous environment. These administrative catch-22s frustrated contractors and prevented them from providing services. The situation also created headaches for the US military and diplomatic personnel responsible for ensuring compliance and strained the US mission.⁴⁴

The Limited Immunity Option

Providing contractors full immunity from Afghan law, which is currently granted to military personnel and federal civilians, would alleviate such problems and allow missions to be conducted more efficiently. But, amending the BSA for such privilege may be a bridge

41 By 2015–2016, there was little reason to think arrests would actually occur despite numerous anecdotal cases and one reported detention. See Sayed Jawad, “Afghanistan Frees US Contractor Illegally Detained in a Dispute,” Khaama Press, April 6, 2013.

42 For more on the thorny taxation issues in Afghanistan arising from “a lack of clarity” in the MTA, see US Department of Defense Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs) Charles A. Allen, “Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq—Assistance in Responding to Questions Regarding Taxation under the Respective Status of Forces Agreements” (memorandum, March 29, 2011). See also Paul Pompeo, *Afghanistan Initiates Plans to Tax US Government Contractors* (Washington, DC: Arnold and Porter LLP, 2011); Ballard and Bradley, “Beyond Tax Treaties”; and Adam G. Province, “Aggressive Foreign Tax Authorities and Military Agreements: Maintaining Tax Exemption in SOFAs to Protect Civilian Contractors from Local-Country Tax,” *Journal of International Taxation* 27, no. 3 (March 2016).

43 Note that under international law, contractors are noncombatants who are generally not valid military targets depending on their specific function. See Campbell, “Contractors on the Battlefield.”

44 *Hearing on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan Before the House Committee on Armed Services*, 114th Cong. (October 8, 2015) (statement of General John F. Campbell, Commander, Operation Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan); and *Hearing on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Posture in Afghanistan: Post-2014 Transition, Risks, and Lessons Learned*, 114th Cong. (March 4, 2015) (statement of General John F. Campbell, Commander, Operation Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan).

too far. Thus, limited immunity might be a more realistic option to ease the burden on contractors and better provide for their safety. Under such a scheme, the US government would play a greater role in facilitating contractor compliance—for instance, the multiple-entry visa requirement for contractor employees would remain, but the visas would be renewed through a US government contracting officer.

Additionally, weapons permits would once again be handled through the commander of US Forces-Afghanistan or the US Embassy, who would provide a current list of permits to the Afghans for accountability. In the unlikely event of a crime against an Afghan national, the United States would have detention authority with an established diplomatic process for handling requests to transfer US citizens to Afghan jurisdiction. Although other conditions-based details would be required, any limited immunity option would provide the Afghan government with ultimate authority over contractors while providing administrative mechanisms consistent with protections of other US citizens accompanying military forces.

Conclusion

Even if one insists on viewing contractors as “mercenaries” such actors have had a very long history, “much longer, in fact, than the almost-exclusive deployment of national militaries to wage wars.”⁴⁵ The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have “triggered an explosion of contracting, measured both in amounts of money and numbers of personnel.”⁴⁶ But, the reduction of contractor protections increases risks to contractors and adversely affects the US mission. The following three actions will remedy this problem:

1. Separate the BSA Joint Commission meetings from the NATO SOFA Implementation Commission meetings. This independence will allow US personnel to address contractor issues relevant to the US mission that are not a priority interest for NATO and are currently neglected in the Joint Commission. Additionally, recognition should be given to the duty of US government personnel to protect and invest in the welfare of US-citizen contractors.

2. American contractors and their US employees should be granted greater immunity, especially when supporting dangerous activities. If full immunity is not possible, then a system of limited immunity should be negotiated as part of an amended BSA. In the meantime, the United States should consider creating an official government position in theater with the primary duties of assisting contractors with BSA compliance.

3. As the United States moves away from long-term contingency operations and towards more frequent midterm expeditionary operations, it is important to consider similar protections for contractors in all combat theaters.

The United States military incorporates extensive contractor support into both its routine and special operations at home and abroad.

45 Kathy Gilsinan, “The Return of the Mercenary: How Private Armies, and the Technology They Use, Are Changing Warfare,” *Atlantic*, March 25, 2015.

46 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Contracting Out Security,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 5 (2013): 650, doi:10.1080/01402390.2016.1139485.

At present, at least one commander has had to “substitute contractors for soldiers” to “meet force manning levels” in Afghanistan.⁴⁷ Ensuring US contractors have the necessary administrative support and legal protections ultimately benefits our nation and contributes to achieving our strategic goals.

⁴⁷ *Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan, Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 115th Cong.* (February 9, 2017) (statement of General John Nicholson, commander Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan).

Enhancing Resilience in an Operational Unit

Douglas A. Sims II and Amy B. Adler

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ABSTRACT: Leaders understand the importance of training their soldiers for rigorous combat assignments, but frequently misunderstand the importance of engaging in the resilience training activities discussed in this article.

Resilient soldiers, cohesive teams, and adaptable leaders serve as the backbone of the human dimensions concept, enabling effective performance in decentralized operations over protracted periods of conflict.¹ While there are many ways to build these capabilities, including tough realistic training, soldiers can also be trained in specific resilience skills that help them withstand and recover from significant stress. Such training can yield surprising benefits; but with competing requirements for units' time, leaders want to be confident that resilience training is worth the effort.

While evidence-based resilience training that has proven effective with servicemembers is a wise investment, both financially and in terms of human resources, even good, empirically validated resilience training implemented half-heartedly and with mixed messages from leadership is not worthwhile. When the unit environment undermines the purpose of resilience training with a “check-the-block” mentality or when the training is isolated from everyday military life, the training loses potential value. And, despite its potential importance in helping soldiers, resilience training is not a panacea: everyone has a point at which bouncing back from stress is more difficult.

Resilience Training

Nevertheless, resilience skills training can help soldiers better manage the psychological demands of military life and enhance the readiness of all a unit's members. Given each person's background—education, religion, socioeconomics, family, etc.—is different, each person's resilience is also different; thus, training needs likewise differ. When unit training is provided, the training content will be novel for some soldiers, but others may find the training redundant. So leaders have a choice: build new skills for subgroups or approach resilience training as a unit-based task similar to other traditional military training.

The benefit of focusing on groups who need specific training is that at-risk soldiers may get more individualized attention while other soldiers can focus on different tasks and can avoid unnecessary training. The cost of this approach includes possibly stigmatizing and inadvertently

¹ US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *The US Army Human Dimension Concept*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).

overlooking some at-risk soldiers as well as not optimally equipping units to reinforce the lessons learned.

The advantage of a unit-based approach is the potential to leverage members' strengths, provide buddy support, and train junior leaders in a common vocabulary of resilience and resilience skills to effectively communicate with unit members. Still, to avoid boring the entire unit, training has to be engaging and progressive over the career cycle of each servicemember. Moreover, training has to be periodically refreshed. The training approach depends both on organizational policy and on leaders' choices—at all levels—to integrate resilience training in their units.

Numerous studies have attempted to disentangle the ingredients of resilience. A review of the resilience literature in a RAND report evaluated and summarized 270 studies.² The researchers identified a set of common resilience skills across the scientific literature and categorized variables associated with individual resilience into five main factors: (1) positive coping such as active problem-solving; (2) positive affect such as optimism; (3) positive thinking such as thought restructuring or changing one's view of a problem; (4) realism such as having realistic expectations and practicing acceptance; and (5) behavioral control such as regulating one's emotional response. Three additional factors were identified for unit-level resilience: (1) positive command climate such as leaders building pride for the mission and modeling good behaviors; (2) teamwork such as work coordination, and (3) cohesion such as bonding. Interestingly, these factors are consistent with human dimensions concept components, which are typically incorporated into the Army's comprehensive resilience training programs.

Empirical Evidence

There appears to be evidence that resilience can indeed be taught, but some studies show an effect while others do not and almost all of the studies that do find an effect show small effects. In each of these studies, resilience is measured in a different way, and while there is no one agreed-upon metric of resilience, each study infers resilience based on other measures such as fewer mental health symptoms, better cognitive skills, and more effective work-related performance. The studies that identify such effects find individuals—such as civilians, police officers, and servicemembers—have better outcomes following universal training designed to improve resilience-related skills.³

Several well-designed studies conducted with the Army highlight ways in which resilience training has improved soldier outcomes on a

2 Lisa S. Meredith et al., *Promoting Psychological Resilience in the U.S. Military* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011).

3 Steven M. Brunwasser, Jane E. Gillham, and Eric S. Kim. "A Meta-Analytic Review of the Penn Resiliency Program's Effect on Depressive Symptoms," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 77, no. 6 (December 2009): 1042–54, doi:10.1037/a0017671; Bengt B. Arnetz et al., "Assessment of a Prevention Program for Work-Related Stress among Urban Police Officers," *International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health* 86, no. 1 (January 2013): 79–88, doi:10.1007/s00420-012-0748-6; Amy B. Adler et al., "Battlemind Debriefing and Battlemind Training as Early Interventions with Soldiers Returning from Iraq: Randomization by Platoon," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 77, no. 5 (October 2009): 928–40, doi:10.1037/a0016877; Amy B. Adler et al., "Mental Skills Training with Basic Combat Training Soldiers: A Group-Randomized Trial," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 100, no. 6 (May 2015): 1752–64, doi:10.1037/apl0000021; and Amishi P. Jha et al., "Minds 'At Attention': Mindfulness Training Curbs Attentional Lapses in Military Cohorts," *PLoS ONE* 10, no. 2 (February 2015): e0116889, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116889.

range of measures. In terms of foundational skills, a randomized trial of 2,432 soldiers going through basic combat training assigned platoons to a resilience training condition or a military history condition. The study found mental skills training such as goal setting, imagery, self-confidence, attentional focus, and energy management improved performance on obstacle courses, Army Physical Fitness Test diagnostic scores, and a weapons qualification event.⁴ In one example, soldiers walked across a high beam seven seconds faster if they had training in mental skills as opposed to training in military history. Soldiers who participated in the training also reported greater use of these important mental skills.⁵ The skills central to this study are the same core performance psychology skills used in the Army's resilience training program.

In terms of skills promoting social resilience, a group randomized trial was conducted with 1,138 soldiers in garrison in which Army platoons were randomly assigned to social resilience training or a comparison condition of cultural awareness training. Those units in the social resilience condition that addressed social cognition, enhancing connections, and resolving conflicts reported improved unit cohesion after the training. Units in the other training condition did not report similar outcomes.⁶ These resilience skills could be used to maintain and improve unit connections in challenging contexts, such as Army National Guard units returning from combat.

In terms of the deployment cycle, predeployment studies demonstrate mindfulness—a type of resilience training in focused attention on the present moment without elaboration or judgment—can enhance soldiers' functioning as measured by neurocognitive assessments of working memory and attention.⁷ Thus, mindfulness training is now being piloted as part of the Army's resilience training program. Studies also routinely find that when soldiers receive predeployment resilience training focused on anticipating deployment stressors and identifying cognitive restructuring skills that can be useful during deployment, they report fewer post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms and physical health symptoms as well as greater morale than soldiers who report not receiving such training.⁸ Two randomized trials of nearly 4,000 soldiers after deployment show benefits of resilience training in terms of reductions of post-traumatic stress, depression symptoms, and sleep problems, as well as increases in life satisfaction.⁹ Such trainings are a core part of the Army's deployment cycle resilience training program.

Regarding the level of evidence presented in these studies, the gold standard is a randomized trial because randomization typically addresses preexisting group differences that might otherwise account for different

4 Adler, "Battlemind Debriefing," 928–40.

5 Ibid.

6 John T. Cacioppo, "Building Social Resilience in Soldiers: A Double Dissociative Randomized Controlled Study," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 109, no. 1 (July 2015): 90–105, doi:10.1037/pspi0000022.

7 Ibid.

8 Eric S. McKibben et al., "Receipt and Rated Adequacy of Stress Management Training is Related to PTSD and Other Outcomes among Operation Iraqi Freedom Veterans," *Military Psychology* 21, no. 1 (January 2009): S68–81, doi:10.1080/08995600903249172.

9 Carl A. Castro et al., "Mental Health Training with Soldiers Four Months after Returning from Iraq: Randomization by Platoon," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 25, no. 4 (August 2012): 376–83, doi:10.1002/jts.21721. For more on the positive impact for soldiers with higher combat exposure, see Adler, "Battlemind Debriefing," 928–40.

outcomes between two study conditions. If a randomized trial is not feasible, a quasi-experimental design can suffice. In this kind of study, individuals are not randomized to different groups but a handful of preexisting groups are contrasted with one another. The difficulty with this approach is that any differences found at follow-up may be due to some other factor, such as a change in mission or leadership, that affected one group and not the other. Statistical techniques can help minimize this problem, but it is still a meaningful limitation.

Sometimes, an intervention can only be tested in a pre-post design. In this situation, individuals being trained may be assessed prior to an intervention and then again afterward. Unfortunately, in this design, there is no way to know if effects are due to the intervention itself or some extraneous factor.

Finally, case studies can be used to describe an individual or a group response to an intervention. Typically, these studies involve an individual attesting to the value of a particular intervention. While both the pre-post design and case study are useful starting points, if a great deal of resources are going to be assigned to roll-out an intervention, the optimal way to determine if this investment in resources is worthwhile is through a randomized trial.

The problem with research, admittedly, is that it is a slow process. Scientists are also typically muted in their enthusiasm for any results they do find because they are trained to identify weaknesses and limitations in their studies. In addition, resilience training usually yields small effects because it is typically provided as a public-health style or universal intervention, implemented with a whole population, such as a brigade.

Despite these small effects, compared to interventions that target specific populations, universal approaches likely yield better long-term results.¹⁰ Basically, moving a large population a tiny amount can result in more overall change than moving a handful of people a substantial amount. This phenomenon occurs because treatment, even evidence-based and validated treatment, typically only attracts a small proportion of people who need it, and of those who seek treatment, only a handful stick with it. Furthermore, only a proportion of those who adhere to the treatment regimen will actually benefit from the treatment. So, the small improvements for more people associated with a universal intervention can actually result in a more powerful improvement than greater outcomes for fewer people affected by a targeted approach.

A Leader's Perspective

In 2013, the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany, initiated an integrated resilience training program as part of predeployment preparations for Afghanistan. Despite the premium on leaders' time, particularly at the company and platoon level, the regimental commander recognized many programs across the installation could support unit and individual readiness. Dubbed Dragoon Total Fitness, this regimental initiative was a commander's priority that integrated the

10 Douglas F. Zatzick, Thomas Koepsell, and Frederick P. Rivara, "Using Target Population Specification, Effect Size, and Reach to Estimate and Compare the Population Impact of Two PTSD Preventive Interventions," *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes* 72, no. 4 (December 2009): 346–59, doi:10.1521/psyc.2009.72.4.346.

Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program with other existing efforts. These additional resilience-building activities, such as yoga, nutrition classes, and financial planning courses, addressed topics across the five dimensions of strength—physical, emotional, family, social, and spiritual—identified by the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program. Dragoon Total Fitness brought these disparate programs together by providing resources and establishing specific expectations.

Leaders in the regiment were provided with a dedicated block of time for Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness resilience training. Every tenth morning a physical fitness period was set aside for resilience training—90 minutes every other week—to build resilience skills without adding to the already packed calendar of events. To help junior leaders meet the requirement to complete both Master Resiliency Training and at least one supplemental resilience activity per month, a user-friendly manual was developed. The Dragoon Total Fitness Guide provided background information on the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program; a schedule of installation resilience-building activities; and an overview of events, contact information, and required equipment; as well as recommendations and milestones for conducting the Dragoon Total Fitness program over a year. Leaders could use the guide to select specific resilience activities for their units and their understanding of their soldiers.

As is the case with all things, leader priority and involvement were critical to the program's success. Leaders were expected to participate. From first-line supervisors to the regimental commander, classes and additional resilience activities were not relegated to optional status; they were regarded as places of duty.

Competing requirements for leaders' time resulted in initial reluctance to schedule the classes and ensure they were conducted with detailed preparation and effort. Furthermore, the seemingly endless requirements dictated by the Army regulation caused some leaders to determine what they believed was important, often reporting completion of some tasks regardless of the quality of completion.¹¹ This reporting style has been identified as a risk the Army takes when there are too many requirements.¹²

Leaders who rejected the program often poorly selected their resilience instructors. In fact, bad instructors were actually more destructive to the program than not conducting training. Soldiers who attended classes led by inadequate instructors were less likely to see the benefits of the training, not inclined to attend additional training, nor were they open to the positive potential of resilience training.

In conjunction with leader emphasis, tenacity played a key role in increasing the unit's engagement in resilience. Despite concerns from some junior leaders, the commander retained resilience as a priority. Timelines for resilience module training and completion of individual soldiers' training were tracked with the same importance as physical fitness tests and marksmanship qualification records. Rather than simply

11 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), *Army Training and Leader Development*, Army Regulation 350-1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).

12 Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).

complete two or four classes, soldiers had to complete full modules in accordance with a published and tracked standard. Recognizing the 2nd Cavalry Regiment would deploy over the life of the program, the modules accommodated the tour in Afghanistan. Although the timeline incorporated the rigors of combat, the criticality of resilience—particularly during the deployment—increased the emphasis on completing the resilience training.

As more leaders experienced the training as it was intended, they became more open to its potential, and the program became part of the regimental culture. Jokes from soldiers on post indicated the program was increasingly becoming a part of the fabric of the unit. Soldiers were discussing training-related terminology across the post. From admonishing each other to “hunt the good stuff” at the post exchange and warning those causing “activating events” that might lead to conflict, the jokes indicated a common language was being established.

The Soldier’s Perspective

As part of the program initiative, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment partnered with the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research during 2013 and 2014 to assess soldier perceptions of Dragoon Total Fitness. The research team surveyed all of the regiment’s available soldiers—a total of 2,181 soldiers—about leader support for the program. Overall, the soldiers rated 28 percent of their company leaders as “enthusiastic”; 47 percent, “open to the idea”; 22 percent, “going through the motions”; and 3 percent, “negative.” The more unit leaders were perceived as enthusiastic or open to the idea of the Dragoon Total Fitness program, the more likely soldiers were to report the training was useful. The usefulness of the training was recognized by 63 percent of the soldiers who rated their leaders as enthusiastic, 43 percent of the soldiers who rated their leaders as open to the idea, 24 percent of the soldiers who rated their leaders as going through the motions, and 17 percent of the soldiers who rated their leaders as negative.

Furthermore, leader engagement in the following supportive behaviors were directly linked to soldiers’ perceptions of leader enthusiasm for the program: (1) attend the training activities, (2) emphasize the importance of training skills, (3) refer to resilience skills when talking with soldiers, and (4) encourage soldiers to use these skills—for example, 62 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as enthusiastic also reported that their leaders attended resilience training activities, 35 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as open to the idea also reported leader attendance, 21 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as just going through the motions reported leader attendance, and only 9 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as negative also reported leader attendance. The same pattern held true for the other supportive behaviors. In addition, the more leaders engaged in these behaviors, the more soldiers reported using the skills they had learned and that the training was useful. Most importantly, the more leaders engaged in supportive behaviors, the better soldiers rated their unit climate and their own mental health.

Notably, even after accounting for rank and generally strong leadership skills in a series of multiple regression analyses, leadership

behaviors that supported resilience training were still independently associated with using resilience skills from the training, finding the training useful, perceiving a positive unit climate, and reporting fewer mental health symptoms such as traumatic stress, anxiety, and anger, which means the focus on promoting resilience training adds value. Additionally, these same models even significantly predicted unit climate and many of the same mental health outcomes four months later.

Command support for resilience trainers has been associated with more effective training in previous studies.¹³ To our knowledge, however, this article is the first to introduce the direct link between ratings of leader support for training and soldier perceptions of training. While these results confirm what many leaders have long known about the power of command support, the findings also offer direction for improving the impact of resilience training on units by emphasizing the role of leaders.

Strengthening Resilience

Training needs to be valuable and relevant. Resilience training should be tested with strong study design, with military populations, and with pertinent military problems and challenges in mind. Training untested in the military context may mismatch the occupational context and could distract from the Army's established and well-vetted program. Interventions based on civilian data may not necessarily work with servicemembers.

In one case, for example, a well-established intervention involving expressive writing was shown to be contraindicated for soldiers following combat deployment. Specifically, soldiers with high levels of combat experiences who were randomly assigned to the expressive writing condition reported more anger months later than did those assigned to the control condition.¹⁴ This study, while not yielding the expected results, was valuable because it underscored the importance of testing interventions in a military context using a randomized controlled design. The research emphasized the need to understand the population and the importance of this understanding for guiding decision-making about appropriate implementation.

Training needs to be integrated and marketed as part of one coherent program. Programs can integrate a range of topics, but ideally, the end user needs to see how the components fit together. Sometimes, perhaps as the result of misplaced enthusiasm, individuals approach senior leaders with new material that has not yet been scientifically validated. These well-intended individuals are typically passionate about their work and their belief that the material is critically important for the health and performance of servicemembers. But, ad-hoc programs lack the appropriate research evidence to validate their expected benefits.

One way leaders can respond to these suggestions is to recommend the individual partner with academic researchers who can help submit research proposals for funding. The government has several mechanisms

13 Paul B. Lester et al., *The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program Evaluation, Report #3: Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Master Resilience Training on Self-Reported Resilience and Psychological Health Data* (Arlington, VA: Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, Department of the Army, 2011).

14 Christopher Munsey, "Writing about Wounds," *Monitor on Psychology*, October 2009, 58.

to fund research studies, including ongoing broad agency announcements that allow preproposals to be reviewed on a continuous basis.¹⁵ These preproposals can be selected for a full proposal, independently reviewed, and potentially recommended for funding. This process is vital to the development of new and effective training.

New material can be valuable to refreshing training programs when appropriately assessed through empirical study. Approved training also needs to be integrated into the unit culture by reinforcing the concepts over time. Embedding resilience skills in military tasks, and not just in a classroom setting, should increase the degree skills will be routinely practiced and supported by unit members and leaders.

Training needs to be scalable. Training that can only be implemented by one or two experts or that requires excessive resources will not lead to a sustainable program. Moreover, training must be provided by carefully selected and sufficiently prepared trainers, even at the unit level, who are well-suited to the task. Ongoing quality control checks need to be conducted to make sure drift from the original training content—a natural risk in providing decentralized training—is avoided. Professional resilience trainers, such as the Army Resiliency Directorate's Performance Experts who are master's and PhD level trainers in mental skills, can also be used to reinforce unit training and ensure optimal presentation.

Training needs to be supported by leaders at all levels. This support can be maximized by explaining the program's rationale, scientific evidence, and the importance of leader engagement. Senior leaders need to send an unequivocal message about the importance of resilience training. Research evidence is critical because leaders need to be able to distinguish between good ideas with enthusiastic support and good ideas with an evidence base. They need to know the questions to ask or reach out to experts to help evaluate proposed ideas.

Part of leader engagement involves creating policies and procedures to ensure implementation, coordination, and resources, such as those described in the analysis of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment's Dragoon Total Fitness program. Leader support does not have to be an amorphous concept. As suggested by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment study, effective leader support can consist of practical steps such as attending training, emphasizing the importance of training, referring to the training content when talking with soldiers, and encouraging soldiers to use the skills.

A review of the Army's resilience training would not be complete without also mentioning the concern that the program is an unnecessary burden on soldiers and leaders. In reality, training is ubiquitous across the Army, and the topics, breadth, and results of such training should be questioned to maintain the learning orientation of the organization. Indeed, some of the analysis provided here regarding the importance of leader support applies to all training implementation. Still, the data are specific to resilience training perceptions and suggest leaders at all levels can engage in behaviors that promote unit-based resilience programs, enhance the efficacy of the training itself, and serve as force multipliers.

15 For information on submitting broad agency announcements and requests for proposals, see "How to Submit a Research Proposal," US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, http://www.usamraa.army.mil/pages/baa_paa/baaproposal.htm (accessed April 5, 2017).

Future efforts should examine ways to select training modules that are a good fit for leaders' units. Combining a unit resilience profile with recommendations for targeted training modules would offer a more systematic approach to matching training with particular units. In this way, scores on various resilience factors, such as those identified by the RAND overview, could be used to align units with specific training and ultimately to help units operate more effectively in decentralized and complex environments.

Prioritizing resilience training among the myriad requirements leaders face requires careful balance in this era of perpetual conflict. Obviously, soldiers need practice in tactics, units need to gain confidence working together as a team, and leaders need experience with high-stress decision-making. Each of these requirements, coupled with individual deployment preparations, means finding time for "additional" training will be nearly impossible. Yet, if resilience training is understood to be a valuable investment, then it will not be so easily dismissed. In fact, appropriately implemented resilience training can make soldiers better at tactics, teamwork, and critical decision-making, all essential elements of the human dimensions concept, and more importantly, keys to success in training and on the battlefield.

Douglas A. Sims II

Brigadier General Douglas A. Sims II most recently served as the 1st Cavalry Division's Deputy Commanding General-Support, Fort Hood, TX, with additional duties as the commanding general for Task Force Forge, Operation Resolute Support and Freedom's Sentinel in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

Amy B. Adler

Dr. Amy B. Adler, a clinical research psychologist at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, cochairs the US Army's Psychological Health and Resilience research program. She has led numerous randomized trials with Army units, published more than 100 peer-reviewed journal articles, and co-edited six books.

Australia's Offset and A2/AD Strategies

Ian Langford

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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the competencies Australia's political and military leaders selected to pursue offset strategies and anti-access/area denial capabilities.

Australia's physical security is in large part achieved as a function of its geography. As the world's largest island sitting astride the Pacific, Indian, and Southern Oceans, Terra Australis Incognita and its inhabitants have traditionally sought comfort in being located "at the bottom of the world."¹ Australians were jolted out of this false notion and realized their physical vulnerability when Japan suddenly captured Singapore in 1942. Since then, Australian security planners have emphasized the importance of possessing the military capability to operate across the sea-air gap to the north of the continent. The *Australia in the Asian Century* white paper elevated this issue: "As the global centre of gravity shifts to our region, the tyranny of distance is being replaced with the tyranny of proximity."²

The Australian Defence Force focuses much of its effort on developing the means to operate in major theaters of conflict as well as to maintain regional access and engagement as part of a layered approach to national security, including continental defense. This approach also acknowledges Australia's reliance on its most important security treaty—the ANZUS Pact (1951).³ One of this alliance's most interesting challenges is ensuring the continuity of global commerce systems in the Asia-Pacific, which requires common access to realize the potential benefits. This aspect has underpinned the region's stability for at least the past 70 years. Today, however, access across the global commons is increasingly problematic due to political, environmental, and diplomatic issues. To guarantee continued common access and security in the region, the Australian Defence Force is expanding its network of parties who likewise value developing capabilities and concepts to defeat adversarial anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats.

1 For more on Australia's Maritime culture, see Michael Evans, "The Third Way: Towards an Australian Maritime Strategy for the Twenty-first Century," in *2013 Chief of Army History Conference: Armies and Maritime Strategy*, ed. Peter Dennis (Canberra: Big Sky Publishing, 2013), 327–58.

2 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), *Australia in the Asian Century*, White Paper 1 (Barton, Australia: PM&C, 2012), 105. The white paper also detailed six key drivers for developing Australia's security environment through 2035: the roles of and relationship between the United States and China; competitive states' challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order; terrorist threats; state fragility resulting from economics, crime, social factors, environment, governing, and climate change; military modernization; and complex, nongeographic threats such as cyber.

3 The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Pact initially bound the parties to cooperate on security matters in the Pacific Ocean region. Today the treaty relates to conflicts worldwide: an armed attack on any of the three parties would be met as a common threat.

Colonel Ian Langford, a career special forces officer in the Australian Defence Force, specializes in future warfare.

Anti-Access/Area Denial

Anti-access challenges—geographic, military, and diplomatic—are designed to prevent, delay, or degrade the ability of military forces to enter an operational area and establish bases farther away from preferred locations.⁴ Limiting an opponent to an inland operational area, for example, creates great distance from ports and usable airfields, presenting a geographic challenge.⁵ In other cases, anti-access challenges are diplomatic or political matters, such as when a nation in a region prohibits or limits the ability of a military operation to deploy joint task forces into its sovereign territory or to fly through its airspace.

Area denial refers to actions designed to restrict freedoms of maneuver, which are characterized by an adversary's ability to obstruct the actions of military forces once they have deployed. Land forces deployed to Afghanistan in 2001, for example, encountered no significant military area denial threats though forces deployed to the region later in the conflict regularly faced severe area denial threats such as improvised explosive devices. In the maritime domain, sea mines and other defensive measures effectively deny access to and use of maneuver corridors (straits), harbors, and beach-landing sites.

The types of A2/AD threats the Australian Defence Force could encounter in future operations will vary considerably. At the low-end of the spectrum of conflict, insurgent forces such as the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria have limited anti-access capabilities and a small number of modern weapons. These forces could still pose a considerable area denial challenge due to their ability to operate among the local population and employ irregular tactics to strike land forces at times and places of their choosing.

In the middle of the spectrum, hybrid opponents can employ irregular or guerrilla-type tactics, but are reasonably well-armed with modern weapons. Examples of these opponents, who can simultaneously fight in a conventional manner, include the pairing of irregular Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War and the Hezbollah forces that Israel fought in southern Lebanon in 2006.⁶

At the high end of the threat spectrum, armed forces of nation-states tend to employ conventional tactics and weapons. Even at this end of the spectrum, the level of A2/AD capability can vary considerably. As with the hybrid threat, this challenge is not new. In World War II, Nazi Germany's submarine force provided a potent, long-range anti-access capability that threatened allied shipping routes across the North Atlantic Ocean. Similarly, during the Cold War, a major mission of the Soviet navy's submarines was to interdict the movement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization reinforcements from the United States to Europe.

4 John Gordon IV and John Matsumura, *The Army's Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges* (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2013), 21–23.

5 US Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and US Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept* (Fort Eustis, VA: ARCIC, 2012), 3.

6 Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Force Quarterly* 52 (1st Quarter 2009).

Offset Strategy

Australia has, in comparison to other regional military forces, a numerically modest capability to provide security over a significant geographic area. To deter effectively and to provide military responses to threats, the Australian Defence Force must compensate for its size disadvantage by developing a competitive, asymmetrical strategy capable of generating an advantage over potential adversaries. This type of strategy usually centers on engineering cross-domain and technological capabilities that effectively offset quantitative inferiority in regions dominated by larger, more potent forces.

In its simplest form, an offset strategy is a competitive long-term concept that generates and sustains strategic advantage.⁷ While not an exclusively technological approach, the strategy does tend to have a robust technical focus. Offset strategies strive for an appropriate combination of technology and operational constructs to achieve decision advantage, and in doing so bolster conventional deterrence.⁸ For the Australian Defence Force, who by any regional comparison will always be a numerically small military, technology and military alliances represent the most important combat multipliers that can generate the military effects required to protect Australia and her national interests.

Force-on-force attrition is the end point of warfare, the least desired operational scenario for military forces. The Australian Defence Force seeks to generate operational outcomes by employing asymmetric effects; it relies on tactics, technologies, personnel, and alliances—its inventory of offset capabilities—to generate its military operations.

Offset Capabilities for Asia-Pacific Access beyond 2020

To retain access and to defeat area denial systems in the Asia-Pacific, the Australian Defence Force offset strategy concentrates on eight core tactical competencies and concepts that, when combined with cross-domain synergy, gives Australian and allied joint forces the edge necessary for future military contests for access. These competencies are at the heart of short-notice, rapid-response force success.

Competency 1: Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare

Modern military ships, aircraft, and ground forces cannot effectively operate without using the electromagnetic spectrum and have not been able to do so for about a century. At a very minimum, communication via radio—notwithstanding runners, pigeons, and easily cut telephone cables—is necessary even in an emissions-controlled environment. Today's Australian forces constantly transmit and receive intelligence, operational plans, and asset locations via wireless networks and other communication and control systems. These systems must be protected while their platforms and their sensor suites simultaneously deny the electromagnetic spectrum from being used by any potential adversary.

⁷ Robert Martinage, *Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 14–20.

⁸ Wing Commander Phil Arms, “The U.S. 3rd Offset Strategy: An opportunity for the ADF,” Australian Army, July 28, 2016, <http://www.Army.gov.au/Our-future/Blog/Articles/2016/07/Third-Offset-Strategy>.

Electromagnetic maneuver warfare is the concept of creating an electromagnetic battle management system, where all individual platforms collect data on and inform the network of enemy signals while managing their own emissions to defeat, deceive, or deny the adversary through offensive kinetic and nonkinetic operations. By unifying and asserting positive control inside the electromagnetic spectrum—indeed maneuvering inside the spectrum—numerically inferior forces have an antidote for an adversary’s military forces. Moreover, electromagnetic maneuver warfare does not only focus on the adversary, it also guarantees access to the electromagnetic spectrum for joint forces’ command and control, detection, force protection, and frequency management capabilities. Supporting the ability for forces to maneuver across all domains—air, maritime, land, space, cyber—as well as to control the spectrum through denial, deception, and destruction, electromagnetic maneuver warfare provides joint forces opportunities to operate without attribution, which protects sensitive capabilities and maintains operational security.

Competency 2: Technologically Intensive, Human Focused Decision-Making

Effective decision-making is critical to success in war. Colonel John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop was designed as an organizing principle for strategy that anticipated and embraced ambiguity and uncertainty, which he perceived as inherent features of man and nature. The randomness of the outside world, he felt, played a large role in uncertainty. Boyd further argued the inability of military commanders to properly make sense of a constantly changing reality is a bigger hindrance. Thus, he called for continuously updating mental concepts by using both man and machine to deal with a constantly changing reality.

Boyd’s OODA Loop emphasizes alertness—the ability to *observe* the changing situation and environment. A follow-on focus of the changing character of the situation allows a person to *orient* to the situation. Armed with this perspective, one can *decide* to *act* based upon action alternatives that inform subsequent OODA Loops via a continuous learning process. While modern technology collects critical information to inform the loop, the interpretation of such information remains an essential human skill founded on the decision-maker’s personal experience and prior preparation to understand the situation and the enemy. Boyd emphasized an additional need for the commander’s intent to unify a force’s purpose and preference for decentralized execution to ensure redundancy in action, thereby increasing the chances of mission success.⁹

As a component of an offset strategy, decision-making is critical. Embracing the OODA Loop allows the military to harness technologies that support decision-making, which is emphasized during the observe and orient phase, while preserving the human aspects of the decide and act component.

The observe and orient focus within an offset strategy generates superior situational understanding for commanders and joint forces to ensure their ability to execute the key warfighting functions—know,

⁹ For more on John Boyd, see Robert Coram, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War* (New York: Bay Back Books, 2002).

shape, strike, shield, sustain, and adapt.¹⁰ To achieve this perspective and the ability to defeat complex systems such as an adversary's A2/AD capability, focus must be maintained on key intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, which include electronic warfare, electronic attack, persistent surveillance, supercomputing, autonomous systems, and unmanned systems, as well as decision support systems such as geoinmager, synthetic simulation, artificial intelligence, and computer learning systems. Analytical technologies that determine the alertness and character of problem-solving as well as analytical functions such as data management and data analysis are also critical: they enable processed and analyzed data to be presented as information appropriately formatted for military forces to apply to the next phase of the decision cycle—decide and act.

The decide and act function as part of an offset strategy requires a centralized command and control system that emphasizes human-to-human interconnectedness and integrates Generation 5 capabilities such as those being introduced into military service over the next decade. Coupled with increased data processing technologies, including accelerated analytics, the decide and act function is likely to rapidly deliver patterns and correlations that were previously unidentified. A more accurate and detailed data set would maximize the use of limited capabilities such as low-density/high-demand intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems as well as optimize the use of scarce resources such as aviation and logistics. High performance analytics also present an opportunity to derive value from big data, solve complex operational problems, and deliver timely, high-quality insights for making decisions.

Competency 3: Integrated Air and Missile Defense Systems

An effective integrated air and missile defense system detects, tracks, identifies, and monitors airborne objects, such as aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ballistic missiles, and if necessary, intercepts them using surface-based or airborne weapons systems. Integrated air and missile defense systems are key enablers for joint force operations and encourage a system of cooperative engagement emphasizing a fully integrated targeting network that designs kinetic and nonkinetic solutions in an all-informed networked environment.

The systems' capabilities provide effective air policing with a deterrent effect in peacetime as well as preserve the actions necessary to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats during times of crisis and conflict. Integrated air and missile defense systems provide a highly responsive, time-critical, persistent capability to achieve a desired or necessary level of air control that allows joint forces to conduct full-range missions. They integrate a network of interconnected national and battle command systems comprised of sensors, command and control facilities, and weapons systems.

10 The combat and warfighting functions of know, shape, strike, shield, sustain, and adapt, which were articulated by the Australian Army, in *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Army, 2008), were removed in the 2014 version of the doctrine, but an oblique reference to these functions, which excludes strike, remains in the following: Australian Army, *Operations*, LWD 3-0 (Laverton, Victoria: Defence Publishing Service, 2015).

A theater-level system is capable of combining sensor data in real time to create a detailed, integrated picture of aircraft and missile threats in the air that can be shared on an allied network to give friendly ships, aircraft, and land mobile systems the ability to create an integrated air defense. This capability is especially important for managing the threat level of an A2/AD environment where the simultaneous targeting of a multitude of anti-access systems is critical to overwhelming and defeating the enemy network.

The advent of cheap, mass-produced, autonomous drones, which have no centralized system but are capable of generating thousands of air vectors that can overwhelm the processing power of an integrated air and missile defense system, has become an emerging arms race. The need for adaptive refresh capabilities and the avoidance of block or system obsolescence will be essential to ensuring the systems remain capable and effective.

Given the myriad of capability priorities for modern military forces, including the Australian Defence Force, the development of an interoperable, robust integrated air and missile defense system must be seen in the context of cost-consciousness. System inceptors should therefore be simple, relatively inexpensive, and employ a network approach to engagement: the active defense versus missile attack cost ratio should be reversed. System procurement should be managed through a development process that allows organizations, including the Australian Defence Force, an opportunity to leap to the end-state, thereby leveraging the defense industry and Australia's alliance frameworks.

Competency 4: Manned and Machine Teaming

Unmanned systems are changing the way all militaries operate and protect forces. Exploration and expansion of these capabilities must be continued while militaries remain conscious of low-technology threats, such as drone technology, that effectively act as autonomous rounds of ammunition. The success of an unmanned system in any domain is best demonstrated by the way it integrates with manned activity and serves as a combat multiplier, rather than a simple swap. Human-machine teaming emphasizes this progression whether it occurs as tactical surveillance in a war zone, support of a humanitarian operation, or movement of supplies in a convoy.

The Australian Defence Force must invest additional resources and effort in developing manned-machine systems that enhance image-capture and sensor systems, positioning and navigation systems, targeting and decision-support systems, and advanced simulation systems. Advanced computing capabilities now allow systems to communicate with teams of humans and other systems. Improvements in affordable, portable, and long-lasting power sources also improve system mobility and accelerate processing ability. Technologies on and off any teamed platform will also help unmanned systems understand tasks and how to respond to obstacles, weather conditions, and other unknown interferences.

Competency 5: Defended and Defending Communications Networks

The Australian Defence Force relies heavily on cyberspace to enable its military, intelligence, and logistics operations, including the movement of personnel and matériel and the command and control of the full spectrum of military operations. Exploitation of cybervulnerabilities could undermine the force's ability to operate, thereby threatening national security and competitiveness. Recent government investments in cybersecurity have improved the posture of networks, systems, and data by reducing attack surfaces and improving control over information access. Results include enhancements in cybersecurity measures and situational awareness, such as monitoring for intrusions, mitigating vulnerabilities, improving identity management and authentication, and central collection of incident data; however, cyberthreats are increasing and adversaries are becoming more skilled, sophisticated, and strategically minded. The Australian Defence Force must ensure it does not overlook the vulnerability of cyberassets.

To meet the challenges expected between now and 2020, transformational changes to cyberculture, workforce, technology, policy, and processes of the Australian Defence Force are required. The results of this strategy will enable the organization to continue to operate effectively in cyberspace, as well as actively defend against adversarial cyberactions. This strategy should emphasize establishing a resilient defense posture, transforming the management of all deployments and operations, enhancing all situational awareness assets with a specific focus on network integrity, and increasing assurance and survivability against highly sophisticated attacks against core systems.¹¹

To support these efforts, the Australian Defence Force will work more closely with its interagency partners, the private sector, and international partners toward collective cyberdefense. Most importantly, the Australian cyberspace workforce will have to be fully trained, equipped, and prepared for defending the cyberinterests of not only the military but also Australian society in general. Although not addressed as a critical element, each focus area will require development of related policy, oversight, and compliance mechanisms to be successful.

Competency 6: Dark Systems

Survivability in a highly contested A2/AD environment demands capabilities that can operate below adversaries' detection threshold, in other words, the capability to "go dark." The Australian Defence Force should develop stealth-like systems that include air, maritime, and land platforms with the following design characteristics: acoustic design features that reduce operating noise emissions and thermal masking through equipment insulation, low emissivity paint, and radar absorbent materials that reduce the probability of interception, as well as metamaterial concealment and nonmagnetic construction materials.

Of significant note is the requirement to reduce a platform's electronic signature, use low-probability intercept transmissions, as well as develop and implement mathematical and statistical algorithms for allied and adversarial radio frequency signal detection, characterization,

¹¹ US Department of Defense (DoD), *DoD Strategy for Defending Networks, Systems, and Data*, (Washington, DC: DoD, 2013).

and localization with a particular emphasis on wideband, multichannel, and distributed sensors. This capability will not only help the Australian Defence Force mask its communication signals but also improve its ability to detect other signals within the operating environment.¹²

Competency 7: Anti-Position Navigation Timing Protection and Disruption Systems

There is a growing awareness among modern militaries of the major disruption risks to operations and capabilities that rely on GPS as the only means of position determination and precision timing. Developed in the 1970s by the US Department of Defense, GPS was created for military navigation and is widely credited with America's military dominance during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91). Since that time, the capability has become absolutely critical to military operations and weapons systems as well as international commerce, which is critical to the global economy. Thus, the Australian Defence Force must possess both the ability to operate within a GPS degraded environment and to deny effectively the use of the same system to an adversary. This ability should increase space resiliency, hedge against the loss of space-based enablers, and develop counterspace capabilities accordingly.

As part of its offset strategy, the Australian Defence Force should pursue a robust and cost-effective solution to protect military capabilities from GPS interference: high-performance GPS antijamming devices that allow GPS receivers to acquire and track satellite signals so the Australian Defence Force can retain the ability to determine accurate battlefields positions.¹³ Alternatively, Australia may need to choose a less direct approach such as ensuring systems can operate on multiple systems such as an adversary's primary Glonass or Beidou systems, which would be less likely to be jammed.¹⁴ This redundancy in position determination and precision timing capabilities does not currently exist.

Spoofing, a process of replacing correct GPS readings by creating a false signal that leads devices to display incorrect times or locations, could potentially disrupt power grids or hijack systems including weapon platform and key maneuver systems.¹⁵ As an offensive capability, the ability to deny GPS signals to an adversary would be an important maneuver and attack tool, especially in a highly decentralized and long-range targeting conflict such as an A2/AD environment with unmanned systems and attack munitions whose core functions rely on the signal.¹⁶

Competency 8: Directed Energy Systems

With the groundbreaking test of a laser weapons system aboard the USS *Ponce* in 2014, directed energy systems have never been closer to

12 "Spectrum Sensing and Shaping," Australian Department of Defence Science and Technology, <http://www.dst.defence.gov.au/capability/spectrum-sensing-and-shaping> (accessed August 18, 2016).

13 NovAtel, *Mitigating the Threat of GPS Jamming: Anti-Jam Technology* (white paper, Alberta, Canada: NovAtel, 2012).

14 Philip G. Mattos and Fabio Pisoni, "Quad Constellation Receiver: GPS GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou," *GPS World*, January 1, 2014.

15 "The increasing risk of GPS systems," Homeland Security NewsWire, November 22, 2011, <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20111122-the-increasing-risks-of-gps-systems>.

16 "China Unveils Anti-Drone Laser Weapon Able to Shoot Down 'Small Aircraft' within 5 Seconds," RT, 2 November 2014, <https://www.rt.com/news/201795-china-drone-defense-laser/>.

becoming integrated as fully operational military systems.¹⁷ An effective capability that can block adversaries' electronics and communications, protect maritime and ground convoys in high risk zones, and protect critical land, maritime, and airborne assets is crucial in defeating future threats. Electromagnetic rail guns and directed energy missile technologies are now fielded capabilities in some countries. Once developed and deployed, these systems, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Javelin antitank missile, are relatively inexpensive.

While size, weight, interoperability, and lethality are factors, other concerns, which mostly involve environmental extremes, limit directed energy weapons. Traditional assault rifles are reliable in extreme tropical, desert, and arctic conditions. They operate effectively in rain, snow, dust, and fog. They can generally be immersed in water and covered in mud without degrading their performance, and unlike directed energy systems, assault rifles are not negatively affected by solar flares or electromagnetic pulses.

A directed energy weapon relies on a sophisticated electronic circuit to generate an energy beam, which can be isolated and shielded from outside influence but not without adding weight and sophistication. Clouds, fog, rain, and snow are all enemies of directed energy. Today's powerful antimissile airborne systems simply burn their way through targets, but lower-energy man-portable systems will not have similar sustained power nor are they likely to be as reliable in extreme battlefield environments. Notwithstanding these caveats, directed energy weapons will continue to evolve and potentially offer a significant technology advantage against a peer adversary, especially against area denial systems such as integrated air defense networks and hypersonic antiship ballistic missiles.

Conclusion

As our forward-looking document, *Australia in the Asian Century* states, "predicting the future is fraught with risk, but the greater risk is in failing to plan for our destiny. As a nation, we face a choice: to drift into our future or to actively shape it."¹⁸ In a region that is increasingly dependent on its maritime, air, and land access as a key element to support national sovereignty, the Australian Defence Force must now focus significant effort on developing the means to conduct expeditionary operations in addition to maintaining regional access and engagement as part of a layered approach to global and regional security as well as continental defense. This amplification will require the Australian Defence Force to develop strategies and concepts for defeating adversaries' A2/AD capabilities as part of its core mission set. And, the well-defined, resourced, and balanced series of offset strategies mentioned here are important components to defeat any such mechanism.

A critical question must be: how will Australia afford an offset system such as that proposed in this paper? What legacy systems may have to be sacrificed in order to afford such a system? Whether it is all or part of the offset capabilities proposed, it is clear that Australia's

¹⁷ "US Navy Deploys Laser Weapon to Persian Gulf for First-Ever Combat Mission," RT, November 14, 2014, <https://www.rt.com/news/205711-us-laser-weapon-persian/>.

¹⁸ PM&C, *Australia in the Asian Century*, 1.

traditional “technology edge” within the Asian region is deteriorating—and quickly. And given its relatively small military force, the Australian government must either decide to leap to a technology end state that reasserts a technology edge or face a loss of global access and influence due to degraded military capabilities.

The French Army at a Crossroads

Rémy Hémez

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ABSTRACT: The French Army strategy to protect the people from terrorism and to remain involved in international stabilization efforts comes at a cost. This article identifies steps to balance the complexities through technology and force structure.

Between 2010 and 2025, French Army equipment will have changed more than it did between 1970 and 2010. But, this shift is not limited to fielding matériel, the French Army is also undergoing a major reorganization—the Scorpion modernization program. Since the Île-de-France attacks (January 7–9, 2015), the French Army’s overarching challenge has been to balance its interventions abroad, reassurance missions, and homeland security operations. Although a relatively stable equilibrium has been found, the model raises new questions regarding its long-term sustainability.

Choosing a priority between defending borders or projecting forces abroad has been a continuous struggle. Beginning with the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–99), France’s strategic culture has been predominantly defined by defending its northeastern border, which requires a large land force. This tendency was reinforced at the end of the Algerian War (1954–62), when colonial troops returned to France. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the early 1970s caused the French Army to join the West’s deterrence mission; however, despite the assigned priority to defend the homeland against a Soviet invasion, a small projection force maintained an expeditionary culture.

This Cold War model defined by *levée en masse* (massive conscription) was applied until 1996, when the suspension of the practice was announced. Since then, strategic priorities have been inverted. The French Army has turned toward its expeditionary force to create a more compact and better equipped army, one in which all units are capable of intervening abroad.¹ This trend extended through 2013 with financial pressure causing a drastic reduction of the number of units and personnel.²

In 2015, budgetary and political constraints pushed the army chief of staff to redesign the service’s structure. This willingness to reform also occurred in a disrupted and changing security environment, which as of March 2017, compelled engagement in three domains: 7,000–10,000

The author’s views do not reflect those of the French Army.

1 Jérôme de Lespinois, *L’armée de Terre, de la défense du sanctuaire à la projection* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003).

2 Between 2009 and 2013, army personnel were reduced by approximately 22,000, dissolving 21 battalions and 7 headquarters. See *Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bosser, chef d’état-major de l’armée de Terre, sur le projet de loi de finance pour 2015.2* (Assemblée nationale, October 15, 2014).

Major Rémy Hémez, French Army, is currently a military fellow at the Security Studies Center of the French Institute of International Relations.

soldiers deployed in homeland operations responding to a high-level terrorist threat; 10,000 participated in operations abroad driven by a jihadist threat; and 300 supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization Reassurance missions to Eastern European and Baltic states.

This article provides an overview of the French Army's navigation of these overlapping demands, and their influence on the service's structure, doctrine, and capabilities. Impacts of the renewed organization and equipment, the innovative tactical thinking, and the friction resulting from French forces' return from national and international commitments are also covered.

"Au contact"—Transitioning within the Median

On May 28, 2015, the French Army officially unveiled its new organization plan *Au contact*, meaning up close, which was drafted before the Île-de-France attacks that emphasized the plan's necessity and relevance. Implementation, including dividing the army into 13 commands, began in September 2015 and will be finalized in 2017. Although *Au contact* focuses on overseas interventions, it also rebalances the army's participation and visibility in terms of protection, particularly across French territory. The National Territory Command, created over the summer of 2016, intends to prepare for and facilitate military engagement in the area in the case of disaster relief or homeland security missions. Key army capabilities—such as special forces, airmobile combat (including a new airmobile brigade), intelligence, information and communication systems, and logistics—have also been reinforced and consolidated into new dedicated commands. Most combat troops have been regrouped into a Scorpion force composed of 47,000 soldiers and organized into the newly created 1st Division, headquartered in Besançon, and the 3rd Division, headquartered in Marseille. This organization was a notable comeback from the "brigadized" French order of battle in place during the late-1990s. These two divisions comprise six combined arms brigades: two armored, two median, and two light (airborne and mountain). These restructuring efforts prepare for the Scorpion program and offer better visibility for France's allies.

Concurrent with *Au contact*, the French Army is completing two important transition phases. The first increases the army's operational combat force from 66,000 to 77,000 soldiers by the end of 2016 and creates 33 combat companies within the infantry, armor, and combat engineer branches. President François Hollande decided to halt previously planned personnel cuts in the wake of the Paris attacks of 2015 and Nice attack of 2016 to meet the demands of the army's high operational tempo. This response marks a historic turning point after years of steady personnel reductions and implies a major recruitment plan: 14,000 new recruits enrolled during 2016 making the army France's leading recruiter.³

The second transition updates equipment the army needs to intervene abroad or to counter a high-end threat. The French Army is significantly renewing its equipment requirements for the fourth time since 1945, intending to replace such vehicles as the *Véhicule de l'avant blindé* (VAB) armored personnel carrier and support vehicle (1976); AMX-10

3 Ibid.

RC wheeled reconnaissance tank (1981); SA 341/SA 342 Gazelle multi-purpose, lightweight utility/attack helicopter (1973); and Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma medium transport/utility helicopter (1968). The new equipment (including 630 VBCI wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, about 20,000 complete *Fantassin à Equipments et Liaisons Intégrés* (FELIN) future infantry soldier equipment systems, 77 CAESAR 155-mm howitzers installed on 6x6 truck chassis, 60 Tiger attack helicopters, and 13 LRU multiple launch rocket systems) was widely used during operations in Africa's Sahel region.⁴ The French Army also intends to improve its drone capabilities by ordering 14 Sagem Patroller unmanned aerial vehicles.

In terms of equipment transitions, the Scorpion program intends to completely modernize the equipment of the French Army's key operating unit, the *groupement tactique interarmes* (GTIA) combined arms tactical group, which is a battalion level task force. All vehicles in the median segment, which is the French Army's hallmark, will be replaced. The army intends to own combat vehicles that can be easily projected onto distant battlefield theaters and can fight in high intensity conflicts. The first phase of the program, scheduled to begin in 2018, consists of delivering the initial 780 of 1,722 Griffon multirole armored personnel carriers that will replace the large fleet of 40 year-old VABs. The initial 110 of 248 Jaguar reconnaissance and combat armored vehicles to replace the AMX-10 RC, among others, are scheduled to be delivered around 2020. Scorpion also includes upgraded versions of the Leclerc main battle tank, with the first deliveries scheduled for 2020.⁵

Under this modernization plan, the French Army expects to deploy its first Scorpion battle group abroad by 2021 and to have a fully equipped Scorpion brigade by 2023.⁶ This renewal fills a critical need because vehicles are suffering from accelerated attrition due to ongoing operations abroad—French VABs average 1,000 kilometers per year in France; per month in Afghanistan; per week in Sahel.⁷ Nevertheless, funding this program through completion proves challenging; of the estimated €7–8 billion needed for the program, only €6 billion have been secured. Even if the mainstream presidential candidates for the 2017 election pledge to increase the defense budget (which was 1.77 percent of the gross domestic product in 2016) by 2 percent, the funding would not be enough to solve all capability gaps, especially if the increase is not realized before 2022.⁸ There is also a risk that the renewal of nuclear deterrence equipment will take away part of France's defense funds at the expense of the army's acquisition budget. Indeed, deterrence funding has been estimated at €6 billion per year by 2025, compared to €3.4 billion per year today.⁹

4 Pierre Chareyron, "Digital Hoplités. Infantry Combat in the Information Age," *Focus stratégique* n°30 bis (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales [IFRI], December 2011).

5 For a good overview of the Scorpion program in English, see Nicholas de Larrinaga, "Enter the Scorpion: French Army Vehicle Fleet Modernization," *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, May 24, 2016.

6 "Armée de Terre, Père des ruptures," TTU, May 3, 2016, <http://www.ttu.fr/armee-de-terre-leru-ruptures/>.

7 Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bossier, chef d'état-major de l'armée de Terre, sur le projet de loi actualisant la programmation militaire pour les années 2015 à 2019 (Assemblée nationale, May 26, 2015).

8 Henry Samuel, "France Must Increase Defence Spending to 2pc of GDP by 2020 Warns Chief of Defense Staff," *Telegraph* (London), December 21, 2016.

9 Institut Montaigne, *Refonder la sécurité nationale* (Paris: Institut Montaigne, 2016), 142.

Tactics: Toward Collaborative Warfare

The upcoming launch of the Scorpion program has triggered interesting debates about the future of land combat, also labeled “digitally-enhanced collaborative warfare.” The underlying challenge here is strategic: the aim is to maintain tactical and operational superiority to counter both irregular actors in expeditionary warfare and state armies. In reality, most of the concepts used to revive the doctrine are not new—for instance, in early 2000, General Guy Hubin tried developing disruptive tactical concepts.¹⁰ But today, the French Army is engaged in a genuine experimental process before welcoming Scorpion’s equipment.

The introduction of the Scorpion command and information system (SICS), a new communications system replacing all the older equipment, creates a network for veterans—a real tactical “game changer.”¹¹ The system facilitates information sharing (with an update of shared information at least every 10 seconds), which enables a collaborative command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); blue force tracking; and enhanced reality, permitting collaborative warfare after 2025. This concept suggests mutual support functions between all ground vehicles will be optimized due to *infovalorization*—disseminating automatic alerts that allow instantaneous response to calls for assistance among other things.¹² In other words, a vehicle detecting aggression can automatically transmit information to friendly forces in the area who can spontaneously direct their detection and firing systems on the target.

These new technologies should enable the army to accelerate the pace of combat since networked units will enhance information sharing and considerably shorten decision cycles. A 2005 RAND Corporation study comparing the attack of an urban area by a nondigitized infantry brigade with a Stryker brigade combat team demonstrated that digitization reduced the delay required for a brigade commander to make a major decision from 24 to 3 hours, thanks to the collaborative work between echelons.¹³ To focus on maneuvering speed and emphasize airmobile combat, French Army tactics also include the possibility of using attack helicopters and drone swarms.¹⁴ The introduction of beyond visual range firing capabilities at the battle group level is another possible tactical breakthrough. Medium-range *missile moyenne portée* (MMP) antitank missiles fired from individual posts or Jaguar strike fighters and Hellfire air-to-surface missiles fired from Tiger attack helicopters could help decompartmentalize the maneuver, contributing to fluidifying it.¹⁵

10 Guy Hubin, *Perspectives tactiques* (Paris: Economica, 2003); and *Les engagements futurs des forces terrestres* (Paris: Armée de Terre, 2010).

11 Nicolas Chaligne, “Le système d’information du combat Scorpion/The Command and Information System (CIS) of Scorpion (SCIS),” *Fantassins magazine* n°36 (June 2016): 48–50, <http://fr.calameo.com/books/000009779038ce32036ba>.

12 Hugues Perot, “L’infovalorisation dans Scorpion/The Scorpion Infovalorization,” *Fantassins magazine*, n°36 (June 2016): 42–46, <http://fr.calameo.com/books/000009779038ce32036ba>.

13 Daniel Gonzales et al., *Network-Centric Operations Case Study: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); and Michel Goya, “Dix ans d’expérience des brigades numérisées Stryker,” *Lettre du Retex-recherche* n°16, Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, May 16, 2014.

14 Armée de Terre, *Action terrestre future: Demain se gagne aujourd’hui* (Paris: Armée de Terre, 2016).

15 Brice Erbland, “Aérocombat et technologies avancées,” *Ultima Ratio* (blog), June 13, 2016, <http://ultimatio-blog.org/archives/7778>.

Agility, however, is needed to conduct swift maneuvers. To obtain agility, or the “continued ability to meet the scalability of a diverse, turbulent and uncertain environment,” the French armed forces must take the following factors into consideration.¹⁶ First, the intellectual capacities to understand the given environment and be imaginative when thinking about tactics are essential.¹⁷ Second, a new information and communication system through networked mode warfare, such as the Scorpion infovalorization, should permit fast reconfiguration of battle order and enable battle group flexibility.

Finally, not only technology but also command culture is key. The French Army has a long tradition of mission-command by objective. To take advantage of new technological advancements, however, the army must encourage more horizontal information exchanges and increasing subsidiarity. This transition will probably prove difficult for the army to undertake. Some small organizational models, particularly within the special forces community, offer us food for thought about the future of subordination.¹⁸ Whether we successfully apply their solutions to larger units, however, remains questionable.

The Challenges of Territorial Defense

Of course, the French armed forces’ priority has always been protecting its national territory, but since 1996, the French Army has devoted most of its attention to Opérations Extérieures—operations abroad. Consequently, 2016 marked the quest for equilibrium between interventions abroad and presence in the national territory.

As far as antiterrorism is concerned, the army has been engaged on national soil since responding to the 1995 Paris subway bombing under the Vigipirate homeland security program. The operational footprint has always been light with approximately 1,000 soldiers mobilized, mainly in Paris, since 2003.¹⁹ Three days after the Île-de-France attacks, a historic turning point occurred: 10,000 soldiers were deployed in the main French cities, which was the beginning of Operation Sentinelle. Although intended as a temporary measure, the deployment was extended after the attacks in Paris and Nice. As of August 2016, the number of deployed soldiers had been reduced to 7,000, half of which operate in and around Paris, and 3,000 soldiers became part of a quick-reaction force.

Since implementing Sentinelle, the distribution of soldiers’ time between foreign and domestic operations has changed tremendously. Before January 2015, a soldier spent 15 percent of his or her time in operations abroad and 5 percent on national soil. Since January 2015, however, the time devoted to operations abroad has not changed and soldiers spend an additional 35–45 percent of their time operating within France. Once the French Army reaches an operational force of

16 “Action terrestre future.”

17 Rémy Hémez, “Tactics Mandatory Imagination in #Leadership,” *The Strategy Bridge*, April 1, 2016. <http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the-bridge/2016/4/1/tactics-mandatory-imagination-in-leadership>.

18 Stanley McChrystal, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (New York: Portfolio / Penguin, 2015).

19 Elie Tenenbaum, *La sentinelle égarée? L’armée de Terre face au terrorisme*, Focus stratégique n°68 (Paris: IFRI, June 2016).

77,000 soldiers in 2018, soldiers will dedicate no more than 20 to 25 percent of their time to domestic operations.²⁰

The Ministry of Defense report on the use of armed forces on national soil presented before the Parliament in March 2016 suggests the logic of projection on the national territory should be replaced by a persistent “land protection posture” concept.²¹ The French public supports this shift with 87 percent of the population having a positive opinion of the army and 77 percent supporting Sentinelle.²² In early 2017, soldiers were also praised for their swift and effective response in two major attacks against them: one at the Louvre museum in February and one at the Orly airport in March.²³ Even so, experts continue to doubt the *modus operandi*: the current legal framework limits responses to self-defense and does not allow soldiers to conduct intelligence missions, make arrests, or engage in kinetic counterterrorism operations on national soil.²⁴

Although Sentinelle predominantly entailed static guarding of sensitive sites between January and April 2015, all current missions are dynamic, with groups of soldiers patrolling the streets. Despite these factors, the debate about how to use armed forces on national soil remains heated, which is unusual for defense-related matters in France.²⁵ The operation is demanding for French soldiers; for example, some of them patrol 20 to 25 kilometers a day on foot.²⁶ Also, 50 percent of the operating force spends more than 150 days a year from their home to conduct Sentinelle and external operations; some soldiers even work 220 days.²⁷ This high level of engagement in homeland operations also affects the training cycle, which was the first variable reduced to meet requirements. On average, only 65 days were dedicated to operational training in 2015 and 70 to 75 days in 2016, compared to a goal of 90 days when personnel requirements are met. The impact of training deficiencies is somewhat offset by operations abroad, but the negative effect on readiness should not be ignored, especially in high-intensity conflicts.

Another way to alleviate pressure imposed on French troops is to use available reserve forces. Hence, France must consider increasing operational reserves from 16,496 members in 2016 to 24,334 members by 2019.²⁸ Rapid mobilization of these soldiers is not straightforward as a

20 *Audition du général Arnaud Sainte-Claire Deville, commandant les forces terrestres* (Assemblée nationale, November 17, 2015).

21 Ministère de la défense, *Rapport au Parlement relatif aux conditions d'emploi des forces armées sur le territoire national* (Paris: La Délégation à l'information et à la communication de la défense [DICoD], March 2016).

22 “Les chiffres clés des sondages de la défense,” Ministère de la défense, July 7, 2016, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/mediatheque/publications/les-chiffres-cles-de-sondages-de-la-defense-juillet-2016>.

23 Lizzie Dearden and Caroline Mortimer, “Le Louvre Terror Attack: Man Shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ Shot after Trying to Kill French Soldier with a Machete,” *Independent* (London), February 3, 2017; and David Chazan, “Radicalised Muslim Known to Security Agencies Shot Dead in Attack at Paris Airport – As Security Stepped Up at Stadium Where Duke and Duchess Watch Rugby,” *Telegraph* (London), March 18, 2017.

24 Tenenbaum, *La sentinelle égarée?*

25 Florent de Saint-Victor, “Débat stratégique français et opération Sentinelle—Quand la France est capable de débattre,” *Mars Attaque* (blog), September 1, 2016, <http://mars-attaque.blogspot.com/2016/09/debat-strategique-sentinelle-france-operations-territoire-national.html>.

26 *Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bossier, chef d'état-major de l'armée de Terre, sur le projet de loi de finance pour 2016* (Assemblée nationale, October 13, 2015).

27 *Audition du général Jean-Pierre Bossier, chef d'état-major de l'armée de Terre, sur le projet de loi de finance pour 2017* (Assemblée nationale, October 11, 2016).

28 *Refonder la sécurité nationale*, 118.

30-day notice period is currently required. This issue is far more complex regarding the secondary level reserve, which represents a significant capacity of at least 20,000 soldiers available to the army alone.²⁹

The secondary level reserve comprises soldiers who left the army in the past 5 years that can be recalled under a prime minister's decree. Although this disposal has never been evaluated on a large scale, it was tested in March 2016 when 46 percent of 3,600 veterans within two brigades responded positively to the call.³⁰ In fact, since the French Army's professionalization in 1996, administrative monitoring for secondary level reservists has been inconsistent. Concerns have also been raised regarding the lack of equipment available for reservists. To revive the operational reserves, France recreated a national guard in October 2016—which, unlike its American counterpart, primarily designates coordination authority. The aim is to constitute a force of 84,000 soldiers by regrouping police, gendarmerie, and reserves before 2018. Most importantly, incentives—mostly financial—have been introduced to attract interest and to accelerate recruitment in the reserves. The 2017 presidential elections also initiated a public debate regarding the reactivation of conscription in France that, if implemented by the future president, will drastically change the French Army model.

Hence, Sentinelle has largely defined the evolution of the French Army's new operational equilibrium between homeland and foreign operations, which will clearly have long-term effects and most certainly remain a controversial issue. The impact this strategic balance will have on foreign interventions is difficult to assess, but it could affect the French Army's operational readiness for high-end scenarios and hamper its ability to react swiftly to a strategic surprise.

Toward a New Model of Intervention

Despite the renewed commitment to homeland operations, the French Army remains heavily engaged abroad. Since September 2014, French troops have been engaged in Operation Chammal in Iraq and Syria to support operations against the Islamic State. In 2015, half of army personnel spent more than 200 days in operations with intense and continual activity. As of March 2017, 10,000 French soldiers are deployed outside France, mostly to counter terrorist threats, and 1,120 strikes have been conducted against the Islamic State, which represents about 8 percent of coalition strikes, the third largest contribution.

France also has three task forces dedicated to the training and mentoring mission of Chammal in Iraq. The first one is embedded inside the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service. The second task force, about 100 soldiers, is embedded inside Iraq's 6th Infantry Division, headquartered near Abu Ghraib. Finally, Task Force Wagram, comprising four CAESAR guns, has been dispatched to Iraq since summer 2016.

Operation Barkhane remains France's prime military deployment and strategic priority. This operation began in August 2014 after the end of Operation Serval (2013–14), a joint combat operation with Malian

²⁹ *Audition du général Arnaud Sainte-Claire Deville, commandant les forces terrestres* (Assemblée nationale, November 17, 2015).

³⁰ Ministère de la défense, *Exercice Vortex 2016, la réserve rappelle ses anciens* (Paris : Ministère de la défense, May 15, 2016).

government forces aimed at protecting the capital city of Bamako and retrieving militant held territory.³¹ Operation Barkhane partly reorganized French military forces that were already present in West Africa. As of March 2017, the French are deploying 3,500 personnel throughout five countries in the Sahel region: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Due to its high level of engagement, France has been forced to curtail other nonpriority operations such as Sangaris in the Central African Republic (December 2013–October 2016). France also maintains forward presence forces of up to 3,800 personnel conducting long-term military assistance and training missions in allied countries such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Djibouti, and the United Arab Emirates.

To cope with the high rate of external deployment and the demand for homeland security operations, France is to a certain extent looking to reform its intervention model by reducing operational durations. Since the war in Mali and Operation Sangaris, Paris has promoted the concept of “bridging operations.”³² The aim of such transitional operations is to stabilize a situation until other forces can take over the mission. According to this concept, a limited but decisive volume of force is used during the intervention phase to work towards the rapid deployment of United Nations forces and to transfer the authority to a multinational body.

The will to reduce the length of commitments abroad is largely driven by the fact that the size of the French Army has been drastically reduced since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, according to its operational contract, France should only deploy 15,000 soldiers to a main theater, and 7,000–8,000 soldiers to a secondary theater, for up to six months; however, an average of 7,500 troops have been deployed in overseas operations since 2008, not counting those operating in France under Operation Sentinelle since January 2015.

These harsh matériel and human constraints are coupled with a strong desire to not engage in lengthy stabilization missions, as experienced in Afghanistan. This perception is particularly true in a context where operations involving French soldiers are cumulative and rarely last less than 13 years. Operation Serval only lasted 18 months, but was continued as Operation Barkhane. Operation Pamir in Afghanistan lasted 13 years (2001–14) as did Operation Licorne in the Ivory Coast (2002–15). Moreover, this bridging model is far from an ideal solution: first, it is always difficult to transform tactical success into strategic effects, and second, United Nations forces are not always efficient.

Faced with major changes in its strategic environment, France must “renew the approach of military commitments” as mentioned in the army strategic vision.³³ The era of external operations that began in the 1970s when the French Army sought efficiency by undertaking quick military action at a low cost is questioned.³⁴ This “techno-professional

31 For a good analysis of this operation in English, see Christopher S. Chivvis, *The French War on Al Qaeda in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

32 Rémy Hémez and Aline Leboeuf, Retours sur Sangaris, *Entre stabilisation et protection des populations*, Focus stratégique n°67 (Paris: IFRI, April 2016).

33 “Action terrestre future,” 15.

34 Michel Goya, “Les opérations extérieures,” in *L’action militaire terrestre de A à Z*, ed. Didier Danet, Ronan Doaré, and Christian Malis (Paris: Economica, 2015), 372–79.

compact Army” model is further challenged by four factors.³⁵ First, victory still requires the continued presence of forces on the ground. Second, the average level of the median threat is rising. Third, the risk of state-to-state conflict is reemerging. And fourth, the army is engaged afresh in France to protect the homeland.

Conclusion

The French Army is engaged in an extremely critical modernization process that includes Scorpion vehicles and information systems, which will renew the French battle groups’ equipment. Though, most important, the French Army is also beginning to encourage a revival of military thinking to adapt the doctrine and tactics for disrupted environments and the new equipment to maintain a tactical and operational edge in a changing strategic environment.

Tensions fostered by the deployment of 7,500 to 10,000 soldiers on the national territory following multiple terrorist attacks have triggered a quest for a new equilibrium between commitments abroad and homeland operations. As far as Europe is concerned, the necessity is specific to France, the only country to have so many troops deployed abroad. Germany has only 2,500 soldiers committed to interventions: that is 60 percent less than France. Even if some European countries, such as Belgium and Italy, have deployed soldiers in the streets of their cities to respond to terrorists threats, the size and duration of the French Army’s commitment to homeland security operations is exceptional. The French Army’s increased operational force from 66,000 to 77,000 soldiers is an answer, but will not be enough latitude for strategic response.

The revival of France’s reserve force will be a key factor in determining the nation’s ability to maintain balance between foreign and domestic operations and should be considered as the means to reconnect with the continental operational legacy of French strategic culture. Besides, it is no coincidence that mass—the “ability to generate and maintain sufficient strength ratio to produce strategic decision effects in the long term”—is coming back into the French Army’s gray literature. The return is necessary due to “demographic expansion in Europe’s southern flank,” “the proliferation of mega-cities,” and the importance of having a robust force when conventional deterrence is considered.”³⁶ The need for mass also highlights the problems raised by military resurgence and emphasizes, among other things, the requirement for a high rate of supervision within the orders to cope with the 118,000 soldiers and policemen that could be recalled under the second tier reserve principle.³⁷

With 77,000 soldiers in the operational force and the reforms carried out as part of *Au contact*, the French model is still viable even if the equilibrium between homeland operations and territorial operations continues. Moreover, because this equilibrium is driven by a political inclination to make the French feel safer and retain French status in the international system, reforms will prove difficult without a major shift

35 Christian Malis quoted in “Action terrestre future,” 15.

36 *Ibid.*, 37–40.

37 Guillaume Garnier, *Les chausse-trapes de la remontée en puissance*, Focus stratégique n°52 (Paris: IFRI, May 2014).

in the global security environment. It is worth noting, however, that this model will remain in tension and may have trouble reacting to a major shift in the strategic environment. It is difficult to always ask for more financial resources, especially in a country with budgetary problems, but as General Pierre de Villiers, the French chief of defense staff said: “The price of peace is the war effort.”³⁸

³⁸ General Pierre de Villiers, “Le prix de la paix c’est l’effort de guerre,” *Les Echos*, December 20, 2016.

Torture and the Human Mind

Larry D. Miller

For the United States government to authorize the infliction of severe physical and emotional distress as a means of extracting information from detainees, the situation must be grave and the need for intelligence extreme. Whether understood as “enhanced interrogation” or “torture,” the process requires stepping outside the bounds of normal interrogation conduct. Evaluating the efficacy of enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT), therefore, is vital to the decision-making process as the consequences of a failed program of interrogation could be severe. Two recent books address the question of effectiveness by exploring enhanced interrogation as a way to achieve an end: *Enhanced Interrogation* by James E. Mitchell and *Why Torture Doesn't Work* by Shane O'Mara.

Considered separately, the two works appear to be in contrast with each other. Mitchell argues from personal experience that enhanced interrogation can be an effective method for extracting information, but only if undertaken with exacting care. O'Mara, on the other hand, argues from neuroscientific and biomedical evidence that torture is counterproductive to mission success. A careful read of each book in turn, however, illustrates the fine line between success and failure and demonstrates that, although sometimes credited with successful outcomes, torture techniques are far more likely to fail than to succeed and authorizing them may create more difficulties and roadblocks than desired.

Enhanced Interrogation details the author's insider account of the development and execution of “enhanced interrogation” techniques within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Efforts to enhance interrogation were initiated early in 2002 in response to the 9/11 attacks. Enhancement adds coercive elements to conventional interrogation. Conventional interrogation operates from a “traditional rapport-based law enforcement approach,” excludes coercive manipulations, and maximizes social influence tactics in an effort to elicit information from reluctant informants (43). Army Field Manual 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, details approved techniques for interrogating prisoners and detainees. One might tersely summarize the field manual's guidance as: “talk, but don't threaten and don't hit.”


According to Mitchell, once EITs were defined and approved by appropriate agencies and authorities, they were employed on high-value detainees believed to harbor intelligence essential to US national security (51). Enhanced interrogation increases physical and mental stress through an array of manipulations, sensory deprivations, and progressively harsher treatment, to include life-threatening, but

Books Reviewed

Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America
By James E. Mitchell, PhD, with Bill Harlow

Why Torture Doesn't Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation
By Shane O'Mara

Dr. Larry D. Miller is professor of communicative arts in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He is a graduate of the University of Michigan and the US Army War College.



James E. Mitchell, PhD, with Bill Harlow, *Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America* (New York: Crown Forum, 2016), 400 pages, \$28.00

non-lethal force under monitored conditions in highly restrictive environments. The purpose is straightforward: create sufficient mental and physical distress to prompt a detainee to reveal what he or she knows. The enhancement increases distress, induces fear, and maximizes discomfort with hard-case, high-value detainees until they are willing to talk. Once they start talking, the interrogator opts for conventional social influence approaches.

Mitchell, a clinical psychologist, is exceptionally knowledgeable and highly experienced with EITs. Prior to being recruited by the CIA, he was an Air Force officer and an operational psychologist with experience in hostage negotiation and considerable expertise in preparing military personnel risking capture during critical missions (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape [SERE] training). Mitchell quickly became a leading figure within a relatively small cadre of interrogators responsible for both crafting enhancement techniques and establishing protocol at secret locations known as “black sites.” He was a CIA contract interrogator from August 2002 until the program ended in January 2009.²

In this book, Mitchell proffers an explanation, critique, and, in good measure, a defense of EITs and his CIA work. Mitchell believes he has been “the target of rumor and innuendo” for over a decade and until recently was relegated to silence by a “nondisclosure agreement with the US government.”³ He argues the official Senate report on CIA torture is incomplete, inaccurate, and, at best, one-sided (3, 5).⁴

Mitchell tells his side of the story in a direct, first-person, narrative style that is somewhat earthy at times. In 12 chapters, he explains how he was recruited by the CIA, why he was recruited, what he did, to whom and how he did it, what he observed, and his perspective on how his advice and council were received. He argues his views were sometimes ignored, overlooked, or dismissed by on-site authorities who took inappropriate liberties in applying unapproved EITs and/or ignoring safeguard protocols.

Mitchell enumerates 10 approved EITs employed at CIA black sites, noting the CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Program “. . . used only the

1 Mitchell’s primary colleague was Bruce Jessen, a former Air Force colleague and a contract CIA operational psychologist.

2 Barack Obama, “Executive Order 13491—Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” January 23, 2009, linked from The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85669> (accessed January 22, 2017).

3 Mitchell and colleague Bruce Jessen have been charged in federal court with violation(s) of the Alien Tort Statute which allows foreign nationals to seek remedies in US courts for human rights violations committee outside the United States. A trial to adjudicate a suit initiated by three plaintiffs is slated for June 2017.

4 For the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, see *Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2014). The full report contains three documents: primary findings and conclusions, additional views, and minority views.


EITs that were cleared by the Department of Justice, approved by [President Bush], briefed to congressional leadership, and authorized by CIA headquarters” (51, 287). Cleared EITs included: attention grasp, walling, facial hold, insult slap, cramped confinement with or without insects, stress positions, wall standing, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding (52–53). Two additional EITs, “manhandling” and “smoking” were not recommended. Manhandling involves violently shaking a detainee using a towel “rolled up and placed like a cervical collar around the neck.” Smoking involves blowing smoke in the detainee’s face until a state of nausea is attained (54).

On balance, Mitchell advances an informative and concerning read anchored by three considerations. First, following 9/11 “getting rough” with high-value detainees (i.e., captives believed to possess needed intelligence) was essential to national security. Second, enhanced interrogation is inherently unpleasant for everyone except possibly those inclined toward excess and misconduct when given a free hand. Third, opportunities for misstep and error in judgment at black site operations are substantial as national security interests can quickly preempt and overwhelm American values.

Mitchell incorporates ample specifics detailing numerous interrogations while unpacking an enduring narrative of his experience with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, the fluent English-speaking terrorist who, along with Osama bin Laden, is believed to be “the principal architect” behind the 9/11 attacks.⁵ Mitchell’s initial encounter with Mukhtar, the title KSM preferred (which translates to “the brain” in English), revealed a short, pot-bellied, naked, angry man with shaved head and beard and “hands and feet shackled” (7).

In chapter six, “KSM: From Confrontation to Compliance,” Mitchell describes how he and Bruce Jessen systematically applied EITs to overcome resistance gradually by a very tough, psychologically resilient, hard-core jihadist who was “highly skilled at protecting information” (150). According to Mitchell, the Spartanesque black site environs involved shackles and chaining, assorted sensory deprivations including hooding, guards dressed in black head to toe behind fully covered faces, walling, around-the-clock interrogation, and waterboarding which, somewhat surprisingly, proved rather ineffective with KSM. Resistance was finally “. . . overcome [through] a combination of walling and sleep deprivation” (149).

Administering EITs, Mitchell believes, requires a careful balance of classical (Pavlovian) and avoidance conditioning. Generally, following any evidence of willingness to comply, Mitchell says he and



Shane O'Mara, *Why Torture Doesn't Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 336 pages, \$29.95

⁵ KSM, detained at Guantanamo Bay, received a degree in mechanical engineering from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 1986. He beheaded *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002. See Marc A. Thiessen, “A Horrifying Look into the Mind of 9/11’s Mastermind, in His Own Words,” *Washington Post*, November 28, 2016.

Jessen shifted from EITs to conventional interrogation techniques, only returning to enhancement should cooperation diminish. The key to loosening the tongue, Mitchell intimates, derives from the interrogator's ability to identify when the detainee is lying or misdirecting and initiating enhancement at precisely the right time. Doing so usually produced results within 72 hours. From Mitchell's perspective, success is not due merely to distress, pain, or discomfort, but in good measure is a function of perceptive judgment resulting from careful observation and extensive familiarity with the detainee's behavior, mannerisms, response patterns, preferences, and rapport with the interrogator, however marginal. Interrogation of KSM reportedly produced information that helped disrupt five terrorist plots and was critical to locating Osama bin Laden. Mitchell maintains the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report claiming the CIA's interrogation program "produced nothing with intelligence value" is ludicrous and views to the contrary were largely ignored by the media (4, 164).

Mitchell acknowledges having used EITs with five high-value detainees. He was also, at times, associated with additional applications and other detainees, and he observed other interrogators at work (201). Peppered throughout the book are statements and comments that EITs were sometimes applied inappropriately, too vigorously, and/or excessively by individuals whose desire to acquire information was compromised by unnecessary displays of authority, mistreatment of detainees for no identifiable or specific reason, and sometimes as an unrestrained desire to exact revenge for violence perpetrated against American citizens and/or uniformed personnel. Mitchell claims, when he expressed concern that cooperating detainees were being handled roughly and inappropriately by guards, he was told by his superiors to "mind his own . . . business" (103).

Mitchell's objections to the application of unauthorized and excessively coercive techniques resulted in his exclusion from interrogation rooms at some black sites. He describes witnessing a variety of unapproved coercive techniques (115). The "abusive drift" he observed early in the CIA program came under scrutiny following the fiasco at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Problems with the Army's management of the facility prompted a concerted review of US personnel practices and eventually resulted in the termination of EITs within the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Mitchell maintains that EITs, when expertly executed, remain effective tools for extracting intelligence from hard-core, high-value detainees. Based on his experience and observations, he believes walling and sleep deprivation to be the most effective techniques (237).

In *Why Torture Doesn't Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation*, O'Mara advances a strikingly contrasting assessment regarding the efficacy of interrogation as a method for extracting information from unwilling informants. While Mitchell offers an intensely personal "hands-on" exposé of his experiences as an interrogator, O'Mara examines, critiques, and integrates a comprehensive body of biomedical research literature documenting the impact of coercive interrogation methods on the brain's ability to regulate "expression of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors" (3). Mitchell explains to the reading public what happens at black sites and how EITs work. O'Mara's goal is different

than Mitchell's goal. He hopes to stimulate "colleagues in neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to become more deeply involved in [what are important] public policy issues" (5).

O'Mara, a dedicated experimental neuroscientist, examines how the human brain functions in response to extreme physiological and mental stressors commonly employed to enhance information extraction from unwilling informants. In his view, the term "enhanced interrogation" is a euphemistic mask for the infliction of severe and sustained stressors, anxiety, fear, and pain such that fundamentally torturous acts are rendered more socially acceptable within the body politic. O'Mara maintains the evidentiary basis for torture lacks credibility in biomedical literature. Moreover, enthusiasm for torture generally, and EITs specifically, is largely the product of an "ad hoc mixture of anecdotal, cherry-picked stories," convincing counterfactual fabrications, and fanciful projections by contemporary screenwriters and production houses (2, 6).

In short, O'Mara argues there is no evidence information stored in the memory systems of detained persons is rendered accessible through EIT protocols. What is more likely is the "profound and extreme stressors [associated with EITs and other forms of torture] cause widespread and enduring alterations to the very fabric of the brain . . . upon which memory depends" (8). His fundamental question: Is there verifiable evidence enhanced interrogation techniques ". . . actually enhance the outcomes of interrogation" (15)?

Why Torture Doesn't Work, organized into eight well-crafted chapters, integrates and summarizes an extensive body of peer-reviewed biomedical literature, including nearly 250 studies. Although the primary targeted readership is the professional biomedical community, the text is accessible to the reading public. Technical and scientific terminology, while somewhat common, is readily clarified by brief explanations and parenthetical commentary.

The initial chapter, "Torture in Modern Times," succinctly details how modern democracies have used torture in pursuit of democratic ends. The records of the French, the English, and Americans, among others, are briefly noted. The primary focus, however, is on decision-making, standards of evidence, and arguments advanced as justification for state-sanctioned "rough handling" as a necessary aid to intelligence gathering. Chapters two and three focus respectively on the relationship between human memory and executive function, including the ability to recall, memory inconsistencies, lapses in eyewitness testimony, and the utility of technologies, such as brain imaging and truth serums, in detecting lying and deception. Chapter four reviews how stress and pain impact brain functioning. Evidence shows chronic severe stressors impair psychological functioning with deleterious effects on both memory and recall whether stress derives from drilling an unanaesthetized tooth (not a sanctioned EIT), physical restraint, claustrophobic confinement (with or without insects), social isolation, sensory deprivation, or a persistent foreboding something very bad, painful, and unknown is about to occur.

Chapter five examines the impact of sleep deprivation on the human brain and information processing ability. Sleep deprivation produces cognitive deficits, diminished verbal fluency and capacity to think,

hallucinations, and impaired motor performance. Somewhat surprisingly, it can also induce amnesia (163). Consequently, using sleep deprivation to enhance memory and recall may be counterproductive. O'Mara is clear: "Sleep deprivation is . . . not a tool that should be used under any circumstances [if] access to ongoing memory function in detainees is required" (167).

Chapter six explores how "manipulating the fundamental metabolic physiology of the body" through near drowning (waterboarding), extreme temperature reduction (lowering core body temperature), applying excessive heat (enhancing thirst), and dietary restrictions (reduced caloric intake) impact the brain's ability to function, process information, and recover memories. Metabolic enhancements are commonly known as "white torture" because they leave no visible marks (172). Compromising essential metabolic functions has a deep record of use in human history as the techniques are easy, inexpensive, and remarkably effective in producing fright, discomfort, and pain. What is patently lacking in the literature, however, is verifiable or even suggestive evidence that metabolic assaults on the body and the brain effectively prompt a willingness to disclose harbored intelligence.

Chapter seven addresses two important questions: Why do people torture, and what impact, if any, does torturing a person have on those who actually do it? The research literature is consistent and closely aligned with the outcomes of the famous 1960s Milgram experiments on obedience to authority. Human beings, all human beings, ". . . have a propensity to obey authority under the right circumstances" especially so when the context is inflamed by high levels of anger (209, 211). Many individuals, although not all, who impose extreme stressors on other human beings, even when the acts are authorized and sanctioned by the state, become troubled in ways that negatively impact their brain function, especially with regard to emotional stability, psychological health, and long-term decision-making. Jennifer S. Bryson, who interrogated detainees at Guantanamo observed "[e]ngaging in torture damages the torturer" because the dehumanization process is self-corrupting (222). Mitchell himself acknowledged the ". . . techniques are so harsh that it's emotionally distressing to the people who are administering them" (206).

In the final chapter, O'Mara makes his pitch: interrogation and talking sans coercion is a viable method with a high, albeit imperfect, likelihood of extracting useful intelligence from initially reluctant detainees. Terrorists, while reprehensible, are not generally crazy. Rather, most are highly dangerous rational actors who are prepared to kill and to be killed in the service of their cause (243). Accessing information and memories from these individuals using only language and enhanced social skills requires time and exceptional psychological and communicative insight. Regrettably, the methods will not work in every instance.

O'Mara acknowledges the extreme challenges inherent in interrogation when working with hostile detained populations. Simply put, harsh practices do not work well as useful intelligence-gathering enhancements. Fresh options are needed. His recommendations are numerous and include: study and refinement of humane interrogation practices, radical alternative approaches such as virtual reality-based

interrogation, and exploring narrative and role-playing reversals, among others.

O'Mara concludes that gathering intelligence through interrogation is an essential, critical competency in the modern world. Current initiatives and practices, however, have not been impressively productive as they are rooted in the whims of policymakers and the tactical methods of poorly prepared interrogators. What is needed is a solid evidence-based approach that establishes what works and what does not work—and most importantly, that is fully grounded in humane, appropriately legal, moral, and ethical interrogation practices (270).

Significance

On balance, “enhanced interrogation” as characterized by Mitchell is not meaningfully different from “torture” as characterized by O'Mara. Their respective experiences, backgrounds, and intents, however, for taking pen to paper are starkly different. Mitchell seeks to tell his story, justifying limited, specific use of torture by those with unequalled expertise; O'Mara seeks to marshal evidence with the potential to impact policy, eschewing torture as psychologically and physiologically ineffective. Both authors agree security considerations require extracting information from hostile and reluctant informants, and interrogation is a viable way through which to accomplish that end. Thus, despite general concurrence on ends and ways, independent readings suggest they maintain minimal agreement with regard to means.

Mitchell believes enhanced interrogation when properly applied works, despite associated problems acknowledged throughout his book. O'Mara views the application of coercion as counterproductive and antithetical to sane policy for responsible and sustainable intelligence gathering. Their points of clear agreement are two. First, both Mitchell and O'Mara acknowledge coercive interrogation negatively impacts the emotional stability and well-being, not only of the subjects in question, but also of the interrogators themselves—not a desirable outcome. Second, and much more subtle, both authors recognize acquiring useful intelligence is intimately aligned with the interrogator's ability to build and maintain a relationship with the detainee.

O'Mara demonstrates convincingly the relationship between detainees and interrogators is absolutely key to “. . . any process by which information, memories, and the like are to be recovered from suspects” (259). Mitchell agrees, contending enhancements alone do not produce useful intelligence, but rather only work when the interrogator is intimately familiar with the individual detainee through observation, sustained dialogue, and comprehensive study. Thus, he argues that although torture may be an effective tool in limited circumstances, it cannot be utilized in isolation as human connection is an essential component of any effective information-gathering campaign.

In sum, the two writers—worlds apart in terms of experience, investigative orientation, and mission—achieve an element of convergence with regard to the use of enhanced interrogation as a programmatic response to threats. Mitchell contends enhancement in the hands of an exceptional interrogator can produce results and, in so arguing, suggests his own exceptionalism. Absent his (or another's)

exacting expertise, enhanced interrogation becomes torture without results. O'Mara argues exceptionalism should never dictate policy, but rather policy should be based on solid, verifiable evidence. In effect, Mitchell's position that absent his (or another's) exacting expertise, enhanced interrogation becomes torture without results advances O'Mara's case against embracing enhanced interrogation at the policy level. Taken together, *Enhanced Interrogation* and *Why Torture Doesn't Work* provide thoughtful and compelling insights into where we have been as a nation and how we can move forward as the leader of the free world during challenging times.

Commentaries and Replies

On “The Army’s Identity Crisis”

Conrad C. Crane

This commentary responds to Gates Brown’s article “The Army’s Identity Crisis” published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 4).

Although it recognizes the difficulty of predicting the location and timing of the next war, the Army has tried to prepare for certain types. Historically, the choices have been between the most dangerous, generally a full-blown conventional war against a near-peer, or the most likely, a lower scale conflict such as counterinsurgency. Some have argued all other types of war or contingencies are just subsets of the first category, a misconception that has had significant consequences from Baghdad to Bosnia, and from Haiti to Helmand. Dr. Gates Brown has introduced a new twist, arguing that in the current environment, the most dangerous scenario of full-scale combined arms warfare against a near-peer competitor is also the most likely, and the Army should train and structure itself accordingly.

He supports that claim by stating that Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, defines the Army’s main threats as a nonstate actor with weapons of mass destruction that would best be handled by special operations forces, or a nuclear capable nation-state partnered with nonstate actors. In fact, the doctrine just calls those “the most challenging potential enemy,” a variation on the most dangerous argument, and states, “The most likely security threats that Army forces will encounter are best described as hybrid threats” (4). The passage goes on to explain that such enemies might resort to high-end capabilities of conventional state conflict or protracted war with irregular proxies, and the Army must be prepared to deal with all aspects of such a threat spectrum, including protecting populations.

Without doctrinal justification, the most effective argument Brown has left to make is that instead of risking an incoherent approach while trying to develop a force capable of both counterinsurgency and maneuver warfare against a near-peer, the Army would be better off focusing its mission, acquisitions, and training on what he terms the “most direct threat to the nation,” which is a high-intensity conflict, and accepting increased risk for other levels of conflict or operations. That is a return to the traditional debate. His position ignores the implications of hybrid threats, and the fact that both Chinese and Russian doctrine writings emphasize the utility of what have been called gray-zone conflicts that avoid the level of high intensity or full blown conventional war.

His approach makes some sense for systems acquisition, as high-intensity conflict is the most technologically dependent. Training is another matter. The Army did see degradation of some conventional

combat skills over the last decade, most notably in large-scale fire and maneuver, but has been working diligently to restore them. I have heard the noted defense analyst Stephen Biddle advocate for an “Army of Mediocrity.” That is not a very attractive bumper sticker, but his point is the force can be given some preparation for a wide variety of missions and then trained-up for specific deployments. That seems a very sensible approach in an uncertain world where the Army cannot choose the missions political leaders will assign.

Arguing in Congress for just the capabilities to conduct a high-intensity conventional war risks making the Army a marginal consideration for policymakers who want, and need, a much wider array of options. Brown is correct that the size of the force will not allow large-scale specialization and that future conflicts might not allow much training time. But, there is no guarantee that such requirements will always be for high-tech conventional war. I am confident that a force no longer committed to the war in Iraq can maintain high enough readiness to respond to any contingency short of the “big one.” If the worst happens, the nation will need time to mobilize more forces anyway, and limitations in strategic lift will always cause deployment delays from CONUS bases. It is also incorrect to define any sort of conflict as more complex or difficult than another. One of my regrets about my work with Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2006 was putting in the quote that counterinsurgency was the “graduate level of war.” All war is at the graduate level, it is just the final exams that are different.

In his article, Brown highlights the superb melding of missions, training, and acquisitions that produced the AirLand Battle army that performed so well in Operation Desert Storm. But, they never did fight the chosen enemy and were lucky instead to go up against a poor and battered Soviet clone. One of the reasons Future Combat Systems failed—along with other programs of the 1990s like Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below and the Army After Next—is they continued to follow the same high-tech, high-intensity developmental trajectory instead of realizing the world and its threats were changing, with dire consequences in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Author Replies

Gates Brown

Dr. Crane rightly calls attention to the problematic nature of forecasting future conflicts. No one knows the probability of a major war occurring. But that reality does not mean it is impossible to discern an emphasis for crafting our national defense or that we should assume risks where there is a possibility of rapid catastrophic defeat.

In my article, I outlined the most dangerous threat to the nation, a conflict with near-peer competitors such as Russia or China who have interests that in some ways counter those of the United States. Identifying these states as the most likely near-peer competitors, however, is not the same as calling them the most likely threats. The current threat, our adversaries’ combination of conventional and unconventional forces

into a hybrid approach to warfare, effectively mitigates the advantages of the United States in terms of policy as well as force structure.

To understand this trend, it is important to put it into a broader context. Hybrid tactics are a reaction to US dominance in conventional maneuver warfare. Due to the need to maintain a low profile, hybrid conflicts have had a protracted nature; limited involvement, in turn, gives rise to smaller political objectives. Neither of these characteristics affects the threat. Thus, the critical fact Crane overlooks is that by maintaining our capability in high-intensity maneuver warfare, US adversaries are forced to operate in the gray zone.

Likewise, if the United States focused on a lighter force to combat hybrid wars, our opponents would soon shift to tactics that mitigate that approach. Focusing US force structure on maneuver warfare, therefore, provides the capability to counter hybrid wars while preserving high-end conventional maneuver forces necessary for bolstering and supporting allied forces as well as countering hybrid aggression.

Hybrid wars, generally, require geographic proximity to the aggressor state, Russia borders Ukraine, North Vietnam bordered South Vietnam. A force fielded to fight maneuver warfare would be able to aid allied nations to contain hybrid conflicts while maintaining the deterrence to major combat operations. While it is true the forces fielded to support AirLand Battle never fought the intended enemy, their capability forced potential adversaries to wage limited wars for limited aims. The consequences of Iraq and Afghanistan were a product of flawed strategy. The Army has to assume risk and the best place to do that is with limited conflicts.

On “Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar”

John A. Bonin

This commentary responds to Brian McAllister Linn’s book review on Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 4).

As an author of two chapters in the book, and a co-organizer of the US Army War College conference that generated this volume, I am uniquely positioned to respond to Brian Linn’s recent review of *Drawdown*. This is especially true since his critique about the lack of policy guidance and implications in the text seemingly overlooked the stated purpose of the book—to contribute to the dialogue on American military “drawdowns.” That dialogue “lacks a proper historical perspective.” An historical baseline for drawing down forces and force structures is essential to making informed decisions of the kind Linn seeks.

Over the course of my nearly 50 years of government service, I have repeatedly encountered the lack of historical perspective in critical decisions, particularly during the periods between conflicts. Our authors provide some unique insights into America’s history of drawdowns. Organized chronologically, the chapters establish both context and relevance over some 500 years that can inform specific policy prescriptions. This edited volume is no less coherent in its themes than any edited military history volume of similar scope. Establishing a tight relationship between early American history and those issues surrounding the all-volunteer force of the current day is useless and ahistorical.

Beginning in the colonial era, sure patterns developed in American history, which makes the text’s early focus relevant and necessary to the overall thrust of the volume. These patterns include the underfunding of military structure for short-term savings at the expense of longer-term efficiencies. They emerged as a result of the “Liberty Dilemma”—the uneasy relationship between the fear and the expense of standing armies and the desire for safety that still affects drawdowns today. It goes beyond the single aspect of “demobilization” that Linn highlights as applying only to a portion of drawdowns, particularly of those involving mass armies.

Finally, Linn criticizes *Drawdown* for being too focused on battle and operations; yet, considering aspects of drawdowns in a vacuum without the reality of the influence of these on future successes or failures in war is irrelevant. Understanding the trends mentioned above will better position contemporary decision-makers to grapple with current challenges.

The Author Replies

Brian McAllister Linn

The author declined the opportunity to respond.

A DIALOGUE ON STRATEGY

On Strategy as Ends, Ways, and Means

Gregory D. Miller, Chris Rogers, Francis J. H. Park,
William F. Owen, and Jeffrey W. Meiser

ABSTRACT: This dialogue regarding teaching, understanding, and practicing strategy stems from Jeffrey W. Meiser's article "Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy" published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of *Parameters* (vol. 46, no. 4).

The Value of a Model. Gregory D. Miller and Chris Rogers

Like Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser, we are frustrated by the formulaic ends, ways, and means model commonly equated with strategy. We acknowledge the handicap created by the lack of a common definition of strategy, and recognize the need for one that does not exclusively rely on a formula but also effectively incorporates the interests and decisions of other actors—allies, adversaries, and neutral states alike. Yet, we were profoundly disappointed in Meiser's criticism, which appeared to diminish not only the Department of Defense's approach to strategy but also how strategy is taught.

We assume Meiser understands models merely simplify reality and are never intended for literal use; they only provide a starting point to develop skilled practitioners who can wisely deviate from them. From Meiser's perspective, a dangerous impression might develop of American professional military education churning out automatons incapable of critical, much less creative, thinking, who simply rely on a formula to develop and implement strategy. We think *Parameters'* readers will be encouraged by the fact that Defense Department programs actually expose senior military officers to a number of strategic models and require critical analysis of such fundamentals.

At the National Defense University's Joint Advanced Warfighting School curriculum, no single definition is taught as the "right answer" and no specific model of strategy is the "right approach." Future practitioners are not only required to articulate their own definitions and models but also to justify when, how, and why they deviate from or improve upon existing models. Thus, the curriculum incorporates complexity and design thinking, both of which challenge conventional approaches to solving problems, especially complex problems, which would include nearly all national security decisions.

Consequently, senior US military officers and their equivalent civilian counterparts who complete this and similar programs are more than capable of moving beyond simple formulas when advising senior leaders. This is true precisely because these students do not rely on simple constructs of ends, ways, and means when developing theater strategies and theater campaign plans. Moreover, these professionals

understand the nuances of incorporating a whole-of-government approach (interagency collaboration) and of applying instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement tools), which Meiser mistakenly treats synonymously. With this understanding, strategy practitioners recognize the military frequently does not want to address problems outside its expertise, even though its capabilities and capacities often result in it being tasked to “do something.”

In closing, students should never be told they can solve the world’s problems by checking all the boxes. Instead, students should learn complex problems rarely have simple solutions because of second- and third-order consequences and the competing interests arising from other actors’ cultures, histories, and principles. At best, a strategist’s efforts can help mitigate conflict or produce more favorable outcomes.

Where Are Policy and Risk? Francis J. H. Park

While I agree in principle with the flaws Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser identifies in the practice of strategy, his analysis omits the roles of policy and risk as critical elements influencing strategy. The relationship between ends, ways, and means had been part of the US Army War College curriculum for some eight years when it appeared in *Military Review* (1989). Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s model of strategy originally appeared in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, a US Army War College student text he edited from 1981 to 1994. Lykke’s model bears influence by contemporaries such as Colonel Harry A. Summers Jr. whose work on the Army’s Vietnam Lessons Learned project eventually bore fruit as *On Strategy* (1982).

While Lykke articulated strategy in the form of an equation, only the most mechanistic application of the model would suggest that the formulation of strategy is merely a balancing act of ends, ways, and means. In practice, strategists consider other factors such as policy, which is conspicuously absent from Meiser’s analysis. Lykke warns that military strategy “must support national strategy and comply with national policy.” This interplay between policy and strategy is essential because policy outlines the bounds of what strategy should attain while strategy identifies the costs of policy’s goals. Although military strategists can influence policy, as Eliot Cohen so notes, it is inherently an unequal dialogue.

Risk, which receives only passing mention in Meiser’s article, is the most important product of the dialogue between policy and strategy. The current risk assessment methodology from the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 3105.01, *Joint Risk Assessment*, describes risk simply as “the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued.” In practice, risk is the ultimate expression of a strategy’s feasibility and not something that is quantitatively derived from an imbalance of ends, ways, and means.

In Afghanistan, coalition forces and their Afghan partners still had to secure areas and their populations while buying time to build the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and Afghan civil institutions—a Herculean task requiring functions and resources

not available in any reasonable capacity within the Department of Defense. None of those considerations would have been apparent in an equation consisting solely of ends, ways, and means. Those charged with crafting policy may not have had discussions in such terms, but those charged with developing strategy, both inside and outside the Defense Department, certainly did. The policy constraints and the realities of the environment did not impede critical and creative thinking. But, any nontraditional approach would have incurred considerable, if not unacceptable, political and strategic risk.

Traditional views of war—divided into strategy, operational art, and tactics in many military discussions—tend to glide over discussions of policy; however, strategy is inherently incomplete without policy and its interactions. The current definition of strategy certainly runs the hazard of ham-fisted execution by unskilled practitioners who might construe strategic ends as full stops. Nonetheless, a new definition of strategy is not required; but as Professor Meiser so notes, a good strategy is.

Strategy Is Not a Sum. William F. Owen

Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser correctly suggests the Lykke model is flawed. A poor model based on a widely known fallacy, its adoption was and is symptomatic of a failure to understand extant strategic theory stemming from an incorrect description of strategy equaling ends, ways, and means. Lykke, and those who saw merit in his model, either did not read or did not understand Clausewitz. Otherwise, they would have likewise framed ends as the policy objectives (the desired behavior or condition), means as combat (the acts of violence designed to overthrow the violent objector), and ways as the link between the two. In short, as Clausewitz stated, strategy is the “use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”

When Meiser referenced the dysfunction highlighted in the 2009 Afghanistan policy review, his failure to recognize nation-states’ successful application of “strategy” accomplished as a campaign within a theater becomes evident. Nonstate actors, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, and even the Irish Republican Army, employ the same model with only a slight variation.

Simply put, strategy in Afghanistan—or anywhere else—is the link of tactical action to policy objectives, and those objectives should be achievable with the removal of the armed objector. As Clausewitz clearly warned, if that is not the case, one should not be using violence to attain the policy. Violence is the means that makes strategy unique. Thus, the whole-of-government approach Meiser referred to attempts to describe a process that aligns tactical means with policy objectives.

To conclude, Lykke’s model remains incorrect within the framework of classical strategic theory and has never had the utility ascribed to it. Strategy is not the sum of ends, ways, and means: rather, ways is strategy, ends is policy, and the means is combat. That the article did not point out this principle is as alarming for obvious reasons as is the fallacious implication that English-speaking militaries do not have adequate strategic theories to formulate successful strategy. Highly practical and effective strategic theory exists. But, the confusion demonstrated in the article is simply the product of a choice to ignore it.

In Response. Jeffrey W. Meiser

“Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy” was written to add clarity to the broad conversation about strategy. I was disappointed with the existing definitions of strategy as being either too narrow and confining or too broad, inclusive, and vague. Both approaches tend to produce bad strategy either by eliminating creative and adaptive thinking or by encouraging the reproduction of vacuous generalities.

After conversing with scholars and practitioners, researching, and teaching over several years, I settled on the definition for strategy: a theory of success. This definition is based on the writings of Barry R. Posen and Eliot A. Cohen, but influenced by a broad range of scholars including Richard P. Rumelt at UCLA Business School, Hal Brands at Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Sir Lawrence Freedman at Kings College, among others. My goal is to develop a definition that can fit all contexts in which strategy is relevant, including business strategy, grand strategy, and military strategy.

My article focused on military strategy because I see significant problems in US military strategy, including how it is taught in US military institutions, how it is discussed in the English-speaking defense community, and how it is implemented within the US government. It is a great honor and privilege to have this opportunity to respond to three thoughtful and well-articulated critiques of my essay. I thank Dr. Gregory D. Miller, Colonel Chris Rogers, Colonel Francis J. H. Park, and Mr. William F. Owen for taking my article seriously enough to write responses.

Defining Strategy

The only point of consensus among the commentators is that Arthur Lykke’s formula of ends + ways + means = strategy is an inadequate definition of strategy. Owen takes the strongest position, arguing that Lykke’s approach never had any utility and is profoundly misguided. Miller and Rogers see some value in Lykke’s approach, but agree that it should not be rigidly applied and must be supplemented by other concepts, definitions, and approaches. This consensus is important. Anyone relying only or primarily on Lykke’s formula should reconsider whether he or she is taking into account the complexity of the world as well as the intense and difficult task of being an adaptive, critical, and creative thinker.

Agreeing on what strategy is not, the contributors disagree on how strategy should be defined. The general definition for strategy proposed in the article is derived from the strategy literature, but refined to focus on what strategy is as a distinctive concept applicable across domains and disciplines. Only one of the commentaries actually proposes a rival definition for strategy: Owen endorses Carl von Clausewitz’s definition of strategy as the “use of engagements for the purpose of the war.” This definition is so narrow that even if we think only in terms of military strategy, it is not very useful. Furthermore, in this statement, Clausewitz does not tell us what strategy is, he tells us what to do with it. I would be relatively happy with a definition of military strategy stated as “a theory of the use of engagements for the purpose of war.”

It is quite common to refer to means as resources, as Lykke did and many others continue to do. In some contexts, means is synonymous with method, (e.g., the ends justify the means); however, it is not appropriate to assert that combat is the only possible means relevant to strategy. Finally, strategy can be applied to a wide variety of circumstances expanding well beyond a specific military campaign within a given theater of operations.

Overall, Owen's rigid, narrow reading of Clausewitz is not consistent with contemporary discourse in the English-speaking defense community even though the call to rethink our concepts in a more Clausewitzian framework is well taken and deserves additional consideration. Returning to *On War* is never a bad idea.

Strategy, Policy, and Risk

Whereas Owen wants to define strategy narrowly, Park argues it must be broadened to include policy and perhaps risk. I agree strategy is influenced by policy, it could hardly be otherwise; however, as I note in "Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy," strategy should have a clear definition that does not include other phenomena. An overinclusive definition distracts from the core purpose of strategy—articulating exactly how we will achieve our goal. Policy should also have a distinct definition. Once clear and distinct definitions are established, it is possible to discuss how the concepts relate to one another.

Let us accept for the moment the definition of strategy as a theory of success and use Park's definition of policy as a statement of "what strategy is to attain." These definitions tell us that policy defines the nature of success; policy tells us what we are trying to cause with the actions we take. Strategy tell us how we will achieve the stated policy. Therefore, we have a tight linkage between strategy and policy after we define them as distinct concepts. Just because two concepts are related does not mean they cannot have distinct definitions; instead, distinct definitions are essential to forming a clear understanding of each concept's role and exactly how they relate to one another.

Park also notes the importance of risk as "the ultimate expression of the feasibility of a strategy." I do not object, except to propose a more cost-benefit expression of feasibility. An action may be likely to cause harm to me, but it may also be likely to result in major benefits or to disproportionate harm to my opponent. Risk is another important concept, but again, it is different from strategy even if it is a necessary component to strategic planning and assessment.

Park concludes by noting the need for good strategy, but not a new definition of strategy. It is not clear whether this is an endorsement of Lykke's definition of strategy or not. If it is, Park does not tell us why or how my critique is wrong or why he thinks my proposed Posen-Cohen model is misguided. I am interested in hearing his position on this point.

On Models

Miller and Rogers describe a fine institution and show an admirable awareness of the broad range of issues relevant to teaching strategy in a very compressed time frame. Though I asserted that Lykke's model of strategy is influential in the broad US defense community, my intent was not to make an inclusive critique of the US defense community.

Programs and individuals relying solely or primarily on Lykke's formula should feel defensive after reading my article, but those who do not, should not.

As a general note of caution for instructors, educators have a hard time seeing the curriculum as students see it. A wise mentor once told me, it is not what you can teach, it is what the student can learn. This phenomenon can be a particularly thorny problem for 10-month long master's degree programs where the curriculum can easily become more about what can be taught and less about what the students can learn. When students and teachers are drowning in material, they sometimes grab onto whatever is easiest to comprehend, such as an easily articulated formula for strategy.

Agreement on a simple, distinctive definition of strategy will improve intellectual discourse on strategy in the defense community, the strategy-making process within the US government, and cross-disciplinary dialogue on the application of strategy application. I suggest the definition "strategy is a theory of success." The point is not to insist on absolute conformity. Thinking of strategy as a theory, logic, narrative about the future, or argument are all productive because they allow sufficient room for creative thinking while grounding us in the basic understanding of strategy as pushing us to think about how our actions are going to cause the future outcome we desire.

I commend *Parameters* for publishing these comments and enabling this dialogue, which I hope continues.

Gregory D. Miller

Dr. Gregory D. Miller teaches in and serves as chair of strategy at the National Defense University Joint Advanced Warfighting School. He has taught in several universities and published numerous articles as well as *The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances before the First World War* (2012).

Chris Rogers

Colonel Chris Rogers serves as the Director of the National Defense University Joint Advanced Warfighting School. He gained experience as an Army strategist during previous assignments as a battalion operations and executive officer, deputy director of the United States Forces-Iraq Commanding General's Initiatives Group, and special assistant to the commander of US Strategic Command.

Francis J. H. Park

Colonel Francis J. Park currently serves as the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Development Division. A career Army strategist, he executed several joint forces planning, strategy, and policy duties for Combined/Joint Task Force 101 (2008–09) and Operation Inherent Resolve (2017) as well as the International Security Assistance Force (2013–14).

William F. Owen

William F. Owen is currently the editor of the *Infinity Journal* as well as a consultant on a range of military issues for various armed forces. He served in the British Army and has worked on security and advisory projects in Algeria and Sierra Leone. He holds a masters degree in research and is widely published on military matters ranging from armored fighting vehicle design to classical strategy.

Jeffrey W. Meiser

Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser, an assistant professor at the University of Portland, taught at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, and published *Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898–1941* in 2015.

Book Reviews

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War


By Conrad C. Crane

Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn, Assistant G-2, Plans and Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and author of *Reconsidering Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict*

Subtitle notwithstanding, military historian Conrad Crane's *Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War* is less what he describes as "a story about trying to influence large institutions to change, ideally in the right direction for the right reasons," than an autobiographical excursion describing his role as member of the team tasked with creating the December 2006 Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and his experiences during the months immediately following its publication. Additionally—if secondarily—the book is a consideration of the publication's impact on operations in Iraq. There is also a very brief synopsis of US involvement in Afghanistan counterinsurgency (COIN) activities.

Despite the several foci, there are a number of worthy insights provided vis-à-vis COIN operations in Iraq. These observations include that all soldiers and marines are potentially intelligence collectors, that better synchronization of special operations units' activities with conventional units' activities remains a crying need even after more than a decade's presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, that trust between representatives of an external coalition force and members of the host nation population is fundamental to success, and that haste in holding elections during a counterinsurgency is unwise, the last only too evident in the often counterproductive behaviors of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki government in Baghdad. While few of these perceptions, drawn from Crane's personal experience and interviews in Iraq, will be new to those familiar with the war, many are sufficiently valuable to bear the repetition. Also notable in this regard is a point too infrequently recognized, one no less valid as operations continue today: "The most adept sociocultural briefings . . . came from soldiers and [m]arines who had probably conducted enough field research . . . to earn a PhD back at a civilian university." In COIN, no less than other forms of conflict, the wisdom of the soldier is both invaluable and an ore too little mined.

Crane obviously took copious notes during his weeks as a member of the FM 3-24 writing team and in-theater travels thereafter. His frequent listing of partners in the undertaking and myriad others attending conferences, working groups, or otherwise influencing the doctrine's creation and application in the field is impressive. The cataloging makes it clear the manual was raised by a quite populous village. Crane's firsthand participation in this community, combined with both his training and practice as a historian, undeniably makes him an appropriate vehicle for the tale's telling. There are times, however, in which he seems a bit too willing to give credit to those closest to him in the endeavor. One such participant is noted for his consistent championing of the need for a counterinsurgency force to continue to



Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2016
307 pages
\$39.95


learn and adapt. Such points unquestionably merit prominence in COIN doctrine; however, essentiality of learning and adapting (and anticipation as a third consideration) was adroitly presented 15 years previously in *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, a valuable book coauthored by Eliot A. Cohen who was also among those influencing the manual's development. So too, the figure on page 88 depicting the evolving emphasis a unit puts on mission type (denoting the relative weights allotted offense, defense, and stability over time) initially appeared in 2001 in Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*.

Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War concludes with a series of additional observations by the author that are certainly worthy of attention. An appendix presents a "Mission Matrix for Iraq," its list of tasks providing further material of value to commanders and staffs who may find COIN or nation-building responsibilities in their "mission-set" during future contingencies. In sum, senior members of the defense community and others seeking analysis of past counterinsurgencies in the service of future field application will find pithier sources elsewhere. Other readers looking for the history of the development of one of America's most influential and necessary doctrinal publications in recent history will find that history here in admirable detail.

Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army

By Benjamin M. Jensen

Reviewed by James H. Joyner Jr., Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council



Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016
216 pages
\$24.95

Organizational change literature argues large bureaucracies tend to remain in a state of inertia absent either catastrophic failure, extreme pressure from external leadership, or strong fear of losing out on resources to a competing bureaucracy. In *Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Changes in the U.S. Army*, Benjamin M. Jensen demonstrates how these explanations have not held true for the US Army, at least in the post-Vietnam period. Despite the popular perception of military brass as "unimaginative bureaucrats trapped in an iron cage," the Army has repeatedly revised its capstone doctrine because visionary top-level leadership continually assessed its "theory of victory" for fighting the next war based on an evolving operational environment.

Through a series of case studies, Jensen concludes "doctrinal change requires incubators, informal subunits established outside the hierarchy, and advocacy networks championing new concepts that emerge from incubators." The former, he argues, are essential because professionals "require safe spaces to visualize new forms of warfare." The latter, meanwhile, spread these new ideas within the community and help socialize them and build "buy in." While not a core argument of the book, Jensen also refutes the myth on constant interservice rivalry, pointing to several examples of seamless cooperation between the Army and Air Force.

Since 1975, the Army has rewritten its capstone doctrinal Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, seven times. Jensen focuses on three

of these revisions—the 1976 Active Defense, the 1982 AirLand Battle, and the 1993 Full-Dimensional Operations concepts—which represented a fundamental change in the Army’s “theory of victory.” He also examines the bureaucratic struggle over the 2006 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

In 1973, a series of events forced Army leaders to reorient the institution. The end of conscription and the dawn of an all-volunteer force fundamentally changed the composition of the US military. The end of American combat operations in Vietnam meant a drawdown to an Army with half the strength it had at the height of the conflict. And, the short Yom Kippur War demonstrated a radical change in the range, accuracy, lethality, and logistical sustainment requirements of modern tank warfare while highlighting a fundamental change in the role of tactical airpower.

Into the breach stepped General William E. DePuy, who would become the first head of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and personally oversee the rewriting of the operations manual. He established a “boathouse gang” of senior leaders and thinkers to write individual chapters and to serve as a “sounding board” for new ideas, which were then field tested with corps-level exercises. The group soon realized adequate close air support would only be possible with air supremacy—which meant the Army would not only need support from the Air Force but would also need to support the Air Force in the early stages of conflict to suppress enemy air defenses. The resulting doctrine, dubbed Active Defense, radically changed the Army theory of victory in Europe from one in which a trip-wire force held off the Soviets until reinforcements could arrive to one of “winning the first battle.” Throughout the development phase, DePuy personally socialized the new findings to key stakeholders within the Army and the Pentagon, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and members of the think tank community.

Almost immediately after the Army adopted the Active Defense doctrine, the Soviets changed their doctrine and command and control capability and introduced modernized weapons. In response, the Department of Defense devised an offset strategy to counter Soviet numerical advantages with vastly improved command, control, and precision technology. Additionally, the twin shocks of 1979—the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—led to the Carter doctrine and a demand for the Army to be ready for low-intensity fights in addition to high-intensity maneuver warfare. General Donn A. Starry, part of the boathouse gang who helped write the 1976 doctrine, succeeded DePuy at TRADOC and oversaw the 1982 manual that introduced AirLand Battle in response to the new operating environment. Like his predecessor, Starry networked the development with key stakeholders, especially the Air Force, which was invited to contribute during the development phase.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War in 1991, Army leadership was faced with a completely new landscape. Not only would troop levels be cut to the lowest levels since 1939, but it soon became apparent ground forces would be required to respond to a much wider and more complex mission set without the advantage of prepositioned forces and ready bases. Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 meant the services had less autonomy in crafting their own doctrine. In response, Gordon R. Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, personally pushed for reforms toward his vision of a “post-industrial” force. Frederick M. Franks Jr., the new TRADOC commander, used the Army’s branch schools as “battle labs” to incubate new ideas and mimicked the Louisiana Maneuvers of the 1940s as a testing ground. This resulted in the publication of the full-spectrum dimensional operations doctrine in 1994 that outlined the Army’s vision for being able to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars while also being engaged in all manner of small wars and operations other than war lower on the spectrum. As in the previous examples, stakeholders inside and outside the Army were courted throughout the process for their input and buy in, and the doctrine was developed in parallel with Air Force doctrinal revisions.

The writing of the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is different from the other cases. Rather than a new overall theory of war for the Army, it was a new theory of victory for a particular fight. Further, as Jensen notes, the actual change was “much less than heralded at the time.” Still, it was an important example of doctrinal change, coming in the midst of America’s largest conflict since Vietnam. Unlike the previous examples, this was neither top-down nor even Army-centric. Army Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Marine Corps Lieutenant General James Mattis led the project and recruited a brain trust of midlevel leaders from their services and a handful of outside experts from the “COINdinita” camp. Capitalizing on the star power of the two leaders, the team engaged in a months-long media blitz spreading their ideas through a series of speeches and within professional and policy journals.

Jensen notes the successful examples discussed in *Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army* were driven by thoughtful professionals who worked in small groups—not drained of creativity by gigantic staffs. To that end, Jensen concludes with a plea for continued emphasis on education, testing new ideas in war games and writing in professional journals, and encouragement of constant challenging of the status quo.



New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014
110 pages
\$49.99

“Soft” Counterinsurgency: Human Terrain Teams and US Military Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan

By Paul Joseph

Reviewed by Michael C. Davies, coauthor of *Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare*

The now-defunct Human Terrain System (HTS) was developed to improve the military decision-making process by facilitating a better understanding of the local population—the human terrain. The program garnered significant press attention, suffered from internal disquiet, and was the focus of numerous denunciations. Paul Joseph, professor of sociology at Tufts University, was one of the first external reviewers of the program. He gained insider access during the program’s early days, and *“Soft” Counterinsurgency* is the outcome of the time he spent with program participants.

Joseph's work centers on the narratives that defined the program at its beginning and questioned whether it could be considered effective. He excels at answering this question. Based on interviews with 30 individuals as well as a large-group session of 20 more participants, Joseph tackles the key debates and concerns of the program from the perspectives of the participants—something distinctly lacking in all but a few works on HTS—while adding his expert analysis to each issue.

The book assesses five major topics, from the program's history and structure to its impact on military commanders, how success can be defined and claimed, the program's effect on operations, and the relationship between HTS and the broader US strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Joseph is blunt in his conclusion on whether HTS achieved its stated objective of altering military perceptions of the battle space and transforming operational outcomes: "No, it did not."

Like the assessments on HTS, Joseph outlines relevant examples of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) embedded in combat units who provided soldiers and commanders with quality assessments of the human terrain. In providing a full account of the words of team members, Joseph shows the limited impact achieved; that while HTTs provided, "a generally accurate assessment of the situation [they] did not contribute to a needed revision" of US strategy in terms of goals, execution, or resources, let alone all three iteratively. This is the unique contribution Joseph brings to the literature on HTS.


The "cultural turn" and HTS may have correctly seen sociocultural awareness as the necessary first step to effective strategy and eventual victory. However, it is political governance, both emergent and institutional, from the local through the national levels, that is at the core of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because this issue was ignored, pushed aside, or overwhelmed by other factors, victory remained fleeting, if impossible from the start. The quality and quantity of the human terrain assessments could therefore only be effective up to a certain point.

Joseph is not the first to recognize this problem, but he fails to tap into other researchers who support his reasoning. As *"Soft" Counterinsurgency* is a slim volume, adding the works of Jenkins, Komer, Krepinevich, the Project for National Security Reform, and others, all of whom have made the same conclusions about how elements of the US government operate on the battlefield, would have brought additional weight to Joseph's argument.

Nevertheless, Joseph shines a light on the other side of the strategy bridge. He asks the question: if war is the continuation of politics, and politics at the ground level is never considered in strategic interaction, why should we be surprised when defeat occurs? He concludes the United States consistently fails to link the two sides through effective and sustainable governance built on an understanding of local politics. And this failure is the core reason the United States lost the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—and other operations. It is also why the United States has learned little from these failures.

"Soft" Counterinsurgency offers an incisive view into one of the most publicized programs from the 9/11 era. In attempting to answer the

question, however imperfectly, of why the United States has struggled so much in the wars that followed, Joseph's conclusion—that strategic interaction between ground truth, operational concepts, and political goals has been unbridgeable from the beginning—should give all civilian and military senior leaders pause.



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
329 pages
\$21.95

War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier

By Carter Malkasian

Reviewed by M. Chris Mason, Professor of National Security Affairs, US Army War College. Dr. Mason was the State Department political officer in the Paktika Province of Afghanistan in 2005.

Carter Malkasian purposefully and successfully styles *War Comes to Garmser* after Jeffrey Race's *War Comes to Long An* (1972), a classic in the academic literature of Vietnam. Like Race's book, which tells the story of the struggle for control of one district in Vietnam between the end of the French war and the beginning of the American war, *War Comes to Garmser* chronicles the local politics and the battle for control of the Garmser District in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan.

For those not familiar with Malkasian, he began his unlikely path to the Garmser District with a doctorate in history from Oxford and a position as professor of military history at Loyola Marymount University, but a relative, who served as a Navy medical officer in Vietnam with 1st Battalion 9th Marines (*The Walking Dead*), persuaded Malkasian he needed to experience war personally if he was going to write about it. So Malkasian took a job as a State Department contractor, working first in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan and then the Anbar Province of Iraq. He agreed to go back to Afghanistan only if he could go to a hot spot. Sent to work in the Helmand Province's violent Garmser District, he got his wish. His success in pacifying the local political situation there and shaping a local, indigenous resistance to the Taliban between 2009–11 brought him national attention and resulted in *War Comes to Garmser*.

True to his inspiration, Malkasian's book succeeds and remains timeless for much the same reason *War Comes to Long An* does: Malkasian never tries to do too much. He remains focused on the conflict in his district, telling the story of the Garmser District over some 30 years, and he avoids offering advice or the bromides about the larger conflict that often litter other books about Afghanistan written from a single perspective. Instead, Malkasian does a fine job of recording the history of the Garmser District, from the large-scale US Agency for International Development (USAID) irrigation and agricultural development projects of the 1950s up to 2011, when he left the district. A postscript to this paperback edition brings the story of Garmser up to 2015.

As few Americans ever could, or even attempted to do, Malkasian understood the tangled, ever-shifting web of social conflicts in Garmser, which pitted rival tribes against one another, indigenous landed farmers against recently arrived squatters, and local strongmen against religious leaders, and he explains them in a way that is accessible even to readers

unfamiliar with Afghanistan. What emerges is strong evidence that at the district level, as was the case in Long An, resistance to the Taliban and the Viet Cong was a local, personal matter, driven by family feuds, tribal politics, land disputes, and village political economies. Malkasian and Race show clearly that in both wars, local resistance to guerillas in remote districts was devoid of any notion of support for predatory and corrupt national governments in capital cities—or even provincial capitals—which were so removed from local lives they might as well have been on the moon. Whether intentionally or not, in so doing they debunk the great fallacy of counterinsurgency theory—the idea that such isolated “ink spots” of resistance can somehow be linked up and transmogrified into a pan-national movement in support of an illegitimate government in time of terrible local violence in primitive, deeply fractured tribal societies with no conception of national identity. Indeed, no counterinsurgency in modern history has succeeded where there was no pervasive, preexisting sense of national identity and where the national government was not seen as legitimate by the great majority of its citizens. Empirical data also shows no government has ever seen its popular support increase during an insurgency or civil war.

Other lessons from *War Comes to Garmser* are less obvious. While many men might have written a book about Vietnam like *War Comes to Long An*, probably only Malkasian could have written this companion volume about the war in Afghanistan. Malkasian’s success in Garmser was almost unique: no other State Department official or military officer anywhere else in the Pashto-speaking south and east of the country (where until recently the conflict was largely confined) achieved anything like what was accomplished in Garmser. The reason for this, which undermined the US effort in the country, was simple: while overall US involvement in Afghanistan closely mirrored the effort in Vietnam in virtually every other respect, there was one critical difference.

During the 12 years of the Vietnam War from 1960 to 1972, the United States trained tens of thousands of American military and civilian personnel to functional fluency in Vietnamese. In the 16 years of the Afghanistan conflict, the United States trained less than 50 to functional fluency in Pashto, with most of them assigned to Kabul. With admirable determination, Malkasian taught himself Pashto, and as the *Washington Post* noted in 2011, his ability to communicate effectively and directly with the elders and other local leaders in Garmser made his success possible. Virtually everywhere else in the Pashtun south and east, US personnel relied on the disastrously ineffective, unreliable, and indirect method of interpreters, very few of whom were native Pashtuns and a majority of whom had, at best, a questionable grip on the nuances of a language which relies heavily on parables, folk sayings, and other culturally derived idioms. This practice made impactful personal relationships, trust, and even meaningful conversations between Americans and Pashtuns all but impossible. In no small part, the US war in Afghanistan was lost in translation.

Twice in 50 years, the United States took sides in a civil war in Asia, occupied a country with large numbers of troops, imposed a culturally illegitimate form of government on an illiterate peasantry, manipulated elections, glossed over fraudulent outcomes, and propped up deeply

unpopular governments riddled with drug lords. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US government misunderstood an elusive and dedicated enemy, mistrusted a national army it created in its own image (which was decimated by desertions and lacked the will to fight for kleptocratic elites in a distant capital), and thought that somehow all these issues could be overcome with superior firepower and slapdash rural development.

The irony of *War Comes to Garmser* is that Malkasian successfully crafts his book as a companion volume to *War Comes to Long An*, but apparently he never saw the Afghan War itself as a reboot of the Vietnam War and missed Race's central lesson: the Vietminh understood the war was about imposing social order from the bottom up, and military conflict was secondary. As one former Vietminh cadre tells Race in *War Comes to Long An*: "You have the central government, then the province, district, and village. But the lowest of the four is the level that lies with the people. If the village level is weak, then I guarantee you, no matter how strong the central government is, it won't be able to do a thing." The United States spent the entire war in Afghanistan trying to build up the national, provincial, and district governments, while the Taliban controlled the villages and imposed an acceptable social order. Garmser is back under Taliban control.

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY


Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era by Michael Mandelbaum

Reviewed by COL Michael Dhunjishah, US Army War College Student

Having attended Yale University at the same time as President George W. Bush and having known President Bill Clinton from Oxford, Michael Mandelbaum wanted to examine what went wrong with US foreign policy when his generation was put in charge. It was the end of the Cold War and the United States was the most powerful nation in the world, but all that power did not necessarily equate to the United States being able to remake the world in its image. Why?

In his most recent book, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era*, Mandelbaum lays out a convincing argument explaining how, even with the best of intentions, US foreign policy failed to produce the more democratic and peaceful post-Cold War world everyone expected. He contends that after the Cold War the United States shifted towards acting more on its values than its interests, and by doing so became focused on putting countries "on the road to Denmark," moving them to a more liberal, democratic system. The failure, however, to realize the enormity of the task resulted in the United States getting bogged down in nation- and state-building—which, as always, are inherently difficult.

Throughout the book, Mandelbaum does an excellent job of looking at all angles of these complex problems. As an example, he is



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504 pages
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
quick to refute criticism placed on L. Paul Bremer III for the failure of postinvasion Iraq, namely de-Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi military. Mandelbaum emphasizes that no one really knows what would have happened if the Baathists remained in charge of Iraq after the invasion or if Bremer had left the Iraqi army in place. He does, however, explain Bremer's logic in making these decisions and argues that keeping both oppressive institutions in place might have exacerbated issues with the Shia population and the Kurds. Although this is counter to conventional wisdom, Mandelbaum is not afraid to look at these issues from all points of view and provide more mature, seasoned analysis of causes and effects.

Additionally, Mandelbaum is not afraid to call it like he sees it. Although he worked on Clinton's first campaign for president, Mandelbaum provides a reasonably objective view of foreign policy decisions regardless of party affiliation or his personal ties with those in power. He finds fault with the foreign policy of Presidents Clinton and Barack Obama, just as easily as he does with President Bush. In today's supercharged environment of political partisanship, this book focuses more on what went wrong rather than blaming one party or the other. This refreshing take allows readers to understand how and why the United States got into problems in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq over the past 25 years. Mandelbaum walks readers down the decision-making path of these leaders who, despite their best intentions, for one reason or another, ended up leading the country into situations where the United States failed to meet its stated objectives.

One of the strengths of the book is also one of its weaknesses. Focusing on the last 25 years, many of the endeavors covered are still ongoing or have recently ended. The benefit of this is that the book serves as an initial compilation of strategic lessons learned or a "history hot wash," providing current foreign policy practitioners valuable insights that may help shape future decisions. Because this is a first draft of history, however, there are many aspects to these relationships, events, and long-term consequences that are unknown at this time. As with any historical event, a more complete understanding does not manifest itself until well after the events have taken place (typically after decades). Nevertheless, *Mission Failure* provides a necessary historical overview on issues currently facing the United States, thereby offering current foreign policy practitioners and strategic leaders much-needed analysis and perspective that might help them avoid making the same mistakes in the future.

Finally, Mandelbaum hangs a little too much on the decision to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). His assertion that the United States now faces a Russia that is hostile to the West due to the expansion of NATO in the 1990s may eventually prove to be correct, but placing all, or at least the majority, of the blame for the poor state of US-Russia relations today on the expansion of NATO seems myopic. Although it can be argued that the expansion of NATO led to some of the issues between the two countries, the US relationship with Russia is more complex and placing blame on one particular action is problematic. Just as Mandelbaum is quick to question blaming Bremer for all the failures in Iraq, it is shortsighted to blame all the failures of US-Russia relations on the decision to expand NATO.

Overall, *Mission Failure* is a terrific book that holds value for foreign policy students, strategic leaders, and casual readers. Mandelbaum's style allows readers from all backgrounds to understand the intricacies of US foreign policy as it played out in the post-Cold War era. His clear prose, strong research, logical organization, and well-reasoned arguments keep readers engaged throughout the book. *Mission Failure* should be required reading for every military strategic leader and foreign policy practitioner.



New York: Penguin Press,
2017
339 pages
\$28.00

A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order

By Richard Haass

Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College

A World in Disarray is an examination of the changing international system and the implications of these changes for US foreign policy. In considering these issues, Richard Haass begins with a general overview of international relations from the mid-seventeenth century until contemporary times. He then provides brief reflections and recommendations on many current global issues and emerging crises. According to Haass, new and complex global dilemmas have raised the possibility that one historical era is ending and another beginning. In this evolving environment, new ways of thinking will be required to deal with challenges such as climate change, the regulation of cyberspace, and the possible rise of pandemic diseases that may kill millions.

Unfortunately, Haass also sees a simultaneous rise in world disorder, whereby the level of international cooperation needed to overcome these problems has eroded. He suggests the United Kingdom's planned withdrawal from the European Union (EU) could lead to the breakup of the country and a partial unraveling of the EU. He further points out that the post-World War I order is unraveling in significant areas within the Middle East leading to huge problems with instability in this part of the world. Complicating everything, the US share of global power is shrinking and being partially redistributed into more hands including both state and nonstate entities. Thus, in Haass's view, multilateral cooperation with a variety of countries and nonsovereign international entities has become more essential than ever.

Haass states that no global orders can be automatic or self-sustaining even when they serve the interests of a variety of countries that should rationally seek to bolster such orders but do not always do so. To deal with current and future problems in a more multilateral way, Haass puts forward a concept he calls sovereign obligation, which he claims is an updating of political realism. This set of ideas stresses governmental obligations to work together with other countries to manage global problems including slow-motion crises such as climate change and potentially lightning-fast catastrophes such as pandemic disease, all of which call for strong international agreements negotiated in advance. Sovereign obligation would also call upon countries to work with other nations to solve domestic problems (such as the rise of international terrorist groups in their ungoverned spaces) that have important international implications. Beyond multilateralism among states, Haass

believes there is a vital, positive international role for nonsovereign international entities such as multinational corporations, charities such as the Gates Foundation, and nongovernmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders (255). According to Haass, an international system can only become an international society when the latter reflects a degree of buy in on the part of the participants including states and important international nonstate entities.

Having identified multilateralism as an important part of the solution for global problems, Haass notes the need for the United States to maintain acceptable relations with other major countries that could serve as partners in addressing some issues, while inevitably remaining rivals on others. In this regard, Haass believes China and the United States have managed to maintain a mostly mutual beneficial relationship, albeit with some deterioration of friendly ties during recent years over issues such as the South China Sea. He also states the United States should have done more to help the Soviet Union, and then Russia, make the transition from a controlled political and economic system to a more democratic political structure and a market economy. Haass further believes the United States supported rapid and provocative North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, and this process now needs to be paused to help prevent further damage to US-Russian relations. According to Haass, the central challenge for the United States in shaping relations with both China and Russia is to discourage bad behavior in a way that does not preclude selective and valuable cooperation on global and regional challenges.

Haass states Iran's Islamic Republic is now approaching four decades in age and can therefore be considered politically secure. This statement is true enough to serve as a basis for strategic planning, but he also views Iran with a great deal of concern. In particular, Haass expresses reservations about the Iranian nuclear agreement with the United States and its negotiating partners and maintains the Obama administration, "committed the cardinal negotiating sin wanting an agreement too much and therefore compromising too much" (133). He also takes an extremely hard line on the 2013 crisis with Syria, in which President Obama withdrew a previous threat (a so-called redline) to bomb Assad regime military forces and infrastructure following the regime's use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. Instead, the administration chose a policy of restraint in exchange for the verifiable destruction of most of Assad's chemical weapons and the infrastructure for synthesizing, maintaining, and storing them. Often, when a country obtains its objectives through diplomacy rather than violence, this result is viewed as both a victory and an act of political maturity, but Haass dismisses the Syrian surrender of such formidable capabilities as "a plus" but certainly not a major factor justifying the decision. This evaluation is surely his only step toward a dogmatic form of conservatism in a study that is otherwise characterized by national interest-based pragmatism.

In summary, *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order* stands as a collection of the author's insights, opinions, and perhaps prejudices. As a kaleidoscopic introduction to global issues, the book certainly has potential value for students, and more seasoned scholars may find many of the ideas presented well worth their consideration. The central concept of sovereign obligation is hardly


unknown even if Haass has developed a new phrase to describe it, but his efforts to add some nuance to the concept are clearly useful. Thus, the work is a rational, reflective, and useful look at global problems and the US place in dealing with these problems as part of a wider world.

GRAND STRATEGY

American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy

By Paul D. Miller

Reviewed by Lukas Milevski, Lecturer, University of Leiden



Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2016

322 pages

\$32.95

Ever since the end of the Cold War, grand strategy has become a fixation among academics writing about American foreign policy and international relations. With the successful conclusion of containment, many believed the United States required a new guiding idea to lead it through a changed world. This thought triggered a sustained debate throughout the 1990s, which abated only slightly during the Global War on Terror, and which has returned with a vengeance in the past decade. Paul Miller, currently associate director of the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, but once an actor within the actual national security apparatus, including the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, has now waded into this unending debate with his newest book *American Power & Liberal Order*. The book is aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at national security professionals and real policymakers.

Miller's main argument is the United States should not step away from the world, as advocates of restraint or offshore balancing would ask. But rather, the United States should maintain active engagement to sustain the extant liberal order. To support this basic thesis, Miller relies on a number of interrelated historical and theoretical arguments. The main theoretical argument is American power and liberal order are mutually reinforcing—American power sustains the liberal order, but the liberal order, in turn, contributes to the sustenance of American power and security. The prime historical argument is American power and realism in foreign affairs, along with liberal order abroad, have been the twin driving forces in American foreign affairs for more than a century. In other words, American policymakers have long recognized the relationship between American power and the liberal order and have sought to protect and increase the latter, often, if not usually, with beneficial results for both.

The theoretical and historical relationship between American power and international liberal order is well argued. But it forms only the foundation upon which the true purpose of the book is built. Miller (deservedly) proudly notes one major distinction between his book and those of most other academics is that he tackles the fundamental hard question which separates a workable policy from an unworkable one—implementation. How could a grand strategy focusing on maintaining liberal order be implemented in practice? Miller argues against mainstream

opinion in suggesting counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations have important roles to play in such a grand strategy.

Miller recognizes selectivity in intervention is vital; he bases his criteria on global power distribution, which is made up of three factors—gross domestic product, material capabilities, and military spending. He posits that it is worth intervening to shore up or install liberal order in states which represent substantial contributions to the aggregate power of democratic and liberal states in the world. For example, Somalia is out, but for a number of reasons Afghanistan remains an important front line. Miller examines every major region in the world, identifying certain countries as being potential opportunities and others as being overly troublesome spots not worth the effort required to transform them. Miller also considers his proposed grand strategy from the instrumental perspective, discussing in his final section various instruments of national power and the vital role each has to play in implementation.

Miller has produced a thoughtful work on American power and liberal order, complete with an initial discussion on how to implement his preferred grand strategy (and he is emphatic it is only the starting point for sustained serious thinking). It is, of course, entirely arguable. His theoretical and historical chapters are largely convincing and thought-provoking. But once he turns to implementation further assumptions seep into his argument. He wholly accepts the veracity of democratic peace theory and implicitly suggests democracy is the most important factor in any international relationship—above history, culture, and so forth. The democracies aggregate into one international camp, and authoritarian regimes similarly form the opposing side. One might wonder how India's great power aspirations fit within this picture. Miller's vision of implementation is bound to be contentious, but this is no surprise. Implementation is usually the most controversial aspect of any policy, as it is in the details that policies are made or broken and real-world consequences occur.


American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy will hopefully spark debate—both academic and official—on the future direction of American grand strategy and, with its emphasis also on the difficult questions of implementation, may set a new standard for this particular genre of academic textual endeavor. It is a book very much worth a read; in agreement or disagreement, it will provoke thought.

The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy

By Paul A. Rahe

Reviewed by LTC Jason W. Warren, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

Paul A. Rahe's account of the Spartan regime of the late archaic and early classical periods demonstrates how the peculiar social mores and resulting political values of this *polis* underpinned Lacedaemon's strategic efficacy during its long Peloponnesian hegemony. Unlike his previous *Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta*, which I reviewed in this



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212 pages
\$35.00

journal, Rahe's new volume is an eminently readable, well presented, and pithy affair, coming in around 124 pages of text. Relying on a host of primary and secondary sources, Rahe succeeds in elucidating the social and cultural backbone of what he considers a Spartan "grand strategy." Rahe repackages through the lens of political analysis Spartan-enforced social cohesion in what would otherwise be well-tread intellectual ground covered by the likes of Paul Cartledge, Stephen Hodkinson, and N. M. Kennell. The strength of this volume also results in its weaknesses, however, as some of the material in *The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy* is overly anachronistic, while digressions into the fog of the eighth and early seventh centuries (BC) serve as a distraction.

Successfully avoiding the pitfall of presenting yet another account on Spartan peculiarities, Rahe frames his discussion in a "political science" and intellectual history framework. He considers this method a lost political science of earlier eras, focusing more on human nature and its limitations in producing sound leaders and political stability than current theory. There are frequent allusions to classical philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom comes in for favorable commentary, and whose ideas Rahe especially utilizes as a vehicle for his analysis. Rahe also projects back into time the thinking of Enlightenment philosophes and early American political leaders to help explain the checks and balances inherent in the Spartan regime, but also how Lacedaemon differed from other such mixed-governments. This setting uniquely places this volume apart.

Reaching forward to analyze backwards is not without literary risks, however, and some of Rahe's examples are unhelpful anachronisms. For example, interjections such as "At least while the Atlantic and Pacific oceans sufficed to isolate and protect it, the liberal republic established by the American Founding Fathers could almost do without men of a warlike demeanor" (40). This would be news to *Parameters* readers, given an armed entity known as the US Army has existed since 1775 and before as colonial militias, and has fought in every decade since the American Revolutionary War. There is nothing added with these comparisons, opening the text to criticism and detracting from a focus best left to earlier times. The same can be said about the idea of a "grand strategy," which in its current connotation anticipates a settled nation-state capable of projecting worldwide economic, diplomatic, cultural, and military power, something the confines of Sparta's 3,300 square-mile holdings could never approximate (93). Sparta's strategy was not grand, but insular, and perhaps the concept of a "strategic culture" would have better served Rahe's purposes.

Rahe begins by describing the *paideia* or, as he defines it, the "education and moral formation [of the community] in the broadest and most comprehensive sense" (xiv). He then analyzes the unique Spartan institutions, laws, and constitution which together formed its *politeia*. This is a rational and beneficial way of beginning the discussion on the cultural factors that ultimately underlay the author's portrayal of a Spartan "grand strategy." He then sets about detailing his conception of nomadic groups of ethnic Dorians, which invaded the Peloponnese in the Greek dark ages after the collapse of Mycenaean civilization. Rahe lingers a bit too long here, attempting to piece together controversial and sparse evidence into a coherent picture that is simply very difficult

to establish. He could have better utilized this text space to demonstrate a firmer link between Sparta's social institutions and its supposed "grand strategy," the latter of which he does not come around to until later in the book and then only again in the conclusion (105). Further consideration of the structural shortcomings of property consolidation resulting from a slackening pure-Spartan population and aristocratic land grabbing would have proven more useful.

The book's coverage of Sparta's servile system as the foundational element of its strategy and alliance is quite worthwhile. Particularly enlightening is Rahe's focus on the Spartan's subjugation and enslaving of the neighboring Messenians and the formation of the "Spartan Alliance," later expanded to the Peloponnesian League that would face down Persia and the Delian League alike (106–20). For it was the serfdom of the Messenians, predicated on Lacedaemon's earlier treatment of the Helots, which advanced a Spartiate class that constantly prepared for war. Not having to concern itself with farming for sustenance, Sparta concentrated on its army. Pure-born Spartan men were cast into barracks at the tender age of seven and not allowed to leave their particular cohort of comrades, if they survived, until military retirement at 45 (interestingly not far off a current 20-year Army retirement once the "cadet" Spartiates achieved full status around age 20). Rahe implies this focus on war was a result of military defeats such as the so-called Battles of the Hysiae and the Fetters against neighboring *poleis* in the first half of the seventh century. Thus, Sparta's grand strategy as the *polis* rose in fame and power rested on the backs of oppressed peoples, while even posturing as a champion of liberty among tyrants and seemingly without irony given the servile system, which allowed this very championing. This necessitated keeping the slaves down and the warlike Argives of the northeastern Peloponnesians out, often with the help of allies—the original members of the Peloponnesian League.


The Spartan Regime will be of interest to classical scholars and readers motivated by comparing a classical notion of political philosophy to the Spartan regimes of the archaic and classical eras. The volume is replete with excellent maps, which will help readers in this endeavor. The idea of establishing a political framework for "grand strategy" based on social and cultural bedrocks is an extremely useful concept at a time when American and Western societies are generally disengaged with wars around the globe fought on its behalf. Rahe's piece serves as a useful reminder, and perhaps a warning, that this current order of events is not as it should be, and that even when cultural and military values align for sound strategy, a nation-state is still at risk for defeat and subjugation. Sparta learned this in the first third of the fourth century at the hands of Epaminondas' Thebans, and later, Philip II of Macedon.

MILITARY HISTORY

Air Power: A Global History

By Jeremy Black

Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army Heritage and Education Center, and author of multiple books on airpower history



Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016

372 pages

\$38.00

Jeremy Black, professor of history at the University of Exeter, is the most prolific writer of military history today. He seems to publish a new book every few months. *Air Power: A Global History* is typical of his products, another well-written summary of a broad topic. Readers are undoubtedly aware of the phrase “a mile wide and an inch deep,” and this work begins a kilometer wide and a centimeter deep, until Black gets to the Cold War about halfway through. From that point on, except for sparse coverage of the Korean War, the narrative is richer and more comprehensive, and fully as global as the title implies.

Air Power is a book about technology and events, not people or theories. Black deals with the famous aces of World War I in one sentence, while providing a detailed analysis of the British development of superior synchronizing gears to fire through propellers—an advantage over the Germans the Royal Air Force was able to maintain into World War II. Few notable air leaders appear, and rarely do any theorists get more than passing mention. Only John Warden merits a more lengthy discussion, but even that is incomplete. Black, however, does much better in his descriptions of the evolution of aircraft. He is obviously a big fan of the B-52, and a strong critic of the F-35, which he argues “may prove to be an expense too far and an entirely unnecessary system” (289). He favors specialized airplanes over multipurpose models, a course difficult to pursue in times of tight defense budgets.

Black acknowledges the United States has made a unique commitment to airpower, and that it is “part and parcel of the American identity” (8). But, he never deals with the intellectual roots of the military application of US airpower developed in the interwar years, and except for some vague references to the influence of California, never covers commercial or civil aspects of aviation at all. One cannot understand American air-mindedness without analyzing that aspect of airpower, the most glaring deficiency of the book. In contrast, Black’s coverage of Eurasian military developments is very thorough, including Japan and China. He also does well with naval airpower and discusses advances in air defenses, missiles, and unmanned systems.

Throughout the book, Black maintains a skeptical tone about the independent strategic accomplishments of airpower, emphasizing instead its essential importance as part of a joint force. He argues that Western airpower today is in a state of crisis. Air forces are very expensive and hard to justify against other competing social and political agendas, while international competitors are also building cutting-edge aircraft. Airpower also seems less relevant against enemies pursuing irregular warfare amidst populations, and other services seem better suited for counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.

Air Power: A Global History will be most useful for readers new to the topic who are looking for a beginning overview. More knowledgeable readers will still find much of interest, but they will also be more cognizant of what has been left out.

Victory Was beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich

By Douglas E. Nash

Reviewed by Richard L. Dinardo, Professor of National Security Affairs, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College

When it comes to studying the German army of World War II, one notes that there are gaps in the record. These gaps get bigger the lower one goes in the military hierarchy, and one can see this at The National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The German records on microfilm there are extensive for the Wehrmacht high command and the army high command. The same can be said for army groups, armies, and corps. Records for divisions get spotty. There are, for example, no extant records for the 352nd Infantry Division for June 1944. Below that, records are almost nonexistent. One might find regimental reports occasionally nested within division records, but that is about it.

In 1994, Douglas Nash, a retired army officer who now works for the Marine Corps History Division at Quantico, Virginia, acquired a suitcase with a most interesting set of contents—the records of the 272nd Fusilier Company, part of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division. Once armed with these records, Nash very carefully supplemented this source with other German records from College Park and the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, the captured German officer manuscript series, extensive American records of the units facing the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, and the secondary literature. The result is the fascinating study provided in *Victory Was beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich*.

Nash provides extensive background on the creation of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division. Its immediate antecedent, the 272nd Infantry Division, had been badly mauled in Normandy. Enough of the division had survived, however, so it could be reconstituted, though this involved drawing elements from other divisions that had been too severely damaged to reconstitute. With the old territorial system of generating replacements destroyed, the new creation had to incorporate replacements drawn from excess Luftwaffe and navy personnel. Nash also presents detailed analysis of the volks-grenadier division as an organization. The new division's slightly smaller size in relation to the older infantry division was offset by improvements in firepower, particularly in the infantry elements.

Nash then follows the division from its initial commitment in the latter stages of the fighting in the Hürtgen Forest to the division's surrender in the Ruhr Pocket, while some elements were able to retreat to the Harz Mountains before surrendering. A trained field grade officer



Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2015

373 pages

\$34.95

with long service, Nash has an excellent eye for tactical situations and the ability to describe and analyze them clearly. His analysis, spread throughout the book, would have benefited from a short concluding chapter offering broader conclusions about the volks-grenadier division within the broader context of the German army.

Given the volks-grenadier division was created largely for defensive purposes, having the records of the 272nd Fusilier Company was a major asset to Nash's research, as the company was the division's counterattack unit, in effect its fire brigade, and fortunate to have a cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers who were able and experienced. Nash's description of events illustrates the combat philosophy of the German army that the outcome of tactical battles often depended upon the actions of one or two individuals. Thus, having an experienced officer or noncommissioned officer was critical to maintaining the combat effectiveness of a company. Nash also describes clearly the situation of the German army in the west in late 1944 in ways one does not always consider. While it was well known the German army was short of artillery ammunition, the army also experienced a shortage of small arms ammunition, especially for some of the more modern weapons fielded by the German army, such as the MP44.

One negative aspect of Nash's book is due to a factor beyond his control. The 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division played a relatively minor role in the campaign. The unit was scheduled to play a role in the forthcoming Ardennes offensive, but instead got sucked into the fighting in the Hürtgen Forest, where a temporary commitment became a long-term one. The story of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, nonetheless, is an excellent illustration of how the enemy often gets a vote in the planning and conduct of operations.


To be sure, Nash does assume readers are familiar with the course of the 1944 campaign in the west; however, novices will benefit from his knowledge of the German army, its men, and its equipment at that stage of the war. For students of the German army in World War II, as well as students interested in the late 1944 campaign, *Victory Was beyond Their Grasp* is a must read.

The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study

By Rob Johnson

Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg, Chair of War Studies and Professor of History, US Army War College

Rob Johnson, in *The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study*, challenges the conventional notion that great power meddling in the Middle East during World War I left poisonous legacies from which the region still struggles to recover. That history, or at least the version common in much of Europe and the Middle East today, posits that the British in particular, while trying to find local allies to help dismember the Ottoman Empire, made contradictory and dishonest promises to mutually contentious groups. These deals included the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) that carved much of the Middle East into French and British spheres of influence, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915) that



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016

354 pages

\$34.95

promised the Hashemites an expansive postwar Arab kingdom, and the Balfour Declaration (1917) that promised the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine.

This version of history places the blame for the tensions and violence of the region on the British and, by extension, the Zionists in Palestine whom the British allegedly favored to serve as their colonial agents. By creating artificial borders and working with questionable rulers, the British and French left the region too fractured and unstable to deal with the problems of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Photographs of Islamic State bulldozers eradicating the Sykes-Picot borders graphically show the self-styled Caliphate erasing a shameful past imposed by foreign interference.

The book's thesis that World War I alone is not responsible for the region's many problems is certainly a valid and welcome one. Jewish-Arab tensions, the Sunni-Shia rivalry, and frustrations that bubbled up in the Arab Spring may have root causes dating to the war, but a great deal happened both before and since. Johnson, therefore, makes an important argument in trying to return agency to the Arabs themselves, riven as they were by internal rivalries, differing attitudes toward the British, and an inability to compromise.


Johnson outlines his thesis logically and reasonably in a solidly argued introduction. Having served in the British army in the Middle East, he has a sense of both the continuity and change in the region's endemic conflicts since 1914. He argues that the British came to the Middle East without a clearly articulated strategy to replace the Ottomans. Indeed, it had been British policy until 1915 to keep the Ottoman Empire intact as a bulwark against Russian expansion into the Dardanelles and central Asia. British policy evolved as the war progressed and as various elements of the British government in London, Cairo, and New Delhi, as well as in the field, contended for control.

The remainder of the book, however, is a fairly conventional account of the war in the Middle East, seen almost exclusively from the British perspective. The first chapter is mainly tangential to the arguments so well articulated in the introduction, dealing with the nature of strategy as seen from London in the years immediately prior to the war. The remaining chapters largely follow the major British campaigns from Sinai to Gallipoli to Mesopotamia.

Readers interested in the Gallipoli Campaign will note Johnson's much more sanguine assessment of an effort usually seen as an unmitigated disaster. While acknowledging the campaign's futility on the operational and tactical levels, he defends Gallipoli as a strategic success, relieving pressure on Russia and altering the strategic environment in Mesopotamia and elsewhere on the Ottoman periphery. He is similarly sanguine about the strategic value of Britain's costly advance in Mesopotamia in 1917–18. In both cases, he cites the British need to maintain prestige in the face of its millions of Muslim citizens in India. More depth on this topic would have solidified this part of Johnson's argument.

Specialists will not find much new information in *The Great War & the Middle East*. The book reads best as a survey of major British

campaigns in the region. Johnson recognizes the global context of the war, with decisions made in Russia, the United States, and France all playing key roles in the outcome of the war in the Middle East. He also understands how to employ the standard ends, ways, and means approach to the evaluation of strategy, although he discusses operations and tactics much more often than the subtitle suggests. While the book does not quite reach the potential of its introduction, it does provide a solid military history on a part of the world where the embers of 1914–18 have yet to cool.



Gloucestershire, UK: The History Press, 2015

432 pages

\$35.00

“A Delicate Affair” on the Western Front: America Learns How to Fight a Modern War in the Woëvre Trenches

By Terrence J. Finnegan

Reviewed by Greg Pickell, LTC, US Army (Ret.)

A great deal has been written about the entry of the United States into the latter stages of the First World War. All too often, this coverage takes the form of high-level histories or narrative descriptions of well-known actions like Belleau Wood or Meuse-Argonne. These books are sometimes described as coffee table decorations. *“A Delicate Affair”* is not one of those books. This meticulously researched history of one of the very first US combat actions on the Western Front succeeds in getting below the over-done high-level narrative and “into the trenches.” Author Terrence Finnegan helps readers understand the nightmarish complexity and daunting challenges involved in trench warfare in a way seldom matched in other works on the subject. Hauntingly, his detailed assessment also looks in great detail at the German approach to the action. In doing so, he provides discerning readers much of the conceptual blueprint for the German blitzkrieg seen 22 years later.

A Delicate Affair chronicles the experiences of the US 26th “Yankee” Division as it entered the trenches near the destroyed village of Seicheprey in mid-April 1918. The event was significant. Although other American units entered the trenches before them, the 26th Division was to encounter the first planned German attack specifically focused on testing the mettle of the newly arrived American troops.

Not surprisingly, subsequent events were not kind to the 26th, which was soundly beaten during the course of the engagement. Employing the fruits of years of experience and refined tactics, the assaulting German force succeeded in breaking through the lines on a relatively wide front while taking almost 200 prisoners. Indeed, what the Americans later thought was their success in halting the drive and forcing the Germans back was really little more than a planned German withdrawal following a successful large-scale raid.

The narrative of the 26th aside, *A Delicate Affair* is a significant addition to the body of knowledge on World War I for several reasons. First, the book succeeds in conveying the incredible complexity involved in the movement and activity of any large body of troops. Finnegan then multiplies this challenge by discussing in detail the activities of the 26th before and during the battle. In the end, it becomes clear the myriad of

actions required to employ the men of the 26th effectively was beyond the capability of the inexperienced leadership at the time—and perhaps beyond the means of any army faced with the challenges that confronted the newly arriving Americans.

A second important point made by the author lies in the effective working relationship enjoyed by the Americans and their French counterparts. While the French may not have learned the lessons of trench warfare as comprehensively as their German foes, they had in fact made significant strides, and these lessons were passed on to members of the 26th Division. Cooperation between US and French leaders was similarly close, and stands in significant contrast to the experiences of other American formations as well as the senior US leadership. The close working relationship enjoyed by the soldiers and leaders of the Yankee Division and their French hosts likely prevented the Americans' baptism of fire from being even more painful.

Perhaps the most interesting part of *A Delicate Affair* lies in its presentation of the planning and execution of the attack from the German perspective. Of all the major combatants in the First World War, the German army proved to be the most adaptable, and their attack at Seicheprey employed four years of hard-earned experience. Their tactical use of artillery and mortars in synchronization with assaulting infantry provides a model that remains valid even today. More important was the Germans' use of infiltration tactics. This technique, in which attacking units flowed around and past centers of resistance to achieve dislocation of the defense, can be directly linked to the blitzkrieg tactics used by the German Wehrmacht in the opening stages of the Second World War more than two decades later. This approach, often overlooked by historians due to the differences in speed and scale involved in infantry versus mechanized movements, was completely missed by the French during this period.


A Delicate Affair is what a serious history should be—detailed, comprehensive, and capable of providing answers to root-cause questions that rarely see the light of day. The story of the 26th and the aftermath of the battle may not be the most inspirational ever written, but that is not the point. War is truly hell, and this book is ironically and appropriately less than delicate in making that point. Exhaustively documented with an extensive array of maps, tactical diagrams, and technical data, *A Delicate Affair* is essential reading for leaders seeking a real understanding of World War I in the trenches and the US entry into that fateful conflict.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

**America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise
in the National Security State**

By Linda Weiss

Reviewed by Richard A. Lacquement Jr., Dean, School of Strategic Landpower,
US Army War College, and author of *Shaping American Military Capabilities
after the Cold War*



Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2014
262 pages
\$24.95

America Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State is an important, thought-provoking book that deserves careful attention from both military and civilian strategic-level national security professionals. Dr. Linda Weiss, professor emeritus of comparative politics at the University of Sydney, offers a rich, fascinating, and accessible analysis of one of the most important aspects of American national security prowess—leadership in technological innovation. The implications of her analysis are far-reaching. Reading her book will be especially valuable to anyone engaged in the enterprises of defense management, research, capabilities development, and acquisition.

Weiss argues America's extraordinary success in technological innovation since World War II presents a puzzle other analysts have not adequately explained. In her book, she explores why the United States has been so successful in leading technological innovation for an extended period of history, masterfully weaving together an analysis of US political economy and national security that describes American success since World War II, explains the emergence of various techniques of state and market interplay that produced this success, and speculates about future US prospects to sustain such an impressive record.

Her analysis starts with a major contrast. The United States did not lead technological innovation, particularly in the military realm, by any appreciable margin before World War II. In contrast, since World War II the United States has led technological innovation, often by wide margins, in the areas of atomic energy, missile technology, computers, antibacterial drugs, the Internet, the Global Positioning System, semiconductors, microwave technology, lasers, and jet aircraft. These and many other innovations have been valuable for security and, in many cases, have delivered significant ancillary benefits to society. So, why has the United States been more successful since World War II?

Weiss identifies two prominent explanations common in national security literature that she then challenges. One explanation identifies innovation as a function of the hidden hand of free market capitalism. The other finds the strong hand of government guiding defense spending as a form of national industrial policy. Her close scrutiny demonstrates neither explanation is sufficient, and her more compelling explanation, which she terms "hybridization," runs between:

America's propensity for radical innovation is not a 'stateless' story and free-market capitalism is not how the United States achieved high-technology leadership. Through an extensive array of public-private alliances and innovation hybrids, technology development programs and investment funds, the United States has created not a liberal, but a hybrid political economy—one that is shaped by a national security state deeply entwined with the commercial sector." (195)

The hybridization explanation offers a useful way to consider the potential for continued American success and highlights potential obstacles more clearly. Weiss shows there is no way to explain American technological innovation without attention to the catalytic role of the government and, in particular, the wide-ranging combination of national government entities she terms the "National Security State" or NSS. The NSS role is especially significant in the early, high-risk stages of innovation. It is also important to note other key players in the NSS, in addition to the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, include the Department of Energy (with nuclear power and weapons), the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

American technological innovation benefitted from an array of national laboratories, higher education institutions, and corporations, as well as from a permissive regulatory environment that allowed innovators to benefit from commercial incentives. Examples of key players include universities such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford, Caltech, Carnegie Mellon, and Chicago; federally funded research and development centers such as the Los Alamos National Lab, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Sandia National Laboratories, the Lincoln Laboratory, and the Mitre Corporation; and venture capital investment entities such as the Small Business Investment Company (sponsored by the Small Business Administration) and In-Q-Tel (sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency).

Looking forward, Weiss suggests there is little time for the United States to rest on its laurels. Potential competitors are narrowing the gap in technological capabilities. Her cautionary conclusion suggests a pair of political and economic factors could impede continued US technological innovation (such as the ongoing efforts of the third offset strategy). One factor is a hyperpartisan domestic political environment that may well sunder the bipartisan support that has permitted the success of hybridization (particularly the effective role the state has played in underwriting risk in the name of long-term potential gains) and an economic system fixated on "financialism" that places short-term gains at such a premium that innovative advancements are less likely to flourish at the hands of the market alone.

America Inc.? is not an easy read, but it is nonetheless very accessible. Weiss builds her complex argument carefully and steps readers through it with a steady hand. The political economy of technical innovation is generally not a story of dramatic events and catalytic moments (although the sense of alarm and the subsequent response to the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik is a major exception). Rather, the main story line is about the accretion of choices over decades by many actors and agencies navigating partisan politics and American culture. The argument is

important and nuanced. The overarching history and associated vignettes are fascinating and well chosen. Weiss brings the wisdom derived from decades of study to a complex subject with great force.

The author's argument is an important one for the United States and its allies. Liberal civil society and its complex architecture are often strained in times of crisis by the requirements of national defense. The United States and Great Britain before it have been able to withstand such pressures because of their abilities to find a firebreak, if you will, that limits the magnitude of resource mobilization to counter adversaries. High defense resource demands can be a powerful excuse for clamping down on the inefficiencies and chaotic domestic conflicts at the heart of pluralist, liberal democratic polities and free market economics. For Britain, the most dramatic of firebreaks was the use of a limited portion of its population and resources to build and operate the wooden walls of the Royal Navy that could exploit the geographic advantages of its island location. Similarly, the maintenance of military capabilities strongly enabled by cutting-edge technologies has allowed the United States to limit its resources and the portion of its population devoted to national security. But as threats mount and geography shrinks, the costs of maintaining an effective qualitative advantage become more daunting.

America Inc.? provides trenchant analysis and raises important questions for policymakers and national security professionals to contemplate in linking technological innovation to national security.



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University Press, 2016
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The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science & Technology

By Mark Zachary Taylor

Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

Popular literature has focused on creative individuals (Walter Isaacson's *Innovators*, 2015) and innovative organizations (Schmidt and Rosenberg's *How Google Works*, 2014) in attempts to discern key traits, processes, and cultures that produce the "secret sauce" and lead to success. At the heart of this success is the ability of individuals and organizations to develop and exploit new technologies with phenomenal results. At a higher level of analysis, scholars seek to discern the factors and conditions among nations that support growth in science and technology. Arguably, science and technology fuel the engines of national economies and are linked inextricably to security interests.

One such scholar is Mark Zachary Taylor, a political scientist with a doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His continued interest in technology and the behavior of nations has resulted in several publications on national innovation and political economy—the latest is *The Politics of Innovation*. An associate professor of international affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, Taylor is well equipped to determine "why some countries are better at science and technology."

Taylor is intrigued by the analysis of British historian Donald Cardwell which led to Cardwell's Law: "no nation has been very creative for more than a historically short period. Fortunately, as each leader has

flagged, there has always been, up to now, a nation or nations to take over the torch” (3). Thus, in *The Politics of Innovation*, Taylor examines historical and regional cases of nation-states to test the law and in doing so uncovers his insights. The introductory chapter includes a section, “The American Imperative,” that demonstrates the applicability of Cardwell’s Law to the United States. An obvious inference is the United States is faltering as a leader in innovation and must therefore understand the critical contributing factors in order to regain and sustain its global leadership.

Taylor presents a comprehensive and systematic analysis of international innovation practices, results, and trends. He provides a series of definitions for often-used terms in science, technology, and innovation that enable the use of frameworks and accepted metrics for his wide-ranging examination. One framework is the “five pillars” of innovation—“intellectual property rights, research subsidies, education, research universities, and trade policies” (74)—he uses to scrutinize the performance of countries. In chapter 5, “Why Nations Fail,” and in chapter 6, “How Nations Succeed,” Taylor finds, “domestic institutions and policies do not determine the rate and direction of national inventive activities . . . institutions and policies do influence outcomes, but are not, causal factors” (139) and “successful science and technology states are typified by international networks of trade, finance, production, knowledge, and human-capital flows that play important roles in determining national innovation rates” (178). He also concludes that domestic policies seeking to encourage innovation may have a paradoxical effect of impeding it because of stakeholder resistance; therefore, governmental intervention is necessary to sustain the effort. A major portion of the book focuses on how nations innovate through the use of institutions, policies, and networks. In the end, the interplay of political agendas among powerful members within a society has the greatest impact on national innovation performance.

Taylor introduces the concept of “creative insecurity” to propose why nations innovate. Creative insecurity is “the positive difference between the threats of economic or military competition from abroad and the dangers of political-economic rivalries at home” (13). Taylor’s analysis confirms the use of external threats as the impetus for national-level innovation in both the economic and military domains. While he does not name the military-industrial complex as a major driver and benefactor of research-and-development and science-and-technology programs, he provides several cases where defense funding is viewed as investments that generate innovation spin-offs for civilian use. Because of the potential consequences of state-on-state conflict, he cautions against constructing and contriving external threats for the purpose of creating growth in innovation.

In the United States of the twenty-first century, we have had several calls to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics as education policy and to invest in research and development through economic and defense policies aimed at securing national-level interests. In a November 2014 memorandum, then-US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative, a major component in the development of the Department of Defense Third Offset Strategy. The initiative’s charter is to “pursue innovative ways


to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st century and improve business operations throughout the Department.” Hagel closed the memo with: “America’s continued strategic dominance will rely on innovation and adaptability across our defense enterprise.” For this reviewer, Taylor’s caution about threat narratives rings true—witness current concerns about the emerging power of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the recurring call to regain technological overmatch over potential adversaries.

Parameters readers will be interested in the four-page section “Military Resistance to Innovation” where Taylor asserts:

“Innovation is threatening to military personnel because changes to their technology can sometimes demand changes to long-established strategic doctrines, battlefield tactics, or bureaucratic organizations. Military advancement is built on these things . . . new military technologies can privilege one branch or mission over another, thereby triggering interservice or intraservice rivalries.” (191)

We have seen the introduction of new technologies (e.g., stealth, precision-guided munitions, sensors, cyber, etc.) that have shaped new strategic and operational concepts—and met resistance from many within the US military.

Taylor’s work is well researched, enlightening, and a worthy read. His major contribution offers the lens of political science to the strategic choices nations make in search of competitive advantage in the global environment. National security professionals will recognize this book is about the interaction among the instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—and thus the innovation performance of nations is based ultimately on political decisions. Whether Cardwell’s Law will hold for the United States remains to be seen.



New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015
416 pages
\$27.95

Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars

By Chris Woods

Reviewed by Whitney Grespin, Director of Strategic Studies, Precision Integrated Programs, PhD Candidate, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, and Graduate Teaching Assistant at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College

Public discourse about unmanned aerial systems—drones, colloquially—has proliferated in years past, yet scholarly literature on the topic has only recently begun to accumulate. In *Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars*, Chris Woods documents and assesses the use of armed drones by the United States (and in some cases its close allies).

It is unclear whether the goal of the book is to serve as a thorough historical record or a comprehensive policy prescription. Unfortunately, the book does neither completely. The disjointed chapters largely record the increasing utilization of drones for kinetic missions since 2001 in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as missions further afield in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Interspersed amongst these fragmented vignettes are underdeveloped ruminations on the legal and moral

implications of using the technology in asymmetric warfare to combat nontraditional enemies.

I hoped to be impressed by the book; however, I was generally underwhelmed by its lack of a nuanced understanding of both the individual players as well as the broader game. Coming from the unmanned industry perspective, *Sudden Justice* presents a superficial overview of drone applications. For example, the widely accepted military parlance for drones is less alarmist and articulates what they are—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are the aircraft platforms used as part of a larger unmanned aerial system (UAS), which may be comprised of multiple UAVs, as well as a ground control system, and other launch/recovery equipment or communications devices. The heavy reliance on the word drone triggers visions of nightly news reporting on tragic deaths and their categorization as “collateral damage.”

Adding to the sensationalist tone are myriad anecdotes that capture retrospective criticisms of military and intelligence professionals about lessons learned in the early years of UAS operations. As in any application of new technology in a complex environment, there were many lessons learned from successes, failures, and after-action reports, which form today’s best practices in the field of UAS operations. Historically, these lessons are important to record in this book. Practically, their presentation comes across as condescending criticisms, implying those responsible should have known better or acted otherwise.

Another perspective I found imbalanced was the chapter titled “Game Face On: The Intimacy of Remote Killing.” While Woods presents the issue of killing from afar as a new phenomenon that mental health professionals are struggling to deal with alongside the operator (remote pilot) community, it could instead be compared against the literature on the psychological experiences of sniper teams—“eyes from a hide” versus “eyes from the sky” (all the more relevant given the author referred to an unmanned aircraft as an “aerial sniper rifle”).


In addition to melodramatic tone and word choices, there are also basic factual discrepancies, such as Woods’s reference to the College of William & Mary as “William and Mary University.” Furthermore, at multiple points, Woods muddies the terminology and responsibilities of US Special Forces (a distinct component of the US Army) with broader US Special Operations Forces, while littering the book with superficial and misleading assessments of well-documented, elite military elements, making me question the depth of his understanding about these topics. There are also instances where the relationship between quotes and their endnote citations lacked context or clarity of intent, thus presenting an opportunity for misinterpretation.

Woods also focuses on and criticizes kinetic applications, rather than balancing his commentary with equally in-depth accounting of their vast use as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gathering platforms. While I respect Woods’s background and journalistic bona fides, he bounces back and forth between praising drone technology as “the most precise weapon in the history of warfare” and highlighting failures of the precision and efficacy of drone strikes in the early years of the technology’s use.

If Woods's intent for the book was to issue a call for public demand of increased government accountability and military procedural transparency, then he hit his mark. But he could have done so to a wider audience in an op-ed piece rather than a book. If his intent was to document the history of increased reliance on, and preference for, UAS capabilities, then he would have done well to pick up where Richard Whittle's *Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution* left off. As-is, the book comes across as a disjointed historical record with an inconsistent mix of condemnation and praise of the technology's capabilities.

Is the topic of drone strikes interesting? Yes. Is increased discourse about this public policy issue both important and appropriate? Yes. Does *Sudden Justice* offer both breadth and depth sufficient to be considered an authoritative source to inform all aspects of such discussions? No. Readers may walk away better informed about relevant issues in a general sense, but without a comprehensive understanding and coherent policy perspective on the myriad capabilities of this technology—both kinetic and otherwise—to improve the warfighting advantage for the United States and its allies.

REGIONAL STUDIES: AFRICA



Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2014

212 pages

\$46.95

Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania

By Donovan C. Chau

Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Adjunct Professor, US Army War College, and Professor, International Relations and Comparative Politics, Armstrong State University

In *Exploiting Africa*, Donovan Chau examines China's relations with Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania from the 1950s to the 1970s. He claims China's current official African policy is reminiscent of past Maoist-era policies (148) and the policy is largely based on China's identification as a member of the developing world, or Global South, tied to the African continent by a common sense of historic neglect and subjugation by imperialist forces. Chau believes China's African foreign policy is a "long-term, pragmatic behavior from the very beginning on the continent" (148)—in other words, China's policy has been strictly "über-realist." Viewed from historic and strategic perspectives, China's current presence demonstrates continuity with the past rather than a renewed focus in the present or an altered direction for the future (3).

According to Chau, China's rapprochement toward the African continent from the 1950s to the 1970s, much like its twenty-first-century foreign policy, demonstrated China's desire to achieve superpower status through a primary strategy of resource acquisition. To accomplish this objective, China's diplomatic relations with Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania "used a mix of international political support, tangible development aid, and economic and security assistance, both covert and overt" (4). Given China's central objective of attaining superpower status, Africa, with its

abundance of natural and mineral resources, fit squarely into China's long-term plans and appetite for industrial development.

In addition to traditional means of diplomacy such as trade, commerce, bilateral agreements, and the military, China used domestic and international organizations to advance its political, military, and strategic relations (22). While these government and nongovernmental organizations varied from region to region, they affected tangibly the targeted individuals and organizations (32). The New China News Agency collected and disseminated news at home and abroad (22–23) and was strategically located in countries and regions around the world at a time when China did not maintain official diplomatic relations with many nation-states (23). Another important organization, the Commission for the Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, performed intelligence work and sponsored the exchange of cultural and scientific delegations. Finally, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, promoted solidarity among African and Asian peoples; however, its true objective was to promote anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, both of which were secondary objectives of Communist China (29).

Through three detailed case studies, Chau reviews China's presence in Africa, beginning in 1958 when China became the first country to establish official diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic after its formation by Ferhat Abbas (44). While China provided the newly independent Algeria with economic and military aid, the Chinese used Algeria as a platform for a political message of developing world and international unity (68).

Next, Chau describes China's penetration of Tanzania as a smooth process due to newly elected Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. Diplomatic relations, established in 1962 when China opened its embassy in the capital Dar es Salaam, were rooted in shared imperial and colonial experiences. To further cement their relationship, China and Tanzania in 1965 signed a treaty of friendship and released a joint communique in which Nyerere reaffirmed Tanzania's commitment to Communist China as the only representative of the Chinese people. China's multidimensional activities in Tanzania included political, development, and security projects, including the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority rail line.

Finally, Chau shows how China's early attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Ghana after its independence in 1957 faced opposition from President Kwame Nkrumah. For Nkrumah, it was necessary to "search for African unity" (77) before establishing diplomatic relations. Ghana finally recognized Communist China as a sovereign independent state in July 1960, the second African country to do so. As Chau points out, given Nkrumah's political ideology emulated the thinking of China's Mao Zedong, Ghana became China's base of revolutionary operations "focused mainly on the training and arming of African fighters" (91). Cozy diplomatic relations came to an end in February 1966 when a military coup d'état ousted Nkrumah. China and Ghana did not reestablish diplomatic relations until 1972.

In the twenty-first century, China is attempting to ascend to its rightful place among the world's superpowers by securing its economic

needs—an ascendancy which began with the pragmatic moderates who came to power under Deng Xiaoping and the establishment of China's special economic zones. Political commentators and pundits assume China is pursuing a realist foreign policy, however, as Chau shows, “today China is actively seeking opportunities of influence on the continent [of Africa] by using the same general strategic approach as it did in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s” (148). While China's actions in world affairs are still driven by revolutionary ideals, Chinese leaders prioritize strategic objectives over ideological pursuits. China wants to offer the world an alternative to the Washington Consensus with its strict laundry list of rules, regulations, and obligations that are imposed upon the developing world. Instead, the Beijing Consensus does not care what kind of government or leadership a nation-state embraces as long as the nation-state is willing to trade with China and recognize there is only one China representative of the Chinese people.

Exploiting Africa makes a valuable contribution to understanding China's past involvement and continued presence in Africa. I highly recommend this book to readers interested in world politics, international affairs, and political science—and, most importantly, to current and future military leaders.



Quantico, VA: Marine
Corps University Press,
2016
239 pages
Free

The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century

Edited by Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov

Reviewed by LTC (P) Jason B. Nicholson, Foreign Area Officer for Sub-Saharan Africa

In *The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century*, editors Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov present select case studies on contemporary African security issues. Bringing together scholars and practitioners, this volume specifically addresses the types of problems most likely to involve the United States and its allies and partners—either directly or indirectly. Broadly organized into three sections, the book's eight chapters explore the challenges faced by African states posed by modernity, ethnic conflict, and violent Islamic extremism.

The first section considers the impacts and opportunities offered by the Arab Spring for northwest African jihadist movements. In chapter one, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross explores Tunisia's hesitant policy of accommodation and confrontation with extremists that facilitated their ability to survive and expand operationally following the collapse of the regime led by dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. In chapters two and three, both Celso and Henri Boré examine the French-led intervention to drive al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies out of northern Mali in 2013 and suggest how this conflict informed potential future regional counterterrorism operations.

The second section evaluates civil wars and the transition from rebel groups to government. Reviewing the Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Rwandan civil wars in chapter four, Ian S. Spears describes how victorious rebel factions consolidated and legitimized their rule. In chapter five, Robert

E. Gribbin analyzes the Rwandan genocide's myriad effects upon society and the government's response to those challenges in the first five years after the killing stopped. France and Libya's interventions in Chad from the 1960s to the 1990s are examined by Nalbandov in chapter six, demonstrating the role of conflict continuation and peacemaking failure as by-products of external power proxy conflicts during civil war.

The last section highlights the cumulative consequences of the social, political, and security problems identified in the earlier sections. Clarence J. Bouchat discusses Nigeria as a microcosm of the structural challenges facing African states in their attempts to provide legitimate and peaceful means of political conflict resolution for their often highly diverse populations. The summary chapter by Celso and Nalbandov suggests that while Africa's political problems are substantial, the singular case studies demonstrate successful solutions are possible if domestic political elites create functional institutions to allocate resources equitably, protect minorities, and govern legitimately.

The political processes discussed throughout the book, such as modernization and democratization, imply winning and losing as outcomes. Identity formation through nationalism is often accompanied by ethnic cleansing and violence to establish in- and out-group identities upon which to base societal resource distribution resulting from greater productivity. Political development of the nation-state is deeply shaped by the effects of industrialization upon identity construction. War, particularly ethnic conflicts in nonindustrialized societies, also plays a causal role in identity formation.

These themes make further study of African political dynamics relevant because they are directly related to the authors' discussions of globalization, tribalism, and jihadism. The "fourth wave" of democratization accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites may now be superseded by a "fifth wave." Some of the last Cold War regimes are in Africa (Tunisia and Egypt) and the Middle East (Iraq and Syria). The political forces present in these states apart have also been slowly emerging in sub-Saharan Africa where other remaining Cold War vestigial regimes continue to exist.

Contemporary conflicts in the Middle East have assumed an ethnic dimension suggestive of the forces of nationalism and identity formation. The political unraveling of the Cold War order in the Balkans during the fourth wave of democratization also resulted in highly destructive ethnic conflicts. Political, defense, and security policymakers should read *The Crisis of the African State* as indicative of the problems confronting weak states that govern ethnically diverse populations in Africa. These challenges possess the potential to activate populations politically in ways they have not been mobilized previously. Understanding the root causes of such conflicts facilitates addressing them now through sustained engagement with African nations to develop legitimate, representative, and democratic institutions that can withstand the strains imposed by inevitable further development of the continent.

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- Scope:** The manuscript addresses strategic issues regarding US defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare. Visit our website (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/) to gain a better understanding of our current editorial scope.
- Audience:** US Army War College graduates and other senior military officers as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.
- Clearance:** If you are a member of the US military or a civilian employee of the Department of Defense or one of its service departments, your manuscript may require official clearance (see AR 360-1, ch. 6). Contact your local Public Affairs Office for assistance.
- Concurrent Submissions:** The manuscript is not under consideration with other publishers and has not been published elsewhere, including on the Internet.

Formatting Requirements

- Length:** 5,000 words or less.
- File Type and Layout:** MS Word Document (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf) file; Times New Roman, 12-point font; double-spaced; 1-inch margins.
- Visual Aids:** Only include charts, graphs, and photographs when they are essential to clarify or amplify the text. Images must be grayscale, a minimum of 640 x 480 pixels, and submitted in their original file format (.tiff or .jpg). It is not sufficient to submit images embedded in a .doc or .rtf file.
- Citations:** Document sources as footnotes. Indicate all quoted material by quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy explanatory footnotes are discouraged and will be edited. *Parameters* generally uses the conventions prescribed in the *Chicago Manual of Style*.

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 - 1 March – Summer
 - 1 June – Autumn
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
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